Identity Politics

Identity Politics Political Economy of the Global South Prof. Tyson Roberts

Documentary Our Brand is Crisis Wednesday night, 8:30-10pm

Presentations at end of class: • Pakistan Wednesday: • Chile, Egypt, Myanmar • (Afghanistan)

Varieties of Identity Politics Which identity groups were salient in Zaire? In Bolivia? • Zaire: Ethnic groups • Bolivia: Urban/rural, economic class, ethnicity

What are some varieties of political identities/cleavages • Ethnolinguistic • Religious • Urban/rural • Economic class (e.g., capital vs. labor, or upper vs. middle vs. lower) What is the difference between identity politics and ideological politics?

What are pros & cons of strong ethnic ties?(Collier) • In traditional societies, strong ethnic ties has benefits: insurance against moral hazard (effective monitoring) • In contemporary states, many ethnic groups are brought together in one polity and are interdependent • In this situation, strong ethnic ties can lead to dysfunctional government

Why polarization undermines growth(Easterly Chapter 13) • Groups are not rational actors, even if they are made up of rational actors • We think of the government as an actor that serves the people, or promotes growth for its own best interest • However, when the state is weak & members of government are fractionalized, the government may pursue policies that are self-destructive

Why might income inequality undermine growth? • Poor governments may want to redistribute from the rich to the poor, undermining investment incentives • Rich governments may not want to provide public education, etc., thus limiting the positive effect of human capital on growth

How might urban/rural cleavages undermine growth? • Urban voters want • low food prices, taxes on agricultural exports to finance manufacturing, urban housing, etc. • deters farmers from producing • Rural voters want • high prices and no taxes for agriculture exports, subsidies for agricultural inputs, rural infrastructure projects, etc. • may create budget deficits

How might politicized ethnic cleavages undermine growth? • Every ethnic group wants policies that favor own group at expense of the nation as a whole • A multi-ethnic coalition might delegate decisions – one group determines exchange rate policy, another interest rate policy, another trade policy • 1st group gets access to cheap dollars (hurts exports) • 2nd group gets access to cheap credit (hurts investment) • 3rd group gets monopoly on imports (raises prices)

Example of Urban-Rural/Ethnic policy conflict undermining growth: Economic policy in post-independence Ghana • Cocoa Marketing Board • Originally answer to volatility • Became source of capital for industrialization • Other boards created • Exports: timber, etc. • Domestic markets: food, etc. • Industrial projects included hydropower dam, aluminum smelter plant, coconut oil mill, sugar estates, tomato cannery, etc.

Fall of Nkrumah • 1966: Low growth, etc. led to coup against Nkrumah • 1969: Busia’s PP, with support traditionally from the Ashanti Region and North and new support from coastal Akan groups, wins election • 1972: Busia overthrown in coup (led by another Akan)

Why does ethnic diversity hinder investment in public goods? • Differences in preferences • where to put roads, language taught in schools, where to put hospitals, etc. • Less willingness to spend on public services perceived to aid other groups • Greater willingness to hurt economic growth by taxing other ethnic groups for redistribution • Example: Indians in East Africa

Countries with low fractionalization and/or less inequality tend to do better • More payoff from growing the pie than taking bigger share of the pie: middle class consensus • Example: Botswana (of course) • Also, good institutions enable good policies, law and order, etc. in spite of fractionalization

Source: Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999

What role does identity politics play in Syria?

Syria groups & proportion shares • Alawi: 14% • Sunni-Arab: 62% • Kurds: 9% • Christians: 8% • Druze: 3%

Hafez al-Assad 1946: Joined Baath party at age 16 1955: One of 1stAlawis to join AF 1963: Participated in Baath coup, rose to CinC of AF 1966: Participated in “Alawi coup,” became Min. of Def. 1970: Led 3rd coup, placed Alawi loyalists throughout gov’t 1982: Hama massacre (5-10k killed) to wipe out (mostly Sunni) Muslim Brotherhood 2000: Died

Bashar al-Assad 2000: Appointed leader of Baath party & army, elected (unopposed) president 2011: Arab Spring protests began in Syria, over 100k protesters. Syrian army tanks storm several cities, including Hama

Hama, August 2011

Bashar al-Assad 2000: Appointed leader of Baath party & army, elected (unopposed) president 2011: Arab Spring protests began in Syria, over 100k protesters. Syrian army tanks storm several cities, including Hama 2012: Free Syria Army seizes Aleppo in the north 2014: ISIS declares caliphate between Aleppo and Diyala

Civil warFailed state

Does ethnic diversity always lead to low growth and conflict? • No • Diversity may increase productivity in the private sector • More points of view, different skills, etc. • Diversity is less damaging at higher income levels • Ethnic identities can be suppressed in favor of national identities

Ethnic diversity reduces primary school spending in Kenya but not Tanzania (Miguel 2004)

Another motive for identity politics may be group pride, or “psychic benefits”

Although ethnic diversity/fractionalization is blamed for many problems, it does not always lead to problems

Given the number of cleavages in Africa, ethnic conflict is very rare Number of potential rebellions & civil wars between dominant group & insurgent group = # of ethnic groups in country less one (N – 1 ), summed across countries and years, for rebellion & civil war. Number of potential ethnic violence incidents = N(N – 1)/2. Source: Fearon & Laitin(1996)

When does a particular identity become politically salient? • Ethnicity most salient when two or more similar sized groups compete for power (Bates 2000, Collier 2001) • One dominant group with no major challengers => low ethnic salience • Many small ethnic groups => low ethnic salience • Ethnicity is also more salient in countries with zero-sum economics • E.g., natural resource-base vs. technology-based)

Why do ethnic groups rebel?Elite & Factional CompetitionCederman, Wimmer,and Min 2010

Bolivia groups & population shares • White: 14% • Mestizo: 29% (European/indigenous mix) • Aymara: 25% (Morales’s group) • Quechua: 30% • Lowland indigenous peoples: 2% Source: Fearon 2003

Conclusions • Ethnic diversity has a number of sources • Migration patterns • Pre-colonial conquest and state formation • Colonial state creation • Instrumental identity formation, voluntary and coercive • Ethnic diversity is believed to create a number of problems for Africa, both politically and economically

Conclusions • However, the mechanism by which ethnic diversity creates problems remains under dispute • Ethnic diversity causes war, or causes poverty which causes war? • Ethnic groups split by borders causes low legitimacy and low growth, or grouped by borders causes commons problems, low public good formation, and low growth?

Surprise Pop Quiz • Did Goni win the presidential election? • What vote share did Goni get? Morales? • Who were the main supporters of Goni? Of Morales? • What happened after the election ended? • Why did some voters vote for Goni? • Why did some voters vote against Goni?

Surprise Pop Quiz • Did Goni win the presidential election? YES • What vote share did Goni get? 22.5% Morales? 21% • Who were the main supporters of Goni? Middle Class(?) Of Morales? Indigenous/Campaneros • What happened after the election ended? Continued economic stagnation, income tax hike, protests, Goni resigned • Why did some voters vote for Goni? Crisis management, past successes (healthcare, etc.), plan • Why did some voters vote against Goni? Sold gas wealth to foreigners; didn’t deliver on job creation; insensitive to rural voters

Identity Politics