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M/V BARKALD and S/V ESSENCE Collision Long Island Sound September 20, 2006 M/V BARKALD Self-discharging bulk freight vessel Steel hull; 623 ft in length; 28,912 gross tons Crew of 30 plus NY Pilot
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M/V BARKALD and S/V ESSENCE Collision Long Island Sound September 20, 2006
M/V BARKALD • Self-discharging bulk freight vessel • Steel hull; 623 ft in length; 28,912 gross tons • Crew of 30 plus NY Pilot • Equipped with 4 deck cranes mounted on starboard side; conveyor belt apparatus mounted on port side • Transiting from Bridgeport anchorage enroute Nova Scotia
S/V ESSENCE • Pleasure yacht / auxiliary sailing vessel • FRP hull; 92 ft in length; 95 gross tons • Crew of 3 / no pax – licensed Master, unlicensed Mate, U.S. licensed Cook • Transiting from Newport to Greenwich
Weather Conditions • Clear skies • Visibility +10 miles • North-northwest winds at 10 kts • 2 - 4 foot chop • Air temp 70 degrees F
M/V BARKALD Bridge Team • Pilot: Captain James Mahlmann, NY Pilot for NY Harbor and LIS – licensed for LIS in August ’06 – this was his 3rd solo trip through LIS – had sailed BARKALD in past • OOW – 2nd Mate – licensed Officer – 3 months on board • AB and OS on helm & throttle controls • Master and Cadet on bridge, not on watch
S/V ESSENCE • Unlicensed Mate on watch / had been ill day before – 2 yrs on board – 1st trip through LIS • Cook sleeping in pilot house • Master asleep below in main salon on port side • VHF, GPS, radar & chart plotter energized • Nav lights energized – running lights, masthead light & stern light • Motor sailing – both engines and mainsail set
Lookouts • On ESSENCE – Mate on watch • On BARKALD – Pilot, OOW, AB & OS • No dedicated lookout on BARKALD • Pilot stated he requested a bow lookout for LIS transit during Pilot/Master exchange • Master stated Pilot never asked and he never offered
Collision • Vessels on nearly reciprocal courses • BARKALD making 14 kts • ESSENCE making 8 kts • All nav lights energized and working properly on both vessels • All nav systems and ship systems operating properly on both vessels • Visual contact made by ESSENCE at 10+ miles • Visual contact made by BARKALD at .2 miles
Collision • Radio comms initiated by ESSENCE • No specific meeting arrangement was made • ESSENCE reported to BARKALD that BARKALD’s port light was out, and made slight turn to starboard • Pilot did not respond to port light comment • ESSENCE affirmed he would stay clear & made hard turn to starboard, crossing BARKALD’s bow
Communication Details • Comms initiated by ESSENCE 1 minute and 17 seconds prior to collision • “Motor vessel off my port, motor vessel off my port, sailing yacht ESSENCE, come in please, over.” • BARKALD responds after second call • “Yes, this is the motor vessel off your port side.” • ESSENCE responds • “Hi, I’m sailing yacht ESSENCE. Um, I just wanted to let you know, I don’t know if you know this, but, um, your – your port light is not working only the starboard is shining, over.” • BARKALD responds • “Okay, so are you going to stay clear of my vessel?” • ESSENCE responds • “Ya, I’m staying clear of your vessel.” • BARKALD responds • “You’re talking to a large cargo ship, correct?” • ESSENCE responds • “That’s you ahead.”
Collision • BARKALD maintained course and speed at all times • Pilot was on the starboard bridge wing at the time of the collision; 2nd Mate was in pilot house • ESSENCE crew survived collision • BARKALD deployed life boat after collision • CG Station New Haven launched 25’ rescue boat • CG rescued ESSENCE Mate and Cook • BARKALD lifeboat rescued ESSENCE Master
Conclusions of CG InvestigationPrimary Cause • The failure of the Mate on the ESSENCE to properly identify the aspect of the lights of the BARKALD and his position in relation to the BARKALD. • He failed to take proper action to avoid collision – Rule 8. • He effected a 70 to 90 degree turn to starboard, crossing the BARKALD bow, resulting in the collision.
Conclusions of CG Investigation Contributing Causes • The failure of the Mate on the ESSENCE to determine that risk of collision existed with BARKALD – Rule 7 • The failure of the bridge team on the BARKALD to make visual contact and/or radar contact with ESSENCE in sufficient time to determine whether risk of collision existed – Rule 7 • The failure of the Pilot and 2nd Mate of BARKALD to determine a head-on situation existed with ESSENCE – Rule 14
Conclusions of CG Investigation Contributing Causes • The failure of the Pilot and 2nd Mate on the BARKALD to maintain a proper lookout – Rule 5 • The bridge team on the BARKALD failed to comply with company policy to post a lookout on the bridge as required during the hours of darkness • Improper communications
QUESTIONS?Dawn Kallen, Marine InvestigatorDawn.M.Kallen@uscg.mil(203) 468-4506