Long War Concept The Marine Corps Vision for Strategic Force Employment ISO the Steady State Security Posture

1. 1 Long War ConceptThe Marine Corps Vision for Strategic Force Employment ISO the Steady State Security Posture This brief is an effort by DC PP&O to create a concept for the employment of Marine Corps forces that will position the Marine Corps to fight the Long War. Incorporating concepts laid out in the 2006 Naval Operating Concept (NOC) with those of strategic distributed operations, the Long War Concept provides a vision for Marine force employment that seeks to provide a persistent, forward deployed Marine presence, in keeping with previously identified COCOM requirements, across key regions in the world while still providing the nation with the ability to concentrate and deploy Marine forces to fight and win our nation�s battles across the full spectrum of potential conflicts. Thus far we have not had an overarching strategy that seeks to address the GWOT. The Long War Concept developed from a recognition by CMC that as OIF drew down, the Marine Corps would need to evolve to both address the growing irregular threat while explaining how the 202K Marine Corps would be employed. This concept fulfills OSD�s requirement that we �accept risk in the traditional to address the irregular� while capitalizing on the naval and expeditionary nature of our Corps in a manner that best meets OSD�s needs. This brief is an effort by DC PP&O to create a concept for the employment of Marine Corps forces that will position the Marine Corps to fight the Long War. Incorporating concepts laid out in the 2006 Naval Operating Concept (NOC) with those of strategic distributed operations, the Long War Concept provides a vision for Marine force employment that seeks to provide a persistent, forward deployed Marine presence, in keeping with previously identified COCOM requirements, across key regions in the world while still providing the nation with the ability to concentrate and deploy Marine forces to fight and win our nation�s battles across the full spectrum of potential conflicts. Thus far we have not had an overarching strategy that seeks to address the GWOT. The Long War Concept developed from a recognition by CMC that as OIF drew down, the Marine Corps would need to evolve to both address the growing irregular threat while explaining how the 202K Marine Corps would be employed. This concept fulfills OSD�s requirement that we �accept risk in the traditional to address the irregular� while capitalizing on the naval and expeditionary nature of our Corps in a manner that best meets OSD�s needs.

2. 2 This purpose was derived out of an EOS two years ago that directed that a global force lay-down be developed, with a supporting rotation plan, that best supports the GWOT. This purpose was derived out of an EOS two years ago that directed that a global force lay-down be developed, with a supporting rotation plan, that best supports the GWOT.

3. 3 Assumptions That the Marine Corps will remain a General Purpose Force capable of full spectrum operations with balanced approach to irregular warfare That geographic CCDRs will have a greater demand for general purpose forces to conduct theater security cooperation That CENTCOM drawdown will allow the establishment of an appropriate, balanced presence throughout the globe. The assumptions upon which the Long War Concept are built are shown here. The single most important assumption is that the purpose of our Corps will be to fight and win our nation�s battles across the full spectrum of combat operations. We will not seek to deviate from this formula that has served our nation so well. Combat operations in the CENTCOM AOR have absorbed the majority of our combat forces for the last 4 years. However combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan will eventually draw down to a sustainable level that will enable the Marine Corps to focus with greater energy on the future prosecution of the Long War. CCDRs have consistently recognized phase 0 operations as being critical to their successful ability to deter aggression in their respective AOR. In the past these efforts have been ad hoc at best. As the drawdown of CENTCOM forces proceeds, the ability of the Marine Corps to replace forces withdrawn from the PACOM, specifically WESTPAC AOR, will be realized. This will enable national leaders to better posture US forces to address security challenges related to north Korea and Taiwan, as well as acknowledging the rise of China and India as competitors for vital natural resources and the other 39 countries in the AOR. The defense policy review initiative (DPRI) talks with Japan resulted in the alliance transformation and realignment agreement (ATARA) and 19 associated agreed implementation plans (AIPs). The AIPs which include Marine equities are: Iwakuni consolidation, Futenma relocation facility, Guam relocation, and land return and shared use of facilities on Okinawa. Lastly, it is assumed that the MARFORs will have sufficient funding made available to prosecute one of the most critical aspects of the Long War: deter potential aggressors and build capacity in a manner that sustains existing partners while forging new relationships with partners we have yet to engage.The assumptions upon which the Long War Concept are built are shown here. The single most important assumption is that the purpose of our Corps will be to fight and win our nation�s battles across the full spectrum of combat operations. We will not seek to deviate from this formula that has served our nation so well. Combat operations in the CENTCOM AOR have absorbed the majority of our combat forces for the last 4 years. However combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan will eventually draw down to a sustainable level that will enable the Marine Corps to focus with greater energy on the future prosecution of the Long War. CCDRs have consistently recognized phase 0 operations as being critical to their successful ability to deter aggression in their respective AOR. In the past these efforts have been ad hoc at best. As the drawdown of CENTCOM forces proceeds, the ability of the Marine Corps to replace forces withdrawn from the PACOM, specifically WESTPAC AOR, will be realized. This will enable national leaders to better posture US forces to address security challenges related to north Korea and Taiwan, as well as acknowledging the rise of China and India as competitors for vital natural resources and the other 39 countries in the AOR. The defense policy review initiative (DPRI) talks with Japan resulted in the alliance transformation and realignment agreement (ATARA) and 19 associated agreed implementation plans (AIPs). The AIPs which include Marine equities are: Iwakuni consolidation, Futenma relocation facility, Guam relocation, and land return and shared use of facilities on Okinawa. Lastly, it is assumed that the MARFORs will have sufficient funding made available to prosecute one of the most critical aspects of the Long War: deter potential aggressors and build capacity in a manner that sustains existing partners while forging new relationships with partners we have yet to engage.

4. 4 COCOM Demand vs. Insufficient Forces COCOMs have long been identifying phase 0 and phase 1 operations as critical components of their efforts to combat the irregular adversaries. Collectively known as �Building Partner Capacity,� these efforts seek to build our partner nation�s capacities to address their own problems thereby building relationships, while simultaneously providing US presence in foreign areas in a manner that deters the growth of these irregular adversaries. However, operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have consumed most of our forces and left the majority of this COCOM demand signal unmet. Between a focus on COIN, the surge requirements to meet those operations, and the impact on our equipment, our ability to focus on these BPC efforts has been degraded.COCOMs have long been identifying phase 0 and phase 1 operations as critical components of their efforts to combat the irregular adversaries. Collectively known as �Building Partner Capacity,� these efforts seek to build our partner nation�s capacities to address their own problems thereby building relationships, while simultaneously providing US presence in foreign areas in a manner that deters the growth of these irregular adversaries. However, operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have consumed most of our forces and left the majority of this COCOM demand signal unmet. Between a focus on COIN, the surge requirements to meet those operations, and the impact on our equipment, our ability to focus on these BPC efforts has been degraded.

5. 5 Mid-Range Threat Assessment2005-2015 Future global threat environment will be characterized by the following drivers of instability: Terrorism / Irregular Warfare Ideological / Religious Extremism Near Peer Competitor Poorly / ungoverned spaces Globalization Economics / Poverty / Health Crisis Natural Resource Competition (water, energy, etc.) Science & Technology competition / advancements Changing Demographics (�youth bulge�, aging populations, etc.) Environmental Factors (climate change, natural disasters, etc.) Crime The future adversary is overwhelmingly an irregular one. Few if any opponents will have the ability to challenge us in a conventional conflict for the foreseeable future. An unstable world favors the future adversary since it provides him with relative freedom of action. Yet, the future environment will be characterized by a variety of drivers of instability (as listed above) that can be influenced or even controlled. Managing these drivers will require flexible Marine Corps MAGTFs capable of engaging a myriad of different potential adversaries manipulating unstable environmental factors to their advantage. The way to best address these drivers of instability is to seek to mitigate the factors that make them possible. Providing a persistent, forward presence tailored for the lower end of the operational spectrum, the Security Cooperation Marine Air Ground Task Force (SC MAGTF) will enable CCDRs to engage in the �dark corners of the globe� where a US presence and capacity building efforts will be so critical. The future adversary is overwhelmingly an irregular one. Few if any opponents will have the ability to challenge us in a conventional conflict for the foreseeable future. An unstable world favors the future adversary since it provides him with relative freedom of action. Yet, the future environment will be characterized by a variety of drivers of instability (as listed above) that can be influenced or even controlled. Managing these drivers will require flexible Marine Corps MAGTFs capable of engaging a myriad of different potential adversaries manipulating unstable environmental factors to their advantage. The way to best address these drivers of instability is to seek to mitigate the factors that make them possible. Providing a persistent, forward presence tailored for the lower end of the operational spectrum, the Security Cooperation Marine Air Ground Task Force (SC MAGTF) will enable CCDRs to engage in the �dark corners of the globe� where a US presence and capacity building efforts will be so critical.

6. 6 Long War Force Planning Construct The Long War Force Planning Concept is nested within OSD guidance that directs the services to adapt themselves to address more of the irregular threats that the future will present. From this guidance, the Navy and Marine Corps developed a plan that seeks to capitalize on the inherent strengths of the Navy-Marine Corps team to operate in the littoral regions of the world in a manner that enables the persistent presence of US forces combined with the ability to project influence into areas that had previously been marginalized. How do we develop a force planning construct? The Long War Concept is derived from the 05-06 QDR which directs risk in the traditional to address the irregular threat. The NOC was written in 2006 and reflects the combined efforts of the USN and USMC to develop a common operating framework. CONPLAN 7500 sees SOCOM as the global synchronizer for the GWOT. A key component of this is BPC. However there is not enough SOF to do all that needs to be done. The SC MAGTF is the vehicle to address this need. It is a MAGTF reflecting the Marine Corps� long history of combined arms teams working together. SC MAGTF will facilitate the use of 27 infantry battalions in a 9 forward/ 27 back configuration. Capabilities and demand will drive task organization. The SC MAGTF must be focused on regional specialization and is the answer for how we capitalize on regional investments. Advisor Concept: 42 now, 747 in 2011. Currently focused on facilitating training teams to OIF/OEF but will evolve to encompass all regions. The global lay-down and force employment plan will provide more responsive, persistent forces to address CCDR requirements currently un-sourced but critical to the GWOT. The Long War Force Planning Concept is nested within OSD guidance that directs the services to adapt themselves to address more of the irregular threats that the future will present. From this guidance, the Navy and Marine Corps developed a plan that seeks to capitalize on the inherent strengths of the Navy-Marine Corps team to operate in the littoral regions of the world in a manner that enables the persistent presence of US forces combined with the ability to project influence into areas that had previously been marginalized. How do we develop a force planning construct? The Long War Concept is derived from the 05-06 QDR which directs risk in the traditional to address the irregular threat. The NOC was written in 2006 and reflects the combined efforts of the USN and USMC to develop a common operating framework. CONPLAN 7500 sees SOCOM as the global synchronizer for the GWOT. A key component of this is BPC. However there is not enough SOF to do all that needs to be done. The SC MAGTF is the vehicle to address this need. It is a MAGTF reflecting the Marine Corps� long history of combined arms teams working together. SC MAGTF will facilitate the use of 27 infantry battalions in a 9 forward/ 27 back configuration. Capabilities and demand will drive task organization. The SC MAGTF must be focused on regional specialization and is the answer for how we capitalize on regional investments. Advisor Concept: 42 now, 747 in 2011. Currently focused on facilitating training teams to OIF/OEF but will evolve to encompass all regions. The global lay-down and force employment plan will provide more responsive, persistent forces to address CCDR requirements currently un-sourced but critical to the GWOT.

7. 7 QDR Guidance: Accept risk in traditional warfare Increase capacity for irregular warfare through employments of general purpose forces Demonstrate commitment for response to catastrophic events Develop capabilities to deal with disruptive eventsQDR Guidance: Accept risk in traditional warfare Increase capacity for irregular warfare through employments of general purpose forces Demonstrate commitment for response to catastrophic events Develop capabilities to deal with disruptive events

8. 8 The Marine Corps will remain a full-spectrum capable force. The Long War Concept explains how the Marine Corps is going to shift resources from traditional to nontraditional challenges. Operations conducted within this force employment concept will focus on shaping the security environment (phase 0), deterring adversaries (phase 1), and enabling civil authorities (phase 5). Some operations such as NEO�s, HA/DR, and limited offensive operations will constitute operations in these phases. However, the Marine Corps will remain equally adept at conducting major operations and participating as members of a joint campaign at the higher end of the operational spectrum. Where deterrence fails, our Marines will remain capable of seizing the initiative (phase 2) , dominating the enemy (phase 3), and stabilizing the security environment (phase 4). CMC�s description of the Marine Corps as a two fisted fighter is apt. The leading fist will be our efforts to continuously shape the environment and deter enemy aggression. However, the rear fist will remain the ability to apply the full measure of Marine combined arms combat power against our Nation�s adversaries through the employment of larger Marine Corps MAGTFs with a robust forcible entry capability. Military engagement, security cooperation with partner nations, and deterrence activities will constitute a continuous effort in the �steady state� security environment. However, when a �surge capability� is required to engage opponents, our Corps will remain prepared. The Marine Corps will remain a full-spectrum capable force. The Long War Concept explains how the Marine Corps is going to shift resources from traditional to nontraditional challenges. Operations conducted within this force employment concept will focus on shaping the security environment (phase 0), deterring adversaries (phase 1), and enabling civil authorities (phase 5). Some operations such as NEO�s, HA/DR, and limited offensive operations will constitute operations in these phases. However, the Marine Corps will remain equally adept at conducting major operations and participating as members of a joint campaign at the higher end of the operational spectrum. Where deterrence fails, our Marines will remain capable of seizing the initiative (phase 2) , dominating the enemy (phase 3), and stabilizing the security environment (phase 4). CMC�s description of the Marine Corps as a two fisted fighter is apt. The leading fist will be our efforts to continuously shape the environment and deter enemy aggression. However, the rear fist will remain the ability to apply the full measure of Marine combined arms combat power against our Nation�s adversaries through the employment of larger Marine Corps MAGTFs with a robust forcible entry capability. Military engagement, security cooperation with partner nations, and deterrence activities will constitute a continuous effort in the �steady state� security environment. However, when a �surge capability� is required to engage opponents, our Corps will remain prepared.

9. 9 This chart depicts a combination of the arc of instability and the historical caliphate which we describe as the zone of engagement. The littorals can be readily affected through the proposed future employment of the MSCT. The continuation of the MEU program addresses traditional COCOM demands And implementation of the global fleet stations and SC MAGTF addresses emerging opportunities to build partnership capacity. This also meets direction given in the QDR to meet acceptance of risk in the traditional quadrant and greater use of general purpose forces to help alleviate strain on special operation forces. The global synchronization conference is the venue to delineate the boundaries between USSOCOM and the GCCs. The step to the right assumes that GPFs pick up FID and COIN tasks allowing USSOCOM to concentrate on SOF specific missions. The proposed Force Planning Construct positions the Marine Corps well to respond to the demands of the Long War and �triangulate� to address drivers of instability well into the future. This plan also supports the Navy�s Global Fleet Stations Concept. GFS is essentially the Navy�s bid for addressing the irregular threat and remaining relevant. We NEED to support the Navy or the Army will. The first GFS platform was the Navy�s Emory S Land operating in the GOG as a sub-tender� it was perfect as a BPC platform due to the ship�s ability to repair the Nigerian�s broken ships. Explain Pacific laydown: 2 PCS to Oki, 2 UDP to Oki, 2 UDP to Guam.This chart depicts a combination of the arc of instability and the historical caliphate which we describe as the zone of engagement. The littorals can be readily affected through the proposed future employment of the MSCT. The continuation of the MEU program addresses traditional COCOM demands And implementation of the global fleet stations and SC MAGTF addresses emerging opportunities to build partnership capacity. This also meets direction given in the QDR to meet acceptance of risk in the traditional quadrant and greater use of general purpose forces to help alleviate strain on special operation forces. The global synchronization conference is the venue to delineate the boundaries between USSOCOM and the GCCs. The step to the right assumes that GPFs pick up FID and COIN tasks allowing USSOCOM to concentrate on SOF specific missions. The proposed Force Planning Construct positions the Marine Corps well to respond to the demands of the Long War and �triangulate� to address drivers of instability well into the future. This plan also supports the Navy�s Global Fleet Stations Concept. GFS is essentially the Navy�s bid for addressing the irregular threat and remaining relevant. We NEED to support the Navy or the Army will. The first GFS platform was the Navy�s Emory S Land operating in the GOG as a sub-tender� it was perfect as a BPC platform due to the ship�s ability to repair the Nigerian�s broken ships. Explain Pacific laydown: 2 PCS to Oki, 2 UDP to Oki, 2 UDP to Guam.

10. 10 Architecture for Building Partnership Capacity OSD proposal to resurrect Military Advisory and Assistance Group concept Marine Corps establishes an advisor organization (in development) SC MAGTFs and Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU) provide foreign training This diagram depicts the Marine Corps� answer to the OSD proposal to resurrect increase our efforts at building partner capacity. This diagram depicts the Marine Corps� answer to the OSD proposal to resurrect the Military Advisory and Assistance Group (MAAG) concept. The MAAG will be a joint organization operating from within selected countries as a critical link between the HN military and both the ambassador and DOD. The MAAG will be staffed according to JMD requirements with Marines who will report to both the commander of the MAAG as well as the MARFOR commander supporting the respective COCOM. The Marine Corps Training and Advisor Group (MCTAG) will constitute a subordinate element of the MARFOR and will interface with the MAAG while acting in an advisory capacity with HN forces aimed at building partner capacity in the security sector. Supporting the MCTAG efforts will be the persistent training efforts of the SC MAGTF , operating from GFS or CSL, and the episodic training efforts provided by MEU as they conduct scheduled training on a more limited basis. The MCTAG will potentially act as the principal coordinator for SC MAGTF and MEU activities in the region, providing critical continuity and links with HN forces that will facilitate the maximizing of SC MAGTF and MEU capacity building efforts. This diagram depicts the Marine Corps� answer to the OSD proposal to resurrect increase our efforts at building partner capacity. This diagram depicts the Marine Corps� answer to the OSD proposal to resurrect the Military Advisory and Assistance Group (MAAG) concept. The MAAG will be a joint organization operating from within selected countries as a critical link between the HN military and both the ambassador and DOD. The MAAG will be staffed according to JMD requirements with Marines who will report to both the commander of the MAAG as well as the MARFOR commander supporting the respective COCOM. The Marine Corps Training and Advisor Group (MCTAG) will constitute a subordinate element of the MARFOR and will interface with the MAAG while acting in an advisory capacity with HN forces aimed at building partner capacity in the security sector. Supporting the MCTAG efforts will be the persistent training efforts of the SC MAGTF , operating from GFS or CSL, and the episodic training efforts provided by MEU as they conduct scheduled training on a more limited basis. The MCTAG will potentially act as the principal coordinator for SC MAGTF and MEU activities in the region, providing critical continuity and links with HN forces that will facilitate the maximizing of SC MAGTF and MEU capacity building efforts.

11. 11 Security Cooperation MAGTFTask organized to meet specific COCOM requirements The Long War Concept introduces a new type of Marine unit to address this COCOM BPC requirement. Similar to a MEU but specifically tailored to address security cooperation. These will have lower firepower requirements and focus on how to best support efforts to build partner capacity. Will operate on the principle of strategic distributed operations and provide persistent forward presence to conduct appropriate CCDR missions. These are GP Forces provide COCOMs with forward deployed/forward based contingency and crisis response capability. Through training & engagement with partner nations they contribute to building partner nation security capacity, support partner nation security efforts, and when required and funded through appropriate channels, these GP Forces can also provide MTTs to conduct FID. Built around an infantry battalion from a regionally focused regiment, capable of distributed operations. Adaptable for re-aggregation / redeployment to meet emerging, full spectrum requirements Proposed Force Planning Construct supports Navy GFS through embarked SC MAGTF detachments SC MAGTF and MEU are complementary The Long War Concept introduces a new type of Marine unit to address this COCOM BPC requirement. Similar to a MEU but specifically tailored to address security cooperation. These will have lower firepower requirements and focus on how to best support efforts to build partner capacity. Will operate on the principle of strategic distributed operations and provide persistent forward presence to conduct appropriate CCDR missions. These are GP Forces provide COCOMs with forward deployed/forward based contingency and crisis response capability. Through training & engagement with partner nations they contribute to building partner nation security capacity, support partner nation security efforts, and when required and funded through appropriate channels, these GP Forces can also provide MTTs to conduct FID. Built around an infantry battalion from a regionally focused regiment, capable of distributed operations. Adaptable for re-aggregation / redeployment to meet emerging, full spectrum requirements Proposed Force Planning Construct supports Navy GFS through embarked SC MAGTF detachments SC MAGTF and MEU are complementary

12. 12 This slide illustrates how regionalization might be achieved in units sourcing the SC MAGTF. At the lowest level, Center for Advanced Operational Cultural Learning (CAOCL) and Security Cooperation Education Training Center (SCETC) training supports building linguistic and cultural awareness in the AOR. This training is aimed at providing a basic understanding of cultural, linguistic, political structures amongst the junior Marines who will deploy into the specific AO. Career Marines (Lts and NCOs) assigned micro-regions through the Career Marine Regional Studies program (assigned at TBS and NCO school) are assigned to units that source the SC MAGTF to a level that facilitates greater understanding amongst the junior leaders who will be key to operating in the AO. The assignment of these career Marines with regions relevent to the SC MAGTF will facilitate the maintenance of highly perishable language skills and the performance of training to reinforce the programs provided by the CAOCL. At the highest level, select billets in the tables of organization of units that source the SC MAGTF are coded to facilitate the assignment of FAO and RAO who will provide the deepest level of regional understanding among the senior leaders. Likely assigned to staff billets where they can be most flexibly employed by the SC MAGTF commander, these will be high demand assets that facilitate the maintenance of effective training programs within the SC MAGTF as well as key linguistic and cultural understanding by the commander and his staff. This slide illustrates how regionalization might be achieved in units sourcing the SC MAGTF. At the lowest level, Center for Advanced Operational Cultural Learning (CAOCL) and Security Cooperation Education Training Center (SCETC) training supports building linguistic and cultural awareness in the AOR. This training is aimed at providing a basic understanding of cultural, linguistic, political structures amongst the junior Marines who will deploy into the specific AO. Career Marines (Lts and NCOs) assigned micro-regions through the Career Marine Regional Studies program (assigned at TBS and NCO school) are assigned to units that source the SC MAGTF to a level that facilitates greater understanding amongst the junior leaders who will be key to operating in the AO. The assignment of these career Marines with regions relevent to the SC MAGTF will facilitate the maintenance of highly perishable language skills and the performance of training to reinforce the programs provided by the CAOCL. At the highest level, select billets in the tables of organization of units that source the SC MAGTF are coded to facilitate the assignment of FAO and RAO who will provide the deepest level of regional understanding among the senior leaders. Likely assigned to staff billets where they can be most flexibly employed by the SC MAGTF commander, these will be high demand assets that facilitate the maintenance of effective training programs within the SC MAGTF as well as key linguistic and cultural understanding by the commander and his staff.

13. 13 This slide provides a notional depiction of how an SC MAGTF might deploy and operate. A CONUS based infantry battalion with tailored ACE and CLE components forming a MAGTF, deploys to a forward operating base from which subordinate elements are deployed to support a series of missions in accordance with CCDR requirements. The elements of this MAGTF have been previously identified, manned and trained to support capacity building efforts for a particular AO. In this slide, the Africa SC MAGTF deploys to Rota Spain from which subordinate elements are deployed across the African continent. Some of these missions would be continuous while others would be episodic. In this case, one reinforced company supported by rotary wing assets deploy aboard navy shipping to support continuous capacity building operations in Liberia while another reinforced company supported by rotary wing assets deploys to a Cooperative Security Location (CSL). From this CSL, subordinate units move via HSV, MV-22, CH-53 and other intra-theater transportation to locations across the Gulf of Guinea in an effort to build partner capacity. Still other units operate directly from the FOS in Rota where mission-tailored units are deployed across Africa to support CCDR initiatives and respond to crises. The SC MAGTF would have the ability to reaggregate on short notice and respond to contingencies, up to and including high intensity combat operations, on short notice. This slide provides a notional depiction of how an SC MAGTF might deploy and operate. A CONUS based infantry battalion with tailored ACE and CLE components forming a MAGTF, deploys to a forward operating base from which subordinate elements are deployed to support a series of missions in accordance with CCDR requirements. The elements of this MAGTF have been previously identified, manned and trained to support capacity building efforts for a particular AO. In this slide, the Africa SC MAGTF deploys to Rota Spain from which subordinate elements are deployed across the African continent. Some of these missions would be continuous while others would be episodic. In this case, one reinforced company supported by rotary wing assets deploy aboard navy shipping to support continuous capacity building operations in Liberia while another reinforced company supported by rotary wing assets deploys to a Cooperative Security Location (CSL). From this CSL, subordinate units move via HSV, MV-22, CH-53 and other intra-theater transportation to locations across the Gulf of Guinea in an effort to build partner capacity. Still other units operate directly from the FOS in Rota where mission-tailored units are deployed across Africa to support CCDR initiatives and respond to crises. The SC MAGTF would have the ability to reaggregate on short notice and respond to contingencies, up to and including high intensity combat operations, on short notice.

14. 14 Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable)Expeditionary Force in Readiness Although the SC MAGTF will provide the persistent forward deployed presence in support of COCOM TSC activities, the MEU (SOC), afloat on Navy shipping, will constitute an additional Marine force provider capable of support COCOM TSC activities. On a more episodic basis commensurate with the MEU requirement to be postured as the Marine Corps� �911 force� afloat, the MEU will be capable of supporting SC activities in a manner similar to that of the SC MAGTF. The MEU will remain the Marine Corps� principal crisis response force; as such, the MEU will not be sourced for SC activities with the same degree of regularity as the SC MAGTF. As COCOMs identify and develop SC activities to support shaping and deterrence efforts, some activities can be tasked to the MEU. In some cases, the MEU may actually be a more appropriate venue for SC activities than the SC MAGTF. This will be particularly the case where the potential for high spectrum, MAGTF level training exercises requiring an aggregated unit with the level of training specialization that the MEU possesses, negates the requirement to re-aggregate the SC MAGTF from other activities that it may have been conducting across the AOR. Although the SC MAGTF will provide the persistent forward deployed presence in support of COCOM TSC activities, the MEU (SOC), afloat on Navy shipping, will constitute an additional Marine force provider capable of support COCOM TSC activities. On a more episodic basis commensurate with the MEU requirement to be postured as the Marine Corps� �911 force� afloat, the MEU will be capable of supporting SC activities in a manner similar to that of the SC MAGTF. The MEU will remain the Marine Corps� principal crisis response force; as such, the MEU will not be sourced for SC activities with the same degree of regularity as the SC MAGTF. As COCOMs identify and develop SC activities to support shaping and deterrence efforts, some activities can be tasked to the MEU. In some cases, the MEU may actually be a more appropriate venue for SC activities than the SC MAGTF. This will be particularly the case where the potential for high spectrum, MAGTF level training exercises requiring an aggregated unit with the level of training specialization that the MEU possesses, negates the requirement to re-aggregate the SC MAGTF from other activities that it may have been conducting across the AOR.

15. 15 This slide provides a vignette that depicts how the MEU can provide SC activities by itself or in a manner complementary to the SC MAGTF. The MEU afloat in the Mediterranean provides the CENTCOM commander with Marine forces to support SC activities in Jordan. In this case, the 24th MEU (SOC) actually conducted these SC activities in support of exercise �Infinite Moonlight� in Jun-Jul 2006, while simultaneously planning and executing a NEO in Lebanon. This represents how the MEU might be capable of conducting SC activities while still responding to a crisis. The MEU afloat in the Indian Ocean provides a hypothetical situation where the MEU disaggregates to provide greater regional presence. Two of the MEU elements support the AFRICOM commander with additional Marine forces to support SC activities being already conducted by SC MAGTF elements. In this case, the MEU is able to link up with the SC MAGTF elements to either reinforce the SC MAGTF units or provide parallel SC activities aimed at maximizing the BPC opportunities with the partner nations of Kenya and Djibouti. This slide provides a vignette that depicts how the MEU can provide SC activities by itself or in a manner complementary to the SC MAGTF. The MEU afloat in the Mediterranean provides the CENTCOM commander with Marine forces to support SC activities in Jordan. In this case, the 24th MEU (SOC) actually conducted these SC activities in support of exercise �Infinite Moonlight� in Jun-Jul 2006, while simultaneously planning and executing a NEO in Lebanon. This represents how the MEU might be capable of conducting SC activities while still responding to a crisis. The MEU afloat in the Indian Ocean provides a hypothetical situation where the MEU disaggregates to provide greater regional presence. Two of the MEU elements support the AFRICOM commander with additional Marine forces to support SC activities being already conducted by SC MAGTF elements. In this case, the MEU is able to link up with the SC MAGTF elements to either reinforce the SC MAGTF units or provide parallel SC activities aimed at maximizing the BPC opportunities with the partner nations of Kenya and Djibouti.

16. 16 Notional Deployment Scheme for Persistent TSC Engagement This slide shows how the deployment cycle of advisors, the SC MAGTF, and the MEU can be arranged in a manner that provides truly persistent, effective coverage of SC activities IAW COCOM and MARFOR guidance. Shading illustrates how the advisor and SC MAGTF deployment times into their theater of operations is offset to allow for a continuous level of effectiveness to be maintained through the maintenance of relationships and situational awareness that supports both units. Ideally, the advisors will be able to provide orientation to the incoming SC MAGTF units bound for SC activities. Similarly, as advisor units rotate, the ability of the incoming advisors to build their situational awareness can be assisted by the already operating and �seasoned� SC MAGTF personnel operating in the AOR. Supporting the critical phase where SC MAGTFs are in transition, MEUs are scheduled to conduct SC activities to ensure maximum effectiveness is maintained. This slide shows how the deployment cycle of advisors, the SC MAGTF, and the MEU can be arranged in a manner that provides truly persistent, effective coverage of SC activities IAW COCOM and MARFOR guidance. Shading illustrates how the advisor and SC MAGTF deployment times into their theater of operations is offset to allow for a continuous level of effectiveness to be maintained through the maintenance of relationships and situational awareness that supports both units. Ideally, the advisors will be able to provide orientation to the incoming SC MAGTF units bound for SC activities. Similarly, as advisor units rotate, the ability of the incoming advisors to build their situational awareness can be assisted by the already operating and �seasoned� SC MAGTF personnel operating in the AOR. Supporting the critical phase where SC MAGTFs are in transition, MEUs are scheduled to conduct SC activities to ensure maximum effectiveness is maintained.

17. 17 Marine Corps Summary Supports the Geographic CCDRs through: Persistent forward presence Balanced MEFs Task organized MAGTFs capable of full spectrum operations In the near to mid-range future, the Marine Corps is going to take the steps necessary to most effectively engage our nation�s adversaries abroad. Doing this is going to require a balancing of capabilities across the range of military operations while simultaneously positioning our units and equipment to most effectively deal with the irregular threat that constitutes the new face of our nation�s foes. In so doing, the Marine Corps will position itself to provide a more robust forward presence in support of CCDR efforts to build and maintain partner capacity through security cooperation and theater engagement. Persistent forward presence with MEFs re-balanced to address COCOM requirements are the answer. These efforts will be in step with OSD guidance and will constitute a �step to the right� to accept a certain degree of risk in the conventional arena in order to address the emerged irregular threat. In the end, we will still maintain our ability to fight and win our nation�s battles. However, our ability to mitigate the risk and decrease the requirement of having to actually fight those battles will be increased by our actions across the lower spectrum of conflict.In the near to mid-range future, the Marine Corps is going to take the steps necessary to most effectively engage our nation�s adversaries abroad. Doing this is going to require a balancing of capabilities across the range of military operations while simultaneously positioning our units and equipment to most effectively deal with the irregular threat that constitutes the new face of our nation�s foes. In so doing, the Marine Corps will position itself to provide a more robust forward presence in support of CCDR efforts to build and maintain partner capacity through security cooperation and theater engagement. Persistent forward presence with MEFs re-balanced to address COCOM requirements are the answer. These efforts will be in step with OSD guidance and will constitute a �step to the right� to accept a certain degree of risk in the conventional arena in order to address the emerged irregular threat. In the end, we will still maintain our ability to fight and win our nation�s battles. However, our ability to mitigate the risk and decrease the requirement of having to actually fight those battles will be increased by our actions across the lower spectrum of conflict.

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20. 20 Points of ContactNational Plans BranchStrategy and Plans DivisionPP&O HQMC Col Keil Gentry 703-692-4383 LtCol Michael Danzer 703-692-4381 LtCol Mark Winn 703-692-4338 Major Edward Novack 703-692-4378 http://hqinet001@hqmc.usmc.mil/pp&o/pl/plnref.asp

21. 21 Back Up

22. 22 Marine Corps Title 10 Assessment �Marine Corps � shall be so organized as to include not less than three combat divisions and three air wings, and such other land combat, aviation, and other services as may be organic therein.� �Marine Corps shall be organized, trained, and equipped to provide fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign.� �In addition, the Marine Corps shall provide detachments and organizations for service on armed vessels of the Navy,� �shall provide security detachments for the protection of naval property at naval stations and bases,� �and shall perform such other duties as the President may direct.� �Marine Corps shall develop, in coordination with the Army and the Air Force, those phases of amphibious operations that pertain to the tactics, technique, and equipment used by landing forces.� �Responsible, [IAW] integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of peacetime components of the Marine Corps to meet the needs of war.� The Marine Corps needs to improve upon (3) of the mandates outlined in our Title 10 requirements. The first is our requirement to conduct amphibious forcible entry operations. These skills have atrophied over the last 4 years due to the requirement to tailor training toward ongoing combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. These operations in the CENTCOM AOR have focused on COIN and FID at the expense of our naval support and amphibious operations requirements. This degrading in capability is not due to a lack of material readiness, but reflects a lack of training focus. This challenge but will be better able to be addressed following the reduction of surge requirements in Iraq. The second area requiring improvement is the lack of Marine Corps detachments deployed aboard navy shipping. This too can be attributed to ongoing operations in CENTCOM and PACOM in support of the Long War. The drawdown in Iraq will enable the one MEU currently operating ashore in Iraq to resume operations afloat while also enabling the sourcing of II MEF assets for the EUCOM MEU. The implementation of USMC support to the GFS concept will further reinforce this Title X mandate. The last area requiring improvement is the USMC task of providing security detachments for the protection of naval property at naval stations and bases. BPC efforts may potentially address this� instead of having to seize forward naval stations and bases, perhaps we can use a checkbook to purchase them.The Marine Corps needs to improve upon (3) of the mandates outlined in our Title 10 requirements. The first is our requirement to conduct amphibious forcible entry operations. These skills have atrophied over the last 4 years due to the requirement to tailor training toward ongoing combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. These operations in the CENTCOM AOR have focused on COIN and FID at the expense of our naval support and amphibious operations requirements. This degrading in capability is not due to a lack of material readiness, but reflects a lack of training focus. This challenge but will be better able to be addressed following the reduction of surge requirements in Iraq. The second area requiring improvement is the lack of Marine Corps detachments deployed aboard navy shipping. This too can be attributed to ongoing operations in CENTCOM and PACOM in support of the Long War. The drawdown in Iraq will enable the one MEU currently operating ashore in Iraq to resume operations afloat while also enabling the sourcing of II MEF assets for the EUCOM MEU. The implementation of USMC support to the GFS concept will further reinforce this Title X mandate. The last area requiring improvement is the USMC task of providing security detachments for the protection of naval property at naval stations and bases. BPC efforts may potentially address this� instead of having to seize forward naval stations and bases, perhaps we can use a checkbook to purchase them.

23. 23 1:2 Battalion-level Rotation Template This slide shows the anticipated sourcing of infantry battalions by MEF to support anticipated force requirements for MEU, SC MAGTF, and UDP on Guam and Okinawa. In all cases except one, a 1:2 dwell ratio is achieved. The exception is 6th Marines which will attain a 1:3 dwell ratio in support of the EUCOM MEU. The big takeaway is the persistent forward posture and increased force structure for III MEF. Long War Concept would see the re-starting of UDP with (3) battalions (2 to Guam and one to Okinawa) while (2) battalions PCS to Okinawa. These increases in force structure for III MEF both provide MARFORPAC with organic forces for conducting BPC while providing presence in a still sensitive part of the world (KTO, rising China). Regional expertise is being considered for regiments that habitually provide forces for SC MAGTF. This will be realized through the staffing of FAO, RAO, and linguist personnel, as well as vectoring of native speakers to these regiments, while also facilitating cultural training through CAOCL and other venues. This will further be facilitated by the new advisor concept which will provide a trained advisor cadre to conduct security assistance in these foreign countries.This slide shows the anticipated sourcing of infantry battalions by MEF to support anticipated force requirements for MEU, SC MAGTF, and UDP on Guam and Okinawa. In all cases except one, a 1:2 dwell ratio is achieved. The exception is 6th Marines which will attain a 1:3 dwell ratio in support of the EUCOM MEU. The big takeaway is the persistent forward posture and increased force structure for III MEF. Long War Concept would see the re-starting of UDP with (3) battalions (2 to Guam and one to Okinawa) while (2) battalions PCS to Okinawa. These increases in force structure for III MEF both provide MARFORPAC with organic forces for conducting BPC while providing presence in a still sensitive part of the world (KTO, rising China). Regional expertise is being considered for regiments that habitually provide forces for SC MAGTF. This will be realized through the staffing of FAO, RAO, and linguist personnel, as well as vectoring of native speakers to these regiments, while also facilitating cultural training through CAOCL and other venues. This will further be facilitated by the new advisor concept which will provide a trained advisor cadre to conduct security assistance in these foreign countries.

24. 24 1. This chart depicts a combination of the arc of instability and the historical caliphate which we describe as the zone of engagement. The littorals can be readily affected through the proposed future employment of the SC MAGTF. 2. The continuation of the MEU program addresses traditional COCOM demands 3. And implementation of the global fleet stations and SC MAGTF addresses emerging opportunities to build partnership capacity. 4. This also meets direction given in the QDR to accept risk in the traditional quadrant and make greater use of general purpose forces to help alleviate strain on special operation forces. The global synchronization conference is the venue to delineate the boundaries between USSOCOM and the GCCs. The step to the right assumes that GPFs pick up FID and COIN tasks allowing USSOCOM to concentrate on SOF specific missions. 5. The proposed Force Planning Construct positions the Marine Corps well to respond to the demands of the Long War.1. This chart depicts a combination of the arc of instability and the historical caliphate which we describe as the zone of engagement. The littorals can be readily affected through the proposed future employment of the SC MAGTF. 2. The continuation of the MEU program addresses traditional COCOM demands 3. And implementation of the global fleet stations and SC MAGTF addresses emerging opportunities to build partnership capacity. 4. This also meets direction given in the QDR to accept risk in the traditional quadrant and make greater use of general purpose forces to help alleviate strain on special operation forces. The global synchronization conference is the venue to delineate the boundaries between USSOCOM and the GCCs. The step to the right assumes that GPFs pick up FID and COIN tasks allowing USSOCOM to concentrate on SOF specific missions. 5. The proposed Force Planning Construct positions the Marine Corps well to respond to the demands of the Long War.

25. 25 SC MAGTF: Expanding Adaptable Force Employment Options While much of the planned growth in USMC end strength must be utilized to increase as quickly as possible core OIF-related essential capacity and to improve the currently-unsustainable deployment-to-dwell ratio related thereto, this growth ability presents a mid- and even long-term opportunity to invest in sustainable capabilities and capacity that can readily execute Security Cooperation missions. The creation and routine deployment of the proposed SC MAGTF in key focus areas in and around the �arc of instability� will help meet combatant commanders� demands for shaping capabilities while preserving and positioning forward a compact, largely seaborne force that can be reoriented on more traditional contingency missions when required. Even absent OIF/OEF type demands, our current forces are not tailored to the lower end of the operational spectrum. MEU engagement activities, while of great value, have been of necessity episodic and limited. The SC MAGTF will bring smaller scale, persistent engagement to the �dark corners of the globe�. While much of the planned growth in USMC end strength must be utilized to increase as quickly as possible core OIF-related essential capacity and to improve the currently-unsustainable deployment-to-dwell ratio related thereto, this growth ability presents a mid- and even long-term opportunity to invest in sustainable capabilities and capacity that can readily execute Security Cooperation missions. The creation and routine deployment of the proposed SC MAGTF in key focus areas in and around the �arc of instability� will help meet combatant commanders� demands for shaping capabilities while preserving and positioning forward a compact, largely seaborne force that can be reoriented on more traditional contingency missions when required. Even absent OIF/OEF type demands, our current forces are not tailored to the lower end of the operational spectrum. MEU engagement activities, while of great value, have been of necessity episodic and limited. The SC MAGTF will bring smaller scale, persistent engagement to the �dark corners of the globe�.