13 th International Conference on Social Dilemmas, Kyoto, 20-24 august 2009

1. Honesty Pays: On the benefits of having and disclosing information in coalition formationIlja van Beest, Wolfang Steinel and Keith Murnighan 13th International Conference on Social Dilemmas, Kyoto, 20-24 august 2009

2. Information dilemma • Revealing information facilitates the achievement of joint outcomes but simultaneously increases personal vulnerability (Murnighan, Babcock, Thompson, & Pillutla, 1999) • Economic theory reacts to the information dilemma by suggesting that people should keep information private, because revealing information can lead rational others to use this information for their own advantage.

3. B A C A definition: • “The process in which two or more parties negotiate about the decision to allocate payoffs to those that are included and those that are excluded in a coalition (Van Beest & Van Dijk, 2007)”

4. Benefits of private information • Being able to exchange one’s chips for a higher value than other players is a huge advantage in coalition formation because it (a) enables this person to obtain more payoffs than other players when chips are handed in at the end of a negotiation, and (b) because it enables this person to make more attractive offers to potential coalition players than those who do not have an exchange advantage

5. Study 1: having private information - Participants are players in a 4(3 2 2) majority game. - payoffs are 10 valuable chips - Player A can exchange chips for 2 euro. - Player B and C can exchange chips for 1 euro. Manipulation: Complete information: all players know Incomplete information: only player A knows

6. AB = 3:2 AC = 3:2 BC = 2:2 Strength is weakness predicts that BC-coalitions will be formed Thus if A is smart he/she offers more than 50% to either B or C Put differently, more than 5 chips What should you do?

7. Study 1: offers

8. Study 1: actual payoffs

9. Summary so far - Having private information about exchange advantage was detrimental for own outcomes. - But what about active information sharing? Will participants place themselves in a situation that resembles the full information condition or will they seek a situation that resembles the incomplete information condition?

10. Study 2: sharing private information - Participants are player As in a 4( 3 2 2) majority game. - payoffs are 20 valuable chips - Player A can exchange chips for 1.5 euro. - Player B and C can exchange chips for 1 euro. -Question 1: Will player A reveal exchange advantage or not? -Question 2: How will this affect attractiveness of offer? -Question 3: How is this related to fairness considerations?

11. Study 2: a process .13 (.37**) Fairness Offer Deception -.57** -.41**

12. Study 3: SVO and perspective taking -Perspective taking is the cognitive capacity to consider the world from other viewpoints. It allows an individual to anticipate the behavior and reactions of others (Davis, 1983). - Galinsky (2008) shows that perspective takers created more value and claimed more payoffs in a bilateral negotiation. - So how would a focus on the position of potential coalition partners affect the likelihood that participants signal that they are attractive?

13. Study 3: Revealing information

14. Conclusions 1 • Coalition bargainers fail to use private information to make themselves attractive • This is facilitated by self-interest motivations and inhibited by fairness motivations • Which are in turn augmented by perspective taking

15. Conclusions 2 • Strength is weakness is based on the assumption that players fail to understand that they do not have power. Instead we observe that players fail to understand that they have to make their power base known • Perspective taking increases joint gains and individuals gains. We show that this may depend on the social value orientation of the participant. Prosocials may increase joint gains. Proselfs may increase individuals gains.

16. Conclusions 3 • Social Utility Model of Coalition formation (van Beest & Van Dijk, 2007) • Self-interest and fairness consideration fuel both ends of the information dilemma • Self-interest inhibits disclosing of information • Fairness facilitates disclosing of information

17. References • Van Beest, I., Van Dijk, E. (2007). Self-interest and fairness in coalition formation: A social utility approach to understanding partner selection and payoff allocations in groups. European Review of Social Psychology, 18, 132 – 174. • Van Beest, I., Andeweg, R., Koning, L., & Van Lange, P. A. M. (2008). Do groups exclude others more readily than individuals in coalition formation? Group Processes and Intergroup Relations, 11, 69-81 • Van Beest, I., Van Dijk, E., De Dreu, C. K. W. & Wilke, H. A. M. (2005). Do-no-harm in coalition formation: Why losses inhibit exclusion and promote fairness cognitions. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 41, 609-617. • Van Beest, I., Van Dijk, E., & Wilke, H. (2004). Resources and alternatives in coalition formation: the effects on payoff, self-serving behavior, and bargaining length. European of Journal of Social Psychology, 34, 713-728. • Van Beest, I., Wilke, H., & Van Dijk, E. (2004). The interplay of self-interest and equity in coalition formation. European of Journal of Social Psychology, 34, 547-565. • Van Beest, I., Van Dijk, E., & Wilke, H. (2003). The excluded player in coalition formation. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 29, 237-247. • Van Beest, I., & Van Kleef, G., & Van Dijk, E. (2008). Get Angry, Get Out: The Interpersonal Effects of Anger Communication in Multiparty Negotiation. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 44(4), 993-1002