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Secure Pork Supply Board Update. Credit where credit is due!. Thanks to Dr. Jim Roth and Dr. Pam Zaabel Center for Food Security And Public Health @ Iowa State University a nd the SPS Planning Committee. Secure Pork Supply Plan.
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Credit where credit is due! • Thanks to Dr. Jim Roth and Dr. Pam Zaabel • Center for Food Security And Public Health @ Iowa State University • and the SPS Planning Committee
Secure Pork Supply Plan • Center for Food Security and Public Health @ Iowa State CVM has received USDA funding to develop the plan. • Coordinating with the Center for Animal Health & Food Safety @ University of Minnesota who also has USDA funding • Will cover movement of swine between production sites and processing plants
Secure pork supply (Patrick's Interpretation ) • SPS is basically a “club” • The benefits that “club” members get the opportunity to move pigs sooner than “non-club” members in an outbreak. • This is because members agree to implement: • a valid pre-harvest traceability program • standardized bio security practices • disease surveillance the level to achieve a defined status
Secure Pork Supply • Built on the experiences of • Secure Egg Supply • Move eggs in the event of HPAI • Plan has resulted in MOU’s between IA, MN, NE and CO • Secure Milk Supply • Move milk in the event of FMD • Secure Turkey Supply • Move turkey’s to harvest in the event of HPAI
Secure Pork Supply Planning Committee • First meeting October 11-12, 2011 • Working Groups formed: • Biosecurity (pre and post outbreak) • Surveillance (pre and post outbreak) • Compartmentalization/Monitored Premises • Data Collection, Management, and Sharing • Risk Assessments • Communications • Plan for response to an FAD Outbreak Tomorrow
Secure Pork Supply • First draft (completed May 2013) covers: • Biosecurity • Pre-harvest traceability • Outbreak tomorrow plan • Data and information sharing agreements • Producers • State Vets • National animal health laboratory network • Packers and Processors
Secure Pork Supply • Parts still under development • Data management, risk assessments and disease surveillance are longer-term projects and will be incorporated in future drafts as they become available.
Secure Pork Supply • Groups provided the draft for review: • State and Federal Animal Health Authorities • USDA FSIS • State Pork Producers Associations / Councils • Checkoff’s Swine Health Committee • AMI / NAMA • AASV’s FAD and Swine Health Committees • Packers and Processors
Secure Pork Supply • Next steps • Continue to bird-dog the process • Review & Incorporate Comments • Focusing on getting the disease surveillance section completed • Engage industry leadership on compliance and verification issues • Program needs to be credible and workable • Need to consider how the industry can verify compliance
Secure Pork Supply • …is a game of “connect the dots” • Many of the “practices” already occur • Needs to be documented and verified • Data & information already exists • Sits in multiple private and government databases • A “common denominator” is necessary to link everything together • Standard Premises Identification Number
Valid Pre-harvest Traceability • Identify all premises with the standard PIN • Industry is solidly behind PIN’s • Implement the Swine ID Standards and maintain records in electronic format • Associates PIN’s with movements • Use Electronic Certificates of Veterinary Inspection or electronic IMR’s • Associate PIN’s with source and destination • Allow access to movement data by animal health officials
Disease Surveillance • Maintain animal inventories by premises in an electronic format • Submit surveillance data and samples in accordance with SPS Surveillance Plan • Include validated PIN on all diagnostic laboratory submission forms
Official PIN Tags • Sow Packer Requirement • Condition of sale by January 1st 2015 by various companies • Must be a USDA Approved Official PIN Tag • http://www.aphis.usda.gov/traceability/downloads/swine_device_listing.pdf • Industry support for this @ Pork Forum
Official PIN Tags • Only 2 companies currently have USDA approval to manufacture and are selling official PIN Tags • Destron Fearing • Allflex • Available in multiple colors • Some packers prefer pink
Official PIN Tags • The PIN on the Official Tag is the USDA allocated Standardized Premises Identification Number (PIN) and not the State allocated Location Identifier (LID) • When ordering the manufacturer will ask for the PIN so they can validate it to the address of the site
Official PIN Tags • According to the Swine ID Program Standards the PIN on the Tag should be the PIN of the breeding farm she was on prior to entering harvest channels • Works for systems that are not parity segregated • Parity segregated systems • Work with the State Vet to determine what PIN make the most sense • Producer records maintain the traceability
Official PIN Tags • One (or one set) and your done • Once identified with one PIN tag or a set of official tags with same PIN and production number then that is it. Producers do not need to put in a new one if the animal moves to another production site BUT they do need to record that movement in case of a traceback.
Disease Surveillance • Allow veterinary diagnostic labs to pass through the PIN’s associated with subsets of diagnostic samples to the NHALN for the express purposes of surveillance for foreign animal (and program diseases) • Allow Packers/ Processors to pass through the PIN’s associated with diagnostic samples for the express purposes of surveillance for foreign animal (and program diseases).
Disease Surveillance • Allow access by state and federal animal health officials to the geospatial information stored in the National and State Premises Repositories for the express purposes of emergency preparedness and surveillance for foreign animal (and program diseases).
Recommendations (Not Required) • Annual Employee FAD Awareness • Separate PIN’s for epidemiological separate premises more than ¼ mile apart. • Provide annual premises updates to SAHO • Develop Swine Health Production Plans for routine interstate movements of feeder pigs(9 CFR 71.19) • A word on the Code
Packer Received Pigs from SPS sites: AA13579 on XX / XX /2012 BB24688 on XX / XX /2012 ETC….. PIN#-765432A: Pork Packer PIN#-AA13579: Wean to Finish PIN#-1234567B: Wean to Finish What the State Vet can determine: 1. Site is a part of Secure Pork? 2. Valid traceability system up and running? 3. Standardized biosecurity in place? 4. Achieved a negative disease status? Permitted Movements PIN#-BB24688: Wean to Finish PIN# -123456A: Sow Farm PIN#-1234567C: Swine Finisher
E2E Proof-of-Concept Demonstration Premises and Plants (SCS) Producer (3rd Party S/W) Testing Results (Diag. Lab) Producer Census and Movement Data State Premises and Plant Data Testing Data Show the day-to-day usefulness for monitoring facility disease status. Show premises disease status and support the decision on whether or not to move animals.
Secure Pork: Disease Awareness, Preparedness, Response and Recovery Dr. Patrick Webb Director, Swine Health Programs
Secure Pork Supply PlanA Continuity of Business Plan for the Swine Industry in the Face of a Foreign Animal Disease James A. Roth, DVM, PhD, DACVM Center for Food Security and Public Health College of Veterinary Medicine Iowa State University
US Animal Agriculture is Highly Vulnerable to Foreign Animal Diseases • US production animals have no immunity to FADs • Export markets will be lost • Prices will drop dramatically • Emergency vaccine stocks are far below what would be required to address a livestock dense state or multi-state outbreak • The size, structure, efficiency, and extensive movement inherent in the U.S. livestock industries will present unprecedented challenges in the event of a FAD outbreak
USDA APHIS Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Plan
Common Components of Secure Food Supply Business Continuity Plans Secure Egg Supply (HPAI); Secure Turkey Supply (HPAI); Secure Milk Supply (FMD);Secure Pork Supply (FMD, CSF, ASF, SVD) • Voluntary pre-outbreak preparedness components • Biosecurity, surveillance, epidemiology questionnaires, movement permits • Risk assessments (completed and in process) • Plans must be based on current capabilities and will evolve with science, risk assessments and new capabilities • Guidelines only: Final decisions made by responsible officials during outbreak • Outreach and training pre and post outbreak
SPS Partners • SPS Planning Committee • Federal and State officials • Representatives of all phases of the swine industry • NPB, NPPC, AASV • Academia • Iowa State University • University of Minnesota
FADs included in SPS plan • Foot and mouth disease • Swine, cattle, sheep, goats, deer • Classical swine fever • African swine fever • Swine vesicular disease Foot and Mouth Disease : 7 days post infection PIADC
Disease Transmission(FMD, CSF, ASF, SVD) • Not zoonotic • Direct contact and oral exposure are the most important routes of infection for swine (Pigs are relatively resistant to airborne infection by all 4 FADs) • Indirect contact (fomites) also can play a lesser role for transmission • Pigs exhale large concentrations of FMDV, cattle are highly susceptible to aerosolized virus
Secure Pork Supply Planning Committee • First meeting October 11-12, 2011 • Working Groups formed: • Biosecurity (pre and post outbreak) • Surveillance (pre and post outbreak) • Compartmentalization/Monitored Premises • Data Collection, Management, and Sharing • Risk Assessments • Communications • Plan for response to an FAD Outbreak Tomorrow
North American Animal Agriculture Industry is Unique • The size, structure, efficiency, and extensive movement inherent in the U.S. and North American livestock industries will present unprecedented challenges in the event of a FAD outbreak • Strategies for the response to, and management of, a FAD outbreak will change as the outbreak progresses and will depend upon the magnitude, location and other characteristics of the outbreak.
Phases and Types of FMD Response http://www.cfsph.iastate.edu/pdf/phases-and-types-of-an-fmd-outbreak
FMD Detection in the United States: Types of an FMD Outbreak Six Types of FMD Outbreaks Type 6: Catastrophic North American Size of FMD Outbreak (in terms of animals, premises, and jurisdictions affected) Response Shifts from Emphasis on Stamping-Out to Emphasis on Alternate Strategies (duration of FMD response) 48
FMD Outbreak in Iowa—Large Control Area Source: NASS, 2007 Number of Swine Affected: 19,883,988 Number of Bovines Affected: 2,366,535 Number of Operations Affected: 110,727 50