The Eagle and the Bear: The Doctrine of Containment and the Cold War, 1945-1950

1. The Eagle and the Bear: The Doctrine of Containment and the Cold War, 1945-1950 PO 326: American Foreign Policy

2. The Seeds of Containment – Kennan’s “Long Telegram” • Mistrust and animosity between the US and USSR, stemming from the development of rival spheres of influence, colors American thinking immediately following the war • Kennan (chargé d’affaires in Moscow)– Defines Soviet threat in 1946 telegram • Soviets “impervious to logic of reason” • Inherently expansionist; will only back down to strong resistance – thus, manipulation of threat of war must be cornerstone of Soviet policy • Quickly becomes shared perspective in US foreign policy community

3. The Seeds of Containment – The Truman Doctrine • Soviet pressure builds on Turkey, Iran • Divided government; Republicans bash Democrats for “communist appeasement” (FDR and Eastern Europe) • Social disruptions in postwar US; public apathy concerning international affairs, but opinion can be shaped • Consensus emerges in administration, based on long telegram • Acheson (SecState): Warns Congress of “likely Soviet breakthrough” (apocalyptic)

4. The Seeds of Containment – The Truman Doctrine • Greece and Turkey – domestic and foreign communist elements threatening to gain control • Truman’s speech to Congress (1947) • Seeks monetary assistance to stave off communist control • Security of US predicated on establishment of US-led international order • Collapse of free institutions in other states would spread quickly, endanger security (domino theory) • “It must be the policy of the US to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures” • Focuses on economic reconstruction (free trade), but issue is inherently political • Similarities to/differences with Wilsonianism

5. The Seeds of Containment – the Marshall Plan (ERP) • Large-scale plan for economic recovery and integration for the purposes of maintaining democratic governance, limiting Soviet influence • Coincides with active attempts to create West Germany • USSR invited to participate (avoids perceptions of divisiveness), but would undermine their influence – convinces USSR that US is bent on European hegemony, penetration of Eastern Europe • $17 billion assistance package passed by Congress (bipartisanship in recognition of threat, means to address it)

6. The East-West Rivalry Solidified – Kennan’s “X” Article • Public restatement of “Long Telegram,” with additions • US policy should specifically center on “long-term vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies” • Sought to force Moscow to moderate its aggressive behavior (only understands strength) • Must apply “unalterable counterforce at every point where [Soviets] show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world” • Reflected sentiments of entire administration, but vague; would be used in future as basis for global military (not just economic) containment

7. The East-West Rivalry Solidified – Soviet Actions in Eastern Europe • Soviet actions in 1947-1948, partially in response to American policy, work to justify US fears • Yugoslavia • Tito (communist) steers “middle course” – Stalin does not respond, but cracks down in other communist countries • Czech Coup (February 1948) – Soviet-controlled communism implemented; USSR will not even tolerate communist rule achieved by democratic means • US responds by further seeking to isolate USSR (Washington Conference, calls for alliance)

8. The East-West Rivalry Solidified – Soviet Actions in Eastern Europe • The Berlin Blockade (1948-1949) • Soviets not invited to London; Stalin seeks to communicate position • Western military shipments to West Berlin halted by USSR in April; full blockade applied in June in response to Western currency reform in occupied area • Stalin sought to force change in Western approach to German question; instead, resulted in increased unity and resolve • US sends nuke-capable B-29s to England • West German constitution drafted in late 1948 • West begins airlift to relieve West Berliners (early 1949); Soviets relent • Berlin outcome, formation of West Germany serious defeats for USSR

9. The East-West Rivalry Solidified – The Formation of NATO • By late 1948, calls for defensive alliance amongst US and Western Europeans intensify • Problems facing Administration: • What would be the true purpose of the alliance? Political or military? • What would the US’s role be? Would it absorb most of the costs, or seek defensive integration amongst Western states? Would it engage in a forward defense of Western Europe (tripwire), making explicit an automatic commitment if USSR attacked? Associated domestic issues • In its drafted form (April 1949), the US was not required to supply automatic commitment or large numbers of troops, and it hoped it could deter USSR via nuclear superiority • However, as operational details were left vague, these commitments could and would be implemented

10. The Containment of Communism Elsewhere – The Fall of China • China was, admittedly, of lower priority for Truman • Chinese communists under Mao threaten to unseat Nationalist government (1948-49) • US gradually withdraws economic assistance • Republicans in Congress attack administration for cutting Chiang loose • By 1949, only direct US military assistance would stave off communists – Truman unwilling • Nationalists fall in October 1949 – source of domestic criticism in the US (communism has spread)

11. Containment’s Capstone – NSC 68 • State/Defense draft directive that incorporates previous US policy into a conceptual framework for future policy • Bipolarity is a “permanent and fundamental alteration” of world power distribution – total struggle between free and imprisoned societies • Must aggressively stop Soviets from consolidating power, expanding – may also seek to undermine Soviets at home • Bleak assessment of relative capabilities – suggested “rapid buildup of political, economic, and military strength in the free world” • Does not leave out possibility of offensive approach, including nuclear first strike • Negotiation seen simply as tool by which time could be bought for gaining superiority • Administration’s duty was seen from within as being the total selling of this perspective to Congress and the American people

12. Development of the Containment Doctrine to 1950 • Marshall Plan and Truman Doctrine – Economic approach with political goal; sought to minimize threat perceived by USSR, but failed • Subsequent Soviet reactions convinced policymakers that Kennan’s view of Soviet threat was entirely correct, and that all available means must be exhausted to counter USSR at every turn (not just economic and political, but military vigilance required as well) • By 1950, communism seen as largely contained in Europe, but the fall of China shows the difficulties of a global containment policy (vast requirements) • Korean invasion removes all doubts about communism, no matter what its nationality