Stability, Security and Development

1. Stability, Security and Development GP3200 August 22, 2012 Rule of Law, Justice, Reconciliation DDR, Humanitarian Assistance Dr Robert E. Looney relooney@nps.edu

2. Outline • Rule of Law • NDU Presentation – Main Considerations • Afghanistan/Iraq General Lessons • DDR – Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration • Justice/Reconciliation • Humanitarian Assistance • Refugees/Internal Displacement • Post-Conflict Summary: Rules for the Military

3. NDU: Rule of Law I

4. NDU: Rule of Law II

5. NDU: Rule of Law III

6. NDU: Rule of Law IV

7. NDU: Rule of Law V

8. NDU: Rule of Law VI

9. NDU: Rule of Law VII

10. NDU: Rule of Law VIII

11. Rule of Law: General Principles • Immediate imperative to stabilizing post-conflict environments is • ensuring that the criminal economy does not suffocate growth of licit commercial and social activities • Requires the establishment or support of law enforcement and judicial bodies that can prevent, investigate, and punish corruption and criminality • Military commanders may rightly contend that in early stages of an intervention they have too many challenges to deal with • and that policing operations focused on illicit power structures would divert resources from other vital security functions • However, U.S. experience in Iraq and Afghanistan has shown that such rule of law functions are inseparable from the goals associated with stabilization operations

12. Rule of Law: Afghanistan Lessons • In Afghanistan part of the rule of law problem has involved the lack of a coherent strategy, and consequently a coherent means of measuring success • “after almost five years of donor activities in Afghanistan, the baseline knowledge about the formal justice system outside of Kabul remains fairly rudimentary. • One problem: for roughly first five years of engagement in Afghanistan, only 1% of USAID budget went to Rule of Law programming. • Despite fact that large segments of the population were concerned with government corruption. • Picture that emerges is one of ad hoc development programs focused on immediately accessible institutions with limited impact on the majority of the country’s population. • Major lesson from Iraq and Afghanistan • Future planning should recognize the full scope of post conflict needs and properly plan a substantial law enforcement component in stabilization operations. • Stabilizing forces must lay out a clear rule of law strategy with measurable timelines, and goals from the outset

13. Rule of Law Funding, Afghanistan

14. Afghanistan, National Corruption Survey

15. Rule of Law: Necessity of Immediate Action I • Violent conflict often leads to the breakdown of state institutions • As armed groups battle with a certain territory, governing institutions may be unable to provide services or may be totally destroyed • Thus a “transition gap” is created wherein government institutions fail to take adequate responsibility for enforcing the law • This gap creates opportunities for the malevolent to develop sophisticated networks with they can pursue illicit activity • As early as April 2003, one month after the U.S. overthrew Saddam Iraq, reports indicated that criminal organizations had begun to develop around the main population centers of Basra, Baghdad and Mosul • By July, many of these organizations had had developed sophisticated means for arms and drug smuggling in and out of the country.

16. Rule of Law: Necessity of Immediate Action II Iraqi Crime (contd.) • These organizations inevitably will develop ties with local governing institutions, allowing them protection, access to resources and additional opportunities for illicit profit • Such trends are not unique to Iraq. • In Bosnia the smuggling networks that were critical to various wartime activities transitioned seamlessly into profit centers during the peace, pursuing a number of illicit activities • Similar accounts in conflict situations throughout Asia and Africa • One of the most serious mistakes stabilizing forces can make is discounting the likelihood of the organized criminalization of post conflict states. • Ignoring such developments sets a path for subsequent institutional and social trends that lead to profound corruption and potentially the inability of a state to sustain governing institutions

17. Rule of Law: Necessity of Immediate Action III Iraq crime (contd.) • Despite its authority and control, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), the U.S. government organization established in 2003 to guide Iraq from conflict to stability: • Seemed unconcerned with any comprehensive policing strategy • Saw crime as an Iraqi responsibility • Despite exploding crime not until 2006 that any prominent US official called for a more intense focus on corruption and criminality • Similar mistakes made in Afghanistan • Warlords who led the Northern Alliance were allowed to divvy up the country into own spheres of influence • Many now run roughshod over the Afghan people and control various aspects of the licit and illicit Afghan economy • Despite years of significant international presence in both countries, Iraq and Afghanistan continue to rank amongst the most corrupt countries in the world

18. Rule of Law: Necessity of Immediate Action IV Summing up • Stabilizing forces must recognize that law enforcement functions are integral to stabilization operations • The development community as a whole (including the military) must stand up rule of law institutions and then gradually transition such institutions over to local authority. • The military must, consequently develop groups that are capable of both adjusting and enforcing law in the early stages of stabilization. • Such law enforcement requirements force policymakers to acknowledge intervention is a resource intensive process and cannot be done on the cheap.

19. DDR I • Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) a key element determining success in the post-conflict environment. It can be looked at as a first step in the justice/reconsiliation process. • Disarmament refers to the collection documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of both combatants and civilians • Demobilization refers to the formal and controlled discharge of identifies and active combatants from armed forces and other non-state armed groups. • Reintegration refers to the process by which former combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment, livelihood or income in a civilian capacity

20. DDR II • DDR complicated by fact there are a whole range of alternatives for the “reintegration” element: • Reinsertion, a form of transitional assistance designed to cover the basic needs of the ex-combatant as they establish themselves – might include training, employment. • Rehabilitation – common element in most DDR related programs and is critical for achieving positive results. Means through which former combatants can overcome psychological issues, drug and drink problems. Also issues related to the communities expected to bear the return of combatants following conflict • Resettlement, repatriation – bundle of issues surrounding whole package of settling former combatants who may have been removed from their communities for some time. • Since there 1980s there have been more than sixty documented DDR Programs • Shift in emphasis away form purely military approaches and towards more developmental ideas particularly on rehabilitation elements

21. DDR III • DDR programs have become an integral part of the post-conflict process. Critically important: • They form a symbolic act relating to the willingness of participants to develop peaceful approaches • They are an integral part of the peace process and the overall reduction in the number of small arms and light weapons • They are the main means through which former combatants can stop being combatants and regain some form of normal live • Critics note however • DDR Process frequently carried out independently of broader peace building initiatives – does not usually address weapons circulating in civilian areas • Have resulted in increased flows of weapons across borders • Combatants receiving help from more than one country.

22. DDR IV DDR – Difficult issues: • Who is eligible for DDR? Starting point is combatants and support services of any armed group • Drawing boundaries around this group not easy • Child soldiers frequently regarded as ineligible and may enter a different process. • Not everyone who can hand in a weapon is a legitimate combatant – problem of verifying eligibility • Typically DDR excludes those too young or who have not served for long enough • Women constitute another complex group in the process • Issues: getting hold of the right weapons rather than obsolete weaponry • Any payment to support reinsertion of former combatants into society should be linked to training or work undertaken and paid gradually over a period of time

23. DDR V • Reintegration process the most complex element of DDR. Major components include: • Providing information and counseling on available reintegration opportunities • Supporting the former combatants and their dependents in participating in local communities • Offering targeted support to groups in need of specialized care (children, the chronically ill, the disabled, women, youth • Increasing the capacities of the receiving communities to integrate the demobilized • A shortage of job opportunities is essentially a security risk and therefore it is critical to develop alternatives to violence based livelihoods of former combatants

24. Justice/Reconcilation I • Post-conflict justice – there are variety of means to deal with legacies of human rights abuses by previous regimes or during confect • Known as transitional justice to differentiate from the longer-term development of regular state justice systems • UN defines transitional justice as “the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses in order to ensure accountability, service justice and achieve reconciliation.” • Such interventions typically include elements of: • Criminal prosecutions, • Truth and reconciliation commissions • Reparations for victims • Tribunals • Vetting and • Institutional justice reform

25. Justice/Reconcilation II • Activities involve prosecution, accountability and truth-telling: • All contribute to overall accountability and the rule of law • Enable the reconstruction of the pubic narrative of what happened during the years of conflict • Traditionally transitional justice has been seen as a separate process to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), but increasingly the two are being treated as interlinked • Aimed at overcoming the illegitimate use of force and the capacity of societies to integrate former combatants • Establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) provides another international mechanism for accountability linking DDR and transitional justice

26. Justice/Reconcilation III • War crimes – ICC specified offenses subject to transitional justice, within the Rome Statute of 2002 include: • Willful killing • Torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments • Willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health • Extensive destruction and appropriation of property not justified by military necessity or carried out wantonly • Compelling a prisoner of war (POW) or protected person to serve in hostile forces • willfully depriving POWs of a fair trial or treatment • Unlawful deportations or confinement • Taking of hostages • Killing or wounding a combatant who has laid down arms • Using any form of gas or chemical warfare • Committing outrages of personal dignity, • Intentionally using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare

27. Justice/Reconcilation IV • Rome Statute also discusses the issue of serious violations of international customs that are applicable to armed conflicts in particular directing attacks against civilian populations. • Approaches to transitional justice include: • The ICC • Prosecutions and tribunals • Truth and reconciliation commissions • Reparations; and • Institutional reform and local justice

28. Justice/Reconcilation IV • The ICC • Expression of liberal view of universal human rights enshrined in the UN – human rights are universal • International community can represent individual citizens against states as well as prosecute individuals for war crimes and issuing warrants for arrest • Rome Statute signed by 120 countries, but not the U.S. • ICC theoretically empowered to investigate acts of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, but there are significant constraints on its power. • Apart from the U.S. not being a member, the ICC has no means of enforcement but depends on signatory states to comply – real problem if a state itself is the perpetrator.

29. Summary Points • The post conflict environment creates a series of challenges that require a number of specific policy approaches in the security and justice areas. • Stabilizing forces must recognize that law enforcement functions are integral to stabilization operations • DDR is a complex process that involves a series of stages. The last stage of rehabilitation is the most complex and can take years or even decades • Involvement of local communities in the reinsertion of former combatants is directly related to the issue of transitional justice • To facilitate reconciliation, former combatants should not be seen to benefit from taking up arms • Justice is an integral part of the overall security system and is critical for the protection of human security.

30. Humanitarian Assistance Overview I • Overview • Humanitarian assistance is provided to save lives and alleviate suffering caused by conflict or other human-made or natural disasters • Provided by national governments, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, foreign governments, and militaries and combatant groups • Some groups provide assistance for purely altruistic or humanitarian reasons: others may provide aid to attain political goals • If the host government is incapable of responding to needs and if security concerns limit what civilian assistance providers can do, military personnel often called upon to help

31. Humanitarian Assistance Overview II • Even when civilians are actively involved, military personnel may play a supporting role in helping ensure that assistance is provided effectively • The commander has a moral and legal obligation to the civilian population in his or her area of responsibility (AOR) • Understanding the humanitarian situation and who is taking what action with regard to it is also critical to SA. • Providing humanitarian assistance requires resolving a series of problems

32. Humanitarian Assistance: The Problems I • 1. Getting relief to victims can be hard • Civilian international relief agencies have become adept at determining requirements needed after a disaster • Many agencies have substantial stockpiles ready for an emergency • However transportation and distribution remain major challenges • People may live in remote areas with poor transport links – conflict has often destroyed what networks existed • The roads that exist may be controlled by insurgents or criminals or be mined • Local police, customs officers, government officials, and militias may demand payments to facilitate free movement of relief supplies or individuals working for humanitarian relief organizations

33. Humanitarian Assistance: The Problems II • 2. Refugee camps can make conflict worse • In many countries refugee camps fell under control of insurgents who • abused residents, controlled supplies, and used the camps as recruiting grounds and bases for insurgent attacks against the host-nation government • 3. Humanitarian assistance is used as a political and security tool • Both armed groups party to the conflict (such as insurgents) and peace-keepers often provide assistance in part to gain the support of local population • In the aftermath of its 2006 conflict with Israel, Hezbollah played a lead role in reconstruction efforts in Lebanon, including one year’s rent to affected families • U.S. military units also provide assistance, both to meet needs and to gain public support • However provision of assistance in a discriminatory fashion violates U.S. government policy, international humanitarian guidelines and international law • It can also perpetuate inequalities and foster discontent/conflict

34. Humanitarian Assistance: The Problems III • 4. Ineffective host government responses to disasters may foster support for an insurgency • In an insurgency, the support of the local population is the ultimate objective of each party • If armed groups opposed to the government visibly do a better job of responding to a disaster than the government • Public support for the government weakens • The position of the insurgents strengthens • On the other hand, security forces that support the local government will strengthen the government’s position, if they effectively provide humanitarian assistance • Combatants may compete with one another to provide assistance even as they engage in combat • Although U.S. government guidance for humanitarian assistance requires that aid be given to those who need it, U.S. forces may be seen both by aid recipients and other assistance providers as having a political as well as humanitarian purpose.

35. Humanitarian Assistance: Main Tasks I • Key Tasks for the host government, civilian assistance agencies and NGOs include: • Determine what needs to be done and coordinate efforts • Help displaced people survive and eventually resettle • Distribute relief • Make sure that relief supports, not undermines, longer- term development goals • 1. Determine what needs to be done • If the host government is able to function, its primary task is to work with relief agencies to determine what needs to be done and to coordinate the relief efforts offered by other countries and agencies • If it is incapable of coordinating this effort, and international organization like the UN may take on this role • The host government and its agencies may be the only institutions that have detailed information on the situation – host government is responsible for transferring this information to assistance providers.

36. Humanitarian Assistance: Main Tasks II • 2. Help Displaced People Survive and Eventually Resettle • If large numbers of people flee, host government should provide or help identify safe locations for shelter • If camps are needed, host government or assistance providers should help set them up • The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has the most expertise in the area. • Organizations such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM) may also be involved • Who does what will be a senior policy-level decision, but military leaders at operational and tactical level should be prepared to help their civilian counterparts involved in these efforts • by providing security and • in some cases transportation or other logistical support

37. Humanitarian Assistance: Main Tasks III • 2. Survival/Resettlement (contd.) • Security is a key concern • If displacement lasts more than a brief period, schools will also be needed in addition to assistance with earning money • In cases where the displaced are not living in camps or other temporary shelters, such assistance can be provided as part of development assistance to the broader community • In these cases, important to make sure that the needs of the displaced are neither ignored nor appear to take precedence over the needs of the long-term population • The displaced can also be employed in short-term jobs in construction and the clinics and schools for their communities. • If the displaced cannot return home quickly it is usually better that they be integrated into the surrounding community, rather than housed in temporary shelters such as camps

38. Humanitarian Assistance: Main Tasks IV • 2. Survival/Resettlement (contd.) • Camps are often recruiting grounds for insurgents who may take over the camp and monopolize its resources • Programs to assist refugees and the internally displaced need to be designed so that they do not perpetuate or reignite the conflict • Ethnic cleansing, continued violence and the ability the ability to enforce property rights will affect what is possible • Donors and the host government should design programs to help the displaced return home or find new permanent homes • They can also provide cash grants or vouchers to pay for travel, seeds, and tools to help people resume their livelihoods. • Donors and the host government may have to work with local governments and leaders to integrate the displaced into new communities which may not be fully welcoming.

39. Humanitarian Assistance: Main Tasks V • 3 Distribute Relief • Host government should permit humanitarian assistance to be given to anyone who needs it. • According to international law, neither it nor the foreign providers of assistance can deny or use aid to punish or reward particular groups • This principle of neutrality protects (albeit not fully) relief agencies that operate in conflict zones from being seen as aligned with combatants and targeted. • Relief supplies can be an especially valuable commodity during disasters and can be used for personal gain or as leverage to induce desired behavior • Used to be wide spread use of religious groups to distribute assistance. Practice had to be abandoned because cases of aid only going to that religious denomination or people being forced to join a religious group • Cases of organizations ordering more supplies than needed in order to sell the surplus • Militias and other armed groups can also use aid to fund their operations • One of major sources of revenue for militias in Somalia is providing protection for aid delivery or diverting the aid.

40. Humanitarian Assistance: Main Tasks VI • 4. Make sure relief supports, not undermines, longer-term development goals • Many relief activities have longer term impacts • Newly constructed infrastructure often becomes permanent after the crisis subsides • Seeds and other agricultural support provided to meet needs will affect what farmers grow • How the displaced are or are not reintegrated in a given area or assisted to return will help define the future economy of to the their place of refuge and the area they fled • Host government should consult with agencies that are providing relief to ensure that the aid provided is positioned to best support the future development of the country • Care should also be taken to protect against the potential negative effects of food aid on local agriculture • Food aid, particularly arriving late in a humanitarian crisis may serve to drive down prices of local crops hurting farmers and providing disincentives for future production

41. Potential Army Tasks • In a situation where humanitarian assistance needs to be provided the Army can expect to be involved in the following tasks: • Provide immediate relief and supply management, logistical, and transport support to assist the delivery of relief if civilian groups are incapable of doing so • Coordinate with other groups • Provide security for the population at risk • Protect roads, ports, airports warehouses, relief personnel and critical infrastructure • Provide technical assistance and training

42. Humanitarian Assistance: Case Study I • Small water purification in Iraq • Working in consultation with the local PRT, a brigade combat team installed a number of small water purification units throughout Dhi Qar province in Iraq • These successfully reduced water-borne illnesses and infant mortality • However to keep the units running, trained technicians, replacement parts, and coordination with the Iraqi government would be necessary • The BCT worked with the PRT to hand off the project to them • The PRT then worked to staff the units with technicians and link them into the Iraqi government supply system • Coordination and effective assignment of tasks and resources resulted in a successful project

43. Humanitarian Assistance: Case Study II • Necessity of civilian guidance in relief operations • As increasing numbers of Iraqis have been displaced, U.S. commanders have often known what their tasks should be to respond to the problem • The absence of clear U.S. government guidance led units to do what they could, when they could • They provided water, temporary shelter etc to people forced from their homes because of combat operations • Reportedly some U.S. military units tried to prevent Iraqis from fleeing their homes • The first of these acts is appropriate; the second is not. Under international law, people have the right to flee violence or other crisis, and should not be prevented from doing so • Over time cooperation between senior military personnel and USAID improved efforts by providing more oversight and guidance, although uncertainties remained.

44. Humanitarian Assistance: Case Study IIIa • Providing security for humanitarian assistance in Somalia • The initial mission of the UN security force in Somalia was to help ensure that humanitarian aid could be provided to over 1.5 million people at immediate risk of starvation in the wake of war and drought. • Warlords were attacking humanitarian convoys and supply ships, seizing supplies and controlling their distribution. • Supplies were not getting through to camps for Somalis who had fled the fighting and drought • The initial military mission under UN mandate, Unified Task Force (UNITAF), was successful • UNITAF protected humanitarian convoys, distribution centers, ports and airports. Key facilities were secured • UNITAF troops built and repaired roads and bridges, dug wells, and set up hospitals • Aid began to flow throughout the country preventing widespread starvation

45. Humanitarian Assistance: Case Study IIIb • Somalia (contd.) • The presence of the U.S. contingent at the head of UNITAF was especially important in convincing warlords to stop attacking aid deliveries and facilities. • This security assistance saved the lives of hundreds of thousands of people • The mission ran into trouble when the objectives expanded to bring warlords to heel and create a single national government while dramatically reducing U.S. forces. • The subsequent mismatch between resources and goals resulted in the withdrawal of U.S. military forces and eventually all UN forces as well • Somalia lapsed back into conflict

46. Refugees and Internal Displacement I • Main issues – Refugees and International Displacement • Interested in the issues surrounding refugees and internationally displaced persons (IDPs) and how to cope with them • amongst key challenges for those working in conflict-affected states • What factors that lead to individuals and/or whole communities becoming refugees or to their displacement? • many and varied causes • Want to examine • complexity of the problems caused by refugee flows and displacement and • their impacts on conflict dynamics and process of development and security

47. Refugees and Internal Displacement II • Terminology: differences between refugees and IDPs • Differ in important ways with implications for: • responsibilities of the states and • international community under international law • U.N. defines a refugee as an individual who: • Owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, or political opinion is outisee3 the country ofhis nationality and is unable to or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself to the protection of that country. • Refugees are recognized as those who have crossed an international border and are no longer under the legal protection of their home country • By crossing the border refugees are automatically covered by international treaties and entitled to protection by agencies such as Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees -- UNHCR.

48. Refugees and Internal Displacement III • Asylum is a process under which a determination is made of an individual’s situation to decide whether they are classed as refugees under the terms of international law • IDPs are those who have fled from their homes, but remain within their country of origin • Usually fleeing violence, violations of human rights or natural or human made disasters. • Therefore considered legally under the protection of their home state and national authorities responsible for their humanitarian assistance. • In practice these populations are often fleeing from a state which is responsible directly or through failures to provide protection for their insecurity • Main IDP populations identified by UNHCR during 2008 were Iraq, Sudan, the DRC, Somalia and Colombia. • IDPs are not granted refugee status as they have not crossed an international border – however some of the approaches used to care for them are similar to those of refugees

49. Refugees and Internal Displacement IV How have states and other agencies dealt with refugees? • The use of refugee and IDP Camps • Temporary camps, particularly in dealing with refugees have been one of most effective ways of administering displaced populations • Especially in short-term emergencies where existing host country facilities overwhelmed, • Or in long-term protracted situations wither refugees are unable to return home – or unable or unwilling to settle in their home state or resettle in a third country • Camps usually set up by international agency such as UNHCR or by NGOs. They often provide • focal point for refugees • central location for delivery and distribution of humanitarian aid and • for longer term establishment of basic services such as clinics and schools

50. Refugees and Internal Displacement V • Camps represent a pragmatic response to the needs of both refugees and host countries which often lack resources and capacity to deal with large influxes of people. • One particular concern as set out in the Convention, the Protocol and other guidance is security • Security ostensibly the responsibility of the host state, but again resources and type of armed forces required to secure a camp are considerable • Refugee camps may provide a way to target assistance, but they also provide a ready target for those seeking recruits for militias and rebel groups and the resources they attract are similarly sought after • Disease is also a pressing concern, particularly in the early stages of establishing camps • Estimated that up to 9 percent of Rwandan refugees who fled into Zaire during 1994 genocide died within a month of arrival