e-Voting Status Quo Germany

1. e-VotingStatus Quo Germany Open Rights Group: Taking the lid off e-Voting London, 08/02/2007 Ulrich Wiesner

2. Germany: Voting Computers • Permitted since 1999 • Only certified vendor is Nedap • Sold 600 computers to City of Cologne in 1998 • Other cities joined since then: Dortmund, Neuss, Cottbus, Koblenz • Covering 2’000 of 80’000 ballot offices • Hamburg decided to introduce Digital Pen in 10/2005 • Based on Anoto Technology • Prototype tested in 2005 • Vendor selected in 01/2007(Windows based system) • IBM Germany announced to develop a roll-in/roll-out offering (embedded Linux and Java) • Adds 1600 ballot offices at once Circle size represents number of ballot offices using computers

3. 2D dot pattern, 90 dpi Dots are offset in 4 directions (up, down, left, right) Pattern of 6x6 dots provide coordinates for pen, Addresses* 436 squares of 2x2mm2 e.g. 20’000x20’000 km2 *)Anoto refers to 60M km2 Digital Pen

4. Digital Pen • Pen with embedded scanner • Paper contains dot pattern acting as a 2D bar code • Pen recognises coordinates where it writes • Electronic representation of marked areas is uploaded to computer and joined with electronic voting form • Paper ballot is put in ballot box • At end of election: • Computer classifies electronic votes • Ambiguously marked scans are presented to officials • Classified votes are counted by computer • Inherent paper trail • Kick-starts the re-count discussion • Is it acceptable to only count a random sample? • Which sample size is required? • How does a recount needs to be organised? • Hamburg plans to count paper ballots in 1.5% of the ballot offices. No recounts after first election.

5. Germany: e-Counting • Manual capture of paper ballots • Barcode scanner (code next to chosen option on ballot paper) • PC based entering via keyboard • 4 eye principle • Used in local elections only • Lacking appropriate legal basis • No certification process • Southern Germany • Baden-Würtemberg, Bayern, Hessen

6. Germany: Opposition • Little media coverage other than modernisation euphoria • But detailled and frequent reports by Richard Sietmann in major computer magazine (c’t) • Other media picking up since Q4/2006 • Election scrutiny • 2005 Bundestag election challenged because of use of Nedaps • Violating election principles transparency and audit-ability • Turned down in December 2006 • Next step is constitutional court • 2006 Cottbus major election challenged • Turned down immediately • 2006 On-line petition against voting computers • Filed by Tobias Hahn, Berlin, Signed by 45’000+ people • Pending with petition committee of the Bundestag • Chaos Computer Club, Berlin • Involved in Nedap-Hack • Active campaign supporting petition and scrutiny

7. Issues / To does • No national campaign • Do we need one? Should it be European or national? • Can existing organisations pick up? • How can we maintain non-partisan character of the issue? • Digital pen adds new quality • Technology requires research • Security needs to be analysed • Paper trail verification issues need to be understood • Available knowledge on recounts need to be applied to German electoral system • Lack of awareness • Many Politicians and Journalists still unaware of e-Voting and related issues • Vendors still gets away with aim to provide the modern approach to elections • Discussion needs to leave the IT corner • Efficiency of electoral systems? • Does participation require more complex electoral systems and more frequent polls? • Might/will drive purchase of e-Voting technology

8. Questions and Answers http://ulrichwiesner.de

9. Germany: Election Organisation • Election Organisation • National Electoral Act and Electoral Code provide framework • National elections are supervised by Ministry of Interior • Execution is with municipalities • Costs are refunded to municipalities by a lump sum per voter • Use of technology • Ministry of Interior is regulator (authorisation) • Municipalities are free in decision if and what to use within regulatory framework • Voter registration • Law enforces that citizens register their residence with the municipality • Voter register is prepared by municipality from residence register • No requirement for voters to enrol in register • No central registers for residence or voters on federal or state level • Process is relatively incident free

10. Germany: Electoral System • National Parliament • 2 votes: One for regional candidate, one for party in federal state • Parliaments of Federal States • Typically 2 votes (candidate and party) or just one vote (party) • Regional Elections • County, Municipality, (Major) • System varies from state to state • Often similar systems to national level • Some states have complex electoral systems • E.g. Frankfurt: One vote for each seat (85) in the Council • Absentee voting • Via mail on request

11. Germany: Remote e-voting • Late 1990‘s • Significant effort in research, projects W.I.E.N, VoteRemote • 05/2002: • Minister of the Interior announces remote e-Voting for 2006 or 2010 • 10/2002 • Parliament discusses remote e-Voting: supported by all 5 parties • Perception that Germany is “behind” • New channel in addition to ballot office and mail • Hope that higher turnout can be achieved using internet voting • Debate is focussed on if internet voting should be used to vote more often (supported by Labour and Greens, opposed by Conservatives) • Since 2004 • Ministry of Interior considers internet voting to be appropriate for non-political elections only • Main concern is that secrecy of the vote can not be enforced

12. Black box voting Hypothesis: • Every electronic voting system violates at least one of the three procedural election principles: Secrecy, Transparency, Verifiability • Every electronic voting system requires trust into vendor and operators • Trust is inappropriate measure to ensure election integrity Secret? Transparent? Verifiable?

13. Election Principles • Verifiability, transparency and secrecy ensure that elections are free, fair and general

14. 2005 Election Scrutiny • Bundestag election, September 19th, 2005 • Four e-Voting related complaints filed with scrutiny committee of the parliament • Federal Ministry of the Interior replied in May 2006: • No evidence of tampering, threads are hypothetical” • Elections are still transparent and verifiable using Nedaps • Nedaps can not be hacked because source code is private • Manipulation is pointless because Nedaps are configured just before election and hackers can’t know which party is on which button • Election integrity is ensured by procedural framework • Bundestag rejected complaints on December 14th, 2006 • Mainly follows arguments of Ministry of the Interior • Next step is Constitutional Court • To be filed by 14/02/2007

15. Legal framework • Transparency and verifiability is substantial part of legal framework, but not repeated in context of e-Voting

16. Upcoming Elections • Germany • No major computer based elections in 2007 • Spring 2008 – Hessen and Nordrhein-Westfalen (Nedap) • Spring 2008 – Hamburg (Digital Pen) • Spring 2009 – European Parliament (Digital Pen?, Nedap) • Autum 2009 – Bundestag (Digital Pen?, Nedap)