DSB Summer Study on Special Operations and Joint Forces in Support of Countering Terrorism

1. DSB Summer Study on Special Operations and Joint Forces in Support of Countering Terrorism Friday August 16, 2002 Final Outbrief For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

2. Sponsors Special Operations & Joint Forces in Support of Countering TerrorismDr. Ted GoldMr. Don Latham USD(AT&L)/Commander JFCOM Prior CT InsightsMG Bob ScalesDr. Wick Murray Future Force CapabilitiesGEN Bill HartzogVADM Dave Frost Advanced CT Technologies & SystemsDr. Mim JohnDr. Ron Kerber We drew on past DSB studies Intel PanelDr. Joe MarkowitzADM Bill Studeman Enduring Freedom Psyops Unconventional Use of Nuclear Weapons Against U.S.Dr. Rich WagnerDr. Bill Graham Managed Information Dissemination We leveraged current DSB Studies Precision Targeting Defensive Information Operations Biological WarfareDr. Anna SkalkaMr. Larry Lynn Discriminant Use of ForceDr. Ted GoldDr. Josh Lederberg Others 2

3. The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT): A Real War, A New Type of Adversary • Requires new strategies, postures, and organization • Committed,resourceful, globally dispersed adversary with strategic reach • A long, at times violent, and borderless war This study only scratches the surface of what will eventually be needed For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

4. Elements of a National Strategy: Orchestrate All Instruments of National Power in a Global Campaign • Preemption/proaction/interdiction/disruption/quick-response capabilities • Be proactive in securing partners and help from allies, friends, and others • Hold states/sub-state actors accountable • Foster information sharing • Fight forward • Focus particular attention on WMD • Sophisticated, aggressive public diplomacy All the above in parallel with consequence management and protecting the homeland and DoD’s missions and forces For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

5. Guidance From Our Terms of Reference • Focus is overseas military operations • Military instrument is only part of the necessary capabilities • Examined the role of intelligence in some detail • Did not address homeland defense explicitly • But difficult to segment theaters in this war • We did consider threats to US military force projection from the US For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

6. The Toughest Challenge: Identify and Find Terrorist Networks • Very small “signals” hidden in massive clutter and noise • Some similarities with Cold War anti-submarine warfare (ASW) efforts • Extensive differences as well For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

7. Conducting Military Campaigns in States Harboring Terrorists • OEF demonstrated substantial progress toward desired force capabilities • From • Air, land, sea, space • To • Robust connectivity • Horizontally integrated, pervasive ISR • Agile ground forces able to operate dispersed • Effective remote fires • Adaptive joint command and control • Assured access and supply (expeditionary mindset) These emerging capabilities will be critical for an effective military role in GWOT For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

8. Characteristics of Afghan Campaign That Will Persist • A more central role for SOF and specialized capabilities • Joint integration at very low levels • Discriminant use of force • Interagency partners play major roles • Creative operational arrangements with coalition partners For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

9. Recent DoD Initiatives in the GWOT • Expanded Joint Warfare Analysis Center (JWAC) and Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA) initiatives • Interagency – Link analysis • Operational net assessment (ONA) capabilities at Combatant Commands • JFCOM – CENTCOM – NORTHCOM • New Campaign Support Group at Ft. Bragg • Multi-agency – Joint – Global perspective – New analysis tools – Multi-option analysis • Joint Program Office – Special Technology Countermeasures: Mission Assurance Analysis • Counter-terrorism Technology Support Office – Technical Support Working Group • Physical Security Equipment Action Group • Special Operations Joint Interagency Collaboration Center • J8 Chem/Bio Warfare Requirements Section • DoD Support to DEA Special Intelligence • JFCOM Initiatives • Standing Joint Force Headquarters – Joint Interagency Coordination Group • Joint Enroute Mission Planning and Rehearsal System - Near Term • Enhanced C4ISR Homeland Operations Center – Joint National Training Capability • USN Deep Blue (Navy Operations Group) • USN/USMC Expeditionary Strike Group Proof of Concept • USMC/SOCOM Integration Initiatives For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

10. Recent DoD Initiatives in the GWOT • DARPA projects, e.g.: • Genoa • Evidence Extraction and Link Discovery • Translingual Information Detection, Extraction, and Summarization • Babylon • Human Identification at a Distance • Modern Internetted Unattended Ground Sensors • Foliage Penetration Radar (SAR and GMT I) • Standoff Precision Identification from 3D Data • Digital Radio Frequency Tags • Advanced ISR Management • ACTDs: • High-Altitude Airship • Pathfinder • Active Denial System • Thermobaric • Adaptive Joint C4ISR Mode • Joint Blue Force Situational Awareness • Language and Speech Exploitation Resources • Cave and Urban Assault • Urban Reconnaissance • Hyperspectral Collection and Analysis System (HyCAS) For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

11. Major Concerns • DoD should take the terrorist threat as seriously as it takes the likelihood and consequences of major theater war • DoD still struggling to get joint C4 right • Pentagon processes overly focused on materiel • Defense and Intelligence processes and cultures remain input- rather than product-oriented For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

12. Understanding adversaries and providing “actionable” intelligence Achieving Decision and Execution Superiority Over Terrorists and Their Sponsors “Tools” to handle tough environments and difficult targets Adaptive and responsive national-level decision making Tailoring forces for more SOF-centric operations For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

13. Understanding adversaries and providing “actionable” intelligence Achieving Decision and Execution Superiority Over Terrorists and Their Sponsors “Tools” to handle tough environments and difficult targets Adaptive and responsive national-level decision making Not the focus of our study Tailoring forces for more SOF-centric operations For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

14. 1 Understanding adversaries and providing “actionable” intelligence Achieving Decision and Execution Superiority Over Terrorists and Their Sponsors 2 “Tools” to handle tough environments and difficult targets A much more responsive, flexible, and effective military capability Adaptive and responsive national-level decision making 3 Tailoring forces for more SOF-centric operations 4 Operationalizing new approaches and capabilities For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

15. Discussion Outline • Organization, context, and themes • Understanding new adversaries and providing “actionable” intelligence • “Tools” to handle tough environments and difficult targets and understand our vulnerabilities • Tailoring forces for more SOF-centric operations • Operationalizing new approaches and capabilities • Recap For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

16. A Much More Responsive, Flexible, and Effective Military Capability • Understanding new adversaries and providing “actionable” intelligence: deep penetration - understanding, finding, and tracking the terrorists and their networks • “Tools” to handle tough environments and difficult targets and understand our vulnerabilities • Tailoring forces for more SOF-centric operations • Operationalizing new approaches and capabilities For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

17. - Key Initiatives – Transformation of HUMINT (and human-technical) operations Aggressive, proactive, preemptive, operations Intelligence surge/unsurge capability Expanded analytical capabilities and throughput against asymmetrical adversaries Understand adversaries as complex adaptive systems Understanding New Adversaries and Providing “Actionable” Intelligence: Deep Penetration - Understanding, Finding, and Tracking the Terrorists and Their Networks For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

18. Transformation of HUMINT Operations • SecDef (working with DCI) expand overall Directorate of HUMINT Services (DHS)/Service roles and explore SOF opportunities • Increase HUMINT forward/operational presence • Work with DCI to deploy new DoD clandestine technical capabilities • NSA/Combatant Commanders/Services pay more attention to support of DoD HUMINT in the field • SOF continue to work Advance Force Operations (AFO) • Define HUMINT role in “Proactive” Ops; ensure Covert Action (CA) and IW/IO connections • Explore development of USAF/Navy HUMINT capabilities (beyond current compartmented programs) • A major covert HUMINT program needs to be made joint • Explore new and more varied HUMINT modes – described on next chart For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

19. Transformation of HUMINT Operations Classified HUMINT Chart

20. Aggressive Proactive, Preemptive Operations Group (P2OG) CLASSIFIED For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

21. Aggressive Proactive, Preemptive Operations • Creation of a Proactive Preemptive Operating Group (P2OG) of creative subject matter operational experts such as: • IW/IO – Covert Action – Diplomacy – Cover & Deception • Intelligence Operations – PSYOPS – HUMINT – SIGINT – SOF • Improves information collection by stimulating reactions • Enhance operational preparation of the battlespace to support preemptive options and actions • Signal to harboring states that their sovereignty will be at risk • Vest responsibility and accountability for the P2OG to a “Special Operations Executive” in the NSC* who shall: • Define the national strategy • Coordinate action • Enunciate policy • Execute to a plan coordinated with the SecDef and DCI and others as appropriate * The position exists in the NSC and is called: “National Director and Deputy National Security Advisor for Combating Terrorism”, NSPD-8, Oct. 24, 2001 For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

22. Intelligence Surge/Unsurge Capability • Maintain a robust global cadre of retirees, reservists, and others who are trained and qualified to serve on short notice, including expatriates • Make investments now • Exercise and engage (through gaming) at least annually • Maintain a database of individuals and skills • Focus on Tier 4 countries where CT operations may be necessary • Contracted roles for industry, universities, and think tanks • Focus on analytic expertise and capabilities, CA/SOF issues, scientists and engineers, linguists/area experts, and personnel recovery skills • Work with DoD and Congress on “unsurge” issues, particularly related to callups • Develop innovative “data surge” capabilities For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

23. Improving Analytical Capabilities and Throughput • Create a new and larger analytic workforce with skills and innovative tools focused on counterterrorism (CT) • Focus on “actionable intelligence,” improved situational awareness, targeting and reachback support and “connecting the dots” using JWAC-like analysis approaches • Full-time collaborative connections between all the critical centers working CT intelligence and support • Analysis components of national intelligence organizations physically or virtually collocated to improve all-source multi-INT “analysis” collaboration and production • Support for intelligence collection-related “target development” • Develop new security/sanitization concepts to aid analysts in protecting new sources and methods • Identify roles for analysts in operational net assessment process/joint experimentation, vulnerability analysis/Red Teaming, and CT-related gaming and simulation For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

24. Greatly Improving Customer Access to Intelligence Counterterrorism Information • SecDef/DCI establish a group to define a future path to achieve a truly joint interoperable CT Common Operating Picture (COP) • Improve chat windows and secure collaborative means/directories for direct access to relevant analysts and related data environments • Converge large e-gov programs currently underway in SIGINT and IMINT for improved customer access to intelligence data/collaboration • Pursue an integrated family of “small terminal programs” for field/small unit access to intelligence data (data, imagery, etc.)—smart push and pull • DCI/SecDef provide portals, tools and pointers for access to unclassified open sources data bases, commercial sources etc. • Develop advanced visualization concepts for conveying intelligence and situational information For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

25. Understanding Adversaries as Complex Adaptive Systems • Further expand and enhance Joint Warfare Analysis Center (JWAC)-like capabilities • Expand the number of countries/actors as well as the factors considered • Address non-physical as well as physical dimensions • Address money flow, cronies, family, intra-military, other • The capabilities must be coupled closer to campaign planning and execution (effects-based operations): • To influence as well as respond • Support information/influence ops in peace/crisis/war as well as more traditional maneuver/fires • These capabilities are also needed to: • Focus information collection efforts • Provide context to better understand collected data For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

26. Recommendation Develop an entirely new capability to proactively, preemptively evoke responses from adversary/terrorist groups Form a new elite Counter-terrorism Proactive Preemptive Operations Group (P2OG) at the NSC level Highly specialized people with unique technical and intelligence skills such as information operations, PSYOP, network attack, covert activities, SIGINT, HUMINT, SOF, influence warfare/deception operations Reports to NSC principal level Lead Responsibility NSC lead with DCI, SecDef, State, Justice participation Recommendation: Proactive Operations • “Cost” • 100 “new” people • $100M/yr for operations and support For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

27. Recommendation Develop new capabilities, sources, and methods to enable deep penetration of adversaries DO/DHS develop new modes and methods for covert operations – See classified chart on HUMINT Increase emphasis on CT CA to gain close target access Develop new clandestine technical capabilities Create a surge capability in intelligence to preempt and deal with rapidly emerging crises in the GWOT Maintain a robust cadre of retirees reservists and specialists, qualified to serve on short notice Contract roles for industry universities and think tanks Lead Responsibility DCI Lead SecDef/CJCS ASD(C3I) and DCI Community Management Staff (CMS) DCI/DoD co-shared lead Recommendation: Improve Intelligence • “Cost” • $1.7 Billion/FY beginning in FY-04 and continuing • $100M/yr for exercises, engagement in the form of gaming, and real operations Supports CIA DO/DDS&T initiatives For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

28. Recommendation Expand counter terrorism and asymmetric adversary analytical capabilities and throughput Increase Service and intelligence agency analytic specialties, unique to CT challenges, by 500 people over the next 18 months to add depth of expertise Focus on understanding effects of globalization, radicalism, cultures, religions, economics, etc., to better characterize potential adversaries More virtual collaboration architecture for analyst support and customers interaction Lead Responsibility CMS shared lead with ASD(C3I) Recommendation: Improve Intelligence (cont.) • “Cost” • $800M/yr for technical capabilities development and 500 new staff For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

29. Recommendation Establish additional “centers” of excellence to handle the greatly increased work load and to augment JWAC to support “targeting” (in the broadest sense) of terrorist organizations and their supporting infrastructure—these activities will draw upon intelligence feeds, Red Teaming, and a great variety of subject matter experts (regional, cultural, psychological, soft and hard sensors) Pursue and expand JFCOM’s operational net assessment activity employed in millennium challenge Lead Responsibility JFCOM Recommendation: Gain Deeper Understanding of Terrorist Organizations and Their Supporters as Complex Adaptive Systems • “Cost” • Add to existing initiatives up to $100M per FY as appropriate • $100M initiative at JFCOM, CENTCOM, NORTHCOM, and DARPA For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

30. A Much More Responsive, Flexible, and Effective Military Capability • Understanding new adversaries and providing “actionable” intelligence: deep penetration - understanding, finding, and tracking the terrorists and their networks • “Tools” to handle tough environments and difficult targets and understand our vulnerabilities • Tailoring forces for more SOF-centric operations • Operationalizing new approaches and capabilities For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

31. “Tools” to Handle Tough Environments and Difficult Targets and to Understand Our Vulnerabilities • - Key Initiatives - • Tough Environments: Urban Warfare • Counter-Weapons of Mass Destruction • Theater and CONUS protection • The consequence management challenge • In-theater • CONUS • Finding terrorists and WMD—persistent ISR • The Red Team • Asymmetric Adversaries and Force Projection For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

32. Inadequate Attention and Resources Devoted to Improving Capabilities to Operate in Urban Environments • URBAN OUR FOCUS: Most likely terrorism environment and the one for which we are the least prepared • Shortfalls in doctrine, training, and technology for urban operations • Doctrine: JFCOM Executive Agent in FY03 • Put priority and resources behind the effort to create joint urban operations doctrine and address DOTMLPF challenges • Training: Current urban ops training facilities inadequate • Include an urban facility in the Joint National Training Capability Initiative • Technology: Develop urban-specific technologies including: • Knowledge systems • Movement capabilities • Precision fires • Special sensor systems • Communications unique to urban environment • Integrated system solutions For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

33. Challenges for Military Operations in Urban Terrain • Urban terrain presents unique challenges in: • Precision strike to avoid collateral damage • Command and control communications limitations • Need for diverse, manpower intensive operations • Standoff weapons’ advantages diminish • The need to call for and control supporting arms at platoon and squad levels • To meet the unique urban challenge, we need better capabilities in: • Ground and aerial surveillance (GPS-guided UAV helos) • Situation awareness (persistent layered ISR) • Urban training and development (dedicated center) • Command, control and communications (DARPA SUO/SAS system) • Low level combined arms maneuver • Precision supporting fires • Detecting and preempting WMD threats For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

34. Progress – USMC “Project Metropolis” • USMC battalion-sized MAGTF experiment • Concept • Penetration, thrust • Combined arms to squad level (infantry, tank, helo, etc.) • 4-5 weeks intense training • Packaged combat support teams • Bounding overwatch • Spherical security • Schedule • Victorville, California – Summer 02 • Urban ground reconnaissance • Rotary-wing tactics • Command and control • Small unit logistics For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

35. The Way Ahead • Develop an urban strategy on the strategic and operational levels • We don’t do cities • We do cities into rubble • We have some good ideas for new urban warfare operations • Develop a dedicated joint urban training and development center • Part of joint West Coast training centers • Subordinate to JFCOM • Develop specialized tools for urban environments • Many good ideas • Develop joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) emphasizing: • Urban intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) techniques • Small unit action • Leadership initiative and flexibility • Low level call for and control of supporting fires • Develop a precise urban environment representation For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

36. Urban Point Position Database(CityMap) • Utility • Gridlock sensor and report data for fusion and handoff • Precisely locate targets for remote fires • Perform accessibility analysis to find routes in and around city • Coordinate movement and position of forces • Construct urban IPB • Creation • Theater-based sensors (LADAR, IFSAR) update a priori maps • Semi automated feature extraction to model structures • Update/revisit rate much higher than traditional maps • Urban context added to basic geometry using other sources (e.g., building plans, Integrated Survey Program, …) • Precision 3D representation of • Structures (windows and doors) • LOCs (minor streets and alleys and underground) • Obstacles (power lines) • Critical infrastructure elements (water, power, comm) • Database of supporting information • Addresses, occupants, functions, more For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

37. Urban OPS Are Enabled by Precise Environment Representation • Gridlock of sensor data • Enable HD multi-sensor processes • Locate and track targets for long epochs • Gridlock of report data • Fuse disparate INT types precisely • Locate targets for remote precision fires • Mission planning and rehearsal • Critical node analysis • Accessibility analysis (ground and air) • Urban C2 • Coordinate movement • Select / prioritize targets for remote precision fires • Precision 3D representation of: • Structures • LOCs (minor streets and alleys and underground) • Obstacles (power lines) • Critical infrastructure elements (water, power, comm) • Database of supporting information • Addresses • Occupants • Functions • More For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

38. Engagement Chain Critical Required Capabilities • Intelligence for target engagement • Very smart sensor management • Understanding the asymmetric adversary and his tactics Intelligence Data to Focus Engagement • Sensors for detecting and locating people and WMD weapons – especially in urban areas • Achieving local high density persistent ISR coverage • Communications for difficult environments Engagement Region Monitoring Target Detection and Identification • Data processing and fusion for target detection, ID, and precision location Target Preparation, Precision Strike and Kill Assessment • Precision location of sensor and shooter assets to minimize collateral damage and aid precision strike • Integrated systems solutions for strike and kill assessment Finding the Enemy and WMD in Complex Environments For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

39. The Integrated Battlespace Space: ISR: SIGINT & Imagery of Earth’s Surface • Air: Navigation / Position Fixing • Precision Time • • ISR: SIGINT & Imagery of Ballistic Missile Launch Warning • Ground and Sea • Weather • Airborne Object Detection / Tracking / ID • Atmospheric Sampling • Localized Weather Terrestrial / Ocean Surface: • ISR: SIGINT, EO / IR, Acoustic, Seismic, Magnetic • Terrain & Man-made Feature Data Undersea: • Weather • Oceanographic Data • ISR • Internet & World Wide Web • Oceanographic Data • Weapons of Mass Destruction Data & Warning • Other For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

40. Improved and Persistent Battlefield ISR Capabilities • Capable of search, synoptic coverage, and space, air, ground sensor dwell (persistent ISR) • Balanced space, air and ground capabilities to create a layered capability and an integrated ISR battlespace • Optimize resource allocation to achieve localized, persistent, high density coverage • Address the unique urban ISR problems • Include ground-based improved tagging, tracking, locating (TTL), close and clandestine technologies • More centralized planning and coordination of architectures, technology, and capabilities – Joint SIGINT Avionics Architecture (JSAA) program • Acquisition of system-of-system (strategic-operational-tactical) ISR architectures and systems – Multimission Command and Control Constellation (MC2C) • New approaches to acquisition, architecture development and systems engineering – capabilities-based approach being used in the MDA For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

41. An Integrated Joint C2/BM Capability Supported Through A Network Centric Information Infrastructure (NCII) Synchronous Orbit Relay Satellite Optical Link Intel Data / CONUS Commands Communications Node with Multi-Beam Antenna and Data Switching Capability Optical Links Broad-Area Surveillance Radar UAV Airborne Command Center Covert Uplink Multiple RF Circuits Forward deployed data to everyone Low-Altitude UAVs Ground/Maritime Sensors Forces Attributes: • All entities: people, platforms, sensors, weapons are interconnected • All entities can pull data in real time • All entities have access (as appropriate) to relevant data at all times For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

42. Four Tiers of Sensors Needed Sensor Tier • Role • Global reference data • Coherent change detection • Detecting fixed and moving targets • Cueing lower-tier sensors • New Technology • Automated urban feature extraction • Sensor interoperability across tiers • Foliage and building penetration • People detection with differential imaging radar • Precision real-time tracking and EO/IR imaging techniques of moving objects I. Space II. High-Altitude Surveillance Radar • Identification of fixed and moving targets • Tracking targets including people III. • Airborne platforms with long-range and endurance Medium-Altitude Optical Imagers • Ultra low-power sensors and data processors • Energy for long-term power • LPI communications • Sensor Network Fusion • WMD sensors • Determining terrorist objectives with persistent close-up surveillance • Provide tactical commander “a look over the next hill” IV. Netted Tactical Sensor Arrays New Sensor Capabilities Are Needed for Locating People and WMD For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

43. Tracking Individuals • Many ideas are in the laboratory phase • Passive/active • Line of sight/non-line of sight • Cooperative/non-cooperative • Emphasis is on tags vs. systems/emplacement/environment • Spectrum of ideas/options • Short term (6 mos.)/long term (years) • Physical tags • Remote biometrics • Need coordinated program to provide a toolkit of capabilities and operationalize concepts, especially in placement and exfiltration schemes For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

44. Needed Standoff detection and tracking at kilometer ranges Active interrogation; high-resolution, high-efficiency devices Passive spectral systems with km’s stand-off range for detection Low false alarm Remotely emplaced sample collection and retrieval Handheld units for ID characterization in seconds to minutes with low false alarms Emplacement, networking, data processing, exfiltration – all clandestine Nuclear detection Chemical Detection Biological Detection WMD Sensor Systems State-of-the-Art • No operational stand-off capability • No clandestine stand-off capability • “Shoe box” size requiring agent collection with limited agent list capability, in development • No operational standoff capability • Bio assays requiring agent collection/contact for detection • Nothing yet to support clandestine operations Priority Challenge for Counter-WMD Warfare: Detecting, Identifying, and Localizing WMD For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

45. WMD—The Way Ahead • Remote sensing has not proved out—seems to require in place sensors • Sensor systems should be considered end-to-end, but initial work should focus on phenomenology and sensing techniques • Network monitoring and analysis of inferential signatures (e.g., deliveries, manifests, people movement) should be undertaken • Stimulated emissions may hold promise for nuclear choke point monitoring • Energize followup on the Zebra Chip recommendation • No matter the sensing, “agent defeat” is critical and requires additional resources For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

46. WMD—The Way Ahead Network and Inferential Signature Analysis Precision Sensor (Stealth) Deployment Sensor Physics/Chemistry Choke Point Monitoring (LPD) Data Exfiltration Agent Destruction Attack Sensing Chem Consider Provocative Deployment CONOPS Nuclear Proposed Relative Bio Investment Among N, C, B For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

47. An Expanded In-Theater and CONUS Counter-WMD Consequence Management Capability • The Counter-WMD Force Element: expanding on today’s capabilities • A joint, deployable counter-WMD force element, trained and equipped for CONUS or overseas: force/base protection, quarantine ops, WMD ISR, helping to plan counter-WMD offensive ops, search and render-safe • Must address consequence management capabilities and serious shortfalls • CONUS • National Guard has civil support teams in 32 locations today • Greatly expand role of National Guard and Reserves and improve training and equipage • The 50 states need to define their roles and budgeting for this mission and other disaster relief missions • Overseas • Any use of WMD in-theater directly impacts host nation as well as US forces • A coalition developed plan for consequence management is needed – country by country – with US assistance • No plans, and little capability, in place today For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

48. Counter-WMD Mission and Relation to CONUS Protection • Create a special WMD “Red Team” dedicated to planning, as terrorists might, ways to attack the US homeland and forces overseas • Establish specialized sub teams with knowledge in WMD mischief making and terrorist cultural beliefs • Scenarios are made widely accessible to analysts and collectors who derive “observables” from scenarios and focus collection on these • Major reach out to creative people outside government for their ideas, scenarios, and postulated adversary capabilities • Major intelligence analytic support on counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation, and WMD For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

49. Assessing DoD Force Projection Vulnerabilities in a GWOT Environment • DoD GWOT force projection capabilities are highly dependent on both commercial and Defense Department infrastructure • Approximately 450 DoD bases involved in some aspect of force projection • (Unknown numbers) of commercial sites are involved as well • No systematic mapping of this infrastructure and associated vulnerabilities to mission requirements exists • Currently multiple DoD entities have some responsibility for assessing site-by-site vulnerabilities: • Local installation/base commanders • Joint Program Office-Special Technology Countermeasures (JPO-STC) at Dahlgren with NIMA and DTRA in support • Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessment (JSIVA) with DTRA in support • Others responsible based upon the attack vector • The responsibilities for DoD force projection risk assessment effort must be clarified • DoD asset vulnerabilities must be ranked in importance and reported to the appropriate levels within DoD • The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and NORTHCOM must add the DoD critical commercial infrastructure required for force projection to their critical national infrastructure protection priorities For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute

50. Responsibilities for Force Projection Risk Mitigation • Responsibilities for mitigation of identified force projection risks must be clarified • The Combatant Commander does not have the resources to fix the problem • Resources must flow from who “owns” the site day to day, not the “gaining command” • At the base level, risk assessment and mitigation funding competes with other installation sustainment demands • SecDef should consider establishing a new line item in each Service and Agency budget for force projection risk mitigation • Segregates the funding • Enables assessments to be matched against mitigation efforts • Provides senior DoD leadership better visibility into this issue For Official DSB Use Only -- Do Not Distribute