90 likes | 204 Views
KFKI RMKI CA Review EUGridPMA May 26-28, Copenhagen. Szabolcs Hernáth MTA KFKI RMKI hernath@sunserv.kfki.hu pki.kfki.hu. Overview. Background & History Present Status & Future Plans Self-assessment & Issues Lessons learned & Suggestions Discussion…. 1. Background & History.
E N D
KFKI RMKI CA ReviewEUGridPMA May 26-28, Copenhagen Szabolcs Hernáth MTA KFKI RMKI hernath@sunserv.kfki.hu pki.kfki.hu
Overview • Background & History • Present Status & Future Plans • Self-assessment & Issues • Lessons learned & Suggestions • Discussion…
1. Background & History • Why 2 CAs in Hungary? - Community needed the service in 2004 - NREN CA (NIIF) was planned, but no progress or roadmap - RMKI had ~90% of LCG users & resources • EUGridPMA in Brussels, Sept. 2004: - KFKI RMKI CA presented - PMA demanded community agreement to preempt a 2 CA situation • Dec. 2004: Community agreement presented - Hungarian grid community will endorse KFKI RMKI CA until the NIIF CA can setup an RA at KFKI campus - PMA accepted the agreement, KFKI RMKI CA accredited - started production in Jan. 2005 • Recent progress in the setup of NIIF RA
2. Present Status • Reliable operation on Debian/OpenCA • Stats: - All issued: 230 (6 for testing) - Revoked: 126 (none compromised) - Valid: 47 (14 user, 33 host) - All host: 145 (68 DNs, even less idenities) - All user: 79 (50 DNs, even less identities) - All CRLs: 120 (1 overdue ) • NIIF RA progress: - RA secure admin interface deployed & tested (based on tokens) - User web interface in development - IdP for NIIF AAI Federation in deployment (for user preauth) - RA contract in preparation
3. Future Plans • NIIF RA in production later this year • Will probably keep the CA for local purposes - will rekey or extend the root - could produce new CP/CPS • After the NIIF RA is in production, will replace all grid certs • Need to leave the club …
4. Self-assessment • Work in progress, preliminary results • Major issues: CA (5) CP/CPS is RFC 2527 D/D (7) Secure environment, access control & log D/D (9) Secure environment undocumented/unaudited D (11) CA key protection B/D (50) Operational audit D/D (51) List of personnel D • Major Issues: RA (2) Identity vetting (user) B/C (3) Identity vetting (host) A/C (4) FQDN ownership B/C (10) Record archival in auditable form C
5. Other Issues • Insufficient resources • No long-term planning (was not expected) • Missing operational documents • Too many hats • ‘Rescheduled’ paperwork
6. Recommendations • More is less: - specify everything as strict as possible - write all operational documents before production • Operational audit/review ASAP (before production) • Separation of GRID namespace is recommended • Accreditation profile version should be recorded on accreditation • Audit guidelines updates for AP changes? (versions for each AP version?) • Separate audit guidelines for different APs?