Time, Self and Mind (ATS1835) Introduction to Philosophy B Semester 2, 2016

1. Time, Self and Mind (ATS1835)Introduction to Philosophy BSemester 2, 2016 Dr Ron Gallagher ron.gallagher@monash.edu Week 11: Scepticism and Exam That’s it! Don’t forget SETU EVALUATION THE BEST WAY TO REVISE FOR THE EXAM IS TO GOTHOUGH ALL THE LECTURE RECORDINGS WHILST LOOKING AT THE SAMPLE EXAM QUESTIONS

3. Intro to Philosophy B: Time, Self, and Mind (ATS1835) • Exam: 2hours 40% Where and When? • Exam Format: • The real exam will be 2 hours and have two parts: • 20 multiple-choice questions (worth 2 marks each) • (b) 2 short essays (worth 30 marks each). The short • essays should be about 300 words each (about 3 average-sized paragraphs) and you will be choosing to write two from four chosen for the exam.

4. From Sample Exam - on Moodle MULTIPLE CHOICE 3.A functionalist believes which of the following? (A) Minds are multiply realisable. (B) Minds are functional types. (C) (A) and (B) (D) None of the above. 2. According to David Lewis which of the following is correct? (A) External time corresponds to the temporal ordering of events and Personal time always corresponds to the causal ordering of events for the time-traveller. (B) External time always corresponds to the causal ordering of events for the time traveller and Personal time corresponds to the temporal ordering of events. (C) External time corresponds to Personal time and the temporal ordering of events always corresponds to the causal ordering of events for the time-traveller. (D) External ordering of events corresponds to temporal time and the Personal ordering of events always corresponds to causal time.

5. From Sample Exam - now on Moodle 7. In which way does the concept of identity differ from that of survival: (A) Identity is necessarily one:one, but survival can be one:many. (B) Identity is matter of degree, but survival is all or nothing. (C) All of the above. (D) None of the above 8. What do the Gettier examples show? (A) That knowledge is justified true belief. (B) That having a justified, true belief is sufficient for knowledge. (C) That having a justified, true belief is necessary for knowledge. (D) None of the above.

6. From Sample Exam - now on Moodle • 11. Imagine the following situation: (a) you are a brain in a vat stimulated by scientists who have fed you all your experience so far in life, (b) the scientists have made you aware of this, (c) you are familiar with Nozick’s tracking theory of knowledge. • According to Nozick, why is it still the case that your belief in the proposition “I am a brain in a vat” (call it P) will not count as knowledge? • Nozick's Tracking Theory S knows that P iff • P is true • S believes that P • (iii) If P were false, then S would not believe that P. • (iv) If P were true, then S would believe that P. • Condition (i) of Nozick’s Tracking Theory is not satisfied. • (B) Condition (ii) of Nozick’s Tracking Theory is not satisfied. • (C) Condition (iii) of Nozick’s Tracking Theory is not satisfied. • (D) Condition (iv) of Nozick’s Tracking Theory is not satisfied.

7. From Sample Exam - now on Moodle SHORT-ANSWER QUESTIONS Part 1 (Time): 1. There is an apparent tension between time travel and personal identity. What is the problem and how does Lewis resolve it using his four dimensionalist account of time? 2. What is the difference between personal time and external time according to Lewis? And how does it help explain the way in which time travel can take “time”? 3. What is the difference between incompatibilism and compatibilism? Discuss using some examples. What is soft determinism, and how is it related to either of these views? Part 2 (Logic): 4. What makes an argument different than a mere collection of statements? What is the crucial difference between a good inductive and a good deductive argument? Give an example of each. 5. What is the difference between an inconsistent set of statements and a contradictory set of statements? If two statements are contradictory, must one of the two be true? If two statements are inconsistent, must one of the two be true?

8. From Sample Exam - now on Moodle Part 3 (Mind): 6. Explain how functionalism allows for the multiple realisation of mental states, and how this might be viewed as an advantage over the view that the mind is the brain. 7. Explain Searle’s Chinese Room thought experiment. Does it show that the Turing Test is not a good test for thinking? Explain your reasons. Part 4 (Self): 8. Locke’s theory of personal identity seems to employ a memory criterion. But Derek Parfit believes that even an improved and more generalized psychological theory is problematic. What exactly is the fission problem and why does it seem to undermine any psychological view of personal identity? 9. Explain why Parfit thinks that the experiments involving patients whose corpus callosum has been severed present a problem for certain theories of the self. How does Parfit propose to avoid the problem? 10. Why does Williams think identity matters in personal identity? How does he motivate the idea in terms of our attitudes toward our future?

9. From Sample Exam - now on Moodle 11. What is the traditional analysis of knowledge? Explain it and then provide a Gettier-style counterexample to it—either one of Gettier’s own counterexamples, one discussed in the literature, or one you have made up yourself (doing the latter of course is most impressive). Explain exactly how the counterexample is meant to work. 12. What is Cartesian skepticism? And how does Descartes’ line of reasoning support it?

10. 12. What is Cartesian skepticism? And how does Descartes’ line of reasoning support it? Propositional knowledge - declarative statements • Practical skepticism (Pyrrhonian skepticism): • a refusal to affirm or deny that we have knowledge • Agnosticism about the question: do we know anything? • Theoretical skepticism (Cartesian skepticism): • the view that there is no knowledge • Note: Descartes wasn’t a skeptic; just popularized discussion of this view. From Lectures 9-11

11. From Lectures 9-11

12. The Cartesian Skeptical Argument • S knows P only if S’s evidence for P is not possibly misleading. (=Infallibilism) • Perceptual evidence is possibly misleading. (by the possibility of skeptical scenarios) • Thus, you have no perceptual knowledge, i.e. knowledge that is based on perceptual evidence. (=local theoretical skepticism about the external world) Thus, you don’t know, for example, that: • That you have hands. • That you’re not a BIV. • That you’re in Australia. • That… Reject Infallibilism, and you dissolve this argument. • Are there any infallible reasons for infallibilism? • If not, then it’s hard to see how it could be rational to be an infallibilist. From Lectures 9-11

13. From Lectures 9-11

14. From Lectures 9-11

15. See p.233 of TSM Reader for summary of Descartes argument. P1. If I know that P, then I know that I am not a brain in a vat P2. I do not know that I am not a brain in a vat Thus, I do not know that P. The Brain in a Vat Argument is usually taken to be a modern version of René Descartes' argument (in the Meditations on First Philosophy) that centers on the possibility of an evil demon who systematically deceives us. P1. If I know that P, then I know that I am not being systematically deceived by an evil demon P2. I do not know that I am not systematically deceived by an evil demon Thus, I do not know that P.

16. 11. What is the traditional analysis of knowledge? Explain it and then provide a Gettier-style counterexample to it—either one of Gettier’s own counterexamples, one discussed in the literature, or one you have made up yourself (doing the latter of course is most impressive). Explain exactly how the counterexample is meant to work. Gettier and Propositional Knowledge Hint: the belief (in Gettier counterexamples) is a true belief which is entailed by another belief which turns out to be false. Thus the justification for the true belief fails.

17. 1. Knowledge as Justified True Belief There are three components to the traditional (“tripartite”) analysis of knowledge. According to this analysis, justified, true belief is necessary and sufficient for knowledge. The Tripartite Analysis of Knowledge:
S knows that p iff p is true; S believes that p; S is justified in believing that p. The tripartite analysis of knowledge is often abbreviated as the “JTB” analysis, for “justified true belief”. From http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/index.html

18. The Basing Demand General Issue: • S can have terrific evidence to think P true. • S can believe P is true. • But S can fail to believe P because of the evidence. = S can fail to base her belief in P on the evidence. = S can believe P for obviously irrelevant reasons. The Basing Demand: In order to know P one must have a justified belief in P. In order to have a justified belief one must base that belief on good reasons. From Lectures 9-11

19. Epistemic Luck (Russell) Alice sees a clock that reads two o’clock, and believes that the time is two o’clock. It is in fact two o'clock. There's a problem, however: unknown to Alice, the clock she’s looking at stopped twelve hours ago. Alice thus has an accidentally true, justified belief. Russell

20. 3. The Gettier Problem In his short 1963 paper, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?”, Edmund Gettier presented two effective counterexamples to the JTB analysis (Gettier 1963). One of these goes as follows. Suppose Smith has good evidence for the false proposition (1)Jones owns a Ford. Suppose further Smith infers from (1) the following three disjunctions: (2)Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Boston. (3)Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona. (4)Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Brest-Litovsk. Since (1) entails each of the propositions (2) through (4), and since Smith recognizes these entailments, his beliefs in propositions (2)–(4) are justified. Now suppose that, by sheer coincidence, Brown is indeed in Barcelona. Given these assumptions, we may say that Smith, when he believes (3), holds a justified true belief. However, is Smith's belief an instance of knowledge? Intuitively, Smith's belief cannot be knowledge; it is merely lucky that it is true.

21. Smith has very strong evidence to believe that his friend, Jones owns a Ford. Gettier writes: “Jones has at all times in the past within Smith's memory owned a car, and always a Ford, and that Jones has just offered Smith a ride while driving a Ford”¹ Suppose that Smith also knows someone named Brown, but he has no idea where Brown is. From this he forms several disjunctions, one of which is “Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona”. This is a justifiable thing to do, given the justifiable belief that Jones owns a Ford. Suppose that, despite all of his evidence, Smith is wrong, and it turns out that Jones does not own a Ford. Perhaps he was borrowing a friend's car, or owned a Ford but has since sold it. In any case, Smith's belief that Jones owns a Ford is false. However, it turns out, by sheer coincidence, that Brown is, in fact, in Barcelona. Surely, one would not claim that Brown knew the proposition “Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona”, since he had no idea where Brown was, and Jones does not own a Ford. He formed other false disjunctions the same way, believing also that “Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Boston” was equally true.

22. In the first example, Gettier supposes that two people, Smith and Jones, have applied for a job. We suppose that Smith has a justified belief that Jones will get the job. The evidence for it is high enough that Smith justifiably believes it, “might be that the president of the company assured him that Jones would in the end be selected” Smith also believes (and indeed, knows) that Jones has ten coins in his pocket, which is true and was demonstrated to him, possibly by Jones counting them himself. From this he believes the logical conseqence of these beliefs, that “the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket”¹ It turns out that Smith was wrong, and that, for some unforseeable reason, it turns out that Smith gets the job, and Jones does not. It also turns out that Smith has ten coins in his pocket, though he didn't realize it. The question is, was Smith's belief that “the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket” knowledge?

23. Structure of the Counterexample Reminder:Traditional account says JTB is necessary & sufficient for knowledge. Question: What does this counterexample teach us about the JTB account of knowledge? JTB is… (a) Not necessary for knowledge. (b) Not sufficient for knowledge. (c) Neither necessary nor sufficient for knowledge. Structure of the Counterexample: S has JTB But: S doesn’t know that p So: JTB is insufficient for knowledge How to Proceed: S knows that p iffJTB + ? Any guesses as to what should be added? From Lectures 9-11

24. Structure of Gettier counterexamples Both of Gettier's counterexamples essentially follow the same general form: Smith justifiably believes that P. P is false. Smith correctly infers that if P is true, then Q is true. So, Smith believes Q, justifiably. Q is true, but not because of P. So, Smith has a justified true belief that Q. In these examples, and all true Gettier-style examples, the flaw arises from forming an inference based on a false premise, though there is sufficient evidence to believe that premise is true.

25. FROM TUTORIAL Spa bath temperature reading Criminal on death row with tattoo Real Akia table from dodgy website Fixed gambling

26. From Sample Exam - now on Moodle SHORT-ANSWER QUESTIONS Part 1 (Time): 1. There is an apparent tension between time travel and personal identity. What is the problem and how does Lewis resolve it using his four dimensionalist account of time? 2. What is the difference between personal time and external time according to Lewis? And how does it help explain the way in which time travel can take “time”? 3. What is the difference between incompatibilism and compatibilism? Discuss using some examples. What is soft determinism, and how is it related to either of these views? Part 2 (Logic): 4. What makes an argument different than a mere collection of statements? What is the crucial difference between a good inductive and a good deductive argument? Give an example of each. 5. What is the difference between an inconsistent set of statements and a contradictory set of statements? If two statements are contradictory, must one of the two be true? If two statements are inconsistent, must one of the two be true?

27. The Core Argument (1) If TT is possible, then you can be distinct from yourself (i.e., fail to be identical to yourself). (2) You cannot be distinct from yourself (for, by Leib’s Law, everything is identical to itself in every respect). Therefore, (3) TT is not possible. (Caveat: Study Guide presents this problem differently. But this is the basic issue.) From Lectures

28. The Two-Times Paradox Time travel seems like it can take time • How long did it take Harry Potter to TT? Suppose it takes 1 hr to travel 1 year into the past. E.g., To TT, then, we’d have to be moving both forward (100hrs) & backward (100yrs) in time! Is this possible? Yes, if time is two dimensional • From Lectures 100hr Trip 1915 2015

29. Two Dimensional Time 2015 Time I Normal Progress Through Time Time Traveler’s Progress 1915 Damnit! I was trying to get over there! Time II From Lectures

30. The Two-Times Objection • (1) If TT takes time, then one cannot revisit exactly the same moment of time in the past. • (2) If one cannot revisit exactly the same moment of time in the past, then TT of the sort we’re interested in is impossible. • (3) TT takes time. • Therefore • (4) TT of the sort we’re interested in is impossible. What sort are we interested in? The sort that gets us back the exact moment of time we want.

31. 3. What is the difference between incompatibilism and compatibilism? Discuss using some examples. What is soft determinism, and how is it related to either of these views?` Compatibilism holds that there is no deep conflict between freedom of the will and causal determination. .

32. Soft Determinsim vs Compatibilism “There are compatibilists who are agnostic about the truth or falsity of determinism, so a compatibilist need not be a soft determinist (someone who believes that it is in fact the case that determinism is true and we have free will). But all compatibilists believe that it is at least possible that determinism is true and we have free will. So all compatibilists are committed to the claim that there are deterministic worlds that are free will worlds.” Kadri Vihvelin, “Arguments for Incompatibilism http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/ http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/incompatibilism-arguments/ See also https://yandoo.wordpress.com/2013/10/25/determinism-free-will-and-compatibilism/

33. Incompatibilism comes in two flavours The first form of incompatibalism holds that freedom of the will requires that an agent who acts freely must be able to act differently—in a very strong sense, one that requires multiple futures. If I do something freely (e.g., scratch my head)..... it means that I could have chosen differently—there was genuinely more than one option available. If we adopt this incompatibilist view, then there are two ways we might complete our position. We might defend the view that humans do sometimes act freely in this very strong sense; we might argue that free will does exist. This is the libertarian view; it is the conjunction of incompatibilism and the view that free actions do sometimes occur (and thus it rejects determinism). The second form of incompatibalism holds that if we are convinced of the truth of determinism, then we will conclude that humans never act freely. Freedom of the will is an illusion. This is often called hard determinism.

34. Fatalism is the view that ‘whatever happens is unavoidable’. A compatibilist would emphasize that determinism doesn’t necessarily yield what fatalism must—namely, that events will happen no matter whatyou want, believe, choose, decide, etc. A determinist who is not a fatalist would emphasize that our futures are not inevitable - they depend on what we do as agents.

35. Compatibilism Determinism may be true and free will is true. (Soft Determinism. Determinism is true and free will is true) Incompatibilism Position 1. Free will is true determinism is false. (Libertarianism) Position 2. Determinism is true free will is false. (Hard Determinism) See TSM Reader P. 18

36. Compatibilism: • Compatibilism: Free will and determinism are consistent. • Adherents: • Stoics, Aristotle, Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Mill, J.M. Fisher, Dennett…. • Recall The Conditions of Freedom: One is able to perform act A freely ONLY IF • 1) there is no obstacle that prevents one from doing A, and • 2) there is nothing that constrains or forces one to do A, and • 3) one could have done otherwise, i.e., action A is avoidable. • Worry: can Determinists consistently ever claim that “I could have done otherwise”? From Lectures

38. From Lectures

39. 4. What makes an argument different than a mere collection of statements? What is the crucial difference between a good inductive and a good deductive argument? Give an example of each. From Lectures

40. DEDUCTIVE REASONING (if the premises are true the conclusion must be true). P1. All men are mortal. P1. No pigs fly P2. Socrates is a man. P2. Porky is a pig C. Socrates is mortal. C. Porky doesn’t fly INDUCTIVE REASONING (if the premises are very likely the conclusion is very likely) P1. Every man in history P1. There are no certified has eventually died. accounts of flying pigs. P2. Socrates is a man. P2. Porky is a pig. C. Socrates will almost C. It is unlikely that Porky can fly. certainly die. The principle of induction is that the basic regularities of the past will continue into the future.

41. Inductive forms of argument Deductively validity is not the only kind of support premises can provide for a conclusion. Sometimes the premises of an argument might give us a good reason to accept the conclusion as true, even though it is logically possible that the premises are true and the conclusion false. From Lectures Definition: An argument isinductively strong or inductively validif it is very unlikely that all the premises are true and the conclusion false.

42. 5. What is the difference between an inconsistent set of statements and a contradictory set of statements? If two statements are contradictory, must one of the two be true? If two statements are inconsistent, must one of the two be true? From Lectures

43. EXAMPLE OF AN INCONSISTENT SET These 3 statements form an inconsistent set Fred is good at logic. Nobody who failed this test is good at logic. Fred failed this test. It is not logically possible that all statements in the set are true.

44. The difference between a contradictory pair of sentences and an inconsistent pair. (From page 75 of ATS1835 Reader) The house is all green. The house is not all green. Contradictory The house is all green. The house is all blue. Inconsistent Test: If one is false is the other necessarily true?

45. From Lectures

46. From Sample Exam - now on Moodle • Part 3 (Mind): • 6. Explain how functionalism allows for the multiple realisation of mental states, and how this might be viewed as an advantage over the view that the mind is the brain. • Multiple realizability – it doesn’t matter what a ‘mind’ is made of, what matters is that it functions as a mind. Mousetrap example, corkscrew example. • 7. Explain Searle’s Chinese Room thought experiment. Does it show that the Turing Test is not a good test for thinking? Explain your reasons • Part 4 (Self): • 8. Locke’s theory of personal identity seems to employ a memory criterion. But Derek Parfit believes that even an improved and more generalized psychological theory is problematic. What exactly is the fission problem and why does it seem to undermine any psychological view of personal identity? • 9. Explain why Parfit thinks that the experiments involving patients whose corpus callosum has been severed present a problem for certain theories of the self. How does Parfit propose to avoid the problem? • 10. Why does Williams think identity matters in personal identity? How does he motivate the idea in terms of our attitudes toward our future?

47. The Self 8. Locke’s theory of personal identity seems to employ a memory criterion. But Derek Parfit believes that even an improved and more generalized psychological theory is problematic. What exactly is the fission problem and why does it seem to undermine any psychological view of personal identity? 9. Explain why Parfit thinks that the experiments involving patients whose corpus callosum has been severed present a problem for certain theories of the self. How does Parfit propose to avoid the problem? 10. Why does Williams think identity matters in personal identity? How does he motivate the idea in terms of our attitudes toward our future? Parfit: Not persistence of identity but concern for survival. Williams: Not psychological continuity, but physical (bodily) continuity) Lewis: Connected time-stages of personal timelines ensure perdurance.