Overview of prisons policy 1994-2002

1. Overview of prisons policy 1994-2002 Introduction • Impetus: Green Paper in development, need for overview of policy trends since the 1994 White Paper • New ‘team at the top’ • Jali Commission has sparked public interest • Identifying roads wrongly taken can

2. Overview of prisons policy 1994-2002 • Hopefully eliminate errors of the past • Report does not tackle overcrowding issue: (1) other initiatives are dealing with overcrowding (2) where sentences are increasing, remedy lies in comprehensive sentencing reform, not policy review

3. Overview of prisons policy 1994-2002 (3) Court management (to reduce time spent awaiting trial) is a practice issue, policy review cannot add much. (4) Overcrowding is also normal and to an extent predictable – the Green Paper will have to be developed within current level of serious (and worsening)overcrowding

4. Overview of prisons policy 1994-2002 (5)The overcrowding refrain cannot excuse bad management, corruption, poor planning and so forth.

5. Overview of prisons policy 1994-2002 Limitations • Key policy areas were selected - the review is not exhaustive • Selection was based on significance, long term implications, or importance for correctional practice

6. Overview of prisons policy 1994-2002 Background • The paper provides a brief overview of the White Paper of 1994, concluding that it did not provide a coherent blueprint for transformation and development • Policy changes that have ensued cannot (mostly) be linked at all to the White Paper

7. Overview of prisons policy 1994-2002 • Key determinant was obviously role played by previous Minister, heavily influenced by USA trends • Also the strained relations between the Minister and the Portfolio Committee chair (separate study is being conducted on role of the Portfolio Committee for CSPRI)

8. Overview of prisons policy 1994-2002 • Series of Commissioners followed, after Sithole’s departure all in care taker positions, until appointment of Commissioner Mti in August 2001 • Since 1994 prison conditions have worsened, and public is not convinced that a crisis situation has been reached

9. Overview of prisons policy 1994-2002 1.Demilitarisation • Occurred after grudging concession in the 1994 White Paper • Badly communicated internally, and scant attention paid to how it would take place • Implementation was crude, caused turmoil • Retraining and reskilling only commenced in 2001, and has been of limited reach and scope

10. Overview of prisons policy 1994-2002 • Most agree demilitarisation has been responsible for a host of other ills in DCS: lax discipline, absenteeism, poor labour relations environment, corruption etc. • Portfolio Committee informed in May 2000 that uniforms would be reintroduced. • The design was already set, but the PC raised

11. Overview of prisons policy 1994-2002 • Concerns that it was too militaristic looking. • Although the PC wanted further briefings on this, it did not occur. • uniforms were introduced from April 2002. • They are arguably very reminiscent of military uniforms (colour, insignia etc) • Although denied, it does seem as if clock

12. Overview of prisons policy 1994-2002 • Has turned back. • Conclusion: identifiable rank seems to be very important for effective DCS management • However, response to the effects of demilitarisation was tardy (6 years), and new khakhi uniforms represent a lost opportunity

13. Overview of prisons policy 1994-2002 2. New modes of prison governance: unit management and privatisation Unit Management • Concept entails that officers become actively involved in day to day supervision – not merely responsible for physical needs, also “change agent” • Requires accommodation in smaller units

14. Overview of prisons policy 1994-2002 • Unit management not mentioned in the1994 White Paper, chosen after study tours to the USA in 1996 • Not referred to in 1998 DSC Annual Report, but 1999-2000 report says unit management was to be piloted in 27 prisons • Next report more cautious- refers to introduction in the 2 new prisons (Malmesbury and Goodwood), decision taken to expand to 3 prisons in each province

15. Overview of prisons policy 1994-2002 • At face value, unit management seems more beneficial – ie positive development • But needs major re-orientation of staff, and question persists whether unit management can be implemented in old style “cattle sheds” • Also unclear if common understanding of the concept exists in DCS

16. Overview of prisons policy 1994-2002 • Not clear if proper research has underpinned the seemingly positive spin off’s from unit management • In 2000-2001, 550 officers trained in unit management – still very limited roll out, thus. • But “New Generation” prisons premised on unit management, so seems to be a permanent feature of DCS policy.

17. Overview of prisons policy 1994-2002 • Privatisation • Originally explored as part of prison building programme – overcrowding to be addressed through rapid acquisition of new facilities • Clearly influenced by Minister Mzimela’s affinity for USA practices • Fullest form of privatisation engaged (APOPS)

18. Overview of prisons policy 1994-2002 • Initially announced that 7 facilities would be procured, but 2 eventually built and commissioned in 2001 (Mangaung) and 2002 (Louis Trichardt) • Process was secretive, extremely rapid (contracts ready and tenders awarded before the legislation permitting private prisons had been tabled),

19. Overview of prisons policy 1994-2002 • And not clear why maximum prisons were selected, as opposed to juvenile or minimum facilities • Questions did come up in Parliament about the involvement of the ANC Youth League in one bid – raised serious doubts about the transparency of the process

20. Overview of prisons policy 1994-2002 • DCS officials involved in negotiations all left after tenders awarded to take up positions with the successful bidders – again suspicions exist about integrity of the process • Now, clear that the contracts are unaffordable – projected that by 2005/5 the APOPS prisons will cost R538 Million per annum, and budget for 2003 is 6% of total DCS budget (more than the entire allocation for rehabilitation of prisoners).

21. Overview of prisons policy 1994-2002 • Contractors are earning 29% and 25% return on capital respectively • Actual total projected costs over the 25 year term must still be calculated (billions?) • Task team (including DCS and treasury) has completed report and presented to the portfolio committee

22. Overview of prisons policy 1994-2002 • Conclusions: • Contracts “unwise”, and treasury at the time advised against transaction but was ignored • Contracts must be renegotiated so that affordable and unrealistic profits eliminated • DSC spokesperson told PC directly that there was illegality (ie corruption) in the tender process

23. Overview of prisons policy 1994-2002 • Although PC suggested corruption should be investigated when told of this, no evidence of such investigation has surfaced • Any corruption by officials or former officials (including the possibility of indirect benefits) should be investigated and pursued as a matter of national priority

24. Overview of prisons policy 1994-2002 • Further, the task team should report urgently on status of renegotiations, and expected timeline for completion • Finally, broader context of the recent privatisation of juvenile facilities (4 so far) should be born in mind if future privatised prisons are planned.

25. Overview of prisons policy 1994-2002 (3) New models of prisons design: C Max, Kokstad and new generation prisons • 1. C Max • Influenced again by USA bias of previous Minister • Originally opened in Pretoria, but widely publicised was intention to create more

26. Overview of prisons policy 1994-2002 • Attracted much publicity due to the harsh regime, and lack of clarity as to who “qualified” for C max classification • Also very expensive for DCS (very high staff requirements) • C Max programme was deprioritised by new Commissioner in 2001

27. Overview of prisons policy 1994-2002 • 2. Kokstad (supermaximum prison) • Obvious Ministerial involvement in the site selection in rural KZN • No impact analysis or land survey preceded site/town selection: site is too steep to allow food to be served • The food is transported from a local prison (

28. Overview of prisons policy 1994-2002 • Newly built, with an extra large kitchen) 10 km away • Completion was seriously delayed as water system of Kokstad was insufficient to accommodate a prison with more than the total inhabitants of the town • Building costs were unusually high, and ran

29. Overview of prisons policy 1994-2002 • 155% over budget (steep descending passages to accommodate the slope, and using vast quantities of bricks) • Very high tech – no keys, hugely expensive doors • Many rumours of corruption in the contracts surfaced

30. Overview of prisons policy 1994-2002 • Now, due to strict admission criteria, DCS is battling to find suitably “bad eggs” to fill prison (with accommodation for about 1400, as at August only 400 odd inmates) • Again, Kokstad was a questionable policy decision that did not pan out the way it was envisaged.

31. Overview of prisons policy 1994-2002 • 3. “New generation prisons” • Concept developed under the present Minister, with his special advisor and an architect from abroad – taking ownership of prison building away from the Dept of Public Works • Expansion of 30 000 beds by 2005 planned

32. Overview of prisons policy 1994-2002 • New generation prison = prototype (smaller or bigger prisons can be built through adding on units • Significant local content brief, black economic empowerment objectives, low tech, people (not technology) focussed security, low maintenance were the requirements

33. Overview of prisons policy 1994-2002 • Costs of the prototype estimated at 1/3 of costs of a comparable new facility ( eg Empangeni prison, opened 2002) • Originally suggested first new generation prison would open in November 2002, but it is now predicted at November 2003 in Nigel

34. Overview of prisons policy 1994-2002 • Conclusions • Welcome features of this policy:- • (1) local content • (2) low technology requirements • (3) focus on the fate of the ordinary prisoner • BUT • The proof lies in the pudding!The jury must remain out until implementation has been fully analysed.

35. Overview of prisons policy 1994-2002 4.Non-custodial sentencing and issues relating to release of prisoners 4.1 Non-custodial sentencing • In practice, low take up rate – currently proceeding from a low base • Suspicion from the bench • Much correctional supervision is DCS initiated, not imposed as an original sentence

36. Overview of prisons policy 1994-2002 • Concerns about lack of staff to monitor, inadequate management of Correctional supervision, widespread abscondment of persons under supervision • Previous commissioner told PC that Correctional supervision as a joke! • Conclusion: in policy and practice,

37. Overview of prisons policy 1994-2002 • Correctional supervision has played a backseat role in policy making and implementation; comprises smaller percentage of the budget than the 2 private prisons • One reason may be the pilot on electronic monitoring tested in 1997 – successfully reducing costs and improving monitoring evidently

38. Overview of prisons policy 1994-2002 • Recommendations in the full policy report include thorough research on the effectiveness of community corrections as sentences • Corruption must be avoided in any contracts related to electronic monitoring that may materialise

39. Overview of prisons policy 1994-2002 • 4.2 Release • Negative public responses to amnesties and early releases have occurred • The effect on prison overcrowding has been very temporary • Recommendation:the focus must remain on long term transformation

40. Overview of prisons policy 1994-2002 (5) Legislation and sentencing policy • New Act approved in 1998, broad agreement that it meets appropriate human rights needs for SA prisons • BUT • Not yet in operation!

41. Overview of prisons policy 1994-2002 • Various reasons for the delay (approaching 5 years) have been adduced, including drafting regulations, some internal opposition to the Act, and “environmental accommodation” (eg serving meals three times a day). • PC played low key role. Regulations were evidently handed out to them in November 2002, but in March 2003, no one remembered or had read them • Now concluded, so process of promulgation must be pushed!!!

42. Overview of prisons policy 1994-2002 • Conclusions: • (1)Regulations will play a powerful role in fleshing out the human rights entitlements of prisoners and civil society should engage with their content • (2)All should lobby for the promulgation of the 1998 Act

43. Overview of prisons policy 1994-2002 • 5.2 Sentencing policy • Most significant development is increased use of long term sentences – through increased jurisdiction given courts, introduction of minimum sentences, and ballooning “tariff” caused by community pressure. • SALC Report on Sentencing (2000) has no “Driver”, and lengthy periods elapse between releasing

44. Overview of prisons policy 1994-2002 • SALC reports and the finalisation of legislation anyway. • Conclusions: • Sentencing reform is an urgent priority, but must be dealt with sensitively by civil society • The focus should, at present, be on promoting effective alternative sentencing

45. Overview of prisons policy 1994-2002 • (6) Restorative Justice • Introduced by Minister as a ‘key priority’ of DCS in 2001 • Links clearly to efforts to introduce rehabilitative policy (as opposed to mine shafts) • Unclear whether paradigm shift has had any measurable impact internally or externally

46. Overview of prisons policy 1994-2002 • Most recent orientation focuses on the term “corrections” rather than restorative justice: are these co-terminous? Or in tension? Is there a common understanding of the theory(ies) of restorative justice? • No actual training in restorative justice techniques (eg victim- offender encounters) appears to have taken place

47. Overview of prisons policy 1994-2002 • Conclusions: • If restorative justice is to be sustained, far better communication (eg about it’s content) is needed (especially within DCS) • At present, seems to be yet another policy shift, feted and lauded without much substance

48. Overview of prisons policy 1994-2002 • DCS should also bolster their position by conducting/commissioning research to show whether restorative justice does address victim needs, and whether it promotes reintegration.

49. Overview of prisons policy 1994-2002 • (7) Overall role of DCS within government • Corrections accorded minimalistic role in 1995 National Crime Prevention Strategy • No mention in the 1996 Constitution • Serious tension from the outset as a result of the friction between the previous Minister and the PC Chairperson

50. Overview of prisons policy 1994-2002 • Vision for much of the 1990’s was focussed on security and preventing escapes • Thus, DCS appeared to have a marginal place in crime reduction and prevention (even restorative justice philosophy sets DCS apart from other govt department in the security cluster)