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Internal and External Motivation of Cooperation

Internal and External Motivation of Cooperation. Mizuho SHINADA (doctoral student). Effects of sanctioning system in social dilemma. Positive effects: A sanctioning system enhances cooperation (e.g., Yamagishi, 1986). Negative effects:

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Internal and External Motivation of Cooperation

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  1. Internal and External Motivation of Cooperation Mizuho SHINADA (doctoral student)

  2. Effects of sanctioning system in social dilemma • Positive effects: • A sanctioning system enhances cooperation (e.g., Yamagishi, 1986) • Negative effects: • A sanctioning system as an addictive drug: The more of it we have, the more we depend on it (Taylor, 1987).

  3. Negative effects of a sanctioning system • A sanctioning system makes people believe that they cooperate for external incentives. ↓ • The sanctioning system reduce intrinsic motivation to cooperate and trust for other people. ↓ • People need severer sanctions to cooperate.

  4. Negative effects of a sanctioning system (cont’d) • An external sanctioning system is a coercer. • Coercion by itself may let people attribute their cooperation to external factors. ↓ Reduction of intrinsic motivation to cooperate • Question: Is it same for an internal sanctioning system ?

  5. Coercion vs. Commitment • When members voluntarily introduce a sanctioning system, they may regard others (and themselves) as cooperation seeker rather than punishment avoiders. ↓ • An internal sanctioning system is a commitment rather than a coercion. ↓ Reduction of intrinsic motivation to cooperate

  6. Purpose of this study • Examining negative effects of an external / internal sanctioning system. • H0: Two sanctioning systems equally reduce intrinsic motivation to cooperate. • H1: An external sanctioning system more greatly reduce intrinsic motivation than an internal sanctioning system.

  7. Experimental Design • Removing Sanctioning Paradigm (Mulder & van Dijk) • Three-person group play social dilemma game. Phase 1: manipulation Social Dilemma trials with a sanctioning system Phase 2: measurement of intrinsic cooperation Social Dilemma trials without a sanctioning system

  8. Experimental Design (cont’d) A sanctioning system is to be introduced by a majority vote. (In fact, the system is introduced always) InternalSanction Condition Control Condition External Sanction Condition SD trials with a sanctioning system SD trials with a chance to vote SD trials without a sanctioning system SD trials without a sanctioning system SD trials without a sanctioning system

  9. Summary: Prediction External incentives • In Phase 1, cooperation rates in external / internal sanctioning condition are higher than in control condition. • In Phase 2, cooperation rates in external sanctioning condition is lowest. Attribution to external factors

  10. Preliminary Results • Cooperation rates (two sessions in each condition) Phase 1 Phase 2

  11. Preliminary Results • In Phase 1, cooperation rates in internal sanctioning condition are highest. • Cooperation rates (three sessions in each condition) Unexpected results Phase 1 Phase 2

  12. Preliminary Results • In Phase 2, cooperation rates in external sanctioning condition is lowest. However, cooperation rates in internal sanctioning condition is much lower than in control condition. • Cooperation rates (three sessions in each condition) Unexpected results Phase 1 Phase 2

  13. Preliminary Results It may be too early to draw a conclusion (we run only two session), but we have to consider why our prediction is not supported by now. • Cooperation rates (three sessions in each condition) Phase 1 Phase 2

  14. Thank You !

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