REVIEW OF Philippines Typhoon 2009 PDNA Process

1. REVIEW OF Philippines Typhoon 2009 PDNA Process Lessons Learned and Key Reflections United Nations Development Programme

2. OVERVIEW OF PDNA • Disaster context: date of crisis, overview of affected sectors, extent of damages: • The 2009 typhoon season in the Philippines was exceptionally destructive, and impacted the northern Philippines and Manila quite heavily. The first typhoon, Ondoy (aka Ketsana) arrived on 26 Sep, prompting the first Flash Appeal. Two weeks later, the second typhoon, Pepeng (aka Parma) hit. The revised Flash Appeal included this second typhoon. • Typically, the Philippines does not request international assistance for natural disasters. The exceptional impacts to the important economic centre of Manila and upcoming elections in May 2010 were likely factors in the request for assistance. Election timing and rules were behind the rush for PDNA completion by early December. • Many areas affected by the typhoon remained underwater, impeding assessments until the end of December (end of typhoon season).

3. OVERVIEW OF PDNA • PDNA timeframe: activities from initial request to final product Tropical Storm Ketsana (locally known as Ondoy) hits Manila and parts of Central Luzon Sep 26 week 0 week 1 week 2 The Government of the Republic of the Philippines requests the assistance of the international community Sep 28 Typhoon Parma (locally known as Pepeng) made landfall in Northern Luzon, reversing track twice and bringing heavy rains over an area much larger than initially anticipated. Oct 3 Oct 5 President Gloria Arroyo declared a state of national calamity caused by Typhoon “Ondoy” (aka Ketsana) and devastations of Typhoon “Pepeng” (aka Parma). Oct 6 -Initial Flash Appeal was launched for Typhoon Ketsana (Ondoy) only. -World Bank asked to coordinate donors (coordinate a PDNA?) by MoF Philippines at WB-IMF annual meeting in Istanbul. Gov. of Philippines released Executive Order (EO) 832 establishing a National Public-Private Reconstruction Commission "to undertake a study of the causes, costs and actions to be undertaken in the wake of typhoons…, and to seek fresh aid to fund reconstruction." EO832 includes a set of key tasks. Key task seven is to "Request the United Nations and the World Bank to coordinate and international pledging session." Oct 12

4. OVERVIEW OF PDNA (2 of 3) • PDNA timeframe cont’: activities from initial request to final product week 3 week 4 week 5 Following the impact of Parma and the predictions of further storms, the Government requested the UN to include areas affected by Typhoon Pepeng (aka Parma) in the revised Flash Appeal. Oct 19 1st PDNA Workshop conducted by WB: Introduces "Two strands of assessment: Human Early Recovery Needs (ERNA) and DaLA", but focused solely on DaLA and use of ECLAC methodology. Oct 20 Gov. of Philippines released EO838, thereby amending EO832 to establish a National Public (no longer Public-Private) Reconstruction Commission which is to enter a partnership with a National Private Reconstruction Commission. Oct 22 WB organizes last-minute PDNA social needs assessment (non-DaLA) field missions with Government counterparts, asks one UNDP staff member if they would like to participate. UNDP CD finds out on Sunday of three-day weekend that mission will commence Tuesday morning. Limited UN Participation Typhoon Santi (aka Mirinae) quickly crosses the northern Philippines, causing further damage in some areas. 2nd PDNA Workshop conducted by WB in ADB Auditorium. Following a presentation describing how DaLA connects to determination of needs, there was a networking session to help connect IASC Clusters to PDNA Sector Teams. IASC Clusters instructed to make inputs through PDNA sector teams. Oct 30 Oct 31 Nov 5

5. OVERVIEW OF PDNA • PDNA timeframe cont’: activities from initial request to final product Nov 13 week 7 week 8 week 9 Inputs to PDNA sector teams due (IASC Clusters instructed to provide inputs through PDNA sector teams), with additional inputs sent to PDNA Advisor. -PDNA "Public-private" consultation workshop. No document to share, so very limited opportunity to comment. WB refers to 180 yr event in one watershed, no data presented. -Revised Flash Appeal launched to include both Ondoy and Pepeng with some additional ER programming. Nov 18 Nov 20 PDNA briefing meeting with Sec. Saludo of Public Reconstruction Commission, Private Sector Commission and many Gov. agencies in attendance as well as UN, EC, WB, ADB. WB announces main draft PDNA report will be shared with all partners (including the commissions) on Sat pm, major comments on Sector reports due 8am Mon. Comments on main section due noon Mon (23Nov). Drafts of PDNA main section and sector reports shared with partners for rapid review over the weekend. Nov 21 Meeting with commissions+: focused on DaLA numbers. Private sector and UN expressed concerns regarding hydrology. UN expressed concerns on social protection issues (Public commission expressed its wish to avoid unwarranted alarm over protection issues) Nov 23 Nov 27 PDNA draft (not for comment) report circulated without incorporating most UN/IASC recommended changes concerning the hydrology or corrections regarding the Flash Appeal description.

6. OVERVIEW OF PDNA • PDNA timeframe cont’: activities from initial request to final product week 9 PDNA officially released for donors meeting in Manila, signed by the Sec. of Finance, Public Reconstruction Commission and WB Country Director on behalf of UN, WB, ADB, and GFDRR Partners. (Final document retains poor characterization of the hydrology and errors regarding the Flash Appeal description.) “ADB would be prepared to provide grant funds for technical assistance for DRM. I do not want to prematurely state a specific amount of ADB assistance. It is important that partner assistance for DRM is well coordinated and delivered as a single package. Uncoordinated effort would be inefficient and counterproductive. The Government can not afford either.” WB informs donor meeting that they have “already secured a GFDRR grant in the order of $5 million to work with local governments around the country to improve disaster risk management and mapping.” “the World Bank could consider further budget support to support progress in disaster risk management and reconstruction” “The Bank has already discussed with the authorities the various options for restructuring of the existing portfolio and lending pipeline in light of the post disaster needs.” Dec 2 Special National Public Reconstruction Commission (SNPRC) establishes a Facebook page with links to PDNA. SNPRC and the Philippine Disaster Recovery Foundation (PDRF) will formulate and implement the reconstruction strategy and master plan Feb 15 2010

7. OVERVIEW OF PDNA cont. Description of key stakeholders: relationships between govt., World Bank, HC/RC, UN agencies and EC: World Bank in the lead with key partner MoF, UN coordinating IASC country team inputs to PDNA, EC providing resources. ADB, WB, UN on “coordination team” Training on PDNA: content, management, timing, participation, frequency, partnerships: 2 training sessions conducted by World Bank with DaLA focus, 2nd session brought IASC country-team attendance. Recovery framework: final output, recovery projects, monitoring system: Recovery framework with projects included in PDNA by design and PDNA was harmonized with Flash Appeal. “The Special National Public Reconstruction Commission’s main functions are coordination, monitoring, and ensuring accountability.” On 16 March 2010, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 870 establishing the Reconstruction Monitoring and Evaluation System (RMES) that will monitor funding, expenditure and implementation of typhoon rebuilding efforts according to the reconstruction strategy and master plan. Materials Course or Module Title – Presentation NN – Block NN – Slide7/NN (number of slides) – 1 October 2014

8. Overview of PDNA Process • Role of Government: level of govt. leadership, communication between govt. and UN system, World Bank, EC, civil society, etc. Government staff included on DaLA and social assessment teams, but not actively leading PDNA coordination effort • Role and nature of involvement of UN system, World Bank, EC, civil society, other actors. World Bank Lead, some significant technical involvement from WHO and FAO, limited involvement of remainder of IASC due to response operations and severe time constraints • Relationship between DaLa/ECLAC and UN HRNA approaches; process to develop consensus on overall approach. Original DaLA centric approach was challenged at 1st PDNA training session and social assessment was added, with weakly coordinated field mission • How were corporate agreements operationalized in the field; level/adequacy of support between HQ and field? Support adequate, but general global agreement not enough to ensure real coordination and collaboration at the country level

9. Overview of PDNAProcess cont. • Use of comparative advantages of different agencies. WHO and FAO seem to have been involved from the start with their competencies recognized, UNICEF and UNHABITAT able to come in later on education and housing. DRM was more difficult as skill sets were distributed across UNDP, ADB and WB. • Resource Mobilization Hard to say if it has made any difference, neither Flash Appeal nor PDNA results expected to mobilize larges amounts of resources in the Philippines. Process may have helped to depoliticize government reconstruction efforts and also to strengthen the coordination role of the SNPRC • Issues related to finalization of PDNA products Process completely controlled by World Bank editors with extremely constrained time for inputs or corrections to be made. • Data collection: what methodology was used, availability of baselines, etc? DaLA was used, not aware of any particular problems with its implementation in this disaster.

10. Lessons Learned • What worked? Effect of joint effort. Joint coordination meetings with donors and IASC displayed a concerted effort to coordinate the PDNA. Inputs from some UN Agencies and IASC organizations were substantial. Combined some assessment efforts • What didn’t work? Main constraints of joint approach. Timing was difficult for many organizations heavily involved in response efforts to be included. Many IASC clusters had scheduled their own assessments and were not well coordinated with the PDNA. PDNA field missions brought together very quickly, so that many organizations were left out. This was especially an issue on the social sector assessment, • What needs to be improved? What capacities are needed in govt? RCs?HCs, WB and EC counterparts? UN system? Others? Needs to be a real agreement on how such an effort is coordinated, including TOR for effort, TOR for coordination team and final editing team. Should not be dominated by a single organization. • Was guidance provided by headquarters? Was it useful? Why/why not? General guidance not useful and specific guidance not accepted by all parties on the ground. Need to agree on some binding rules of engagement.

11. Lessons Learned cont. How much did your institution invest in the PDNA (financial, technical, logistical, resources)? BCPR provided one PDNA consultant for a month and additional short-term support from Bangkok and Delhi as well as 2*3-month Early Recovery consultants. This was in addition to UNDP Philippines CO staff actions. How much did counterparts invest in the PDNA (financial, technical, logistical, resources)? World Bank had a team of 10+ from HQ with considerable financial support, EC provided financial resources, GoP provided staff resources, as did many IASC organizations. Reflections on improving relationship between partner agencies, communications, logistics, decision making, etc. This is always going to be difficult, but need to establish some basic rules of engagement, TORs, etc that will help establish clear expectations from all parties, beforehand. This is the essence of coordination. Utility of the recovery framework? Framework is a good idea, only the extremely short time to contribute made it difficult. Had timing and inputs to the recovery frameworks been clear from the start, it would have been easier for IASC members to contribute. Materials Course or Module Title – Presentation NN – Block NN – Slide11/NN (number of slides) – 1 October 2014

12. Lessons Learned Cont. • What is the ability to monitor the recovery framework? In the Philippines the Government will follow their own strategy and master plan, informed by the PDNA, and this should be monitored well, as it has been institutionalized well. • Sector specific lessons. For DRM, there needs to be stronger joint working to capitalize on strengths and overcome weaknesses within different organizations. • Have best practices been identified, institutionalized and shared? For PDNA? No • Other major issues raised by PDNA process Governments should have a clear understanding of what they will get, and not get, from what is intended to be an internationally accepted process. There needs to be some assurance that sensitive IASC issues are given their proper voice in the PDNA process.

13. Relationship of PDNA and therecovery process • What recovery strategies have been undertaken since the crisis? The Government has formed a strong institutional framework for recovery including collaboration with the private sector. This should help inform their recovery strategy and action plan. The President has requested that initial priorities in the plan be exempted from election rules that restrict project implementation. • How much has been invested in recovery? Substantial public and private resources to be committed to the recovery effort, although slowed a bit by the election process. • Nature of relationship between assessments undertaken/PDNA recovery framework developed and actual strategies and investments? Still too early to tell • Documentation of recovery activities: existence/effectiveness of monitoring system?Still too early to tell, monitoring system ordered 16 March 2010 • Do recovery needs persist that require further assessment and investment? Full recovery efforts will be delayed by elections and many of the larger, structural issues will require additional assessments