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Russ Shafer-Landau. Moral Rationalism. Moral Rationalism. Moral Rationalism is the view that moral obligations entail reasons for action. Necessarily, if one has a moral obligation to do something they have a reason to do it.
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Russ Shafer-Landau Moral Rationalism
Moral Rationalism • Moral Rationalism is the view that moral obligations entail reasons for action. Necessarily, if one has a moral obligation to do something they have a reason to do it. • If an action is morally right, then the action’s moral rightness is a prima facie justifying reason for performing it. Consider the following: • If an agent thinks that an action is morally right, and cites its rightness as a reason to perform it, and it is in fact morally right, and other see that, we don’t generally question their action. • If an agent thinks that an action is morally right, and its rightness is questionable and others see that, then we do generally question their action.
Shafer-Landau’s project • Shafer-Landau’s project is to defend moral rationalism. • This will be done through two approaches. • On the one hand by providing some positive reasons in favor of moral rationalism. • On the other hand by defusing the arguments against moral rationalism that are provided by the reasons internalist, the rational egoist, and the mystical nature of extrinsic reasons.
The reasons internalist argument against moral rationalism. • Reasons internalism is true: reasons must be capable of motivating those for whom they are reasons. • Desires are required for motivation. • Moral obligations apply to agents independently of their desires. • Therefore, moral rationalism is false. Basically – if you don’t have a desire that would be satisfied by doing an action, then you don’t have a reason to perform the action.
Responding to the Reasons Internalist • If internalism is true, then one has no reason to do A if A-ing is rationally unrelated to one’s existing motivations. • If one has no reason to A, then one can’t be justly blamed or punished for not A-ing. • Therefore, if internalism is true, then one can’t be justly blamed or punished for not A-ing, if A-ing is rationally unrelated to one’s existing motivations. • Some agents are justly blamed or punished for their evil deeds, even though avoidance of such conduct was rationally unrelated to their motivations. • Therefore, reasons internalism is false.
The Case of the Evil Misanthrope Consider a person so misanthropic, so heedless of others’ regard, so bent on cruelty, that nothing in his present set of motives would prevent him from committing the worst kind of horrors. He cannot, in the relevant sense, be moved to forbear from such behavior. But why should this unfortunate fact force us to revise our standards for appropriate conduct? Nothing we say to him will convince him to modify his behavior. But is this intransigence a basis for holding him to different standards, or isn’t it rather a justification for convicting him of a kind of blindness? It is natural to say that people have a reason to refrain from behavior that is fiendish, callous, brutal, arrogant or craven. We don’t withdraw such evaluations just because their targets fail to find them compelling.
Questions to consider: • Can somebody be blameworthy for an action they commit or fail not to commit, if they had no desire that would be satisfied by not committing the action or no desire to commit the action? • Can somebody be blameworthy for an action if there is no reason to not commit the action? • If we find that people can be blameworthy for committing or not committing certain actions that are outside of their motivations, should we accept that there can be reasons for action that are desire-independent?
The Rationalist Egoist Argument Against Moral Rationalism • Rational egoism is true. • Ethical egoism is false. • So, moral rationalism is false. Explanation: since (EE) is false, there are some things one is obligated to do that do not promote their self-interest, and since (RE) is true, one will have no reason to pursue any interests that don’t promote their interest. Rational Egoism: one has a reason to do A if and only if doing A will promote one’s interests. Ethical Egoism: one is morally obligated to do A if and only if doing A will promote one’s self-interest. Moral Rationalism: Necessarily, if one has a moral obligation to do something they have a reason to do it.
Cases to Consider • Do I have a reason to yell out and warn a person about to be run over by an oncoming vehicle, if I have no interest that would be promoted by doing so? • Do I have a reason to call the police and intervene immediately if I see a gang of youths corner a young woman, taunt her, and drag her into a dark alley, if I have nointerestthat would be promoted by doing so? • Do I have a reason to give a hiker some water, if I see that they dehydrated, even if I have nointereestthat would be promoted by doing so?
Response to the Rational Egoist Argument • Accept that ethical egoism is false, and challenge the claim that rational egoism is true. • Consider two conditionals: • If A promotes x’s self-interest, then x has a reason to do A. • If x has a reason to do A, then A promotes x’s self-interest. Accept that (a) is true, butargue that (b) is false. • Argument against (b): Some of our autonomous choices do not promote our self interest, yet they provide us with reasons for action. Consider the soldier who decides to sacrifice his life to save his fellow soldiers. In killing himself he autonomously pursues what is not in his self interest. But the autonomous choice provides him with a reason to pursue certain steps.
Two Types of Reasons • Prima Facie reasons are first consideration reasons that come merely from a situation but do not come by way of considering one’s other desires and or operative reasons for action at a given time. • An all things considered reason is a final reason for action which comes by comparing competing reasons and desires, ranking them, and deciding that one reason overrides all other competitors. • Can we have prima facie reasons for action that don’t depend on promotion of our self-interest? • Can we have an all things considered reason that does not depend on promoting our self-interest?
The Argument from Extrinsic Reasons Against Moral Rationalism • If moral rationalism is true, then moral facts are intrinsically reason-giving. • There are no intrinsically reason-giving facts. • So, moral rationalism is false. • Anti-rationalists maintain that all reasons derive from an agent’s perspective. • Does theclaim that there are non-perspectival reasons make sense? • If reasons exist regardless of one’s desires or interests, then where do they come from, and how could we know them?
Demystifying Moral Rationalism • Moral rationalism is thought to be mystical because it posits the existence of non-perspectival reasons that are independent of our desires and contingent projects and goals at a given time. • But is the mystical aspect of non-perspectival reasons really that mystical when we look at all the problems that stand in the way of making sense of anti-rationalism. • Moral rationalism is not dependent on moral objectivism. Some of our angst about moral objectivism drives our angst about moral rationalism because we think they are tied together through the idea that rationalism depends on objective facts that are like non-normative facts.
Responding to the Argument from Extrinsic Reasons • There are non-perspectival or intrinsic reasons: • If an agent believes that p implies q, and that p is true, she has a reason to believe q even if no desire would be satisfied by believing q. • For example, suppose you believe that if the plane your son was on crashed, then your son would most likely be dead, and that you believe that the plane your son was on did crash, because it was just announced on the news. You then have a reason to believe that your son is most likely dead, even though you have no desire-dependent reason to believe it. That is no desire of yours would be satisfied by believing that your son is dead. • 2 + 2 = 4, whether or not anyone has a desire that would be satisfied by believing it, there are intrinsic reasons for believing that 2 +2 = 4.
The Self-Defeating Nature of Anti-Rationalism • Anti-rationalism maintains that all reasons are perspectival, contingent, and dependent on the specific desires, projects, and goals that an agent has. It denies that there are any non-perspectival reasons for belief or action. • But if anti-rationalism is true, then there is no non-perspectival reason to believe it, because all reasons for belief are contingent upon the agent, and no perspective on the world is superior to another. • Therefore, if anti-rationalism is true, whether or not an agent has a reason to believe it depends merely on his or her contingent perspective on the world.
