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CULTURAL POLICY UNDER NEW LABOUR: STRUCTURAL, BEHAVIOURAL AND POLICY CONSTRAINTS. Clive Gray Centre for Cultural Policy Studies Warwick University. Structure, Agency and Labour’s Cultural Policy. Focus is on the structural context within which national governments operated between 1997-2010
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CULTURAL POLICY UNDER NEW LABOUR: STRUCTURAL, BEHAVIOURAL AND POLICY CONSTRAINTS Clive Gray Centre for Cultural Policy Studies Warwick University
Structure, Agency and Labour’s Cultural Policy • Focus is on the structural context within which national governments operated between 1997-2010 • The specific choices that were made in this period were not structurally determined, and were not simply a policy continuation of the grand scheme of things laid down by the previous Conservative national governments (cf. free admission to the national museums and galleries), even if some specific policies remained exactly the same • However, the room for manoeuvre that Labour Governments and Ministers had was constrained by the structural characteristics of the cultural policy sector
The Cultural Policy Sector in Britain: I • A priority for Governments? • 1997: new Departmental name (National Heritage to DCMS) • New status – new significance?: but - no effective executive or implementation role • Increased expenditure (especially in comparison with other departments) – new significance? • But – DNH/DCMS as buffer mechanism and money conduit – limited (if any) direct control over detail of expenditure (arm’s-length principle over specifics) • No other evidence that DNH/DCMS was important for the overall work of Governments
The Cultural Policy Sector in Britain: II • ‘Arm’s-length but hands-on’ (Taylor)? • Emphasis on policy direction and not detailed control? • But – high levels of policy ambiguity and no effective control of implementation • Minimal levels of effective executive power over important cultural providers (cf. Regional Cultural Consortia and Local Cultural Strategies; cf. cultural industries policy) • Leading to little, if any, evidence of direct policy direction
The Cultural Policy Sector in Britain: III • Consequences: financial incentivisation?: not directly, but – • Instrumentalisation: money for non-cultural ends that use ‘culture’ as the means (cf. London Olympics; The Millennium Dome; Tate Liverpool/Modern as regeneration strategies) (Largely top-down approach) • Attachment: alignment with multiple non-cultural ends to get necessary resources for cultural activities (the Yosser Hughes approach: ‘I can do that, give us a job’) (cf. museums/galleries and social inclusion) (Largely bottom-up approach) • Increasing (competitive) project funding as policy continuation?
‘Sound and Fury…’: I • In the grand scheme of things what changed? • Organisationally: • LCSs and RCCs introduced and left to die • Continuing regional restructuring in ACE • Devolution to Scotland and (effectively and eventually) Wales – leading (eventually) to the creation of Creative Scotland and a more co-ordinated approach to the cultural sector as a whole (?) • Possibility for charitable Trust creation (cf. museums) and contracting-out of service provision (cf. sports/leisure sectors) (latter as policy continuation of previous Conservative policy)
‘Sound and Fury…’: II • Managerially: • ‘Modernising government’ (NB. This was very different to NPM – emphasis on effective service delivery and policy outcomes, not on economic versions of managerial efficiency based on ‘value for money’) • ‘Evidence-based policy’ as an off-shoot of this – based on medical models (relevance to the cultural sector?) • Cultural/creative industries policy as normal industrial policy • None of this dealt directly with the ‘cultural’ dimension of the sector, largely as a result of inability to rigorously assess delivery/outcomes in ‘cultural’ terms (policy ambiguity)
‘Sound and Fury…’: III • Financially: • Continuing ‘competition’ for funds (cf. policy continuation) • Changes in lottery distribution (cf. the Olympics – contributor to increased money for the cultural sector in comparison with other ‘good causes’) • Discretionary funding for cultural activities in local government in England and Wales remained – leading to concerns about funding levels in times of austerity (2007 onwards) • National museums entrance fees changes (cf. local authority and Trust museums increasingly charging for entry)
‘Sound and Fury…’: IV • Ideologically: • ‘Steady as she goes…’? : did the attitude of governments between 1997-2010 show any real difference to that of governments before or since then? • Greater social dimension in comparison with previous 18 years? – largely through instrumentalisation • ‘God help the government who meddles in art’? (cf. more recent library closures and central government non-intervention) • Based on ‘ritual rationality’ rather than instrumental/economic/social/political rationalities?
‘Signifying Nothing…’? • ‘Small earthquake in Chile: not many killed’ • Lots of claims of importance – ‘a golden age’: but – • Never a policy priority for central government (and no preferential treatment when the cuts started) • Still subject to instrumentalisation/attachment strategies • Still operating on the same policy models and rationality assumptions • Problems of causality/attribution/measurement still exist • So: no evidence of changes to the dominant approach to culture, and no evidence of changes in outcomes of cultural policies - the dominance of structure over agency?