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A Future Oriented Approach to China-Japan Relations. For A talk at Sagamore Institute, 26 March 2013 Shunji Cui Fulbright Scholar-in-Residence, 2012-13 Marian University. A Future Oriented Approach to China-Japan Relations.
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A Future Oriented Approach to China-Japan Relations For A talk at Sagamore Institute, 26 March 2013 Shunji Cui Fulbright Scholar-in-Residence, 2012-13 Marian University
A Future Oriented Approach to China-Japan Relations The Current State of China-Japan Relations – Tensions over East China Sea Disputes Why It Has Proved to be So Difficult? ‘The Drums of War’ or Can it be Avoided? How do China and Japan Move towards a Future Oriented Direction?
Fishing Platform/Pinnacle Islands钓鱼台列屿 / 尖閣列島 Diaoyu/Senkaku (D/S) Islands • A chain of tiny 8 islands • 5 uninhabitable islands, • 3 barren rocks • All are volcanic formations from the Neocene age • Largest Island • 钓鱼台Diaoyutai (S) • 鱼钓岛Uotsurisima(J) • surface area: 3.5 skm.
Geographical Location 120 nautical miles northeast of Taiwan 200 nm east of PRC 200 nm southwest of Naha, Okinawa
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea,1982 • Territorial Waters– 12nm • The sovereign territory of the state • But foreign ships (both military and civilian) are allowed innocent passage through it • Exclusive Economic Zone—200nm • Control of all economic resources, including fishing, mining, oil exploration, and any pollution of those resources.
D/S Island Disputes: Downward Spirals? 2012-9-11: Japan’s “nationalization” of 3 of the Islands Followed by Chinese maritime surveillance ships entering into disputed waters – even within 12nm Small aircraft of China’s State Oceanic Bureau flew into airspace over the D/S Japan deploying Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) Global Times (China) argued: “we need to prepare for the worst”, if Japan not be deterred. Situation worse than 2005 Possible War?
Why It Has Proved to be So Difficult? Conflictual Claims Political & Emotional
Japan’s Claim: I 1885~: 10-y survey, terra nullius (land without owner) 1895-1-14: Meiji Cabinet’s decision to incorporate the islands into Japanese territory actual control. 1896-4-1: Placed under the administration of Ishigaki, Yaeyama District, Okinawa Prefecture 1895-4-17: Signing the Treaty of Shimonoseki 1895-5: the Treaty came to effect.
Japan's Claim: After WWII • 1951: The San Francisco Treaty (US-J) • Japan renounced claims to a number of territories and islands including Taiwan • the Nansei Shoto (Nansei islands) came under US trusteeship • 1971: the Okinawa reversion deal • Nansei Shoto returned to Japan • The islands are under Japan’s control • No disputes over the Islands • China is just for oil
China’s Claim: Historical 1 • Not terra nullius , but have been part of its territory since ancient times. • Historical Records: • 1430, 顺风相送(Fair winds for escort), earliest, a non-official Chinese navigational record. • 1534, 使琉球录, earliest official record of the Imperial Envoy's Visit to Ryūkyū. • Those islands served as important fishing grounds administered by the province of Taiwan.
China’s Claim: Historical 2 • 1874: Japan took Ryukyu Islands • Japan took Ryukyu Islands (Okinawa) from China by force when Chinese Qing Dynasty was involved in several wars with other foreign countries • However, the Diaoyu Islands still remained under the administration of Taiwan, a part of China. • 1895: The Treaty of Shimonoseki • After being defeated by Japan in the Sino-Japan War (1894-95), China ceded Taiwan to Japan under the Shimonoseki Treaty. • As a part of Taiwan, the Diaoyutai Islands belonged to Japan at that time.
China’s Claim: after WWII • Cairo Declaration (1943) & Potsdam Proclamation (1945) • Taiwan was returned to China at the end of World War II • The Japanese government accepted the terms that stated in these documents "...that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria and Formosa(Taiwan) shall be restored to the Republic of China.” • Thus, deny the effects of 1951 San Francisco Treaty (US-J).
Difficulty II: Sovereignty and Beyond • Japan: • Actual Control – No sovereign Issue • Concern of Okinawa • China’s Rise, perceived assertiveness, and threat • China: • Emotional – reminding its weakness and humiliation, and Historical injustice in modern history. • Vulnerable to Nationalist sentiments • US Asian Policy
Shared Interests in Deescalating Their Relations • Economic Impacts (by the end of 2012): • Nissan’s sales in China have fallen 5.3 % to 1.18 million units, • Toyota’s by 4.9 % to 840,000 units, • Japanese direct investment in China fell by almost a third – (ASEAN looking for opportunity) • Tourism –(2012-9-21) • ANA: nearly 4,000 Japanese canceled their plans to visit China. • The Japanese National Tourist Association: 20% drop in numbers visiting Japan from China
Japanese car sales inChinain 2012 Source: China Daily 2013-1-8
Shared Willingness and Efforts Natsuo Yamaguchi’s meeting with Xi Jinping (in Beijing, 2013-1). The eighth Tokyo-Beijing Forum (in Tokyo, July 2, 2012). Dialogue on D/S Island disputes (in HZ, 2012-10) The International Politics of East Asia and the East China Sea (in Hangzhou, China, December 14-15, 2012) To Japan-China Dialogue: Toward a Future Oriented Japan-China Relationship (in Tokyo, Jnuary 23-24, 2013). Strong calling for ‘wisdom’ in settling territorial disputes
What Can be Done for A Future Oriented Relations? Managing the Disputes Managing the Great Power Relations Enhancing People-to-People Relations
1. Managing the Disputes • Understand/Accept the New Reality • China: Japan’s nationalization of Islands • Japan: existing disputes over sovereignty • Shelving the dispute & Searching for joint cooperation • Fishing; Energy • No entry into disputed area • Set up ‘hot lines’ to prepare for contingency • Establish UN Environmental Protection Areas
‘Japan and China have struck a deal for the joint development of a gas field in the East China Sea, resolving a protracted bilateral dispute.’BBC, 18 June 2008 China: Chunxiao Gas Field
2. Managing the Great Power Relations • China: • Clear vision of regional/global governance • Stronger demonstration of its Peaceful rise • Japan: • Accepting China’s rise • US • Policy of pivot Asia: accommodating China
3. Enhancing People-to-People Relations • China-Japan: move beyond history – forward looking • Reconciliation • Kim Dae-jung examples • Constructing Friendly Relations • Cross-Strait Example • Identity among people in Taiwan