Stability, Security and Development

1. Stability, Security and Development GP3200 August 20, 2013 Rand, Overcoming Obstacles to Peace Sierra Leone Case Study Dr Robert E. Looney relooney@nps.edu

2. Sierra Leone

3. Sierra Leone Overview I • Civil war in Sierra Leone began in 1991 • Started with an invasion of armed rebels coming from and supported by one of the contending factions in Liberia • In 2004 the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission also cited as key factors to the war • Poor governance • Rampant corruption • Denial of human rights • Disregard for democracy and the rule of law • Economic deterioration and • Sub-regional instability

4. Sierra Leone: Overview II • At the end of the war in 2002 Sierra Leone received considerable attentional from international donors • Particularly former colonial ruler Brittan • Nation building efforts have attempted to address the roots of the conflict by • Improving governance • Strengthening state institutions • Regulating the mining industry • Providing opportunities for the young and • Reforming the country’s armed forces

5. Sierra Leone: Overview III • During more than a decade of nation building: • Donors have achieved mixed results • Prompting them to redirect their efforts and change strategies • Overall progress in Sierra Leone remains tenuous because • Patronage and corruption are proving hard to eradicate • The country remains extremely fragile economically

6. Sierra Leone I Local Factors Before the Peace • Country has significant resources • Diamonds, bauxite and gold • Forests, good agricultural land and fisheries • Governed by long-standing rulers who utilized patronage to stay power • Country had become a “shadow state” • Government institutions were ineffective focused on providing funds for ministers and employees • Country largely a failed state before start of civil war • War only exacerbated those factors that helped precipitate it • Easily accessible and poorly regulated diamond resources fueled the conflict • Rebel movement (RUF) attracted disaffected ethnic groups

7. Sierra Leone II • Geographical and Geopolitical • Proximity to Liberia and the porosity of its borders have make Sierra Leone vulnerable to spillovers from that country’s crisis • War in Sierra Leone started when Charles Taylor, leader of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), supported the RUF’s invasion of Sierra Leone • Taylor’s motive -- get access to Sierra Leone’s diamonds to help fund the NPFL • Diamonds are alluvial – anyone with limited equipment can become a diamond miner • Ease of extraction together with size of diamonds makes them easy to smuggle made them an ideal way to fund the conflict • RUF not only group to use diamonds • Many elements of the army, paramilitary groups also involved in illegal mining.

8. Sierra Leone III • Cultural and Social • Rural region of Sierra Leone bordering Liberia vulnerable to RUF incursion because of human as well as physical terrain • Sierra Leone population divided among several ethnic and social groups • Limits sense of national identity • Made it easier for the RUF to find recruits. • Tribes and ethnicities usually lived together rather peacefully during pre-independence era. • Changed as politicians started to rely on their own tribes to garner political support and as the population grew • While ethnic tensions had some role in the conflict, indirect – resentment over government favoritism undermine legitimacy of state and shifted loyalties away from the state

9. Sierra Leone IV • Another factor facilitating the sustained conflict was emergence of disaffected youth • Before and right after independence country had excellent educational system • From 1968 to 1985 drastically changed – public support for education was halved • Overwhelming majority of youth grew up without education and struggled to find employment • 1985 country ad the lowest adult literacy rate out of 160 countries • During war lack of educational and economic opportunities played role in making recruits available for different fighting factions. • RUF promised them food, money and in some cases scholarships to study abroad.

10. Sierra Leone V • War only compounded the difficulties of the population • RUF’s systematic mutilation of civilians had dramatic social and economic consequences for a population made up mostly of farmers • Almost 7,000 of combatants demobilized by the UN Mission were child soldiers • Economic • In spite of many natural resources, Sierra Leone’s economy steadily declined during independence years • By 1991 country was at the bottom of the UN’s HDI • Value of agricultural production had declined to $10 million • In mid-1980s Sierra Leone’s foreign debt equivalent to 300 percent of its export revenue

11. Sierra Leone VI • Mismanagement of diamond industry played large part in fall of government revenues between 1970-1990 • In the 1960s diamonds provided Sierra Leone with revenue equal to one-fifth the country’s GDP and 70% of foreign exchange earnings • President Stevens gained support for his party before 1967 elections by promising illicit miners he would not interfere with their activities if they helped him get elected. • By 1988 most of diamond mining had shifted to illicit sphere • Value of exports of legal diamonds had dropped to $22,000

12. Sierra Leone VII • Next president started military operations against illegal miners – 25,000 lost their livelihoods without any alternatives • Many joined ranks of RUF when war broke out • Country’s economic situation only made worse by the war • Destroyed half the country’s infrastructure • Although state revenue remained minimal, in 1995 military absorbed 75% of spending • State lost what little control it had over its resources • RUF looted the country (practice called “Operation Pay Yourself”)

13. Sierra Leone VIII • Political • Country’s patronage system facilitated war in several ways • First – such systems are very vulnerable to external shocks such as economic crisis • Reason: based on a leader or ruling coalition providing privileges to its supporters rather than on the creaton of a political and moral community • When there are no more resources to distribute to political clients – system collapses. • Second, large segments of the population did not benefit from the patronage networks • Resented the government for not providing them with most-basic public services • First segment to go with the RUF when war broke out in 1991

14. Sierra Leone IX • Third: The patronage system created a highly fragmented state with patronage networks competing against each other • Fourth: Because the system stifled dissent from those who did not benefit from it, violence became an option for the disgruntled population • Institutional • Prior to conflict lack of effective state institutions enabled rampant corruption and shrinking of the formal economy – especially extractive industries • Allowed present Stevens to put into place an elaborate patronage system funded by large scale looting of state revenue • Stevens’ replacement in 1985 by President Momoh did nothing to improve situation • State almost bankrupt at one point • Many emigrated

15. Sierra Leone X • Lack of capacity of Sierra Leone’s army not directly a cause of war, but contributed to prolonging it. • President Stevens intentionally sidelined country’s armed forces during his rule – relied on a paramilitary unit whose function was state security • During war appalling fighting conditions for the military resulted in • Large number of soldiers colluding with the RUF • Looting property • Engaging in illegal mining • The Sierra Leone Police – • Dysfunctional with unskilled and underpaid personnel who lacked equipment and vehicles • Earned a reputation for inefficiency and corruption

16. Sierra Leone XI • Nation Building Efforts • Started before the conflict officially ended in January 2002 • In 1998 England started plans with the Sierra Leone government for a reform of the sector • International community addressed governance and economic issues • With a focus on offering more opportunities to the young who had been prime recruits of the RUF • Improving governance included • efforts to increasing accountability of public officials, • countering rampant corruption • decentralizing government and • reforming the army and the police

17. Sierra Leone XII • Economic Measures Included • Restructuring and monitoring the diamond industry • Restoring the state’s ability to generate revenues • Programs failed to meet donor expectations • Cultural and social • In attempt to heal the traumas of the war, government with support of international donors set up several transitional justice mechanisms • Special court established for war crimes • Truth and Reconciliation commission also established • Reintegrating Sierra Leone’s former combatants another priority • More than 70,000 combatants benefited from UN-managed DDR program completed in 2004

18. Sierra Leone XIII • Reintegration program criticized on several counts • It taught former combatants skills (carpenters, plumbers and auto mechanics) skills that are in low demand in a country as poor as Sierra Leone • Some beneficiaries simply resold the tool kit they had been given once they realized they would not find work. • The DDR program largely overlooked needs of female ex-combatants • They represented less than 7 percent of the total number of combatants formally demobilized, • But their estimated participation in the war was 10 to 50 percent varying among the warring factions.

19. Sierra Leone XIV • International donors focused on the education system • Literacy rates began to increase rapidly – 41 percent for adults and 58 percent for youths • Still considerably below the regional average • Economic Assistance • Started before the conflict ended in 2001 • IMF, EU, World Bank program to designed to bring more revenue to the government • Not only through tax collection • Also countering the plundering of resources • U.S. Coast Guard provided three patrol boats to counter illegal fishing which was costing the country $10 million per year

20. Sierra Leone XV • Another important step in giving Sierra Leone’s government more control over its budget was the cancellation, in 2006 of the country’s $1.6 billion external debt • Even before the war ended efforts to control “conflict diamonds” -- plundering of diamonds to fund the fighting • Kimberly process put in place certifying the origin of diamonds • Other initiatives Kono Peace Diamond Alliance supported by USAID also put in place • These initiatives were only partially successful – • problems in managing donor assistance – • underlying assumptions not completely accurate

21. Sierra Leone XVI Outcomes: • In the 10 years since the end of its civil war, • Sierra Leone remained at peace and • Democratization made significant advances but • Government effectiveness improved only slightly • Per capita GDP increased by 72.7% but • Socioeconomic development remained very low • Nation building in Sierra Leone has required reconstructing a failed state rather than simply stabilizing a post-conflict country • Has required a very broadly conceived program of social and institutional reforms

22. Sierra Leone XVII

23. Sierra Leone XVIII • Sierra Leone’s patronage system was an important source of grievances and social fragmentation giving rise to conflict • Patronage networks are still prevalent in the country, although at the same time democratic processes are taking hold • Weak military capabilities contributed to prolonging the conlict • Since the conflict the military has improved considerably through UK efforts • However in other areas including the police institutional development is still at its first stages • Corruption continues to plague institutional development

24. Sierra Leone XIX • As of 2012 the overall situation in Sierra Leone was peaceful but fragile • Country’s socioeconomic performance is still very weak – 180th out of 187 countries in the UN’s 2011 HDI • Corruption still constrainst state revenue and weakens the confidence of public instate institutions • Army and more so the police lack skills and equipment • The new decentralized governance system is still seeking a balance between traditional chiefs and local officials • Young men remain disproportionately unemployed compared with other categories of the population

25. Sierra Leone XX • Although many of the factors that gave rise to the coflct have not been successfully addressed • External factor that triggered the conflict has been resolved • Sierra Leone should be considered vulnerable to conflict should some new trigger emerge.