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THE US SECURITY STRATEGIES IN EAST ASIA

THE US SECURITY STRATEGIES IN EAST ASIA. EDGARDO E. DAGDAG Professor and Assistant to the Dean for Academic Affairs, Asian Center, UP Diliman. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT.

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THE US SECURITY STRATEGIES IN EAST ASIA

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  1. THE US SECURITY STRATEGIESIN EAST ASIA EDGARDO E. DAGDAG Professor and Assistant to the Dean for Academic Affairs, Asian Center, UP Diliman

  2. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT • This presentation made use of a lot of sources, especially reports of my graduate students in Asian Studies 211 (Security Issues in the Asia Pacific), Asian Center, University of the Philippines-Diliman. • Note: This powerpoint presentation can not be publicly circulated, copied or uploaded. However, its highlights or main points can be cited by interested parties.

  3. OUTLINE OF PRESENTATION • 1. Post-Cold War Asian Security Strategy of the US: Common strategic objectives (Bush 1 and Clinton) • 2. The Bush 1, Clinton and Bush 2 security policy • 3. Bush 1 critiques on Clinton’s East Asia Policy • 4. Clinton and Bush on China • 5. Clinton and Bush on Taiwan • 6. Why US care for Taiwan? • 7. US on Japan • 8. Clinton and Bush on Korea • 9. US on North Korea • 10. Bush as a unilateralist • 11. GWOT during the Bush administration • 12. Bush stance on East Asia

  4. OUTLINE OF PRESENTATION • 13. Bush’s stance on East Asia • 14. Bush on Southeast Asia • 15. Pronouncements of Obama as candidate on East Asia • 16. Obama Policy 2009 • 17. US reaffirming solidarity with allies • 18. 2010 Obama policy in East Asia • A. US and South Korea • US and North Korea • US and China • 19. US and the Obama security policy in East Asia: A Japanese perspective • 20. Conclusion

  5. POST-COLD WAR ASIAN SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE US • East Asia Strategy Report of the DoD 1990, 1992, 1995, 1997 (Clinton and Bush Administration Security Policy) COMMON STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES (Bush and Clinton) • Prevent rise of regional hegemon • Maintain strong forward presence to deter conflict in Korea and preserve regional stability. • Ensure a level playing field regarding access to markets of Asia. • Maintain freedom of navigation. • Halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons • Promote liberal democracy.

  6. THE BUSH 1, CLINTON AND BUSH 2 SECURITY POLICY • The United States is an "Asian power“; it had vital interests in the region. • The key to US strategy is its bilateral alliances in the region (south Korea, Japan, Phil, Thailand). • Preventing the rise of a regional hegemon is a fundamental strategic principle of the US. • The US military presence provides regional stability, and that regional stability is the sine qua non for economic development. • The US is committed to deterring a North Korean invasion of South Korea. • The US is willing to use the threat of military force to prevent Taiwan from being coerced or intimidated by China. • The US is committed to fostering liberal democracy, freedom of the seas and free trade.

  7. GW BUSH CRITIQUES ON CLINTON EAST ASIA POLICY • The Clinton administration was ambivalent over whether Japan or China was more important. • The Clinton administration was too timid or too ambivalent about encouraging Japan to become more involved in security issues in East Asia. • The Clinton administration was unconcerned about the security implications of the rise of China and the potential threat that a modernizing PLA posed to Taiwan in the mid-term and to US interests in the longer term. • The Clinton administration was too anxious to engage North Korea, and too willing to be manipulated by Pyongyang with very little to show for years of dialogues other than a flawed "Agreed Framework”

  8. CLINTON AND BUSH ON CHINA • During the campaign, Bush characterized China as a "strategic competitor“; on the other hand, Clinton regarded China as a "strategic partner.” • The White House characterized the US-China relations "candid, constructive and cooperative." (The Chinese only use constructive and cooperative.) • Bush supported the entry of China in WTO in Sept. 2001

  9. CLINTON AND BUSH ON TAIWAN • During Clinton's eight years, the US govt aggressively sought military-to-military engagement with Beijing. The DoD was proactive. • In 1998, President Clinton publicly affirmed the so called Three (3) no’s Policy: (1) No support for Taiwan's independence,(2) No support for “two Chinas”, “One China, One Taiwan” and (3) no support for Taiwan’s membership in international organization that require statehood. • President Bush introduced "strategic clarity" regarding US intentions should China make an unprovoked attack on Taiwan, by stating that "the US would do whatever it took" should Beijing attack.

  10. WHY US CARE FOR TAIWAN? • Taiwan is critical for the continued credibility of the US strategic commitments towards East Asia. • The US is benefitting from Taiwan’s economic achievements; in 2007 Taiwan is the US ninth largest trade partner with nearly $65 billion in bilateral trade. • Many in the US believes that how China handles Taiwan will be an important measure of how the US and the world will manage the challenges of a rising China. • Taiwan’s evolution from a one party authoritarian state to a multiparty democracy and open society over the past 20 years has also added critical new component to US interest. • Chinas’ Rise, Challenges and Opportunities, Bersten C. Et.al, 2008.

  11. US ON JAPAN • The 2000 Armitage Report on Security Policy toward Japan • Reaffirming and reassuring Japan that the U.S. really values its bilateral alliance with her. America's most important Asian relationship is with Tokyo not Beijing. • The US quietly encourages Japan to move away from the prohibition on collective self-defense. This has taken new momentum in the wake of 9/11. In other words, the US encourages Japan to be a more active alliance partner.

  12. CLINTON AND BUSH ON KOREA • In March 2001, ROK President Kim Dae Jung insisted on visiting Washington very early in the Administration to ensure that Bush will continue Clinton’s policy of engagement with North Korea. • This turned out to be a really bad decision. First Kim Dae Jung came off as lecturing the White House on Nokor. And second, no one either in Seoul or in the Bush Administration appreciated President Bush's personal antipathy toward Nokor (“KJI is not fit to lead his country”; “he is willing to let his people starve”, “Nokor one of the ‘axis of evil’ countries”, etc.)

  13. US ON NORTH KOREA • For Clinton, the US has deterred NK's conventional forces for 50 years; there is no rush to solve this. First things first, focus on WMD. • The Bush Administration has been more outspoken about this "Axis of Evil" state, and would be pleased if it collapsed tomorrow. • The big difference: US under Bush is not willing to talk directly with North Korea to achieve its disarmament objectives. (Reuters) - Former U.S. President Bill Clinton made a surprise visit to North Korea and met its reclusive leader on Tuesday to try to win freedom for two jailed American journalists in a move that could re-energize nuclear talks.

  14. BUSH AS A UNILATERALIST • The eradication of terrorism is an important policy objective of Pres Bush. • Bush declared the US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol on Global Warming. • He showed a negative attitude towards negotiations on the Protocol for the Biological Conventions on the Prohibition on Biological weapons. • He showed a marked reluctance towards ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. • US withdrew from the treaty on Anti-Ballistic Missiles Systems

  15. GWOT DURING THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION • The US military forces in the region are engaged in the global war on terrorism, and Southeast Asia is a major theatre in this conflict. • Southeast Asia has the highest strategic profile among US strategic planners of any time since the end of the Vietnam War because of the large Islamic populations in the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, and because Singapore has been such a strong ally in this fight. More than half of the Southeast Asian population are Muslims and are perceived to be critical of the US GWOT.

  16. BUSH STANCE ON EAST ASIA • 1. Japan is the US’s most important strategic partner in Asia. • 2. China is a strategic competitor. • 3. The US should be clearer in its support of Taiwan. • 4. The US should have a tougher policy toward North Korea. • 5. There is uncertainty in Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia that requires attention, especially Indonesia. • Michael Muchizuki, “US Foreign Policy Towards East Asia”Professor, George Washington University,2001

  17. BUSH AND SOUTHEAST ASIA • 1. There is a perception that because of its global war on terrorism and its military involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US has “abandoned” or did not give much importance to Southeast Asia. It did not accede to the ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation for Southeast Asia, (TACSEA); and it has been noticeably absent in a number of ARF meetings. • 2. The US GWOT has antagonized the Muslim population in Southeast Asia. • 3. Because of the so-called US “abandonment,” there was a resulting vacuum and this gave China and the ASEAN countries the opportunity to forge closer links.

  18. PRONOUNCEMENTS OF PRES OBAMAAS CANDIDATE ON EAST ASIA • US PRESENCE: It plays a key role in preserving peace in Asia. • US-JAPAN ALLIANCE : This plays a vital role in helping the US maintain regional security. • SOUTH KOREA: There is a need not only to reaffirm the alliance but also to enlarge its focus on issues beyond those specifically tied to security on the Peninsulas. • NORTH KOREA: The US shall maintain the goal of achieving complete and verifiable elimination of North Korea’s nuclear weapon program. • CHINA: There is a need for the US to monitor China’s growing military capabilities and to press its leadership to end its support for authoritarian regimes like those in Burma, Sudan, Iran and Zimbabwe.

  19. OBAMA POLICY 2009 Highlights of Obama’s policy in East Asia • - Re-affirming solidarity with regional allies • - Reaching out to new regional powers ( such as Indonesia and India) • - Continuing a policy of engagement with China. • - New approach to free trade: Example; put punitive tariffs on Chinese automobile and light truck tires; pursue American accession to ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity Cooperation (TAC) • - Returning to East Asia • - Downsizing the US GWOT by withdrawing from conflict areas like Iraq and Afghanistan

  20. US REAFFIRMING SOLIDARITYWITH ALLIES • Obama’s pledge to re-engage with the region has been met - - the first head of State to visit the White House was PM Taro Aso of Japan (February 24, 2009) • In Feb 2009, Sec. Of State Hilary Clinton had her first overseas trip to Japan, Indonesia, South Korea and China; in July 2009, she visited Thailand and India when she attended the ASEAN Regional Forum.

  21. 2010 OBAMA POLICY IN EAST ASIA Three (3) Policy Goals of US: Promotion of Economic growth within the region. 2. Structuring stable Security 3. Expansion of Democracy and protection of human rights. • East Asia has taken on growing economic importance as a major US trade partner • East Asia presents security problems as well: (a) nuclear proliferation, (b) unresolved territorial issues, and (c) growing tensions over energy and natural resources • Emerging states like China and India can not be ignored. • Source: East Asian Strategic Review 2011, The United States: The Obama Administration Facing Its second Year of Challenges.

  22. 1. The US will deepen its alliance with Japan, ROK, Australia, Thailand and the Philippines 2. It will strengthen its ties with emerging states such as India and China as well as with Southeast Asian countries like Indonesia, Vietnam and Singapore. 3. It will view the ASEAN, ARF and EAS as important regional frameworks regarding security affairs (a role that APEC performs regarding economic affairs) and it will actively strengthen its engagement with each of these forums. 4. The Obama administration will seek to combine the maintenance and enhancement of its relations with allies and partners with building stable relations with the emerging states and positive participation in regional forums.

  23. US RELATIONS WITH COUNTRIESIN EAST ASIA • US –JAPAN ALLIANCE • The year 2010 marked the 50th year of the US-Japan Security Treaty; The Obama administration views the alliance as the cornerstone of its strategic relations with East Asia. • The Obama administration has sought to strengthen the relationship by emphasizing close bilateral ties with the Naoto Kan administration to deal with the regional and global security issues. Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan bows after giving a speech at the Democratic Party of Japan lawmakers' meeting in Tokyo Friday, Aug. 26, 2011. Kan announced he was resigning after almost 15 months in office.

  24. The US-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation • Reaffirming that the Roadmap emphasizes the importance of force reductions and relocation to Guam in relation to the realignment on Okinawa and stipulates that approximately 8,000 III Marine Expeditionary Force personnel and their approximately 9,000 dependents will relocate from Okinawa to Guam by 2014, in a manner that maintains unit integrity, and recognizing that such relocation will realize consolidation and land returns south of Kadena. • Regarding the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Funtenma, the US and Japan agreed to make efforts both towards relocation of the air base within Okinawa Prefecture and towards a reduction in the economic burden of maintaining the base in Okinawa.

  25. On territorial dispute • Regarding the 7 September incident in which a Chinese fishing boat rammed into a patrol vessel of the Japan Coast Guard in Japanese Territorial water near the Senkaku islands, Secretary Clinton made clear the US position that Article 5 of the Japan US-Defence Treaty also applies to these islands during the JAPAN-US foreign ministerial meeting held in 23 September.

  26. US ON SOUTH KOREA • 2010 marked the 60th anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War. The Obama administration ranked the US-ROK alliance alongside with the US-Japan alliance as central to peace and stability in the Asia Pacific region. Source: Reutershttp://www.reuters.com/article/slideshow?articleId=USTRE6AM0YS20101123&slide=1#a=11

  27. US AND ROK • President Obama met on June 26, 2010, with ROK President Lee Myung-bak and the two presidents agreed that the transition of wartime operational control on the Korean Peninsula, which during the term of former President Roh was originally scheduled for April 2012, would be extended to December 2015. • Strategic Alliance of 2015 would serve as implementation for this transition of wartime operational control, consolidation of U.S. bases into two hubs, tour normalization, and management of U.S.forces in Korea within broader, world-wide mission requirements. • The OPCON transition plan envisions South Korea as taking the lead in defense against North Korea as well as in other operational plan requirements Source: Center for US-Korea Policy, A project of The Asia Foundation, September 2010.

  28. US ON NORTH KOREA • The US and the ROK continue to seek concrete measures to the complex, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear program. • The consultative meeting gave its full support to the ROK position that the March 26 sinking of the ROK patrol vessel Cheonan was caused by the underwater detonation of a North Korea Torpedo; in response to the sinking, the US and the ROK conducted large-scale antisubmarine exercises in July and September.

  29. US ON NORTH KOREA • Before the meeting, Sec of State Hilary Clinton and Secretary of Defence Gates also visited the Demilitarized Zone, along with ROK Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Yu- Myung-hwan and Defence Minister Kim Tae- oung to display the resolute US-ROK alliance against North Korea.

  30. US ON CHINA • The Obama administration is continuing to seek to build a “positive, cooperative and comprehensive relationship.” • President Obama’s November 2009 visit to China was marked by a mood of cooperation. However, with the start of 2010, friction clearly began to appear in the bilateral relationship as a result of US arms sales to Taiwan, Google’s decision to withdraw from China in reaction to Chinese censorship, and issues relating to the actual value of the Chinese renminbi.

  31. US AND CHINA • Amidst such circumstances, Hu Jintao attended the April “Nuclear Security Summit” convened by President Obama. • In May, a US delegation of some 200 members, including Secretary Clinton and Secretary of the Treasury Timothy Geithner, visited Beijing and took part in a “US-China Security and Economic Dialogue, the second such dialogue following talks held at the end of July 2009 in Washington. • In addition President Hu was invited to Washington for US-China Summit talks on January 19, 2011, where the leaders displayed a common understanding of the importance of broadening and deepening the two state’s cooperative relationship in a wide range of areas including economics and security

  32. US AND CHINA • The US has been giving attention to the Chinese military growing capabilities regarding anti-access and area denial as well as in space and cyberspace. • The US also is increasingly wary regarding remaining territorial conflicts in the South China Seas and higher levels of activity on the part of the Chinese military. • Secretary of State Clinton attending the ARF Meeting in Hanoi Vietnam last July 23, stated that the US has national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia’s maritime common’s, and respect for international law in the South China Sea, and she indicated that the US would contribute positively toward peaceful resolution of territorial conflicts. • US-China military to military relationships, which had seen considerable development in 2009, were cut off as part of the Chinese reaction to the January 2010 US decision to sell arm sales to Taiwan.

  33. US AND CHINA • Secretary Gates attended the expanded ASEAN conference of defense ministers (the ADMM-Plus Meeting) in early October 2010 where he met with Chinese Minister of National Defense Liang Guanglie and reached an agreement to normalize military exchanges. • After the agreement meeting of US and Chinese naval officials responsible for ensuring safety was held in Hawaii on October 17 2010 under the Military Maritine Consultative Agreement (MMCA) exchanges with China as a means of improving mutual understanding between the two militaries and encouraging an accurate communication of ideas and In January 2011 Secretary gates was able to visit China. • At the Asian Security Summit (the Shangrila Dialogue) in Singapore in early June 2011, Secretary of Defense Gates responded by stressing the importance of stable, on going military exchanges which were not influenced by the political relations between the US and China and he strongly urged China to resume the exchanges at any rate.

  34. US AND THE OBAMA SECURITY IN EAST ASIA: A JAPANESE PERSPECTIVE, YOSHIHEDE SOEYA, 2009 • The dominant function of the US–Japan alliance has always been to sustain the US military presence for the American regional and global strategies. • The primary role of the US–South Korea alliance has been to defend South Korea against the threat from North Korea.  •  The US–China relationship is a typical case of strategic coexistence between great powers, which is in essence competitive but will remain cooperative in the foreseeable future out of necessity

  35. CONCLUSION • . US Deputy Sec. Of State James Steinberg: • - There are rising powers in Asia –India and China. • - There are allies like South Korea and Japan that are seeking more normal status in the international scene. • - There are countries in Asia trying to make their way in a world that presents immense opportunities, as well as problem. • - The US can not and should not ignore the aspirations of these countries and the other East Asian countries. • I share Steinberg’s view. If the US does otherwise, it stands the risk of being overtaken by rising countries like China in the bid to maintain a dominant strategic presence in the region.

  36. CONCLUSION • With the continuing rise of China, there is a shift of global power to East Asia that makes the US role in the region the subject of continuing debate among regional states (even among its traditional allies). The economic woes currently faced by the US is also one reason why regional states in East Asia are looking for alternative security options. • US allies and friends need continuing reassurance of support from the US considering its long history of unilateralism.

  37. END OF PRESENTATION • This ends my presentation. Thank you for giving me the opportunity to share my views on “The US Security Policies in East Asia” - -a very important topic. • I wish you all a good day. PROF EDGARDO E. DAGDAG Professor and Assistant to the Dean for Administration, Asian Center, UP Diliman President, Philippines-Taiwan Friendship Society.

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