Tactical

1. From JP 3-0 Glossary: strategic level of war. The level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic security objectives and guidance, then develops and uses national resources to achieve those objectives. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) strategy. A prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0) Not defined in Army Doctrine Strategic From JP 1-02 Glossary: operational level of war — The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to achieve strategic objectives within theaters or other operational areas. From JP 1-02 Glossary: campaign — A series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space. See also campaign plan. (JP 5-0) From ADRP 3-0 paragraph 2-7: A campaignis a series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space (JP 5-0). A major operation is a series of tactical actions (battles, engagements, strikes) conducted by combat forces of a single or several Services, coordinated in time and place, to achieve strategic or operational objectives in an operational area (JP 3-0). Operational From JP 1-02 Glossary: major operation — 1. A series of tactical actions (battles, engagements, strikes) conducted by combat forces of a single or several Services, coordinated in time and place, to achieve strategic or operational objectives in an operational area. 2. For noncombat operations, a reference to the relative size and scope of a military operation. See also operation. (JP 3-0) From ADPR 1-02: major operation – (DOD) 1. A series of tactical actions (battles, engagements, strikes) conducted by combat forces of a single or several Services, coordinated in time and place, to achieve strategic or operational objectives in an operational area. 2. For noncombat operations, a reference to the relative size and scope of a military operation. See ADRP 3-0. Are operations at the operational level of war? From ADRP 3-0 paragraph 2-58: For Army forces, an operation is a military action, consisting of two of more related tactical actions, designed to achieve a strategic objective, in whole or in part From JP 1-02 Glossary: operation — 1. A series of tactical actions with a common purpose or unifying theme. (JP 1) 2. A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, operational, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission. (JP 3-0). From ADRP 3-0 paragraph 2-58: A tactical action is a battle or engagement employing lethal and nonlethal actions designed for a specific purpose relative to the enemy, the terrain, friendly forces, or other entity. Tactical actions include widely varied activities. They can include an attack to seize a piece of terrain or destroy an enemy unit, the defense of a population, and the training of other militaries to assist security forces as part of building partner capacity. Tactical From ADRP 1-02 and JP 1-02: engagement 2. A tactical conflict, usually between opposing lower echelons maneuver forces. (JP 3-0) See also battle; campaign. From ADRP 1-02: battle – A battle consists of a set of related engagements that lasts longer and involves larger forces than an engagement. (ADP 3-90) See also campaign; engagement; major operation.

2. Other Theorist Definitions Clausewitz: strategy, the use of engagements for the object of the war. Pg 128 Strategic Antoine-Henri Jomini, “the art of properly directing masses upon the theater of war, either for defense or for invasion.” (From Swain JFQ Article) Julian Corbett, “the art of directing force to the ends in view,” and classified it as major and minor, the former a branch of statesmanship and the latter having to do with plans of operations (From Swain JFQ Article) Aleksandr A. Svechinset broad goals to be achieved over relatively long periods compared with tactics. (From Swain JFQ Article) Naveh: Therefore, one can rightly claim that the operational level is the application of the universal system in the military sphere. The essence of this level, as the intermediary field between strategy and tactics, is the preparation, planning, and conduct of military operations in order to attain operational objectives and strategic aims. pg 9-10; Criteria for Operational: cognitive tension between strategic aim and tactical mission; industrious manoeuvre, expressing dynamic interaction between various elements of the system as well as between general action and the strategic aim; synergetic: more than a sum of its parts, combined arms, amalgamation of various forms of warfare, and integration of various units in geography and time; aim is disruption of enemy system; must account for randomness and chaos; non-linear nature. the plan should be hierarchically structured and express depth; interaction between notions of manoeuvre and attrition; must be independent from strategy; must be related to a broad and universal theory. pg 13-14 Kelly and Brennan: Operational Art: A two-way conversation between strategy and tactics. Operational level of war is the grouping of tactical action by time and space towards a single idea or intent. Operational Schneider: Operational Art characterized by employment of forces in deep distributed operations. Swain: Operational Art = the employment of military forces to achieve strategic goals in a theater of war or theater of operations, through the design, organization, and conduct of campaigns and major operations. Isserson (through Harrison): Now, the “main thing in the evolution of the modern operation, is its “depth, which determines its new and enormous intensity” as it makes its way through the enemy’s position (emphasis in the original). Pg 106. Aleksandr A. Svechin: translated the broad abstract goals of strategy into discrete tactical tasks and provided the wherewithal to sustain action to accomplish intermediate goals, developing, in the whole, accomplishment of the strategic design. (From Swain JFQ Article) Clausewitz: tactics teaches the use of armed forces in the engagement. Pg 128 Tactical Aleksandr A. Svechin : to do with maximization of weapon or material capabilities within particular contexts to solve immediate problems. (From Swain JFQ Article)

3. Size of operation Type of Force JOINT Strategic Campaign From ADRP 1-02: corps – The Army’s largest tactical unit and the instrument by which joint force commanders conduct operational-level maneuver. (FM 3-90) Operational Major Operation ARMY Are operations at the operational level of war? Operation From ADPR 1-02: division – An Army echelon of command above brigade and below corps. It is a tactical headquarters which employs a combination of brigade combat teams, multifunctional brigades, and functional brigades in land operations. (ADRP 3-90) Engagement Tactical Battle

4. ADRP 5-0, 2-1: Planning results in a plan and orders that synchronize the action of forces in time, space, and purpose to achieve objectives and accomplish missions From ADRP 5-0 paragraph 2-20. Conceptual planning is directly associated with operational art—the cognitive approach by commanders and staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment—to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means (JP 3-0). Operational art is a thought process that guides conceptual and detailed planning to produce executable plans and orders. From ADRP 3-0 Paragraph 4-1: For Army forces, operational art is the pursuit of strategic objectives, in whole or in part, through the arrangement of tactical actions in time, space, and purpose. This approach enables commanders and staffs to use skill, knowledge, experience, and judgment to overcome the ambiguity and intricacies of a complex, ever changing, and uncertain operational environment to better understand the problem or problems at hand. Operational art applies to all aspects of operations and integrates ends, ways, and means, while accounting for risk. Operational art is applicable at all levels of war, not just to the operational level of war. From ADRP 1-02 Glossary: operational art – (DOD) The cognitive approach by commanders and staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment—to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means. See ADP 3-0, ADRP 3-0, and ADRP 5-0. From JP 1-02 operational art — The cognitive approach by commanders and staffs — supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment — to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means. (JP 3-0)

5. Antoine-Henri Jomini (1779-1869)Summary of The Art of War (1837) • Experience: Staff of Marshal Michel Ney, One of Napoleon’s Marshalls; later Russian Army in Tzar Alexander’s Headquarters • Motivation: “frantic scramble to succeed by making an impression on some key man.” • Derived theory from study of campaigns of King Fredrick the Great of Prussia; influenced by Lloyd and Bulow • “It is proposed to show that there is one great principle underlying all operations of war, - a principle which must be followed in all good combinations” = Universal Principles • Decisive Point (from Schneider & Lawrence – “Clausewitz’s Elusive Center of Gravity” also in Calhoun – “Clausewitz and Jomini”): • Jomini fundamental principles of war consist of the following maxims: • To throw by strategic movements the mass of the army, successively, upon the decisive points of a theater of war, and also upon the communications of the enemy as much as possible, without compromising one’s own • To maneuver to engage fractions of the hostile army with the bulk of one’s forces. • On the battlefield, to throw the mass of the forces upon the decisive point, or upon that portion of the hostile line which it is of the first importance to overthrow. • To arrange that these masses shall not be only thrown upon the decisive point, but that they shall engage at the proper times and with ample energy. • Lines of Operation • If the art of war consists in bringing into action upon the decisive point of the theater of operations the greatest possible force, the choice of the line of operations (as the primary means of attaining this end) may be regarded as fundamental in devising a good plan for campaign. (Jomini, pg113 and 176) • Thus, when two armies confront each other, both on the battlefield and in the theater of operations, operations should usually be directed against one of the extremities of the enemy’s front and towards his communication with his rear. (Gat, pg119) • “Principles of War”: • Initiative, Mobility & Movement, Concentration of Force • Strategy is “the art of making war upon the map” • Simple – easy to understand (he wanted to sell books) • Serves as a field guide of practical advice for conduct of warfare through application of universal principles • Gat: “On one central point, Jomini’s theoretical outlook fundamentally differed from his predecessors. This divergence was related to the shift in emphasis from tactics to strategy…” (pg115) • “The greatest secret of war consists in becoming master of the communications of the enemy” (Jomini did attribute to Napoleon, Gat, pg117) • The destruction of the enemy’s field army is the military aim. (Gat, pg117) • “The employment of masses upon the decisive points, constitutes alone good combinations, and … it should be independent of all positions.” (Gat, pg118) • Genius: the skill with which the commander could employ in combat the fundamental principles of war he is elucidating – how well can he identify the decisive point. • “in every position a general may occupy, he has only to decide whether to operate by the right, by the left, or by the front. (Calhoun, pg34) • “Checklist” • Popular because it was “available,” having been written in French • Was linked by B.H. Liddle Heart as “strategy of the indirect approach” as means to break the gridlock of the modern battlefield • Still see his influence in current doctrine: interior/exterior lines; principles of war; etc. • Reynolds Theorist? No. Not sufficiently abstract (limited examples to Fredrick); does not achieve intersubjectivity (land-centered, principles specifically geared towards land warfare); and does not show empirical relevance – true when tested against reality (principles don’t hold up to conflict today). (Calhoun, pg35)

6. Carl Philip Gottlieb Von Clausewitz (1780-1831)On War (1832 – published by his wife, Marie) • Experience: Prussian Army, Administered Prussian General War College and tutor to Prussian Crown Prince • Motivation: Development of a general theory of war • Significant impact on U.S. doctrine: quoted to start (second paragraph, pg I-1) JP 1 (the fundamental principles and overarching guidance for employment of the Armed Forces of the United States) – description of “art of war” • Theory: You can not develop a theory. Challenges: 1)Psychological forces (hostility, danger, intellectual qualities) on the CDR – forces interact in unpredictable ways; 2)War’s inherently interactive nature; 3)Unreliability of information in war, a result of the many unobservable actions taken by the participants (Calhoun, pg28) • Thus: theory should guide student of war… “light his way, eas his progess, train his judgement, and help him avoid pitfalls.” • Method: Dialectical reasoning, or contrasting opposites in discourse. Not specifically Hegel-esque, rather it’s contrasting extremes to show that practical reality exists somewhere in between. (Calhoun, pg29-30) • Also published after his death; “The first chapter of Book One alone I regard as finished” – leads to confusion • War is an act of force, . . . Which theoretically can have to limits: • Referred to in discussion of ethics by Walzer, pg23 • War is extension of policy: “the continuation of politics by other means” (Book 1, Chapter 1, Section 24 heading) • Defense is stronger than offense, but has a negative object. Offensive has a positive object. (Dr. Brucino) • Fog of war: “War is the realm of uncertainty; three quarters of the factors on which action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty. (pg101) • Friction in war: “the unseen, all-pervading element that brings about this change of perspective” (pg119) • “Everything is very simple in war, but the simplest thing is difficult” (pg119) • “Friction is the only concept that more or less corresponds to the factors that distinguish real war from war on paper” (pg119) • Duality (concept) • Paradoxical trinity between primordial violence (blind natural force: people), hatred (play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam: commander & army), and enmity (element of insubordination, as an instrument of policy: government) – theory on war must maintain balance of the three. • COG: • Book 8, CH4: “one must keep the dominant characteristics of both belligerents in mind. Out of these characteristics a certain center of gravity develops, the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends. This is the point against which all our energies should be directed.” (pg595-6) • Book 6, CH27: “A center of gravity is always found where the mass is concentrated most densely. It presents the most effective target for a blow; furthermore, the heaviest blow is that struck by the center of gravity.” (pg485) • “War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.” Book 1, CH1 • “Destruction of the enemy forces is the overriding principle of war.” • “Theory should be study, not doctrine” (pg141) • Military Genius: “any complex activity, if it is to be carrie don with any degree of virtuosity, calls for appropriate gifts of intellect and temperament. If they are outstanding and reveal themselves in exceptional achievements, their possessor is called “a genius.” (pg100) • Questions about revised chapters? • Revised: Book1: On Nature of War, Book 7: The Attack, & Book 8: War Plans • Unrevised: Book Two: On the Theory of War, Book 3: On Strategy in General, Book 4: The Engagement, Book 5: Military Forces, Book 6: Defense • Reynolds Theorist? Yes. Sufficiently abstract (broad description of phenomenon of war); achieves intersubjectivity (range of conflict from total war to limited war); and shows empirical relevance – true when tested against reality (says his principles don’t hold up to reality… is reality). (Calhoun, pg35)

7. Operational Art • Current (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-27): The cognitive approach by commanders and staffs – supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment – to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means. See ADP 3-0, ADRP 3-0, and ADRP 5-0. • Strategy: A prudent idea or set of ideas for the employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objective (JP 3-0) • Campaign: (DOD) A series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. See ADRP 3-0. (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-6) • Operation: 1. A series of tactical actions with a common purpose or unifying theme (JP 1) 2. A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, operational, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission. (JP 3-0) (JP 1-02, 15 July 2012) • Ends: objectives and desired end state (JP 3-0, pg II-4) • Ways: sequence of actions most like to achieve objectives and end state (JP 3-0, pg II-4) • Means: resources required to accomplish that sequence of actions (JP 3-0, pg II-4) • Alternate Definition (ADP 3-0, pg 9): “Operational art is the pursuit of strategic objectives, in whole or in part, through the arrangement of tactical actions in time, space, and purpose. … The effective arrangement of military conditions in time, space, and purpose is the task of operational art.” • Old (FM 1-02, pg 1-138): (DOD) The employment of military forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations and battles. Operational art translates the joint force commander’s strategy into operational design, and, ultimately, tactical action, by integrating the key activities at all levels of war. • JP 1-02 (Amended through 15 July 2012): The cognitive approach by commanders and staffs – supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment – to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means. (JP 3-0) (*Same as ARDP 1-02) • James Schneider (Vulcan’s Anvil: The American Civil War and the Foundation of the Operational Art): operational art is characterized by the employment of forces in deep distributed operations. (pg28) • John Olsen and Martin van Crevald (The Evolution of Operational Art – From Napoleon to the Present): Broadly defined as the grey area between strategy and tactics, operational art spans the theory and practice of planning and conducting campaigns and major operations aimed at accomplishing strategic and operational objectives in a given theatre of operations. (pg1) • Michael R. Matheny (Carrying the War to the Enemy: American Operational Art to 1945): At the heart of operational art is campaign planning. The campaign plan actually links tactics to strategy by determining where, when, how, and, most importantly, to what purpose military forces will engage the enemy. (pg xviii). While some would claim it was lost, he claims that it was never lost, and was called by different names, and it was rediscovered in 1981 when it was codified with the current name. • Shimon Naveh (In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory): The introduction of the term “operational art” in the 1986 field manual (FM 100-5) marked the definite recognition of creativity, as the basic quality required from operational level commanders. . . . The American definitions of campaign and theater now resemble those of the Russians. (pg12) • Naveh “test to deem something operational” (nine checks) – pg 13-4 • Reflected cognitive tension between orientation towards strategic aim and adherence to the tactical missions • Muse be based on industrious maneuver, expressing dynamic interaction between elements in the system • Planned action should be synergetic (synthesis through aspects of combined arms combat, amalgamation of various forms of warfare, and integration of forces across geography and time) • At tactical level, operations aim at destruction of opponents system • Must reflect contemplative attitude towards randomness, chaotic dimensions and interrelation between contentious systems • Should be non-linear in nature (should be hierarchically structured and express depth) • Should reflect deliberate interaction between notions of maneuver and attrition • Should constitute a completely independent entity with specific scope of mission/aim • Concept, plan or act must be related to a broad and universal theory

8. Operational Approach • Current Definition: Operational Approach – (DOD) A description of broad actions that the force must take to transform current conditions into those desired at end state. See ADRP 3-0 and ADRP 5-0. (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-27) • Through operational art, commanders translate their operational approach into a concept of operations and ultimately into tactical tasks. (ADRP 3-0, pg 4-1) • In applying operational art, commanders and their staffs use a set of intellectual tools to help them communicate a common vision of the operational environment as well as visualizing and describing the operational approach. Collectively, this set of tools is known as the elements of operational art. These tools help commanders understand, visualize, and describe combinations of combat power and help them formulate their intent and guidance. (ADRP 5-0, pg 2-4) Completed CDR Vision (ADRP 5-0, pg 1-4)

9. Depicting Operational Approach “Techniques” JP 5-0, pg III-39 JP 5-0, pg III-15

10. (Ten) Elements of Operational Art (ADRP 3-0, pg 4-2) In applying operational art, commanders and their staffs use intellectual tools to help them understand an operational environment as well as visualize and describe their approach for conducting the operation. Collectively, this set of tools is known as the elements of operational art. (ADRP 3-0, pg 4-2)

11. CDR Role in the Operations Process (ADRP 5-0, pg 1-3) The commander’s role is to drive the operations process through activities of understanding, visualizing, describing, directing, leading and assessing (as depicted in figure 1.1). (ADRP 5-0, pg 1-2)

12. (Eight) Elements of Combat Power (ADRP 3-0, pg 3-1) To execute combined arms operations, commanders conceptualize capabilities in terms of combat power. Combat power has eight elements: leadership, information, mission command, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection. The Army collectively describes the last six elements as the warfighting functions. (ADRP 3-0, pg 3-1) A warfighting function is a group of tasks and systems (people, organizations, information, and processes) united by a common purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions (ADP 3-0, pg 13) Combat power is the total means of destructive, constructive, and information capabilities that a military unit or formation can apply at a given time. (ADRP 3-0, pg 3-1)

13. Operational and Mission Variables (ADRP 5-0, pg 1-7)An operational environment for each operation differs and evolves as each operation progresses. Army leaders use operational variables (PEMESII-PT) to analyze and understand a specific operational environment in which they are conducting operations. They use mission variables (METT-TC)to focus on specific elements of an operational environment during mission analysis. (Paragraph 1-8, pg 1-2, ADRP 3-0)

14. (Nine) Principles of War / (Twelve) Joint Operations Since the establishment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1947, joint doctrine has recognized nine principles of war. Subsequent experience from a wide variety of irregular warfare (IW) situations has identified three additional principles – restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy. Together they comprise the 12 principles of joint operations. (JP 3-0, pg I-2) (Army) The twelve principles of joint operations represent important factors that affect the conduct of operations across the levels of war. The principles are not a checklist. While commanders can consider the principles in all operations, they do not apply in the same way to every situation. Rather, they summarize characteristics of successful operations. Their greatest value lies in educating the military professional. Applied to the study of past operations, the principles are powerful tools that can assist commanders in analyzing pending operations. While considering the principles, commanders synchronize efforts and determine if or when to deviate from the principles based on the current situation. (ADRP 3-0, pg 4-1)

15. Design • Operational Design: The conception and construction of the framework that underpins a campaign or major operation plan and its subsequent execution. See also campaign; major operation. (JP 5-0) (JP 1-02, pg 234) • Operational design is a process of iterative understanding and problem framing that supports commanders and staffs in their application of operational art with tools and a methodology to conceive of and construct viable approaches to operations and campaigns. (JP 5-0, pg III-1) • Army Design Methodology: A methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe unfamiliar problems in approaches to solving them. (ADP 5-0). (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-3) • A design is a vision expressed in terms of intent (what I want to do), concept (how I want to do it), and narrative (my instructions). (Swain - “Commander's Business: Learning to Practice Operational Design”, Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 53, 2nd QTR 2009, pg 65)

16. (Thirteen) Elements of Operational Design (JP 5-0, pg III-18) Within operational art, joint force commanders and staffs consider elements of operational design. Elements of operational design are individual tools that help the joint force commander and staff visualize and describe the broad operational approach. (See figure 4-3. See JP 3-0 for a discussion of the elements of operational design.) Army forces use elements of operational design when functioning as a joint force headquarters. (ADRP 3-0, pg 4-3)

17. Army Design Methodology (ADRP 5-0, pg 2-4 – 2-11) • Definition: a methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe problems and approaches to solving them (ADP 5-0). (ARDP 1-02, pg 1-3) • Key concepts: • Critical & creative thinking • Collaboration and dialogue • Framing • Narrative Construction • Visual Modeling • Army Design Methodology (4x activities) • Improved understanding of operational environment • Frame Operational Environment • Diagram current state of Operational Environment (product) & Narrative (product) • Diagram desired end state of the Operational Environment (product) & Narrative (product) • Frame the Problem • Technique (ask these questions): • What is the difference between the current state and the desired end state of the operational environment? • What is preventing US forces from reaching the desired end state? • Problem Statement (product) • Operational Approach (serves as link between detailed and conceptual planning) • Elements of operational art and method (defeat vs. stability mechanisms) related to core competency (CAM & WAS) feed into developing LOE chart (logic of purpose vs. geographical reference: LOO) • LOE chart (product) • Initial Commanders Intent • Purpose • Key Tasks • Endstate: Commanders describe the operation’s end state by stating the desired conditions of the friendly force in relationship to desired conditions of the enemy, terrain, and civil considerations. • Key Outputs • Problem Statement • Initial Commander’s Intent • Planning guidance, to include operational approach • Operational Approach: organizes combinations of potential actions in time, space, and purpose that will guide the force to a desired end state • Planning guidance: orients the focus of operations, linking desired conditions to potential combinations of actions that force may employ to achieve the desired end state • Reframing: during operations, commanders decide to reframe after realizing the desired conditions have changed, are not achievable, cannot be attained through current operational approach, or because of change of mission or end state.

18. Activities of the Army Design Methodology ADRP 5-0, pg 2-6

19. “A/The” Design Process (Swain – “Commander’s Business,” JFQ, issue 23, 2nd QTR 2009) • Figure out what inspired the external directive (Higher HQ Guidance/OPORD) that opened the deliberations • CDR has dialogue with superior to ensure complete understanding between sponsor (Higher HQ) and actor (Sub-units) • Conduct System Framing (effort to learn all one can in the time available about the nature and content of the systems creating the unsatisfactory situation): Create system frame which bounds the hypothetical portrayal of a relevant system, captured both graphically and narratively. • Contains a group of interacting actors and potential actors (must always contain the United States) • Define existing relationships that govern interactions • Then group actors into assemblages (subgroups with collective influence on system behavior) • Cognitively transfer from learning to action • Create a mental model (a depiction of sponsor’s desired state of affairs, or system, as a basis) of the desired system (may/should look similar to first system with different roles/links) • Assess logic of enemy rationale, logic of command rationale, and logistics rationale; and do not limit model to friendly side of considerations • Formulate the problem – what needs to be done to establish the conditions to achieve the desired endstate • Operational Framing: formulating the strategy, or pattern of actions to change the system described by the system frame (this is the defining act of design)

20. Guide to the use of Army Design Methodology (with references) Why Army Design Methodology?:War is a complex system, which means that it is open, interdependent, emergent, multidimensional, purposeful, and counterintuitive (Clausewitz, Gaddis, Gharajedaghi, Doerner, Senge, Boyd/Osinga, Naveh, Lawson). That said, a lot of the time in tactics and even campaigning, there are enough repetitive patterns to be useful, so a lot of the time, doctrine informed by military theory is enough. For example, in campaigning, we can use elements of operational art, principles of war, mission command, operational frameworks, and military theory elements of strategy and operational art (ADP 3-0, 5-0, and 6-0; JP 3-0 and 5-0; Jomini; Clausewitz; Liddell Hart; Isserson; Svechin). Sometimes, these more common patterns do not fit as well or do not fit at all, which is usually an indication that the problem is unfamiliar. In such cases we can use different tools to improve planning: Army Design Methodology and Joint design, which emphasize understanding the operational environment, identifying the problem, and developing operational approaches—activities that are enabled by doctrinal tools such as visual modeling, narrative, framing, PMESII, DIME, and METT-TC. In order to better apply these activities and tools, we study certain theories, which in turn provide tools that can fall into three broad categories: • 2. In checking the work of all activities, watch out for: • Causation, normalization, rhetoric, closure, focalization, underreading, overreading, and gaps in narratives (Abbott) • Falling into the icon trap, image trap, puzzle trap, numbers trap, or category trap (Lawson) • Vague goals, absolute language, overgeneralization, repair service behavior, solving problems one at a time, fixation on familiar issues or solutions, methodism, goal inversion, ballistic behavior, and dosage (Doerner) • 1. In thinking about all activities in planning, strive to: • Be aware of causal links, implicit and explicit (e.g.: Gaddis, Reynolds, Stone) • Be aware of cultural norms and assumptions—your own, enemy, local population (e.g.: Gat, Potter, Linn, Lynn, Gharajedaghi) • ----- • Gharajedaghi: • Think holistically—structure, function, process, purpose/context • Think operationally—feedback loops, delayed responses, carrying capacity • Understand self-organization of the system—its propensity, especially toward cultural norms • Be interactive—experiment (wargame), test to see if it is the right problem • Doerner: • Make more decisions • Test hypotheses • Have goals—structured, intermediate, tested • Think by analogy • Ask why questions • Freely experiment • Cull unsuccessful techniques • Develop well buffered systems—with stable negative feedback loops • Delegate—don’t overcentralize • Bar-Yam: • Understand degrees of interdependence across the system • Scale responses/approaches to appropriate level • Look for patterns across the system 3. Leadership, teamwork, and organization: These problems, activities, and tools are difficult. They can be dealt with by just the commander or select individuals on the staff, but that usually requires genius and/or a lot of time to do the work. As a result, commanders and leaders need support in dealing with difficult and unfamiliar work, which usually falls to staffs and planning teams. Those staffs and teams in turn require leadership and teamwork to be successful. Strong teams and leaders are characterized by the qualities emphasized in ADP 5-0, ADP 6-0, ADP 6-22, JP 5-0, supported by the leadership and organizational lessons found in Kotter, Schoen, and Hatch.

21. Problem • No definition in ADRP 1-02 / JP 1-02 • ADRP 5-0, pg 2-9: “2-41. A problem is an issue or obstacle that makes it difficult to achieve a desired goal or objective. In a broad sense, a problem exists when an individual becomes aware of a significant difference between what actually is and what is desired. In the context of operations, an operational problem is the issue or set of issues that impede commanders from achieving their desired end state.” • Problem Statement: A concise statement of the issue or issues requiring resolution. (ADRP 5-0, pg 2-9) • Critical to defining the problem is determining what needs to be acted on to reconcile the differences between existing and desired conditions. (JP 5-0, pgs III-12 – 13) • The JFC and Staff must identify and articulate (from JP 5-0, pg III-13): • Tensions between current conditions and desired conditions at end state • Elements within the operational environment which must change or remain the same to achieve desired end states • Opportunities and threats that either can be exploited or will impede the JFC from achieving the desired end state • Limitations. An action required or prohibited by higher authority, such as a constraint or restraint, and other restrictions that limit the commander’s freedom of action, such as diplomatic agreements, ROE, political and economic conditions in affected countries, and host-nation issues. • A concise problem statement is used to clearly define the problem or problem set to solve. It considers how tension and competition affect the operational environment by identifying how to transform the current conditions to the desired end state – before adversaries begin to transform current conditions to their desired end state. The statement broadly describes the requirements for transformation, anticipating changes in the operational environment while identifying critical transitions. (JP 5-0, pg III-13) • Problem Statement example (from ADRP 5-0, pg 2-9) [141 words] • The Newland defense force is the primary impediment to establishing a democratic government in Newland and the primary factor of instability in the region. For over forty years, the Newland defense force has maintained power for itself and the regime by oppressing all opposition within society. In addition, the Newland defense force has a history of intimidating Country Z through force (both overtly and covertly). Corruption in the Newland defense force is rampant within the leadership, and it has close ties to several drug cartels. General E is the latest of two dictators emerging from the Newland defense force. Even if General E is removed from power, the potential of a new dictator emerging from the Newland defense force is likely. There is no indication that the leadership of the Newland defense force is willing to relinquish their power within Newland.

22. ADP 3-0 “Logic Map”

23. Decisive Action • The Army conducts unified land operations, in the anticipated operational environment, in support of unified action, executed through decisive action. (ADP 3-0, pg iii) • Decisive Action – (Army) The continuous, simultaneous combinations of offensive, defensive, and stability or defense support of civil authorities tasks. (ADRP 3-0) (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-11) • Offensive Operations: operations conducted to defeat and destroy enemy forces and seize terrain, resources and population centers. They include movement to contact, attack, exploitation, and pursuit. (ADP 3-0, pg 5) • Defensive Operations: operations conducted to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economize forces, and develop conditions favorable for offensive and stability tasks. These operations include mobile defense, area defense, and retrograde. (ADP 3-0, pg 5-6) • Stability Operations: military missions, tasks and activities conducted outside the United States to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and to provide essential governmental services, support to governance, and support to economic and infrastructure development. (ADP 3-0, pg 6) • [Homeland Defense and] Defense Support Of Civil Authorities represents DoD support to U.S. civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events. They include tasks: provide support for domestic disasters; provide support for domestic chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives incidents; provide support for domestic civilian law enforcement agencies; and provide other designated support. (ADP 3-0, pg 6)

24. Army Core Competencies (CAM & WAS) The Army’s two core competencies – combined arms maneuver and wide area security – provide the means for balancing the application of Army warfighting functions within the tactical actions and tasks inherent in offensive, defensive, and stability operations. It is the integrated application of these two core competencies that enables Army forces to defeat or destroy an enemy from gaining a position of advantage. (ADP 3-0, pg 5) Combined Arms Maneuver: The application of the element of combat power in unified action to defeat enemy ground forces; to seize, occupy, and defend land areas; and to achieve physical, temporal, and psychological advantages over the enemy to seize and exploit the initiative. (ADP 3-0) (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-8) Wide Area Security: The application of the elements of combat power in unified action to protect populations, forces, infrastructure, and activities; to deny the enemy positions of advantage; and to consolidate gains in order to retain the initiative. (ADP 3-0) (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-38) “…You don’t do one without the other, it is not CAM is Combined Arms Live Fire, and WAS is KLE’s.” - LTG David Perkins (28 Nov 2012; talking to SAMS 13-01)

25. Defeat Mechanisms (ADRP 3-0, pg 2-9)(also, JP 5-0, pg III-30) • Current Definition: The method through which friendly forces accomplish their mission against enemy opposition. (ARRP 1-02, pg 1-12) • Generally, defeat mechanisms are appropriate for combined arms maneuver, while stability mechanisms are best suited for wide area security (ADRP, 3-0, pg 2-9) • Army forces at all echelons use combinations of four defeat mechanisms: destroy, dislocate, disintegrate and isolate. • Destroy: CDRs apply lethal combat power on an enemy capability so that is can no longer perform any function. • Dislocate: CDRs dislocate by employing forces to obtain significant positional advantage, rendering the enemy’s dispositions less valuable, perhaps even irrelevant. • Disintegrate: Disrupt the enemy’s command and control system, degrading its ability to conduct operations. Leads to rapid collapse of the enemy’s capabilities or will to fight. • Isolate: CDRs deny an enemy or adversary access to capabilities that enable the exercise of coercion, influence, potential advantage, and freedom of action. • CDRs describe defeat mechanisms as Physical, temporal or psychological: • Physically defeating: deprives enemy forces of ability to achieve enemy aims • Temporally defeating: friendly anticipates enemy reactions and counters them before they become effective • Psychologically defeating: deprives the enemy of the will to continue to fight • JP 5-0: Defeat mechanisms primarily apply in combat operations against an active enemy force. Combat aims at defeating armed enemies – regular, irregular, or both, through the organized application of force to kill, destroy, or capture by all means available. There are two basic defeat mechanisms to accomplish this: attrition and disruption. (pg III-30) • The aim of disruption is to defeat an enemy’s ability to fight as a cohesive and coordinated organization. Th alternative is to destroy his material capabilities through attrition, which generally is more costly and time-consuming). …Joint doctrine favors disruption because it tends to be a more effective and efficient way of causing an enemy’s defeat. (pg III-30)

26. Stability Mechanisms (ADRP 3-0, pg 2-10)(also, JP 5-0, pg III 30-1) • Current Definition: The primary method through which friendly forces affect civilians in order to attain conditions that support establishing a lasting, stable peace. (ADRP 3-0) (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-84) • Generally, defeat mechanisms are appropriate for combined arms maneuver, while stability mechanisms are best suited for wide area security (ADRP, 3-0, pg 2-9) • The four stability mechanisms are compel, control, influence, and support. • Compelmeans to use, or threaten to use, lethal force to establish control and dominance, effect behavioral change, or enforce compliance with mandates, agreements, or civil authority. • Control involves imposing civil order. • Influence means to alter the opinions, attitudes, and ultimately behavior of foreign friendly, neutral, adversary, and enemy populations through inform and influence activities, presence, and conduct. • Supportis to establish, reinforce, or set the conditions necessary for the instruments of national power to function effectively. • As with defeat mechanisms, combinations of stability mechanisms produce complementary and reinforcing effects that accomplish the mission more effectively and efficiently than single mechanisms do alone.

27. Tenets of Unified Land Operations (ADP 3-0, pg 7) • Not defined in Army/Joint doctrine; explained in ADP 3-0 • Unified land operations describes the Army’s approach to generating and applying combat power in campaigns and operations. (ADP 3-0, pg 7)

28. Campaign vs. Phase and Operation • Campaign: (DOD) A series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. See ADRP 3-0. (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-6) • Operation: • ADRP 1-02 does not have definition for “operation” • OLD: Operation – (DOD, NATO) 1. A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, operational, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission. 2. The process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defense, and maneuvers needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign. See FM 3-0 (FM 1-02, pg 1-137) • Joint – JP 1-02, 15 July 2012: operation – 1. A series of tactical actions with a common purpose or unifying theme (JP 1) 2. A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, operational, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission. (JP 3-0). • Phase: (Army) A planning and execution tool used to divide an operation in duration or activity (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-29) • OLD: Phase: (Army) A specific part of an operation that is different from those that precede or follow. A change in phase usually involves a change in task. (FM 3-0 / FM 1-02, pg 1-145)

29. HVT vs. HPT vs. HVI • High-Value Target (HVT) – (DOD) A target the enemy commander requires for the successful completion of the mission. The loss of high-value targets would be expected to seriously degrade important enemy functions throughout the friendly commander’s area of interest. See FM 2-01.3 and FM 3-60. (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-19) • High-Payoff Target (HPT) – (DOD) A target whose loss to the enemy will significantly contribute to the success of the friendly course of action. High-payoff targets are those high-value targets that must be acquired and successfully attacked for the success of the friendly commander’s mission. See FM 3-60. (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-19) • High-Value Individual (HVI) – A high-value individual is a person of interest (friendly, adversary or enemy) who must be identified, surveilled, tracked and influenced through the use of information or fires. A HVI may become a HPT that must be acquired and successfully attacked (exploited, captured or killed) for the success of the friendly commander’s mission. (FM 3-09) (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-19)

30. Doctrine • No definition of doctrine in ADRP 1-02 • Old Army FM: doctrine – (DOD) Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application. (NATO) Fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application. See FM 3-0. (FM 1-02, pg 1-65) • JP 1-02: Fundamental principles by which the military force or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application. See also multinational doctrine; joint doctrine. (JP 1-02, pg 97)

31. Center of Gravity (Schwerpunkt) • Current Definition: (DOD) The source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act. Also called COG. See ADRP 3-0. (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-6, also described in various ADP/ADRP’s as both an element of operational design and operational art) • A center of gravity is the source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or the will to act (JP 5-0). This definition states in modern terms the classic description offered by Clausewitz: “the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends.”* The loss of a center of gravity can ultimately result in defeat. The center of gravity is a vital analytical tool for planning operations. It provides a focal point, identifying sources of strength and weakness. (ADRP 3-0, pg 4-4 – 4-5) • Centers of gravity are not limited to military forces and can be either physical or moral. . . . Physical centers of gravity, such as a capital city or a military force, are typically easier to identify, assess and target. They can often be influenced solely by military means. In contrast, moral centers of gravity are intangible and more difficult to influence. They can include a charismatic leader, powerful ruling elite, religious tradition, tribal influence, or strong-willed populace. Military means alone usually prove ineffective when targeting moral centers of gravity. Affecting them requires the collective, integrated efforts of all instruments of national power. (ADRP 3-0, pg 4-4) • One of the most important tasks confronting the JFC’s staff during planning is identifying and analyzing friendly and adversary COGs. A COG is a source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act. It is what Clausewitz called “the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends…the point at which all our energies should be directed.” An objective is always linked to a COG. There may also be different COGs at different levels, but they should be nested. At the strategic level, a COG could be a military force, an alliance, political or military leaders, a set of critical capabilities or functions, or national will. At the operational level, a COG often is associated with the adversary’s military capabilities—such as a powerful element of the armed forces—but could include other capabilities in the operational environment. In identifying COGs it is important to remember that irregular warfare focuses on legitimacy and influence over a population, unlike traditional warfare, which employs direct military confrontation to defeat an adversary’s armed forces, destroy an adversary’s war-making capacity, or seize or retain territory to force a change in an adversary’s government or policies. Therefore, in an irregular warfare environment, the enemy and friendly COG will most likely be the same population. (JP 5-0, pg III-22) – This joint pub has four pages dedicated to COG. • Joint definition of objective – 1. the clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal toward which every operation is directed. 2. The specific target of the action taken which is essential to the commander’s plan. See also target (JP 5-0) (JP 1-02) • Clausewitz: • A center of gravity is always found where the mass is concentrated most densely. It presents the most effective target for a blow; furthermore, the heaviest blow is that struck by the center of gravity. (On War, Howard & Paret, pg 485 – Book 6, CH 27) • *… One must keep the dominant characteristics of both belligerents in mind. Out of these characteristics a certain center of gravity develops, the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends. That point against which all our energies should be directed. … For Alexander, GustavusAdolphus, Charles XII and Fredrick the Great, the COG was their army. If the army had been destroyed, they would all have gone down in history as failures. In countries subject to domestic strife, the center of gravity is generally their capital. In small countries that rely on large ones, it is usually the army of their protector. Among alliances, it lies in the community of interest, and in popular uprisings it is the personalities of the leaders and public opinion. (On War, Howard & Paret, pg 595-6 – Book 8, CH 4) • Antulio J. Echevarria II (Clausewitz & Contemporary War, pg 177-190) on Center of Gravity: • Clausewitz clearly considered COG important – used it 50+ times in On War • Question of relevancy is valid – concentration of forces (mass refers to concentration of effects) is no longer considered a necessary principle of war; trend is towards non-contiguous operations, and terrorists/insurgents/non-state actors have no physical center to attack • 1991 Gulf War, GEN Schwartzkopf (Combatant Commander) identified 3x COG: Saddam Hussein, Republican Guard & Iraqi Chem/Bio/Nuke capabilities while his Air Component Commander, GEN Charles Horner, identified 12x “target sets” ranging from national leadership and command and control to railroads, airfields, and ports – each of which in his view corresponded to a center of gravity. (pg 184) • Since reintegration into doctrine since 1980’s – multiple interpretations, Joint Publication definitions changed with each issue, and don’t accord with examples given • Pure Clausewitz concept: COG was the thing that, if struck, would lead one to decisive victory. Inspired by physics: “… it is against that part of the enemy’s forces where they are most concentrated that, if a blow were to occur, the effect would emanate the farthest…” • Applied Concept: Clausewitz did allow for multiple COG’s (also said to ideally get to just one – pg 617, Book 8, CH 9), and it depended on the degree of connectivity, or overall unity, the opposing force possessed – when Clausewitz references the COG where the forces are most concentrated, he is really referring less to the actual forces than to what concentrates them. Based on this, for Clausewitz, COG refers to the actual element that causes them to concentrate and gives them purpose and direction. • Conclusions: term has become too diluted; better to think of COG as focal point rather than source of strength or specific strength or weakness; COG only exists where threat separate parts are connected enough to form a single entity; COG only valid if complete defeat of an opponent is sought; COG for jihadist organizations if political and ideological – reduce overall appeal & empathy is success; WMD is interesting factor when considering COG ; Finally – concept is effects-based, not capabilities-based, should encourage thorough thinking by policy-makers.

32. Analyzing Center(s) of GravityStrange, Joe and Richard Iron. Understanding Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities, Part II: The CG-CC-CR-CV construct: A Useful Tool to Understand and Analyze the Relationship Between Centers of Gravity and their Critical Vulnerabilities. (1) Critical Capabilities (CC) ILE: Critical capability—Actions (verbs) that will achieve the objective. JP 5-0: Critical capabilities are those that are considered crucial enablers for a COG to function as such, and are essential to the accomplishment of the adversary’s assumed objective(s). (pg III-24) Strange: Primary abilities or military instruments whose presence allows a centre of gravity to function and to be identified. Strange & Iron: Every center of gravity has some primary ability (or abilities) that make a center of gravity in the context of a given scenario, situation or mission – including phases within campaigns or operations. Most simply stated: what can this center of gravity do to you that puts great fear (or concern) into your heart in the context of your mission and level of war? Within a critical capability, the key word is verb: it can destroy something, or seize an objective, or prevent you from achieving a mission. (pg7) (2) CoGs (CG) ILE: The CoG possesses the critical capability. The CoG performs the action that achieves the objective. JP 5-0: A COG is a source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act. (pg III-22) Strange & Iron: CG are physical or moral entities that are primary components of physical or moral strength, power and resistance. They don’t just contribute to strength; they ARE the strength. They offer resistance. They strike effective (or heavy) physical or moral blows. At the strategic level, they are usually leaders and populations determined to prevail. At operational and tactical levels they are almost invariably specific military forces. (pg7) • (3) Critical Requirements (CR) • ILE: Critical requirements are essential resource, or means for the CoG to perform a critical capability. • JP 5-0: Critical requirements are the conditions, resources, and means that enable a critical capability to become fully operational. (pg III-24) • Strange: Those essential conditions, resources, and means that sustain effective critical capabilities. • Strange & Iron: Are conditions, resources, and means that are essential for a CoG to achieve its critical capability. Examples are: • Good weather, precise intelligence, fuel and ammo re-supply, chemical gear, ability to go 35mph across open desert for 6 hours • Force X must accomplish its mission as a precondition before force Y can accomplish its mission • A robust sea train for a warfighting fleet operating long periods at sea. • Political leader Y needs no less than X% popular support (pg7) (4) Critical Vulnerabilities (CV) ILE: Critical vulnerabilities are aspect s of a critical requirement, which are deficient or vulnerable that if successfully attacked will degrade the CoG. (THESE BECOME DECISIVE POINTS) JP 5-0: Critical vulnerabilities are those aspects or components of critical requirements that are deficient or vulnerable to direct or indirect attack in a manner achieving decisive or signifigant results. (pg III-24) Strange: Can be deduced from recognizing which of the enemy’s enemy requirements can be converted into vulnerabilities by an attacking force using means of interdiction, neutralization, or destruction. Strange & Iron: Are those critical requirements, or components thereof, that are deficient, or vulnerable to neutralization or defeat in a way that will contribute to a center of gravity failing to achieve its critical capability. The lesser the risk and cost, the better. Critical vulnerabilities may, usually, be of the silver-bullet type: so if success can be achieved by focusing on just a single vulnerable critical requirement, then that’s great! An example might be where one precisely targeted cruise missile destroys the enemy leadership and results in an immediate end to conflict. More typically, critical vulnerabilities are of the lead-bullet type; where final success can only be achieved by focusing on a combination of vulnerable critical requirements that can be neutralized, interdicted or attacked simultaneously or sequentially. Here it is the cumulative effect that produces decisive results. This involves seeking a series of successive battlefield advantages that will lead to the unbalancing and eventual culmination of the enemy, with or without a final dramatic decisive act. (pg8)

33. CCIR (ADRP 5-0, pg 1-5) • Definition: commander’s critical information requirement – (DOD) An information requirement identified by the commander as being critical to facilitating timely decision making. Also called CCIR. See ADRP 5-0. (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-8) • The two key elements are friendly force information requirements and priority intelligence requirements (JP 3-0). (ADRP 5-0, pg 1-5) • Priority Intelligence Requirement – (DOD) An intelligence requirement, stated as a priority for intelligence support, that the commander and staff need to understand the adversary or the operational environment. Also called PIR. See FM 2-01.3. (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-30) • Friendly Force Information Requirement – (DOD) Information the commander and staff need to understand to understand the status of friendly and supporting capabilities. Also called FFIR. See ADRP 5-0. (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-17) • A commander’s critical information requirement (CCIR) directly influences decision making and facilitates the successful execution of military operations. Commanders decide to designate an information requirement as a CCIR based on likely decisions and their visualization of the course of the operation. A CCIR may support one or more decisions. During planning, staffs recommend information requirements for commanders to designate as CCIRs. During preparation and execution, they recommend changes to CCIRs based on assessment. A CCIR is— • Specified by a commander for a specific operation. • Applicable only to the commander who specifies it. • Situation dependent—directly linked to a current or future mission. • Time-sensitive. • Essential Elements of Friendly Information: Commanders also describe information they want protected as essential elements of friendly information. An essential element of friendly information is a critical aspect of a friendly operation that, if known by the enemy, would subsequently compromise, lead to failure, or limit success of the operation and therefore should be protected from enemy detection. Although EEFIs are not CCIRs, they have the same priority. EEFIs establish elements of information to protect rather than ones to collect. Their identification is the first step in the operations security process and central to the protection of information.

34. MOP vs. MOE (and Indicator) • Measure of Performance: (DOD) A criterion used to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task accomplishment. See ADRP 5-0. (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-24) (MOP answers “was the action taken” or “were the tasks completed to standard” = “are we doing things right”) • ADRP 5-0, pg 5-2: The uses of MOPs are a primary element of battle tracking. MOPs focus on the friendly force. Evaluating task accomplishment using MOPs is relatively straightforward and often results in a yes or no answer. Examples of MOPs include: • Route X cleared • Generators delivered, are operational, and are secure at villages A, B, and C • Measure of Effectiveness: (DOD) A criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect. See ADRP 5-0. (ADRP 1-02, pg 1-24) (MOE answers “are we doing the right things”) • ADRP 5-0, pg 5-2: MOE for the objection to “Provide a safe and secure environment” may include: 1) Decrease in insurgent activity 2) Increase in population trust of host-nation security forces • ADRP 5-0, pg 5-4: In the context of assessment, an indicator is an item of information that provides insight into a measure of effectiveness or measure of performance. Indicators take the form of reports from subordinates, surveys and polls, and information requirements. Indicators help to answer the question “What is the current status of this MOE or MOP?” A single indicator can inform multiple MOPs and MOEs. Examples of indicators for the MOE “Decrease in insurgent activity” are: • Number of hostile actions per area each week. • Number of munitions caches found per area each week. • Number of reports of insurgent activity by the population per area per week. ADRP 5-0, pg 5-3

35. COA Sketch ADRP 1-02, pg 10-1 – 10-4 ATTP 5-0.1, pg 4-20 ATTP 5-0.1, pg 4-21

36. COA Validity Check (ATTP 5-0.1, pg 4-16)(FAS-DC)

37. (Three) Organizing Framework(s) (ADRP 3-0, pg 1-9 – 13) • Organizing Framework not defined in ADRP 1-02; refer to ADP 3-0 and ADRP 3-0 • An established operational framework and associated vocabulary can assist greatly in Army leaders are responsible for clearly articulating their visualization of operations in time, space, purpose, and resources. • Deep-Close-Security: historically associated with terrain orientation (contiguous; nonlinear and noncontiguous; nonlinear and contiguous) but can be applied to temporal and organizational orientations as well. • Deep: In contiguous areas of operations, a deep area is an area forward of the close area that a commander uses to shape enemy forces before they are encountered or engaged in the close area. • Close: In contiguous areas of operations, a close area is an area assigned to a maneuver force that extends from its subordinates’ rear boundaries to its own forward boundary. • Security: In contiguous areas of operations, a support area is an area for any command that extends from its rear boundary forward to the rear boundary of the next lower level of command. • Decisive-Shaping-Sustaining: lends itself to broad conceptual orientation. • Decisive: the operation that directly accomplishes the mission • Shaping: an operation that establishes conditions for the decisive operation through effects on the enemy, other actors, and the terrain. • Sustaining: operation at any echelon that enables the decisive operation or shaping operation by generating and maintaining combat power. • Main and Supporting Efforts: more simplistic than other organizing frameworks, focuses on prioritizing effort among subordinate units. Therefore, commanders can employ it with either the deep-close-security framework or the decisive-shaping-sustaining framework. • Main: The main effort is a designated subordinate unit whose mission at a given point in time is most critical to overall mission success. • Supporting: A supporting effort is a designated subordinate unit with a mission that supports the success of the main effort.

38. Strategy • No definition of strategy in ADRP 1-02 • JP 1-02: A prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives. (JP 3-0) (JP 1-02, pg 300) • Clausewitz: “[Strategy] is the use of an engagement for the purpose of the war.” (On War – Howard & Paret, pg 177) • [Clausewitz’s definition of strategy] recognizes only one means, combat or fighting. Yet it is actually broader than his critics admit, and demonstrably valid even in today’s postmodern setting. In judging his definition unfit, his detractors typically commit at least one of two classic errors: 1) mistake conclusions drawn from pure concept of war, that is, war considered from a strictly logical standpoint, as reflective of his approach to strategy; 2) they overlook the critical point that his definition of war’s means includes not only violence, but the threat of violence.” Echevarria (Clausewitz and Contemporary War, pg 133) • Jomini: “Strategy is the art of making war upon the map, and comprehends the whole theater of operations.” (Summary of the Art of War, trans. Mendell and Craighill, pg 69) • OR… “the art of properly directing masses upon the theater of war, either for defense or invasion” (Swain - “Commander's Business: Learning to Practice Operational Design”, Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 53, 2nd QTR 2009, pg 65) • Napoleon: “Strategy is the art of making use of time and space.” (Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon, pg 161) • Colin Gray: “the use that is made of force and the threat of force for the ends of policy.” (Echevarria, Clausewitz and Contemporary War, pg 144) / “To paraphrase Gray, strategy is the product of the dialogue between policy and national power in the context of the overall international security environment.” (Mackubin Owens, “Strategy and the Strategic Way of Thinking, pg114) • Richard Betts: “the link between military means and political ends” (Echevarria, Clausewitz and Contemporary War, pg 144) • Liddle Heart: “the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy” (Echevarria, Clausewitz and Contemporary War, pg 144) • RaoulCastex(French Admiral, inner-war): “Strategy is nothing other than the general conduct of operations, the supreme art of chiefs of a certain rank and of the general staffs destined to serve as their auxiliaries” (Strachan, “The Lost Meaning of Strategy”, pg39) • Thomas Schelling: “Strategy is not concerned with the efficient application of force by with the exploitation of potential force.” (Strachan, “The Lost Meaning of Strategy,” pg43) • Moltke: “Strategy is the transfer of knowledge to practical life… the art of acting under the pressure of the most difficult conditions.” (Strachan, “The Lost Meaning of Strategy,” pg46) • Mackubin Owens: “In essence, strategy describes the way in which the available means will be employed to achieve the ends of policy” (“Strategy and the Strategic Way of Thinking” pg111) • Julian Corbett: “the art of directing force to the ends in view” [and classified it as major and minor, the former a branch of statemanship and the latter having to do with plans of operations.] (Swain - “Commander's Business: Learning to Practice Operational Design”, Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 53, 2nd QTR 2009, pg 65)

39. Levels of War • The levels of war are doctrinal perspectives that clarify the links between strategic objectives and tactical actions. Although there are no finite limits or boundaries between them, the three levels are strategic, operational, and tactical. They apply to all types of military operations. (FM 3-90, pg 1-2) • Tactical level of war: The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to achieve military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) (JP 3-0, pg GL-17) / (JP 1-02, pg 309) • The strategic and operational levels provide the context for tactical operations. Without this context, tactical operations are reduced to a series of disconnected and unfocused actions. Engagements are linked to battles. One or more battles are linked to winning major operations and campaigns, leading to operational success, which can lead to strategic success. (FM 3-0 discusses major operations and campaigns.) • A battle consists of a set of related engagements that last longer and involve larger forces than an engagement (FM 3-0). Battles can affect the course of the campaign or major operation. A battle occurs when a division, corps, or army commander fights for one or more significant objectives. Battles are usually operationally significant, if not operationally decisive. • An engagement is a small, tactical conflict between opposing maneuver forces, usually conducted at brigade level and below (FM 3-0). An engagement normally lasts only a short time—minutes, hours, or a day. It can result from one side’s deliberate offensive movement against an opponent or from a chance encounter between two opponents, such as a meeting engagement. An engagement can be a stand-alone event or one of several related engagements comprising a battle. • Levels of command, size of units, types of equipment, or types of forces or components are not associated with a particular level of war. National assets, such as intelligence and communications satellites, previously considered principally in a strategic context, are an important adjunct to tactical operations. Actions are strategic, operational, or tactical based on their effect or contribution to achieving strategic, operational, or tactical objectives. Many times the accuracy of these labels can only be determined during historical studies. • Advances in technology, information-age media reporting, and the compression of time-space relationships contribute to the growing interrelationships between the levels of war. The levels of war help commanders visualize a logical flow of operations, allocate resources, and assign tasks to the appropriate command. However, commanders at every level must be aware that in a world of constant, immediate communications, any single event may cut across the three levels (see FM 3-0). (FM 3-90, pg 1-2-3) • Operational level of war: The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to achieve strategic objectives within theaters or other operational areas. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) (JP 3-0, pg GL-14) / (JP 1-02, pg 234) • Strategic level of war: The level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic security objectives and guidance, then develops and uses national resources to achieve those objectives. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.) (JP 3-0, pg GL-16) / (JP 1-02, pg 299)

40. Rapid Decisionmaking and Synchronization Process - RDSP (ADRP 5-0, pg 4-6) • RDSP is a technique that commanders and staffs commonly use during execution. Consists of five steps; • Compare the current situation to the order • During execution: • Monitor the situation to identify changes in conditions • Ask if changes effect overall conduct of of operations and if changes are significant • Identify the changed conditions represent variances from the order – especially opportunities and risks • Determine that a decision, and what type, is required • Variance identified: • Describe variance • Determine if variance provides significant opportunity or threat and examines the potential of either • Determines if a decision is needed by identifying if variance • Indicates • Develop a course of action • Define and validate the course of action • Implement

41. Elements of Decisive Action Chart(ADRP 3-90, pg 2-3)

42. Tactical Mission Tasks (1 of 8)

43. Tactical Mission Tasks(2 of 8)

44. Tactical Mission Tasks(3 of 8)

45. Tactical Mission Tasks(4 of 8)

46. Tactical Mission Tasks(5 of 8)

47. Tactical Mission Tasks(6 of 8) A A

48. Tactical Mission Tasks(7 of 8)

49. Steps to Developing ScenariosSchwartz, Peter. The Art of the Long View. (New York: Doubleday, 1991.), 226-34. // Wilkinson, Lawrence. “How to Build Scenarios” Wired.

50. Evolution of Operational ART Herring Manifest Destiny/ Monroe Cold War/ Bipolar World _____ MCDougal Old /New Testament Containment Global Police Forces • Wilsonianism Policy Policy Strategy ( Mintzberg, Dolman, Clausewitz) Operations Tactics Industrial Revolution Thucydides (Peloponnesian War) Melian Dialogue –”Strong Do what they can , weak suffer” War on Terror – Echevarria “America has two grammars of war- conventional / unconventional “ Application of creative imaginations by commanders and staffs- Design strategies, campaigns and major operations and organize and employ Military Forces- Operational Level is where this takes place (usually Corps) Bosnian War Seige of Sarajevo (Blue Helments 1992-1995) UN Joint Operations in the Philippines (Luzon) Pacific Campaign Cambodian Campaign (Abrahms/….Vietanamizaiton) Franco Prussian War (Bismark) General staff - Moltke Field Marshal Slim (Burma Campaign) Operation Desert Storm (Schwarzkoph)) Operation Desert Storm (Schwarzkoph)) Soviet Offensive Campaign ( Operation Bagration) Sun TZU – “Subdue the enemy without fighting” Napolein (Jena Campaign 1806 – Corps structure History Mexican War (Scott’s Campaign) Jomini influence American Civil War (Vicksburg) Jomini influence Meuse-Argonne Offensive (WW1 Pershing) WWII (Overlord, Cobra, Goodwood) Revolutionary War (George Washington) Yom Kippur War (Egypt invades Isreal) Vietnam War (MACV Westmoreland) Korean War (UN offensive MacArthur) Phillippines (Counter Insurgency) 1918 1776 1806 1863 1866 1900 1944 1944 1847 1950 1944 1942 1962 1970 1973 1990 1992 1990 2003-2013 Epstein (Napolean’s Last Victory (1809) a strategic war plan that effectively integrates the various theaters of operations; the fullest mobilization of the resources of the state. Operational Art requires Structure- IE. Modern Task Org and mobilization. CONCRETE Snieder (Vulcan’s Anvil) Civil War: decline of the decisive battle, the emergence of the empty battlefield and the rise of distributed free maneuver. Operational art Requires Instantaneous communication – IE technology Bruce Menning- “Operational Art’s Origins” in Historical Perspectives of the Operational Art Soviet’s and Deep Battle: Operational art required the practitioner to: - Identify strategic objectives within theater. - Visualize a theater in three dimensions. - Determine what sequence of military actions – preparation, organization, support, battles, and command arrangements – would bring attainment of those objectives Theory Swain: Filling the void “The employment of military forces to achieve strategic goals in a theater of war or a theater of operations, through the design, organization and conduct of campaigns and major operations.” 1982 FM 100-5 COGNITIVE Dolman- Pure Strategy Operational Art- Directly matches means to ends.Bruscino, Thomas: “The Theory of Operational Art and Unified Land Operations Concrete vs Ethereal- The cognitive linking of strategy and tactics. Naveh, Shimon. In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory Operational Art is that cognitive tension between strategic aim and tactical execution