The diversity of truths

1. The diversity of truths SUSAN HAACK <shaack@law.miami.edu>

2. “The truth is rarely pure and never simple. Modern life would be intolerable if it were either.” – Oscar Wilde

3. ONE TRUTH, MANY TRUTHS • TRUTH IN SCIENCE • TRUTH IN HISTORY • TRUTH IN LAW • TRUTH IN FICTION

4. 1. One Truth, Many Truths • what I mean when I say that there is “one truth” is • not that there is one all-important true proposition, THE TRUTH • but that there is one non-ambiguous, non-relative truth-concept

5. i.e. • that, whether we are talking about propositions of natural science, of social science, of history, of law, of literature, etc. • when we say that a proposition is true, what we mean is the same: • that it is the proposition that p, and p

6. & • what I mean when I say that there are “many truths” is • not that there are many truth-concepts • but that there are many propositions, beliefs, theories, etc, that are true

7. & that • these many truths differ very significantly among themselves • in their epistemological status (how we know they are true) • & in their metaphysical status (what makes them true)

8. 2. Truth in Science • a good way to think of the sciences: as a loose federation of kinds of inquiry • roughly characterizable by subject-matter • which differs from (but sometimes overlaps) that of historical, legal, literary, etc., inquiry

9. my picture is synechistic • no sharp line between e.g., cosmology & metaphysics, or psychology & philosophy of mind • historical sciences like evolutionary biology have some affinities with historical inquiry, social sciences with legal scholarship, etc.

10. “synechism” is Peirce’s word for the methodological principle: look for continuities, not sharp dichotomies

11. the goal • of scientific inquiry as of ALL inquiry • is to discover the answer(s) to some question(s) – the true answer(s) • this doesn’t mean scientists seek THE TRUTH, nor that they collect truths, as someone might collect stamps

12. only • (as we saw last time) that they want to end up believing • that p, if p • that not-p, if not-p • and that it’s more complicated than that if it is more complicated that that!

13. of course • many (most) scientific claims and theories eventually turn out to be false • i.e., there have been many scientific “truths,” as well as scientific truths • & no scientific claims are certain; all are fallible

14. moreover • many scientific claims and theories have eventually turned out • to be only approximately true • and/or to be true only in a more restricted field than formerly supposed

15. every scientific theory • is the result of scientists’ intellectual work • so in one sense, scientific truths are made by scientists • but whether a scientific theory is true or is false does not depend on what scientists do, or believe, but on how the world is

16. natural-scientific theories are (mostly) about natural phenomena, things, & events – which are not of our making • social-scientific theories are about human societies, roles, rules – which are of our making

17. yet • both, if true, are (normally) objectively so • in that whether they are true or false does not depend on whether you, or I, or anyone believes they are true • (there are social-science exceptions – self-fulfilling & self-undermining prophesies)

18. of course • not all scientists are objective (= unbiased, impartial) – far from it • they may be partisans of one theory, enemies of another; blind to certain evidence; etc.

19. evidence in the sciences • is always complex, often ambiguous • invariably incomplete (& hence potentially misleading) • this is why scientists themselves hesitate to claim truth, preferring to say “probably,” “possibly,” or “this is the best model,” etc.

20. for example, Watson preferred to write of “solving the structure of DNA” – i.e., getting the right model … but that would be equivalent to giving a true account of the structure of DNA

21. 3. Truth in History • like all inquiry, historical inquiry aims at finding true answers to its questions • but historians are even more reluctant than scientists to claim truth • & these days many prefer to speak not of truth but of “truth”

22. why so? • some, probably, have been made nervous by post-modernist and other forms of cynicism about the concept of truth • but there are also other (& somewhat better) reasons

23. like all inquiry, historical inquiry is fallible • like social-scientific inquiry, historical inquiry requires interpretation of people’s belief, desires, hopes, fears, etc. • which is even harder with distance in time, culture, etc.

24. moreover, historical inquiry • must rely on evidence that itself needs to be shown authentic • which is also even harder with distance of time, etc. – and requires interpretation of records, & so forth

25. & • this evidence may be skewed, because those who left the records often had their own agenda • &, like evidence in the sciences, evidence is history is always incomplete

26. for example • an account of a battle will probably tell us which side won, what he consequences were for the war, how many were killed • possibly how many tanks, planes, etc. were destroyed

27. but • certainly not how many flowers were trampled (or even, probably, how many horses were killed) • quite likely not about the famine or the epidemic that ensued

28. & of course • if the now-available records all come from whichever side or party or sect or class or race, etc., prevailed in some conflict • this will very likely introduce bias

29. hence the saying … “history is written by the winning side”

30. for example Donald Kagan argues that Thucydides’s history of the war between Athens and Sparta presented a complex, messy conflict in a partisan manner – while purporting to be definitive, “a thing for all time”

31. all that said • that a historical account is only part of the truth doesn’t mean that it is not true, so far as it goes • & to say that a historical claim is true is to say that it is the claim that p, and p

32. 4. Truth in Law • the word “law” suffers the same kind of ambiguity as “truth” • it may refer to the concept of law (as in “law is distinct from morality”) • or to specific laws & legal systems (as in “there ought to be a law against it”)

33. there are truths about law, the concept • & truths about legal systems and laws • here, I focus on the latter

34. legal truths (in this sense) • are relative to a legal system, and a time • e.g., in U.S. federal law between 1923 & 1975 the Frye Rule governed the admissibility of scientific testimony • in 1975 the Federal Rules of Evidence (Rule 702) provided a different standard

35. & • they are gappy (answers to some legal questions are indeterminate) • e.g., between 1975 & 1993 it was neither true nor false that the Federal Rules of Evidence had superseded Frye

36. & • legal truths can be changed by the action of legislators or of judges interpreting the law • As, in 1993, when the Supreme Court ruled in Daubert, it became true, in virtue of their decision, that FRE 702 superseded Frye

37. of course • a legal system is not itself (like science and history) a kind of inquiry • though legal proceedings will involve inquiry, of roughly two kinds: • into questions of fact (e.g., was there a stop sign?) • into questions of law (e.g., what is the legal standard here?)

38. indeed • the latter kind of inquiry is what “legal scholarship” refers to • in practice, however, this scholarship always involves interpretation, and often shades into advocacy • &, like historians, many law professors prefer to speak of “truth” than truth

39. nevertheless • there are true and false answers to (some) questions about what the law is in system S at time t • & it is true that the law in S at t provides that x, y, z just in case the law in S at t does provide that x, y, z

40. 5. Truth in Fiction • like legal systems, novels, plays, cartoons, etc., are not themselves forms of inquiry • though they involve imaginative exploration of scenarios, characters, etc. – somewhat like the imaginative thinking required by scientific inquiry

41. though novels, etc., may be set in real places, and/or apparently include real people among their characters • statements in a work of fiction about fictional places, persons, etc., are not true – “fictional” is the opposite of “real”

42. nevertheless • there are truths about novels, etc., of two types • external: about the author, the circumstances of the writing, the history of the book, etc. • internal: about the contents of the novel

43. examples • internal: “Conan Doyle wrote the Sherlock Holmes stories” • external: “In Doyle’s stories, Holmes was a detective, lived in Baker Street, solved the Case of the Speckled Band,” etc.

44. Sir Arthur Conan Doyle -- with Sherlock Holmes

45. this “graphic novel” translation of Doyle’s The Case of the Speckled Band, was published in Vancouver, Canada

46. “true in the novel” • raises some good philosophical questions about what is “implied” in the novel, and what indeterminate • but these are not as interesting (to me) as the questions about truths conveyed by works of fiction

47. for many fictional works • illustrate, and thereby convey obliquely, truths that they do not state explicitly; for example: • Samuel Butler’s The Way of All Flesh conveys, without stating, truths about the human weakness for self-deception, hypocrisy, & sham reasoning

48. This work of his is one of the finest epistemological novels” of all time (in English; you can probably think of Chinese examples)

49. one hard question is • exactly what kind of “speech” act is involved in “conveying, but not stating”? • it is like hinting, or suggesting, that p, without actually saying it – but not exactly • as e.g., “I have another appointment” might convey “Let’s do this quickly”

50. & another • are there special ”literary’ truths”? • my answer: no, fiction conveys perfectly ordinary truths, in the ordinary sense of the word • what is special is the conveying