The logical problem of evil

1. The logical problem of evil Michael Lacewing enquiries@alevelphilosophy.co.uk

2. The problem of evil • If God is supremely good, then he has the desire to eliminate evil. • If God is omnipotent, then he is able to eliminate evil. • If God is omniscient, then he knows that evil exists and knows how to eliminate it. • Therefore, if God exists, and is supremely good, omnipotent and omniscient, then evil does not exist. • Evil exists. • Therefore, a supremely good, omnipotent and omniscient God does not exist.

3. The logical problem of evil • The mere existence of evil is logically incompatible with the existence of God. • The following claims cannot all be true: • God is supremely good • God is omnipotent • God is omniscient • Evil exists. • (The evidential problem: the amount and distribution of evil that exists is good evidence that God does not exist.)

4. Two types of evil • Moral evil: evil caused by moral agents through choice. • Natural evil: pain and suffering caused by natural processes, e.g. earthquakes, predation, etc.

5. Mackie on the logical problem • God is supremely good. • God is omnipotent. • God is omniscient. • Evil exists. • Good is opposed to evil, such that a good thing eliminates evil as far as it can. • There are no limits to what an omnipotent thing can do. • We can solve the problem by denying one of these claims • Does evil exist? Or is what we call ‘evil’ not really evil? • Are there limits to what an omnipotent being can do?

6. ‘Good can’t exist without evil’ • ‘There can be no good without someevil’. • If it is logically impossible for good to exist without evil, then God can’t create a world in which good can exist without evil • And evil doesn’t oppose good, but is necessary for it. • But is this true? • A contrast effect? E.g. could everything be red?

7. ‘Good can’t exist without evil’ • Mackie: contrast effects are only needed for us to know. • Everything can be red, but we wouldn’t notice • But how we think and talk isn’t a restriction on what is possible for God • So why can’t everything be good (even if that means we wouldn’t notice)? • (Even if we allow that good can’t exist without evil, we would face the difficulty of explaining how much evil there is – the evidential problem.)

8. ‘The world is better with some evil’ • There are some goods that require some evil: • Virtues such as courage, benevolence, sympathy • As good, God will only eliminate those evils that are not necessary for a greater good. • Suffering: ‘first-order’ evil; pleasure: ‘first-order’ good. • Virtues: ‘second-order goods’ • Seek to minimise first-order evils, but can’t exist without them. • Second-order goods are more valuable than first-order evils are ‘disvaluable’.

9. ‘The world is better with some evil’ • Therefore, a universe with both second-order goods and first-order evils is a better universe than one without both. • Objection: what about second-order evils, e.g. cruelty, cowardice, malevolence? • Is the world better with these as well? • Can’t we have a world without second-order evils?

10. ‘Evil is due to free will’ • Second-order evils are the result of free will • As are many first-order evils. • But free will is so valuable that it outweighs these evils. • Why doesn’t God make us choose the good? • Because this is logically impossible – to be free, our choices can’t be determined.

11. ‘Evil is due to free will’ • Mackie: second-order evils are not logically necessary for free will. • It is possible to freely choose what is good on one occasion. • If it is possible to freely choose what is good on one occasion, then it is logically possible to freely choose what is good on every occasion. • God can create any logically possible world. • Therefore, it is possible for God to create a world in which creatures are free and freely choose only what is good.

12. ‘Evil is due to free will’ • God would eliminate evil that is not necessary for a greater good. • Second-order evil is not necessary for a greater good. • Second-order evil exists. • Therefore, God does not exist.

13. Theodicy v. defence • To try to answer the question ‘Why does God allow evil?’, to give a reason, is to offer a theodicy. • To try to show only that God’s existence is logically compatible with evil is to offer a defence • This doesn’t require that we discover the true explanation for why evil exists – perhaps we can’t know.

14. Plantinga’s free will defence • A world containing creatures that are significantly free is better than a world containing no free creatures. • God can create significantly free creatures. • To be significantly free is to be capable of both moral good and moral evil. • If significantly free creatures were caused to do only what is right, they would not be free.

15. Plantinga’s free will defence • Therefore, God cannot cause significantly free creatures to do only what is right. • Therefore, God can only eliminate the moral evil done by significantly free creatures by eliminating the greater good of significantly free creatures. • The conclusion is not defended as true, but as possible. If it is possible, then the existence of evil, including second-order evil, is logically consistent with the existence of God.

16. Natural evil • We can provide a defence for natural evil either by • Arguing, as we have, that it is possible that first-order natural evils are necessary for second-order virtues • Or arguing that it is possible that natural evil is a consequence of moral evil – free will of the Devil – and moral evil is necessary for free will.

17. How good is free will? • Plantinga only compares free will with an absence of free will • But what about selective interference? • You can’t defend a murder by saying how good it is that the murderer has free will! • Wouldn’t God interfere to prevent very harmful actions? • But if God is constantly interfering, we don’t have free will. • But wouldn’t God at least prevent the terrible harms done by the Devil? • But this is now the evidential problem of evil.