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External Operations Experience Update. Department of Energy Operating Experience Work Group October 8, 2013 Larry Stirling, Office of Analysis ( HS-24). NIOSH Smart Phone App for Ladder Safety. Uses visual and audio signals to help workers check ladder angle
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External Operations Experience Update Department of Energy Operating Experience Work Group October 8, 2013 Larry Stirling, Office of Analysis (HS-24)
NIOSH Smart Phone App for Ladder Safety • Uses visual and audio signals to help workers check ladder angle • Provides instant feedback on position • Download from Google Play or iTunes websites • http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/updates/upd-06-17-13.html
Chemical, Biological and Nuclear Air Purifying Respirators • NIOSH fact sheets address the unique performance, use limitations and storage requirements of air purifying respirators: DHHS (NIOSH) Publication Nos. 2013-146, 2013-156, 2013-1577 • Getting Optimal Performance from a Powered Air-Purifying Respirator (PAPR) Depends on the Condition of its Battery! • http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/docs/2013-146/ • What’s Special About Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Powered Air-Purifying Respirators (PAPR)? • http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/docs/2013-156 • What’s Special About Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Air-Purifying Respirators (APR)? • http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/docs/2013-157/
Eye Safety • Eye Safety Checklist (NIOSH): http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/eye/pdfs/EyeSafetyChecklist.pdf • Eye Safety Toolbox (NIOSH): http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/eye/pdfs/instructor.pdf
Electric Arc Furnace ExplosionCarbide Industries • U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board Case Study (No. 2011-05-I-KY) • Explosion killed two workers • CSHIB found it resulted in a failure to investigate similar but smaller explosive incidents over many years while deferring crucial maintenance of electric arc furnace
Electric Arc Furnace ExplosionCarbide Industries • Carbide failed to conduct a detailed hazards analysis • Response to incidents did not sufficiently address hazard • Did not determine root causes • Company management process resulted in “normalization of deviance”
Contact Information: Larry Stirling Office of Analysis (HS-24) 202-586-2417 john.stirling@hq.doe.gov