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Coercive Measures. Military intervention, foreign aid, and sanctions. I. Military Intervention. Predicting intervention Interstate War Escalation: Joining an ongoing armed conflict Best predictor: Prior third-party intervention Alliance portfolios predict side choice.
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Coercive Measures Military intervention, foreign aid, and sanctions
I. Military Intervention • Predicting intervention • Interstate War Escalation: Joining an ongoing armed conflict • Best predictor: Prior third-party intervention • Alliance portfolios predict side choice
What is an alliance portfolio? • All of the allies of a state • Similar portfolios generally reduce conflict / increase cooperation • Better predictor than dyadic alliance!
I. Military Intervention • Predicting intervention • Interstate War Escalation: Joining an ongoing armed conflict • Best predictor: Prior third-party intervention • Alliance portfolios predict side choice • More likely when existing parity between combatants
Balances of Power: Disparity and Parity Disparity Parity
I. Military Intervention • Predicting intervention • Interstate War Escalation: Joining an ongoing armed conflict • Best predictor: Prior third-party intervention • Alliance portfolios predict side choice • More likely when existing parity between combatants • Great powers intervene much more frequently!
2. Intervention in Civil Wars • Predictors (all prior to intervention): • Battle-Deaths, Refugees/Displacement, Media Reporting (US all types), Duration • Cold War, Bilateral Colonial Ties, Contiguity, Civil War State’s Rivals and Rivals’ Rivals, Parity, Bilateral FDI (military intervention only!), Prior Intervention. • Stronger rebels attract more pro-rebel intervention.
2. Intervention in Civil Wars • Inhibiting factors: Economic/Military power of target (government), Oil exports of CW state, Population/Density, Prior Great Power Intervention, Victory • Tough calls: Democracy of intervener and target (mixed – leans positive), Bilateral Trade (mixed)
B. When does intervention work? • Who wins interstate wars? • Who started it? Initiators win most wars quickly, but tend to lose long wars. • Bigger economy usually wins (GDP outperforms military predictors) • Bigger military also helps – parity makes victory less likely for both sides (stalemate)
2. Intervention in Civil Wars • Does intervention lead to compromise?
Probability of Compromise, 1816-1997 Intervention for government No intervention 2. Intervention in Civil Wars
2. Intervention in Civil Wars • Does intervention lead to compromise? Yes • Does intervention prolong wars?
2. Intervention in Civil Wars • Does intervention lead to compromise? Yes • Does intervention prolong wars? Yes • Is intervention getting more common?
2. Intervention in Civil Wars • Does intervention lead to compromise? Yes • Does intervention prolong wars? Yes • Is intervention getting more common? Yes • The intervenor’s dilemma: Saving lives vs. Justice • Want to end the war quickly? Help the strong crush the weak • Want to find a compromise? Write off another 10,000 people
II. Sanctions and Pressure • Predicting Sanctions • US Sanctions: Best single predictor is target’s relationship with US • Domestic factors, target characteristics almost irrelevant • Interesting: Belligerence towards US after threat reduces chance that US imposes sanctions
II. Sanctions and Pressure • Predicting Sanctions • US Sanctions: Best single predictor is target’s relationship with US • Domestic factors, target characteristics almost irrelevant • Interesting: Belligerence towards US after threat reduces chance that US imposes sanctions • General: Asymmetric dependence • If I depend on you, I am unlikely to sanction you • If you depend on me, I am more likely to sanction you • Problem: Measuring dependence is hard
Example: US-South Africa • 1984: Asymmetric Interdependence? US = 15% of S.A. trade, but S.A. = only 1% of US trade • Issue: Apartheid • US backs South Africa, vetoes UN resolutions for sanctions • US imposes minor sanctions only (to forestall larger ones) • Question: Why not sanction?
Example: US-South Africa • Answer: Minerals • USSR was obviously unreliable for strategic minerals
Example: US-South Africa • US needed imports of critical minerals:
F-100 Engine Use of Imported Metals(F-15 and F-16 aircraft – key to air defense in 1980s) Cobalt 910 lbs 73% (Norway, Finland) Tantalum 3 lbs 80% (China) Titanium 5,366 lbs 77% (Australia, South Africa) Columbium 171 lbs 100% (Brazil) Aluminum 720 lbs 100% (Australia) Chromium 1,656 lbs 80% (South Africa) Nickel 5,024 lbs 63% (Canada) (Note: Metals indicated are used in more than one place in engine)
Example: US-South Africa • Best case: end trade = price increases • Worst case: end trade = inferior hardware
Example: US-South Africa Did South Africa’s Minerals Make It Secure? • No: Fear of resource conflict nuclear proliferation • 1957: US provides nuclear reactors, enriched uranium • 1970s: Insecurity in southern Africa = security-based rationale for atomic bomb (South Africa fears Soviet influence) • 1975-1976: US cuts off nuclear cooperation over NPT dispute; UK terminates bilateral defense treaty over apartheid • “laager mentality:” Fear of Soviet invasion, need to force Western defense, conventional arms embargoes, isolation proliferation • 1977-1979: US-Soviet pressure fails to prevent probable nuclear test (possibly joint Israeli-South African test) • 1980s: Six atomic bombs constructed • 1990: White government dismantles arsenal before majority rule
B. Do sanctions work? • The basic problem: The “best” sanctions are never imposed (game theory)
B. Do sanctions work? • The basic problem: The “best” sanctions are never imposed (game theory) • Keys to success • Sanction must be large % of target’s GDP • Sanction must not harm sender (very much) • Problem: Trade is mutually beneficial. Cutoff will always harm sender • Success usually takes less than 5 years
III. Foreign Aid • Predicting foreign aid • In general (who gets the most aid?) • Free market countries (especially during Cold War) • Post-Colonial states (especially during decolonization) • Poverty and Debt • Specific relationships • US: Egypt, Israel, Iraq (since 2003) • Japan: “Friends of Japan” – similar UN voting and trade • Western Europe: Former colonies
1. Recent International Affairs spending (aid and diplomacy): Surprising stability
3. Top Three Recipients of US Aid: FY 2001 – FY 2009 (And 2010 Request) Israel and Egypt were the top two from 1979 to 2002 and in the top five ever since 9/11 (along with Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan – countries where US forces have been fighting). Why?
C. Does foreign aid work? • Aid and corruption: No overall correlation, positive or negative • More corrupt countries tend to attract US aid • Less corrupt countries tend to attract aid from Australia and Scandinavia • Aid and growth • “Good policies:” Aid may have positive effect • “Bad policies:” Aid has no effect • Problem: Hard to establish effect of aid on growth. Why?