Tools for Conflict-Sensitive Agriculture

1. Tools for Conflict-Sensitive Agriculture Talk for AIARD Annual Meeting, June 4, 2006 Michael S. Lund, Senior Associate for Conflict and Peacebuilding, Management Systems International, Inc.

2. Overview Post 9/11 US foreign policy sees development as key part of war on terrorism • Remote, poor countries that had no geo-strategic significance are seen as possible breeding grounds or sanctuaries for terrorists. • US Gov’t. inter-agency efforts are focussing on failed states and post-conflict countries • Varied programming sectors – women, police, agriculture, youth --are “discovering” conflict and fragile states and want to address them Aims of talk: Part I. Recent conflicts and useful concepts Part II. How agricultural issues can be part of the problem Part III. How agricultural professionals can be part of the solution

3. Part I: Recent Conflicts and Useful Concepts Global Picture Since 1989, there have been about 115 major armed conflicts. The vast bulk arose over intra-state issues – control of the government or territory, or government policies -- not issues between states. Examples • Former Soviet Union: Georgia, Moldova, Tajikistan, Chechnya • Balkans: Croatia, Bosnia, Kosovo • Africa: Algeria, Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Burundi, Rwanda, Democratic Republic of Congo • Asia: East Timor, Nepal, Afghanistan, Philippines • Latin America: Chiapas, Mexico Many intra-state conflicts are still active: 20 in 2005 (e.g., Colombia, Sri Lanka).

4. Types of post-Cold War conflicts Global or regional transnational: Islamic jihadists (e.g., IMT in Central Asia), Al Qaeda Intra-state, on a national scale: • humanitarian emergencies (Somalia), • civil wars secessionist struggles (Eritrea), • ethnic and religious identity-based civil wars (southern Sudan), • ethnic cleansing (Yugoslavia), • genocide (Rwanda), • insurgencies (northern Uganda), • terrorist bombings (North Caucasus in Russia) Intra-state, pitting national vs. local interests: natural resource conflicts (Papua in Indonesia, Bougainville) Intra-state, localized: • intercommunal resource conflicts (Indonesia, Kenya), • inter-ethnic riots (India) • local political uprisings (Uzbekistan),

5. THE GOOD NEWS: Violent conflicts have declined! Global Trends in Violent Conflict: 1946-2004 Warfare Totals (Societal +All Interstate) Societal Warfare All Interstate Wars (inc. colonial wars) Interstate Warfare

6. Why?This drop in conflicts is not accidental. It results from developing country leaders’ political learning, plus: “…persistent and coordinated efforts atpeacebuilding by civil society organizations, national leaders, non-governmental organizations, and international bodies.” (Gurr and Marshall, 2005)

7. THE BAD NEWS: Future trends can bring new conflicts! • Current “post-conflict” countries can slide back to conflict (e.g., E. Timor) • Powerful global trends can generate future conflicts and failed states: • Environmental: degradation; global warming; scarcer water, oil, and land • Social: rapid population growth, millions of educated but unemployed young people, gross socio-economic disparities within and between nations • Economic: globalization, liberalization, smuggling • Political: democratization; terrorism and anti-terrorism; erosion of international cooperation • Military: small arms proliferation

8. Early Warnings 31 countries are currently listed as very vulnerable to mass killings, serious violent conflict, or government collapse in the next few years, such as: • Afghanistan, Algeria, Burma, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Guinea, Haiti, Lebanon, Pakistan, Papua in Indonesia. 51 other countries are somewhat vulnerable, such as: • Armenia, Egypt, India, Russia, Serbia

9. Why Be Concerned about Conflict and Fragile States?

10. Violent intra-state conflicts destroy the environment and development and export problems Conflicts and state failure are “development in reverse.” • They inflict on the conflict countries: civilian deaths and injuries, ruined infrastructure, hunger, disease (HIV/AIDS, malaria), population dislocation, higher military expenditures, capital outflows, destroyed or halted development programs, policy and political breakdown, psychological trauma, landmines. • They export to us and others: refugees, migrants, disease, increased military burdens, reduced economic growth, illicit drugs.

11. Part II: How Agricultural Issues can be Part of the Problem

12. Four basic ways agriculture can contribute to conflicts • Failures in aggregate production: widespread food insecurity can generate popular unrest • Chronic mal-distribution of assets within or benefits from the agricultural process (e.g., land tenure, seed, water, credit, infrastructure, technical assistance, prices, income) creates inter-group competition • Social or other externalities: harmful crops (e.g., poppies for coca, cotton or other crops requiring exploitative labor or environmental damage) • Rural lands as symbols for group identity (e.g., Chiapas Indians)

13. Violent Conflicts Have Multiple Sources For violent conflicts to actually erupt, underlying, enabling and triggering factors must come together -- at the same place and time. The “Perfect Storm”

14. The “dry woodpile on a hot day”

15. Sources and Drivers of Violent Conflicts • Underlying (“root”) sources are slow-acting, hard-to-change conditions that increase the possibility of violence • Enabling sources are processes -- institutions, policies, politics, resources, ideologies -- that worsen the underlying sources or fail to address them and thus mobilize collective violence • Triggering factors are immediate acts or sudden events that directly cause violence or escalate it further

16. How agriculture problems can cumulate into violent conflicts: Illustrated in (A) Zimbabwe and (B) Uzbekistan

17. Existing Capacities for Peace Almost always, some built-in local capacities also exist for that can “brake” escalation into violence conflicts: • Mitigating conditions (legal or illegal) often offset root causes – e.g., patronage networks, remittances, smuggling • Transforming social and political mechanisms and policies channel grievances, contain tensions – e.g., traditional dispute resolution, • Conciliating acts discourage violent acts and elicit cooperation -- e.g., compensatory rituals, key leaders bargaining

18. Capacities for Peace in Agriculture

19. Part III.: How Agricultural Professionals can be Part of the Solution To address conflict and state fragility effectively, do conflict-sensitive agriculture programming At least, “Do No Harm”: • Don’t worsen sources of violent conflict! • Don’t weaken existing capacities for peace! Even better, “Do Some Good”: • Reduce (offset, channel, discourage) sources of violence • Build up or add capacities for peaceful progress

20. How? Conflict-Sensitive Agriculture Programming: Steps • Identify sources of possible violence and state fragility (in conjunction with an agricultural sector assessment) • Identify existing capacities for peace  • Assess whether existing ag. programs are helping or hurting – how do they affect conflict sources and peace capacities? 4. Design and implement programs that reduce the sources and strengthen the capacities.

21. Conflict-Sensitive Agriculture Programming

22. A Key Lesson:Act Early to Prevent Violence from Erupting • Violent conflicts do not suddenly explode; they are preceded by increasing tensions and disputes. • This offers time and opportunities to act -- before it is much harder to contain violence. • It is much more humane and cheaper to act early to keep peaceful disputes from erupting into violent conflicts, through pro-active preventive actions, than to deal with wars and their aftermath. • Prevention Success stories: Baltic states, Macedonia, Ukraine-Crimea, So. China Sea Islands dispute • Failures or Missed Opportunities: Bosnia, Rwanda, Darfur • Differing stages in the life cycle of conflicts often require different policies.

23. Stages of Peace or Conflict PEACEMAKING PEACE ENFORCEMENT (Conflict management) (Conflict mitigation) Chechnya, WAR early 1995 cease-fire outbreak of violence CRISIS DIPLOMACY PEACEKEEPING Bosnia, early 1996 (Crisis management) (Conflict termination) settlement CRISIS North Korea, 1994 confrontation PREVENTIVE Kosovo, 1993 UNSTABLE DIPLOMACY PEACE Cambodia, 1995 (Conflict prevention) POSTCONFLICT rapprochement rising tension PEACE BUILDING (Conflict resolution) El Salvador, 1995 STABLE PEACETIME DIPLOMACY Russia, 1993 South Africa, 1995 PEACE OR POLITICS (Basic order) U.S.-China, 1995 reconciliation U.S.-Britain, 20th Century Duration of Conflict DURABLE PEACE Mid-conflict (Just order) Early Stage Late Stage Life Cycle of Conflicts

24. Prevention is cheaper than war and post-conflict reconstruction

25. Conclusion 1. Conflict and failed states have many destructive impacts. 2. But violent conflicts and state breakdowns are NOT inevitable. They can be prevented, contained and terminated, and they often are. 3. The sources and dynamics of conflict and state failure are multi-faceted and complex, but not mysterious or inevitable. 4. Agriculture and agriculture policies/programs can affect conflict and fragility, positively or negatively -- depending how they affect conflict sources and peace capacities. 5. If agricultural professionals seek to understand conflict sources and peace capacities where they work, they can design “conflict sensitive” programs that make a discernible difference.