Why has union density declined?

1. Why has union density declined?

2. Why has union density declined? John Commons Union growth is cyclical, structural,and institutional Cyclical: Economic factors that affect labor demand Structural: Demographics, industrial composition, part-time vs full-time Institutional: laws, enforcement, type of government

3. Structural Factors • Female Labor Force Participation • Minority population growth • Education • Shift in population South and West • Job growth in traditionally nonunion sectors (services, retail) • Job declines in traditionally unionized sectors (manufacturing)

4. Structural Factors: Assessment • Female Labor Force Participation: small impact, women more likely to vote union • Minority population growth: small impact, blacks more likely to vote union, Hispanics mixed

5. Structural Factors: Assessment • Education: small impact due to union growth in teachers, government employees, health professionals

6. Structural Factors: Assessment • Job growth in traditionally nonunion sectors (services, retail): IMPORTANT 1950 1980 2001 Service 11.9% 19.8% 31.0% Retail 14.9% 16.6% 17.8% • Job declines in traditionally unionized sectors (manufacturing): IMPORTANT Manufacturing 33.7% 22.4% 13.4% Trans/Util 8.9% 5.7% 5.3%

7. Structural Factors: Assessment • But declines in membership density within traditionally unionized sectors are also IMPORTANT 1985 2002 Manufacturing 25% 14% Trans/Util 37% 23% Trade 7% 4.5% F.I.R.E. 3% 1.9%

8. Structural Factors: Assessment • Female Labor Force Participation: small impact, women more likely to vote union • Minority population growth: small impact, blacks more likely to vote union, Hispanics mixed • Education: small impact due to union growth in teachers, government employees, health professionals • Shift in population South and West: IMPORTANT • Job growth in traditionally nonunion sectors (services, retail): IMPORTANT • Job declines in traditionally unionized sectors (manufacturing): IMPORTANT • Decreases in density within industries: IMPORTANT

9. Surveys of union interest among unorganized workers show Broad-based support of about 33% Why don’t they join?

10. Supply and demand for union services • Structural changes don’t explain within sector declines • Institutions have not changed since Taft-Hartley (’47) and Landrum –Griffin (’59) (except for changes in direction of political pressure) • Economic Model • Demand-side: Workers trade off returns from union representation (wages, benefits, job conditions, job security, ….) against costs (dues, rules, potential job insecurity, ….)

11. Example LIUNA: Laborer’s International Union of North America http://www.liuna.org

12. Supply and Demand Application: Dickens and Leonard, “Accounting for the Decline in Union Membership, 1950-1980.” Industrial and Labor Relations Review (April 1985)

13. Conclusions • 1/3 of decline due to decreased economic growth • <1/3 of decline due to decreased organization rate Org rate = percent of unorganized workers who participate in an election • 1/4 of decline due to decrease in union success rate in certification elections Success rate = percent of pro-union votes on certification election

14. Problem • Is decreased union effort and success due to declining worker demand, declining union supply, or rising firm resistance? • Farber and Krueger, “Union Membership in the United States: The Decline Continues”

15. Data • Nationwide surveys of union sentiment in 1977, 1984, 1991, 1992 • Is decline due to decrease in proportion expressing interest in unionization or an increase in proportion who want unions but cannot get services (frustrated demand)?

16. Venn Diagram of Union Interest • U= In union or not D=Want union or not U=0D=1 U=1D=1 U=0 D=0 U=1D=0

17. Venn Diagram of Union Interest • U= In union or not D=Want union or not U=1D=1 U=0D=1 U=0 D=0

18. Conclusion • Decrease due to decreased interest in unionization, holding demographics, industry structure constant. • Farber and Krueger believe there is no evidence of decreased union density due to increased anti-union animus by firms. • (Unless decline in pro-union sentiment is driven by firm actions)

19. Evidence on Union Supply • Fiorito and Jarley, IRRA 55th Annual Proceedings, 2003 • 1995: new AFL-CIO leadership pledges $20 million for organization • Unions need to add 300,000 workers per year to maintain density • Little evidence of rising effort or membership after John Sweeney’s call to organize

20. Theory of Union Supply • Farber, “Union Success in Representation Elections: Why Does Size Matter?.” Industrial and Labor Relations Review (January 2001) Facts: • Union organization effort declined precipitously since the mid 70s. • Average size of unit in elections declined over time • Union success on certification elections fell • Union success fell most in large firms.

21. Theory of Union Supply • Farber, “Union Success in Representation Elections: Why Does Size Matter?.” Industrial and Labor Relations Review (January 2001) Conclusions: • Unions would be expected to face declining win rates over time as the most promising prospects are organized first. • Decrease in union organization effort is consistent with the declining supply of promising prospects • There has always been a lower union success rate in large firms. The growing gap in election success rates between large and small bargaining units is consistent with a simple application of the law of large numbers when probability of success is < .5 • Could also be that large firms fight harder against unions.

22. Management Resistance to Unions: How Important is it? • Kleiner, JLR (Summer 2001) • Firms can resist union organizational efforts through carrots and sticks • Carrots (wages, benefits, revenue sharing, participatory management, …) • Sticks include: • Hiring consultants (annual expense $200 million) • Legal resistance • Illegal resistance

23. Evidence of rising illegal resistance • Rising importance or worker reinstatement due to illegal firing • Rising 8(a)(3): Union discrimination; and 8(a)(5): good faith bargaining filings • Minnesota sample of 26 contentious organization drives • 14/26 led to NLRB investigations • Union successful in only 3/26 cases • Kleiner citing Freeman: 40% of union decline due to employer resistance

24. Why would firms risk illegal activity, penalties? • Penalties too low ($2,733/worker) • Low compared to some other federal violations • Returns to resistance can be very large

25. Richard Hurd. “Union Free Bargaining Strategies and First Contract Failures” • Even if union wins certification election, firm may be able to avoid bargaining • About 25% of certifications fail to result in a first contract • Certification gives the union exclusive rights to represent the bargaining unit for minimum of 12 months (contract bar), maximum of three years. • After 12 months, if union fails to get a contract, employees may ask for decertification

26. Bargaining delay strategies • Technical refusal to bargain • NLRB decisions on bargaining unit, remedies on election conduct not appealable • ULP decisions are appealable • Refusal to bargain leads to ULP charge, appeals can drag out process • Example: IBEW and Tempco Electric Heaters

27. Bargaining delay strategies • Defiant bargaining • Violate requirement to bargain in good faith because benefits outweigh costs • Example: IAM and S&S Screw • Evasive bargaining • Attempt to comply with good faith bargaining while dragging out the process • Example: SEIU and Freedom Crest Nursing Home

28. Bargaining delay strategies • Peremptory bargaining • Adopt nonnegotiable terms that will not be acceptable to the Union • Example: BCTW and Dawn Frozen Foods • Nearly 75% of failures to reach first contract use these methods, 18% of new certifications