Mooting Training 1

1. Mooting Training 1 Harmish Mehta

2. Strategy • Introduction • Guide • LSESU Law Society Mooting Training Seminar, 16th October, 12-1pm, Sheikh Zayed Theatre • Training • Practice Moots • Competitions

3. Introduction • What is mooting? • Format • Questions • Mooting Guide • Laptops • Slides (www.lsesubarsociety.co.uk/resources)

4. Introduction • Mooting Training – Non-law students – 15th October 4pm-6pm – CLM.2.05 • Mooting Training – Non-UK students – 16th October 3pm-5pm – CLM.1.02 • Practice Moot

5. Lucy v Drew Drew and Lucy were long standing acquaintances who regularly had business dealings with one another. On 1st November, Drew, from his home address in Northampton, wrote to Lucy at her address in Bristol, offering to sell her his customised Renault Clio motor car, (which she has long admired), for £7,000, the offer to remain open until 5th November. On receiving the offer on 2nd November, Lucy left Bristol on a business trip to Liverpool. On the 2nd November Drew sold the car to Kelly and posted to Lucy a revocation of his offer. This was delivered to Lucy’s Bristol address on 3rd November. On 4th November, Lucy posted an acceptance of the offer from Liverpool, addressed to Drew at his business address, (which was the address from which Drew usually conducted dealings with Lucy) in Coventry. It was delivered there on 5th November but as Drew was absent from his office on that day, it wasn’t read by him until 6th November. On 7th November Lucy returned home and read the letter of revocation. Lucy claimed that a contract had been formed between herself and Drew, in that she had accepted the offer either on 4th November through the application of the postal rule, or on the 5th November when the letter was delivered to Drew’s place of business. Both events took place before the offer lapsed and before Drew’s letter of revocation was communicated to her.

6. Lucy v Drew Held by Nonsuch J.: 1. that the postal rule did not operate to form a contract on 4th November, since the acceptance was posted to the wrong address. In such a case, the postal rule becomes displaced and the acceptance does not take place until the letter of acceptance is received and read, (i.e. on 6th November) by which time the offer had lapsed. The court accepted the U.S.case of Eliason v. Henshaw 4 Wheat 225, as being a correct application of principle. 2. in any case, the offer had been revoked before Lucy’s letter of acceptance had been posted. Although the rule is that an offer is not revoked until the revocation is communicated to the offeree, in this case ‘communicated’ meant that the offeree should be given a reasonable time to read the letter of revocation, once it had been delivered to the place from which the offer had been made and at which the offeree was reasonably supposed to be present. This, at the latest, was at the close of business on 3rd November. Lucy is appealing against both findings.

7. Positions • Senior Appellant – against first finding • Junior Appellant – against second finding • Senior Respondent – for first finding • Junior Respondent – for second finding

8. 1) Our finding 1. that the postal rule did not operate to form a contract on 4th November, since the acceptance was posted to the wrong address. In such a case, the postal rule becomes displaced and the acceptance does not take place until the letter of acceptance is received and read, (i.e. on 6th November) by which time the offer had lapsed. The court accepted the U.S.case of Eliason v. Henshaw 4 Wheat 225, as being a correct application of principle. Senior Appellant

9. 2) The key case Eliason v. Henshaw 4 Wheat 225 • An offer to sell barrels of flour stipulated that the acceptance must be sent by the wagon in which the offer was sent, meaning it must be sent to Harper's Ferry, where the wagon was headed. The offeree instead sent acceptance to Georgetown. Senior Appellant

10. 2) The key case Eliason v. Henshaw 4 Wheat 225 • 'The place, therefore, to which the answer was to be sent constituted an essential part of the plaintiff's offer.' • 'an acceptance communicated at a place different from that pointed out by the plaintiffs and forming a part of their proposal imposed no obligation binding upon them...' Senior Appellant

11. 3) Other submissions • Lucy was not mistaken to post acceptance to Drew’s business address in Coventry • Adams v Lindsell [1818] 106 E.R. 250 • 'Then as to the delay in notifying the acceptance, that arises entirely from the mistake of the defendants, and it therefore must be taken as against them, that the plaintiffs' answer was received in course of post.' Senior Appellant

12. 3) Other submissions • Textbooks • Academic articles • Westlaw/Lexisnexis Senior Appellant

13. 4) Skeleton Argument 1. It was merely held in Eliason v Henshaw 4 Wheat 225 that if an offer stipulates to which address acceptance must be communicated, it must be communicated in that way; Drew, however, made no such stipulation, and so the principle in Eliason v Henshaw may be distinguished 2. Furthermore, it was entirely reasonable for Lucy to have posted her acceptance to Drew's business address in Coventry, as she had regularly had business dealings with him 3. In the alternative, if it is held that acceptance is not operative until received and read, Drew's absence from his office caused the delay in receiving and reading the letter and this must be held against him, considering the principle expounded in Adams v Lindsell 106 E.R. 250 Senior Appellant

14. 5) Speech • Improvisation • Semi-improvisation • Scripted • Practice Senior Appellant

15. 3) Other submissions • Lucy was mistaken to post acceptance to Drew’s business address in Coventry, or should have posted to both • Argue against the postal rule • Can lead to strange outcomes • No strong justification • Gardner (1992) 12 OJLS 170 Senior Respondent

16. Conclusion • Other positions • Questions • Feedback • Practice Moots • contact@lsesubarsociety.co.uk • harmish.mehta@googlemail.com • 07799726251