Establishing Civilian Supremacy in Southeast Asia

1. A Report on “Establishing Civilian Supremacy in Southeast Asia”By Harold Crouch Lucio B. Pitlo III AS 210 July 17, 2008

2. AUTHOR: HAROLD CROUCH Education • BA- Melbourne University • MA- University of Bombay • Phd- Monash University Career • Presently Professor, Department of Political and Social Change, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University • Taught political science at the University of Indonesia (1968-71) • Taught political science at the National University of Malaysia (1975-85, 1988-90) • Taught political science at the University of the Philippines (1983-84) • Director, Indonesia Project, International Crisis Group (2000-02)

3. AUTHOR: HAROLD CROUCH Interests • Southeast Asian politics, particularly Indonesia. Key Publications • Trade Unions and Politics in India (1967) • The Army and Politics in Indonesia, Cornell University Press, 1978 • Malaysian Government and Society, Cornell University Press and Allen & Unwin, 1996

4. HISTORICAL CONTEXT • Cold War- Asia as the battleground for communism and capitalist-based democracy (i.e. Indochina, Korea) • Rise of military intervention in politics • Western support for military dictatorships by the West as a vanguard against the spread of communism (e.g. Marcos in RP)

5. HISTORICAL CONTEXT

6. INTENTION OF THE PAPER • Concerned with the challenge for Indonesian elected government to establish civilian supremacy over the military • Compare the civilian-military relations as experienced by different Southeast Asian countries

7. RP EXPERIENCE • Military withdrawal among Southeast countries was easiest in the Philippines • It was a civilian dictator who called for the military; government remained largely under civilian control with only few cabinet positions afforded to active and retired generals; defense ministry was under a civilian minister • RAM as representing the few politicized military elements, but which grew more prominence after Marcos’s martial rule staging 8 failed coups during the Aquino administration • Civilian supremacy enshrined in 1987 Constitution

8. THAI EXPERIENCE • Military withdrawal more difficult • Thai military has a history of actively participating in politics and governance • Military coup welcomed when it ousted unpopular regimes, but military rule is also criticized for its human rights abuses • Military’s hold in power checked by factionalism and infighting • Military retired from politics after popular outrage over their handling of mass demonstrations in the early 1990s • Since then, Thai military became more professional

9. INDONESIAN MILITARY DURING SUHARTO’S REGIME • Military were entrenched in the government from the cabinet ministries, national and regional parliaments, regional and local government units, foreign service, justice and leadership in state-owned enterprises • Presence of military counterpart for almost all civilian government positions • Developed Dwifungsi (dual function) doctrine, saying that on account of the military’s participation in the struggle for independence, they are entitled to play not only the role of a professional military, but also an actor in the sociopolitical life of the country

10. INDONESIAN MILITARY DURING SUHARTO’S REGIME • Territorial organizational structure reinforced military role and contributed to militarization; 2/3 of the army’s battalions scattered throughout the country • This structure checked the rise of social unrest and ethnic, religious or social strife; it was also used to monitor the activities of political parties, religious orgs, NGOs, student groups, trade unions etc. • Central troops- Kostrad (Strategic Reserve Command) and Kopassus (Special Forces)- are called in the event that territorial troops would need augmentation • Police integrated in the military and given military training • Military given access to spoils, legal and otherwise, getting their support for the maintenance of the status quo

11. INDONESIAN MILITARY IN THE POST SUHARTO YEARS • Change in the military mind-set during the mid 1990s, with many encouraging Suharto to step down • Many in the military still admire the dictator so no use of force to oust him came from the military • Resentment over his patronage politics (i.e. favoring of family, cronies in business) and use of military for his personal interests (i.e. overthrow of Megawati as leader of IDP in 1996) • Failure by Suharto to initiate or foresee the need for reforms in light of the Asian financial crisis which hit Indonesia • Suharto compelled to step down amidst widespread street demonstrations • The next president, Habibie depended on the military to add legitimacy to his term • Easing of restrictions in criticizing the military led to a barrage of attacks against the military for protecting and lending itself as an instrument for the authoritarian Suharto regime • Gen. Wiranto apologized over military excesses in Aceh, but refused to acknowledge the scale and magnitude of the abuses • Military intervention in East Timor further eroded its credibility

12. REFORMASI • “New Paradigm” advanced- envisions a professional military cushioned from politics and concerned more on external defense • Reforms implemented -Reduction of military officers in electoral and govt seats -Active military officers to divest from running for elections or taking govt seats -Disassociation of the military from Golkar, the political party of Suharto, and observance of neutrality during elections -Police separated from military and internal security considered a police matter -From Dept of Defense and Security to Dept of Defence to stress new focus -Acceptance of the concept of civilian supremacy among the military ranks; civilian as new Minister of Defence -Pres. Wahid conducted reshuffling of military commands to place reform-minded officers in the best positions to effect change -Gen Wiranto dismissed from Cabinet and made to face charges of abuses during the East Timor campaign

13. CHALLENGES TO THE REFORM PROCESS • Army’s territorial structure • Identified as prone to abuse and an obstacle to full democratization • Reduction in the no. of territorial command troops proposed • SARA • Military is recognized as the most effective force to deal with ethnic, social, religious and regional conflict • Military can be called on during times of crisis • Military prerogatives • Many in the military believed that their duty to protect their country, at times, may justify their going above the law • In instances when stability, national unity and public order is at stake, some argue that they can supersede civilian institutions

14. THESIS • If the economy became better, social order maintained and political institutions are functioning well, there will be lesser justification for military intervention • The return of the military will be met with strong public opposition • Strengthening of political parties centered on policies and platforms as a possible antidote against military adventurism

15. CRITIQUE AND REACTION • Police is still inadequate to maintain peace and order in the archipelago considering its sheer size • No guarantee that the replacement of military by police will amount to lesser cases of human rights violations • Military presence is crucial in maintaining the territorial integrity of the country amidst separatist aspirations by some ethnic-based movements (i.e. GAM in Aceh, Papua) • Military presence is also critical in staving off ethnic, social and religious conflicts • What will happen to military men made redundant by the reforms (i.e. troop reduction)? • How will the military face the specter of losing their opportunities for material advancement that they use to enjoy abundance? • Despite the inroads of the reforms, few higher ranking military gets punished for war crimes or abuses • No thorough investigations on alleged military excesses were made