Policy reform i.e. transforming the state WHAT WORKS AND WHAT DOES NOT WORK

1. Policy reformi.e. transforming the stateWHAT WORKS AND WHAT DOES NOT WORK Sorin Ioniţă Romanian Academic Society (SAR, independent think tank) sionita@sar.org.ro

2. Symptoms of poor policy making • Ministries work in isolation and produce narrow draft laws; no cross-cutting strategies and policies; imprecise language, avoiding hard decisions (made by default in secondary legislation) • Discomfort in negotiating with other line agencies / assess broader social effects / facing trade-offs – quest for “the right technical solution” • Dysfunctional cabinet meetings – long, uncertain agenda, ambushed by agencies with their own pet projects, crisis-driven

3. Symptoms of poor policy making • No proper policy analysis, outcome assessment, CBA, implementation monitoring and feed back • Unstable and poor quality legislation leads to crises, solved typically by direct intervention; formal norms and institutions are by-passed: crisis mood – adoption of the acquis • Reinforce existing social habits to apply laws selectively; or ignore “unpleasant” rules In weak states, conflicts and negotiations occur after, not before a decision is made

4. Good policy process • An institutional “brain” exists helping the central government to filter and aggregate issues before they reach the cabinet; identify trade-offs, esp. across sectors, and make informed allocations (re-politicisation); cost out its actions; and monitor implementation • Relations among tiers of government are based on predefined rules (contractual), with due consideration paid to local autonomy • What the government does is reasonably transparent to the public • Bureaucracy is impersonal and effective (weberian)

5. Good policy process All these = changing the nature of the state = completing the unfinished process of modernization of Balkan societies (an effort pre-dating Communism) • Difficult change: it alters the balance of power between social actors • A good institutional structure (ex. Hungary) is a necessary, not sufficient condition of success

6. Agenda for reform How do we get there? two strategic reform principles: • People respond to incentives – not to preaching, pleas, trainings, etc. • Trainings and TA can fix knowledge problems; they cannot fix incentives problems

7. The actors What various actors can and cannot do. • The government • The parties • The think tanks • Brussels

8. 1. The government Do: • Admit that it has a problem with policy making • Spend some political capital to initiate PM and CS reforms – commitment at the top • Accept the idea of outside scrutiny (corporate audits) • Pilot new PM system on big cross-sectoral legislation: decentralization, fiscal code, etc Don’t: • Expect the problem will be solved through TA alone • Avoid unpleasant tasks (reforming the policy cycle, CS reform) by delegating them to junior ministers with little real power

9. 2. The parties Realistically - little to be expected from them; it is usually easier to reform the state than the parties = subjects rather than instruments of reform Do: • Try to separate people seeking high office (ministeriabili) from those seeking advisory positions (experts) • Try to recruit and support good experts – in party think tanks

10. 3. Independent think tanks Dilemma: • Providers of expertise (limited success) • Enablers – create an environment in which politicians are forced to deliver and good policies pay off politically

11. 3. Independent think tanks Do: • Start with big, eye-catching issues which can be explained on a bumper sticker, but are relevant – get media attention and make impossible for politicians to avoid them (ex. declarations of assets and income) • Alternate friendly advice (increase capacity) with confrontational approach (make things move)

12. 3. Independent think tanks Don’t: • Criticize “political class” in general, cynicism is already widespread / but identify champions of reform in government and the CS and help them (otherwise, counter-selection); help the public opinion to distinguish performers / poor performers (popularity is not a good predictor)

13. 4. Brussels Do: • Use the EU conditionality mainly as an anchor for the rule of law (use “soft acquis” to reform the judiciary) Don’t: • Expect the negotiations / absorption of the acquis to change SCG public administration and policy making process – it won’t • On the contrary, it will add extra burdens on a weak state and consume the scarce resources of time and energy of the government

14. 4. Brussels • “EU models” used as a rhetorical device to promote one’s group agenda • Danger that acquis will generate another layer of formal institutions, while reality will continue unchanged beneath The EU enlargement is not a development agenda for a poor and weak state; it helps only if used wisely by domestic actors

15. Agenda for change Practical things to reform PM and CS: • “Sunshine law” • All public procurement contracts are made public (including privatizations) • Institutionalize public hearings in parliamentary Committees (and possibly cabinet committees) • Individual track record of votes in Parliament, posted on the website

16. Agenda for change • External audit on the Prosecutor office (possible: secondment?) • External audit / monitoring (formal, informal) on budget execution, based on benchmarks • Formula-based financial transfers to local governments Basic idea: increase the costs to politicians of poor policy or clientelism