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Protection against internal Hazards in the Review of Nuclear Physics Experiments

CERN - European Organization for Nuclear Research. Protection against internal Hazards in the Review of Nuclear Physics Experiments. Fabio Corsanego CERN SC/GS. 5 th International High Energy Physics Technical Safety Forum SLAC 11-15 May 2005.

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Protection against internal Hazards in the Review of Nuclear Physics Experiments

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  1. CERN - European Organization for Nuclear Research Protection against internal Hazards in the Review of Nuclear Physics Experiments Fabio Corsanego CERN SC/GS 5th International High Energy Physics Technical Safety Forum SLAC 11-15 May 2005

  2. How can we make safety discussion more efficient?

  3. Milestones for the realization of an experiment • Approval of the research board • Appointment of GLIMOS (group leader in matter of safety= Mr. Safety) • ISIEC (Initial Safety Information on Experiments at CERN) • Safety talks • Risk analyses • Early safety inspections • Safety Reception • Exercise .

  4. ..world wide collaborations..(Example: list of Collaborators to (N-TOF 11)) • Japan, Tsukuba (Ibaraki-Ken)High Energy Accelerator Research Organization (KEK) • Spain, BarcelonaUniversidad Politecnica de Cataluña  • Spain, SevillaUniversidad de Sevilla Dept. de Fisica Atómica Molecular y Nuclear  • Switzerland, GeneveEuropean Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) • United Kingdom, Didcot, OxonRutherford Appleton Laboratory • United States of America, Oak Ridge, TnOak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) • United States of America, Princeton, Nj Princeton UniversityJoseph Henry Laboratories • United States of America, Upton, NyBrookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) We propose to perform a proof-of-principle test of a target station suitable for a Neutrino Factory or Muon Collider source using a 24-GeV proton beam incident on a target consisting of a free mercury jet that is inside a 15- T capture solenoid magnet. This test could be performed in the TT2A tunnel of the nTOF proton line (upstream of the spallation target). The tests would require only    100 fast-extracted pulses of full PS intensity, delivered in a pulse-on-demand mode of operation over about 2 weeks. The main piece of apparatus is the LN2-precooled, 15- T copper magnet of total volume slightly over 1 m   with a 15-cm-diameter warm bore. The principle diagnostic is a high-speed optical camera. The mercury jet is part of a closed mercury loop that includes an insert into the bore of the magnet

  5. …Collaborators to CMS Detector RESEARCH INSTITUTIONS

  6. Safety talks”…a discussion between the GLIMOS and the safety authorities about hazards, based on the information given on the ISIEC Form” The main risks of the discussion on risk: too much focus on too few topics lack of perception of the accident interaction between different system lack of perception of the concurrent play of countermeasures

  7. What are the basic subsystems of an experiment?

  8. So what to make sure that all safety aspects are covered since first talks? • Checklists • interesting but one-dimensional and sequential: difficult to formalize concurrences and correlations between topics • HAZOP, FMECA • nice tools, but need to know already the design in details, and take months to give results • Can we imagine something intermediate?

  9. Major Accident Scenarios • Fire • Explosion • Chemical accident • Cryogenic accident • Nuclear accident • Collapse • …. • Wrong operation • Control system failure • Electric failure • Mechanical failure • Earthquake

  10. Failure Causes Cranes Missile or rotor fragment impact Construction Design • Where could each scenario come from? usage SCADA malfunctioning and overpressures Ice formation Nuclear induced ageing, fragility, gas overpressures etc

  11. Causes List of possible causes for mechanical failure of a vessel • “Independent” mechanical failure (..all that is related to bad design, bad construction and exercise, independent from the rest of the environment) • Fall of static loads located above or aside • Collision with crane bridges, vehicles or other mobile loads • Earthquake • Missile, high speed flying fragment • Formation of ice in piping or cryogenic embrittlement • Overpressures induced by nuclear transmutation • Overpressures induced by SCADA faults • ….

  12. Injuries, victims Consequences Air pollution Water pollution • For any scenario, possible outcomes that could be even more severe have to be investigated Blast , explosion Nuclear accident Electric accident Bleeve - fireball flooding

  13. Example of consequences of collapse of a pressurized component • Blast or Explosion • Injuries to occupants • Intoxication of occupants • Nuclear Contamination • Fluid leakage/flooding • Cryogenic fluid outbreak • Fire • Formation of secondary missiles hitting other components • …

  14. Layer of protection analysis (LOPA) SIS= safety interlocked system ESD= emergency Shutdown system

  15. In-depth defense: • Barriers have to be: • (Big I) Independent • (3D) Able to Detect, Decide, Deflect • (3E) Fast Enough, Strong Enough, Big Enough

  16. Protective barriers for our examplesub-case: lift mishandling-> vessel failure-> nuclear accident Vessel rupture Cranes Nuclear accident Which are the safeguards stopping the accidents scaling up in the direction ith ? Which are the safeguards applicable to the cause jth ?

  17. Safeguards (Independent Protective Layers) Inherent safety: does the problem exist? Cranes outside? Fork lifts? Crane bridge inside?

  18. Safeguards (Independent Protective Layers) Daily operation Planning and backup resource allocation Procedure Training Keys managing

  19. Safeguards (Independent Protective Layers) Barriers Protection cage Corrective Operational measures Working field Panic button Bumpers Overload limiter Traffic barriers

  20. Safeguards (Independent Protective Layers) Emergency preparedness

  21. How to summarize all this ?

  22. How to describe protection against the worsening of the consequences: • (Table similar to the previous one, BUT with consequences)

  23. “How many” independent protective layers do we need? • Hard to say in few words…but in principle “big events” shall be kept under 10-6, 10-8 occurrences per year (same chance as a big asteroid hitting our planet)

  24. Advantages • All the possible sources are systematically treated • Failure of further multiple levels are required to worsen the consequences • Rudimental probabilistic assessment are sometimes possible • Domino effects between systems are, up to a certain extent, treatable • More defined focus on specific aspects to be treated with HAZOP and FMECA further analysis

  25. …..Is that all?

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