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Interagency Lessons Learned from Exercise Diablo Bravo

Diablo Bravo . Tier II exercise under DHS National Exercise ProgramDeveloped in partnership with DoD to validate DoD support requirements during a nuclear weapon incident when the weapon is in DOE custodyFirst national-level full-scale exercise to test the response activities to a terrorist attack on U.S. nuclear weaponsFirst real-time deployment of response assets in a national-level exerciseFirst national-level exercise in which the weapons were in DOE custody under the National Response F32213

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Interagency Lessons Learned from Exercise Diablo Bravo

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    1. Interagency Lessons Learned from Exercise Diablo Bravo David Freshwater DOE Office of Emergency Management

    2. Diablo Bravo Tier II exercise under DHS National Exercise Program Developed in partnership with DoD to validate DoD support requirements during a nuclear weapon incident when the weapon is in DOE custody First national-level full-scale exercise to test the response activities to a terrorist attack on U.S. nuclear weapons First real-time deployment of response assets in a national-level exercise First national-level exercise in which the weapons were in DOE custody under the National Response Framework; and First nuclear weapons exercise in which the DoD was a supporting agency to a DOE event conducted in the public domain

    3. Diablo Bravo Conducted July 28-31, 2008 Exercise location near Bremerton, WA Terrorist attack on an OST convoy Multiple day, multiple shift exercise Exercise started at 1300 PDT, July 28th Ran continuously until 1900 PDT, July 29th Exercise play from 0700-1900 PDT, July 30th Exercise play from 0700-1135 PDT, July 31st

    4. Exercise Participants Federal DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DOE)/NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION (NNSA) Office of Emergency Operations (NA-40) Office of Defense Programs (NA-10) Office of Military Application & Stockpile Operations (NA-12) Office of Secure Transportation (NA-15/OST) Office of Congressional, Intergovernmental, and Public Affairs (NA-3.5) NNSA Service Center Office of Public Affairs DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (DHS) Office of Operations Coordination National Operations Center (NOC) Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) FEMA Region X

    5. Exercise Participants Federal ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (EPA) DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) FBI Seattle Office & Silverdale Resident Agency DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

    6. Exercise Participants Federal DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DoD) Office of the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters (ODATSD/NM) Under Secretary of Defense (Policies) Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense (ASD/HD) Joint Staff National Military Command Center (NMCC) Joint Nuclear Accident/Incident Response Team (JNAIRT) US Fleet Forces Command (CFFC) United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM) Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) Navy Region Northwest (NRNW) CNRNW Fire & Emergency Services Naval Base Kitsap (NBK) Navy Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) Strategic Systems Programs (SSP) Strategic Weapons Facility Pacific (SWFPAC)

    7. Exercise Participants State/Local STATE OF WASHINGTON Washington State Department of Health (DOH) Division of Environmental Health Office of Radiation Protection Washington State Emergency Management Division (EMD) Washington National Guard 10th WMD Civil Support Team (WANG CST) Washington State Department of Agriculture Washington State Patrol

    8. Exercise Participants State/Local KITSAP COUNTY Kitsap County Dept of Emergency Management South Kitsap Fire and Rescue Kitsap County Sheriff's Office Bremerton Police Harrison Medical Center Kitsap County Dept of Health Kitsap County Central Communications/911

    9. Diablo Bravo Objectives Validate the capability of emergency response assets to safely mitigate an incident involving a U.S. nuclear weapon in DOE custody Examine the roles and responsibilities under the National Response Plan (NRP) or National Response Framework (NRF) of departments and agencies responding to a U.S. nuclear weapon incident Assess the real-time deployment of emergency response assets and resources Establish and coordinate a National Security Area (NSA) Validate DOE Nuclear Weapon Accident Program Plan (NWAPP)

    10. Additional Exercise Design Areas Examine interagency coordination inside and outside the National Security Area, with emphasis on the crime scene investigation Evaluate the nature and extent of DoD support to the DOE Coordinate an effective and consistent public affairs message in response to a terrorist attack on a DOE nuclear convoy. Examine emergency response activities within the constraints of a crime scene/evidence collection

    11. Diablo Bravo Scenario A van exploded next to a NNSA OST convoy near Bremerton Trailer breached on both sides Immediately following attack, condition of cargo and extent of contamination unknown Nine (9) reported civilian casualties as a result of the explosion and resulting trailing automobile accidents No NNSA personnel injured Although Safeguard Transporter (SGT) damaged, NNSA maintained custody of weapons

    13. Lessons Learned – Onsite Incident Management Unified Command and all entities outside the NSA had little awareness of the downrange status or activities A fully integrated and cohesive Unified Command was established almost five hours after the incident began The Incident Management Team (IMT) did not have the sufficient resources did not properly use staff to fill key ICS positions did not have a communications suite or radios at the ICP to connect with the NSA or off-site locations.

    14. Lessons Learned – Onsite Incident Management Information Management and reporting requirements were not clearly defined Slow badging, multiple site access authorities, and failure to relay sign-countersign led to delayed entry of first responders Body removal was not coordinated and eventually notionalized No request for lighting for night operations

    15. Lessons Learned – EOC Management Information flow and resource management was not coordinated between Incident Command Post and the Multi-Agency Coordination Center (MACC) MACC lacked situational awareness to effectively provide resources to incident site

    16. Lessons Learned – WMD/HAZMAT Response Radiological survey data within the NSA was not passed to the FRMAC Cross-contamination resulted from inconsistent contamination control procedures Responders used varying instrumentation and units to establish levels of contamination State radiological monitoring assets could not obtain data from the federal agencies because data maintained in a classified system

    17. Lessons Learned – EPI JIC did not have sufficient information from the incident scene to answer media inquiries JIC was slow at times to respond to media inquiries First JIC press conference occurred on Day 2 Only two more followed Much of the federal action within the Joint Information System was simulated

    18. Lessons Learned – Emergency Triage Fear of contamination delayed treatment Decontamination was given priority over life safety Patient triage was conducted backwards. Less severe patients, (labeled “minimal”) were treated before more severe patients (labeled "immediate") Local EMS did not receive patient information, such as injuries and contamination levels, from the OST agents who performed the initial patient assessment Local first responders addressed the casualties they encountered first, not the most severely injured

    19. Lessons Learned – Exercise Design SIMCELLS did not perform as expected due to the lack of MSELS, agency representation, and coordination with each other Some agencies did not fully exercise as was expected The scope of scenario information, or ground truth, given to controllers varied Onsite controllers had detailed scenario information Offsite controllers and those in the simulation cells did not receive detailed scenario information Controller conference calls did not begin with a reset of where the overall exercise stood

    20. Lessons Learned - DOE HQ EMT HQ EMT did not have direct capability to access HSIN for Federal common operating picture Responsibilities of the SEO and the capability to meet those responsibilities should be re-examined Existing policies unclear on which agency has primacy DHS DOE under Nuclear/Radiological Annex, National Contingency Plan, Atomic Energy Act DOJ/FBI under Terrorism Annex

    21. Lessons Learned - DOE HQ EMT NIMS Unified Command policy unclear on who has primacy if there is a conflict between participants in the Unified Command Existing policy on Federal press releases seems unclear – multiple Federal releases versus one agency responsible for press releases Policy on who is responsible for clean-up of the site appears unclear

    22. Major Strengths Challenging scenario Demonstrated ability to recall and deploy assets in real time Effective interagency coordination during incident site joint operations Efficient establishment of a National Security Area Senior NNSA officials involved in exercise and drove HQ EMT actions Good investment of time by exercise participants OST and response assets did their jobs and did them well No security issues during the exercise

    23. Questions David Freshwater NA-41 202-586-7220 David.Freshwater@hq.doe.gov

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