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The Chernobyl Forum Vienna International Center; Vienna, Austria; September 6 th , 2005. Recommendations to the G overnments of Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukra n i a on environmental monitoring, remediation and research. Summary by.
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The Chernobyl Forum Vienna International Center; Vienna, Austria; September 6th, 2005 Recommendations to the Governments of Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukrania on environmental monitoring, remediation and research.Summary by Abel J. González Autoridad Regulatoria Nuclear; Av. Del Libertador 8250; Buenos Aires; Argentina +54 1163231306; agonzale@sede.arn.gov.ar
Significant radionuclides IODINE (THYROID GLAND) CAESIUM (WHOLE BODY EXPOSURE)
Environmental monitoring and research • Environmental transfer and bioaccumulation of 137Cs and 90Sr are now well understood • Little need for major new research programmes • Requirement for continued but more limited targeted monitoring of the environments
Environmental monitoring and research Long term monitoring of 137Cs and 90Sr) is required to: (Practical) • To assess levels of human exposure and contamination of foods to determine the need for remedial actions; • To inform the general publicaboutthe radioactive contamination in food products and its seasonal and annual variability in natural food products as well as give dietary advice.
Environmental monitoring and research Long term monitoring of 137Cs and 90Sr) is required to: (Scientific) • To determine parameters of long-term transfer of radionuclides in various ecosystems and different natural conditions to improve predictive models; • To determine mechanisms of radionuclide behaviour in less studied ecosystems (e.g., role of fungi in the forest).
Remediation and countermeasures • Different effective long-term remediation measures are available, • but their use should be justified and optimized. • The general public should be informed and involved in the decision-making process.
mSv/year NATURAL BACKGROUND VERY HIGH 100 10 1 100 10 1 INTERVENTION ALMOST ALWAYS JUSTIFIABLE EXTANT ANNUAL DOSE INTERVENTION MAY POSSIBLY BE JUSTIFIABLE TYPICALLY HIGH INTERVENTION IS NOT LIKELY TO BE JUSTIFIABLE AVERAGE
Remediation and countermeasures • Remediation measures on radiocaesium in soilmay be justified in agricultural areas with sandy and peaty soils where there might be a high transfer from soil to plants.
Remediation and countermeasures Efficient regular agricultural countermeasures are: • Radical improvement of pastures and grasslands as well as draining of wet peaty areas may be an effective remediation measure • Enhanced application of mineral fertilisers in plant breeding, application of Prussian Blue to cattle and pre-slaughter clean feeding accompanied with in-vivo monitoring.
Remediation and countermeasures • There are still agricultural areas in the three countries which are out of use. However this land can be safely used after appropriate remediation.
Remediation and countermeasures • Restricting harvesting of wild food products such as game, berries, mushrooms and fish from ‘closed lakes’ by the public may still be needed.
Remediation and countermeasures • It is unlikely that any future countermeasures to protect surface waters will be justifiable. • Restrictions on consumption of fish may remain in a few closed lakes.
137Cs activity concentrations inpredatory Pike fish from Kiev reservoirs Codex level
Codex level 137Cs activity concentrations in non-predatory Breamfish from Kiev reservoirs
Remediation and countermeasures • Particular attention must be given to the production of milk where 137Cs concentration may exceed action levels.
137Cs activity concentration in milk Codex level
…radionuclides released during the accident might be incorporated into materials, goods, merchandises, products…
…and, in general, into any “commodity” of public use.
September 2000: IAEA General Conference, following a request from Belarus, decided the development of radiological criteria for radionuclides in commodities.
Board of GovernorsGeneral Conference GOV/2004/54-GC(48)/8Date: 30 July 2004 General DistributionOriginal: English For official use only Item 3(c) of the Board's provisional agenda(GOV/2004/51)Item 13 of the Conference's provisional agenda(GC(48)/1) Measures to Strengthen International Co-operation in Nuclear, Radiation and Transport Safety and Waste Management Radiological Criteria for Radionuclides in Commodities Report by the Director General
Radionuclides Level (Bq/g) I-129 0.01 Na-22; Sc-46; Mn-54; Co-56; Co-60; Zn-65; Nb-94; Ru-106; Ag-110m; Sb-125; Cs-134; Cs-137; Eu-152; Eu-154; Ta-182; Bi-207; Th-229; U-232; Pu-238; Pu-239; Pu-240; Pu-242; Pu-244; Am-241; Am-242m; Am-243; Cm-245; Cm-246; Cm-247; Cm-248; Cf-249; Cf-251; Es-254 0.1 C-14; Na-24; Cl-36; Sc-48; V-48; Mn-52; Fe-59; Co-57; Co-58; Se-75; Br-82; Sr-85; Sr-90; Zr-95; Nb-95; Tc-96; Tc-99; Ru-103; Ag-105; Cd-109; Sn-113; Sb-124; Te-123m; Te-132; Cs-136; Ba-140;La-140;Ce-139; Eu-155; Tb-160; Hf-181; Os-185; Ir-190; Ir-192; Tl-204; Bi-206; Th-232 1, U-233; U-235 2; U-238 3 Np-237; Pu-236; Cm-243; Cm-244; Cf-248; Cf-250; Cf-252; Cf-254 1 Be-7; F-18; Cl-38; K-40; K-43; Ca-47; Mn-51; Mn-52m; Mn-56; Fe-52; Co-55; Co-62m; Ni-65; Zn-69m; Ga-72; As-74; As-76; Sr-91; Sr-92; Zr-93; Zr-97; Nb-93m; Nb-97; Nb-98; Mo-90; Mo-93; Mo-99; Mo-101; Tc-97; Ru-97; Ru-105; Cd-115; In-111; In-114m; Sn-125; Sb-122; Te-127m; Te-129m; Te-131m; Te-133; Te-133m; Te-134; I-126; I-130; I-131; I-132; I-133; I-134; I-135; Cs-129; Cs-132; Cs-138; Ba-131; Ce-143; Ce-144; Gd-153; W-181; W-187; Pt-191; Au-198; Hg-203; Tl-200; Tl-202; Pb-203; Po-203; Po-205; Po-207; Ra-225; Pa-230; Pa-233; U-230; U-236; Np-240; Pu-241; Cm-242; Es-254m 10 H-3; S-35; K-42; Ca-45; Sc-47; Cr-51; Mn-53; Co-61; Ni-59; Ni-63; Cu-64; Rb-86; Sr-85m; Sr-87m; Y-91; Y-91m; Y-92; Y-93; Tc-97m; Tc-99m; Rh-105; Pd-109; Ag-111; Cd-115m; In-113m; In-115m; Te-129; Te-131; I-123; I-125; Cs-135; Ce-141; Pr-142; Nd-147; Nd-149; Sm-153; Eu-152m; Gd-159; Dy-166; Ho-166; Er-171; Tm-170; Yb-175; Lu-177; Re-188; Os-191; Os-193; Ir-194; Pt-197m; Au-199; Hg-197; Hg-197m; Tl-201; Ra-227; U-231; U-237; U-239; U-240; Np-239; Pu-234; Pu-235; Pu-237; Bk-249; Cf-253; Es-253; Fm-255 100 Si-31; P-32; P-33; Fe-55; Co-60m; Zn-69; As-73; As-77; Sr-89; Y-90; Tc-96m; Pd-103; Te-125m; Te-127; Cs-131; Cs-134m; Pr-143; Pm-147; Pm-149; Sm-151; Dy-165; Er-169; Tm-171; W-185; Re-186; Os-191m; Pt-193m; Pt-197; At-211; Th-226; Pu-243; Am-242; Cf-246 1000 Co-58m; Ge-71; Rh-103m; Fm-254 10 000
Codes Alimentarious levels (incorporated into the BSS as generic action levels for foodstuffs)
Radionuclides in foods Guideline Level (Bq/kg) 238Pu, 239Pu, 240Pu, 241Am 1 90Sr, 106Ru, 129I, 131I, 235U 100 35S, 60Co, 89Sr, 103Ru, 134Cs, 137Cs, 144Ce, 192Ir 1000 3H*, 14C, 99Tc 10000 Guideline levels for radionuclides in foods
Drinking water The WHO levels
Environmental aspects of the shelter dismantlement and radioactive waste management • A comprehensive safety and environmental impact assessment should be performed. • Development of an integrated radioactive waste management programme for the Shelter. • Strategy for rehabilitation of the Exclusion Zone • Overall plan for the long-term development of the Exclusion Zone
Epilogue • Preservation of the vast tacit knowledge that is available on the Chernobyl experience. What to do?
Detectability limits in radioepidemiology Because radiation is a weak carcinogen, it is practically impossible to detect effects at low doses.
Exposed group “N” people “E” cancers “n” probability of ‘natural’cancer ‘pD’ probability of ‘radiation’ cancer Control group “N” people “C” cancers “n” probability of ‘natural’ cancer
Epidemiological significance • The expected number of cancers in the control group will be: C = n N • The expected number of cancers in the exposed group will be: E = n N + pd D N • The expected number of excess cancers will be E – C
E = n N + pd D N Number of cancers in exposed group C =n N Number of cancers in control group Difficult to detect! E-C
Epidemiological significance • The standard deviation is = 2 n N + pd D N • If the excess cancersare to be detected with a statistical confidence of 95% E – C > 2
Epidemiological significance Operating algebraically and as n >> pd D, N> constant / D2 which is the equation giving the number of people, N, needed for detecting excess cancers at dose D. (Constant = 8 n / pd2)
Dose (mSv) DETECTABILITY OF SOLID CANCERS Region of detectability Region of undetectability 1 mSv 10 9 p. People
Dose (mSv) DETECTABILITY OF SOLID CANCERS Region of undetectability Region of detectability Chernobyl doses ~50 mSv Population ~270 000 People
Dose (mSv) DETECTABILITY OF HEREDITABLE EFFECTS Region of detectability Region of undetectability ~10 mSv ~1010 people! People
Dose (mSv) Region of detectability 100.000 man Sv x 5%/Sv = 5000 deaths! 0.001 Sv 100.000.000 p. People
Dose (mSv) Region of detectability Epistemological Limitation No grounds of knowledge!! Do the effects in this region actually occur? People
Responding to this demand, three years ago, the IAEA General Conference requested that commodities requiring regulatory control shall be identified.
If it is satisfied that the doses of radiation incurred will betrivial, the competent authority shouldwaive the requirementsof …… : …operations which do not involve the use of radioactive substances at concentrations exceeding0.002 Ci/g(74 Bq/g)or solid natural radioactive substances at concen-trations exceeding0.01 Ci/g(370 Bq/g).
I.e., it can be construed that the first BSS applied to controllable operations involving radioactive substances at concentrations exceeding some 10’s of Bq/g!