THE BRAHIMI REPORT: An Overview

1. THE BRAHIMI REPORT:An Overview DAVID T LIGHTBURN

2. CATEGORIES OF ISSUES • Peacekeeping - Substantive Issues • Process • Resources • Structure

3. PEACEKEEPING ISSUES • PREVENTIVE ACTION • Address in integrated fashion • More use of fact-finding missions • PEACE-BUILDING • Funds – quick impact • SSR & human rights • DDR and funding • Peacebuilding concept and policy at UN • PEACEKEEPING DOCTRINE • Robust ROEs

4. PROCEDURAL MATTERS • Clear, Credible Achievable Mandates • Transitional Administration • Interim Criminal Code • Deployment Timelines (30 & 90 Days) • Mission Leadership • List of acceptable experts • Mission HQ training • Integrated Mission Planning & Support • Delegate Pk Budgeting To DPKO • Better Use Of Information Technology

5. RESOURCES • MILITARY • Partnerships Of Nations (SHRBRIG) • Certification Of Contingents • 100 On-call Planners • POLICE • National Pools • Regional Training • 100 On-call Planners • Also For Judges, Penal, Human Rights And Other Ssr Specialists

6. RESOURCES (continued) • Civilian Specialists • Central list • Career possibilities • Staffing strategy • Public Information Capability • Logistics • 5 mission start-up kits • Increased procurement authority • Funding (Authority To DPKO)

7. STRUCTURAL ISSUES • Information And Strategic Analysis • Separate Military And Police In Dpko • Restructure Lessons-learned Unit • Increase DPKO Staff • Place Peace-building In DPA • Enhance Staff Of High Commissioner For Human Rights

8. SINGAPORE MEETING ON“THE REFORM PROCESS OF UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS”

9. SINGAPORE MEETING • Included Brahimi, Shimura, Vierra de Mello, Coleman, senior reps from 3 missions • Excellent mix of practitioners, academics, military, politicians, diplomats, bureaucrats, civilian field experts

10. REPORT ON THE MEETING • General Reflections And Criticisms • Peacekeeping Issues • Procedural Issues • Resources Issues • Structural Issues • Regional Views • Brahimi Approach Vs NATO Lessons-learned • Conclusions

11. REFLECTIONS & RESPONSE • CRITICISM • Learned and experienced – use in implementation • Beyond scope of study – reform of UNSC; pk by proxy; humanitarian intervention a Trojan horse for developed nations to intervene in developing nations affairs • Issues between secretariat and nations not addressed • Resistance to reform within UN • TERMINOLOGY – • PEACE OPERATIONS – used by Report • PEACEKEEPING – used by UNSC

12. REFLECTIONS & RESPONSE (continued) • Other reflections • Too light a treatment of Conflict Prevention and Preventive Measures (panel mandate was peace ops) • With more time, panel could have done more on Gender, DDR and Peace-Building • Reform is a process just beginning; don’t over-analyse • No major troop contributors represented on 10 person panel

13. PEACEKEEPING ISSUES • Robust approach – two views • Apply robust concept to civilian operations • Police – need new concepts, policies – as result of UNTAET and UNMIK – regional like-minded groupings? • Need for advance planning with Partners • Problem of Development being used synonymously with Peace-building

14. PEACEKEEPING ISSUES(continued) • Conflict Prevention - UN role important but regional actors are critical • “Humanitarian Intervention” or “Human Rights Intervention”

15. PROCEDURAL ISSUES • Information available to UNSC poor • Missions hopelessly over-regulated • Consideration of OSCE “REACT concept”

16. RESOURCE ISSUES • Need for well prepared and trained quality personnel • Need lists of SRSGs, Deputies, CIVPOL. regional coordinators… etc

17. STRUCTURAL ISSUES • Realities • No Space for more staff • Integrated Mission Task Forces – no directors available in DPA or DPKO

18. REGIONAL VIEWS • REGIONAL MEETINGS FEB/MAR 2001 • CONCLUSIONS • CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE IN UN (Brahimi represents minimum change) • RECOMMENDATIONS ARE TECHNICAL & OPERATIONAL SOLUTIONS TO POLITICAL PROBLEMS • NEED FOR UN TO WORK WITH REGIONAL ORGANISATONS (greater role for regions) • NEED MORE EFFORT ON PREVENTION • SUPPORT ROBUST CONCEPT (but needs training, and resources to develop capacity)

19. COMPARISONNATO - BRAHIMI • Mandate/mission/capabilities – mandate approved only with resources • Robust ROEs and credible force – Robust approach • Engage partners in planning – engage troop contributors • Both NATO and UN change their approach to management of crises • Both urge of unity of effort (need for effective co-operation and co-ordination prior to and during operations)

20. SEMINAR CONCLUSIONS • Basically, Brahimi got it right – landmark report – need now to implement • Relations with troop contributors still poor (UNSC and secretariat) – Key near term issue • UN cannot take on every crisis; must select carefully; better not to engage than to engage poorly • Need for quality, well-prepared, people for missions • Take account of experience in UNTAET and UNMIK concerning a shift in policing concepts • Complex operations are now the norm

21. KEY PEACEKEEPING ISSUES - 2001 • Move beyond 1992 Agenda For Peace and acknowledge modern multi-fucntional ops as the norm • Improve preparations for a crisis • Between organizations • Within nations and organizations • Improve international community’s early management of a crisis • Need robust, professional, unity of effort from the international community