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Preparing for Melbourne

Preparing for Melbourne. About social commitments (of) Frank Dignum. Contents. (Social) commitments Use of commitments in AC Nature of commitments “Definition” Use in AC Commitment strategies Conclusions. Commitments in agents. Cohen & Levesque (commitment strategy)

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Preparing for Melbourne

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  1. Preparing for Melbourne About social commitments (of) Frank Dignum

  2. Contents • (Social) commitments • Use of commitments in AC • Nature of commitments • “Definition” • Use in AC • Commitment strategies • Conclusions

  3. Commitments in agents • Cohen & Levesque (commitment strategy) • (P-GOAL x p) ≡ (GOAL x (LATER p))  (BEL x ¬p)  [BEFORE ((BEL x p)  (BEL x □ ¬p)) ¬(GOAL x (LATER p))] • Rao & Georgeff (commitment strategy) • INTEND(inevitable◊Φ)  inevitable(INTEND(inevitable ◊Φ)  BEL(Φ))

  4. Social commitments • Castelfranchi • (S-COMM x y z a) (OUGHT x (DOES x a)) • (HONEST x) = (S-COMM x y z a)  (I-COMM x a) • Singh • P-commitment • S-commitment (beliefs and actions)

  5. Semantics of Agent Communication Problem: How to check the beliefs of the agents? They are private and not accessible from the outside. <i, inform(j,X)> FP: BiX Bi(BjX BjX  UjX  UjX) RE: BjX

  6. Social Commitments in Agent Communication • [inform(x,y,p)] SC(x,y,p) • [promise(x,y,)] SC(x,y,) • A speech act leads to a social commitment which is visible from outside. • Walton & Krabbe use “commitment stores”

  7. Some questions • What are the consequences for an agent when it has a social commitment? • Connection between mental attitudes and commitment? • Connection between social and private commitment? • Connection between commitments and norms/obligations? • Committing vs. commitment

  8. Commitment Definitions (Webster’s, Wordweb): • The act of binding yourself (intellectually or emotionally) to a course of action or a purpose • A (message that makes a) pledge or promise

  9. Commitment • Mental attitudes involved • Choice should be possible • Knowledge vs. belief • Degrees of commitment • When to abandon a commitment? • Little possibilities for revision • Many supports that should be revised • Rf. Epistemic entrenchment

  10. Commitment • A commitment of an agent to a mental attitude (like belief, goal or intention) is the degree to which the agent is prepared to stick to the choice by which she created that mental attitude. • COMMIT(x,ma,d) • ma := Bx(Φ) | Gx(Φ) | INTx() • d  (0,1] • We assume: • Bx(Φ)  COMMIT(x, Bx(Φ),d) • Gx(Φ)  COMMIT(x, Gx(Φ),d) • INTx()  COMMIT(x, INTx(),d)

  11. Commitment • Primary citizen or derived? • Is commitment merely calculated from an existing web of mental attitudes? • I.e. is it an intrinsic aspect of every mental attitude? • Or can we have a commitment and derive some mental attitudes from it?

  12. Social Commitment • SOC-COMMIT(x,y,ma,d) ≡ COMMIT(x, ma,d)  Ox,y(ma) • The private part of a social commitment is a private commitment which is made under complete autonomy by the agent • The social or public part of a social commitment is an obligation!

  13. Social Commitment • The obligation in a social commitment comes about by an act of the agent that is obliged. • Therefore it is often assumed that that agent is also having a commitment • But this needs not be true!

  14. Social Commitment and AC • [inform(x,y,p)] Ox,y(B(x,p)) • [promise(x,y,)] Ox,y(INT(x, )) • The resulting obligation might lead to a decision to create or increase a commitment to the mental attitude. • So, a speech act leads to an obligation • Only when an agent is sincere it will lead to a social commitment.

  15. Example I • INFORM(x,y,“the weather in Melbourne is nice”) • Now y infers Ox,y(B(x,”the weather in Melbourne is nice”)) • Suppose ¬B(x,”the weather in Melbourne is nice”) • It seems x created a dichotomy between its mental states and obligations. This will lead to “stress” in subsequent conversations. • Because x voluntarily and autonomously provided the information and we assume that x tries to avoid unnecessary violations/”stress” we usually conclude that x also is committed to what it says.

  16. Example II • INFORM(x,y,“this car is nice”) • Now y infers Ox,y(B(x,”this car is nice”)) • Suppose ¬B(x,”this car is nice”) • Now x continues: • INFORM(x,y,”you can buy it for only є10.000”) • x created a dichotomy between its mental states and obligations for a reason! The information is needed to support his subsequent offer. • In this situation we still belief that x has an obligation to belief what he said, but we do not assume that he actually believes it!

  17. Connection between Social Commitment and mental attitudes • Ox,y(B(x,p))  ¬B(x,p)  Violation • However, the violation cannot be detected from the mental attitude directly! • Only acts from which this belief can be inferred can be used to detect a violation. • E.g. inform(x,y,¬B(x,p)), or a failure to defend B(x,p) in an argumentation

  18. Conclusions • Commitments are private • Obligations are public (and can be committed to) • Commitments say more about the change of mental attitudes than that they are mental attitudes themselves • There is a lot of future work to do (in Melbourne)

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