140 likes | 268 Views
South Asian Strategic Stability Institute, annual meeting 2006. IAEA Experiences and roles the Nuclear Security Plan 2006-2009. Anita Nilsson Director, Office of Nuclear Security. Main Threats of Nuclear Terrorism. A nuclear explosive device Theft of device
E N D
South Asian Strategic Stability Institute, annual meeting 2006 IAEA Experiences and roles the Nuclear Security Plan 2006-2009 Anita Nilsson Director, Office of Nuclear Security
Main Threats of Nuclear Terrorism • A nuclear explosive device • Theft of device • Theft of material to make a device • Radiological Dispersal Device • Theft of radioactive material • Sabotage for dispersal • A nuclear facility/location • Transport
The Dual Use Aspect Dilemma: • Peaceful uses of nuclear technologies are essential for development, and of vital importance in our daily lives • Nuclear weapons require nuclear materials, produced with similar or the same physics and chemical processes I.E.: The same processes may have peaceful and military applications Thus, making available of nuclear technologies to all non-nuclear weapons States for peaceful purposes, is balanced by States obligations as regards peaceful uses.
Global Security EvolutionCold War -Post Cold War - Post 9/11 Main Players • Nation-states • Bi-polar • Superpowers • Non-States • Small states • Global network Threats • Low density, low intensity • Higher probability • Socio - psychological terror • High density, high intensity • Lower Probability • Physical overkill • Geopolitical • Predictable • Calculable • Malicious • Unpredictable • Incalculable Motives
Global Nuclear Security Regime • Nuclear Safeguard – Non-proliferation • Nuclear Security – Counter Terrorism • Nuclear Safety – Technical Accident Prevention Holistic Approach Safeguard Safeguard Safety Security Safety Security
National requirements (laws and regulations) and policy SCR 1540 obliges States to establish effective monitoring to detect trafficking in nuclear materials CPPNM requires States to ensure physical protection of nuclear material in international nuclear transport CPPNM requires States to cooperate to return nuclear material seized in trafficking Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of radioactive sources includes guides on export/import control for radioactive sources Legal basis to combat illicit trafficking
Basic approaches for international efforts to strengthen nuclear (and radiological) security • Responsibility for nuclear and radiological security rests with each individual State. • “Nuclear, and radiological, terrorism is one of the greatest threats to society.” • The building of infrastructure to combat nuclear terrorism is in the beginning; efforts must be accelerated to catch up with the need to strengthen prevention against such acts. • The IAEA has an important role in the global efforts to improve the global nuclear security framework and for promoting its implementation. • “New” recognition of the need of broad approaches and of synergies between security, safety and safeguards. • Establish international cooperation while maintaining confidentiality of sensitive information.
The platform of legal instruments • Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (Amended in 2005) • >110 States (and Euratom) Parties. • Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism • >100 States signatories • Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols • Several States have yet to sign and ratify the Additional Protocol. • UN Security Council Resolutions1540 and 1374 • Obligations are binding for all States. • Nuclear Safety Conventions • Non-binding Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources
Comprehensive Nuclear Security Approach Information data-banks, Illicit Trafficking Database, analysis of information, programme feed-back Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plans, Interaction with general public. Needs assessment, analysis and information Security Infrastructure Maintaining confidentiality of information Prevention Accountancy, SSAC, registry of sources (first line of defence) Physical protection Detection and Monitoring, interdiction and seizure Threat assessment and response Detection & Response Law Enforcement, intelligence (second line of defence) Mitigation and Recovery Radiological Event Radiological emergency response Nuclear Security Support (Knowledge Base, Legal Framework)
Modalities of implementation • Nuclear security framework: The IAEA Nuclear Security Series with guidance documents • Services: Missions for evaluation and assessments; technical advice • Human resource development • Technical assistance; urgently needed technical improvement; equipment • Research and development (CRP)
Human resource development IAEA - Pakistan cooperation programme • Combating illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials • Security of radioactive sources • Physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities; objectives and principles • Incident and radiological emergency responses • Maintaining confidentiality of sensitive information
Interacting with International Organizations • Cooperation and joint projects: • Providing analysis, support to and co-sponsor of IAEA technical guidance. • Convening joint meetings on CBRN issues. • Sharing of relevant information (within respective mandates), enhanced analytical efforts • Joint work on combating illicit nuclear trafficking • Partner International Organizations • International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) • European Police Office (Europol) • Universal Postal Union (UPU) • World Customs Organization (WCO) • Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) • Institute for Transuranium Elements (ITU) • United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) • United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI)
Concluding remarks • The implementation of the strengthened platform of international legal instruments is a very significant step forward and a challenge. • Increased coordination and cooperation is required, as well as education, training, detection equipment, scientific support and information analysis and feedback. • Reality shows that continued efforts are required to combat illicit nuclear trafficking • States efforts to control and combat trafficking in radioactive materials could/should be paired with efforts to combat trafficking in sensitive nuclear equipment • IAEA to maintain a leading role in the global efforts to improve global nuclear (and radiological) security and is strengthening international coordination.