A Cradle to Grave Chinese Fuel Cycle?

1. A Cradle to Grave Chinese Fuel Cycle? Mark Hibbs Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 9th ROK-UN Joint Conference on Nonproliferation and Disarmament Issues Jeju, Republic of Korea December 2-3, 2010

2. Current global supplier situation • Vendors may export reactors together with fuel and services • Areva only globally active fully integrated fuel cycle services supplier • Areva: separated plutonium, HLW repatriated to client • Areva: may be willing to reprocess, retain plutonium, will return waste (Taiwan, ROK) • No foreign reprocessing by Japan, Russia, others

3. Newcomer States and Spent Fuel • Nuclear Newcomers in Asia-Pacific, Middle East, South America, Europe • Many will have no budget, no infrastructure for waste management • States and regions with no legacy of cooperation • Stranded HLW, spent fuel, plutonium inventories on horizon

4. Russian Federation USSR power reactor supply in Eastern Europe accompanied by spent fuel takeback This business was terminated in 1994 Russia only bidder on 2008 Turkish tender requesting spent fuel takeback option Russia now offering takeback if EUP is Russian Without Russian EUP reprocessed products are to be returned

5. China’s Aspirations Official policy is a future closed fuel cycle Partnerships emerging with Russia, France, Belgium, others toward this goal Chinese industry wants commercial Purex plant by about 2020 China also has aspirations beyond Purex Ambitious fast reactor development plan

6. China’s decision making China now internally deliberating on fuel cycle policy implementation No consensus on fast breeder reactor roadmap Negotiations with France, Areva for supply of commercial-scale reprocessing, MOX plants Outstanding bilateral issues: technology transfer, price, nonproliferation

7. Which Reprocessing Technology Policy?Current CNNC thinking Option 1: Purex; MA and FP in vitrified HLW; recover U and Pu Option 2: Advanced Purex: recover U, Pu, Np; partitioning to separate TRU, LLFP and heat-generating isotopes Cs-137 and Sr-90 Option 3: separate U, Pu, Np, separation of actinides from lanthanides; MA and LLFP to be burned/transmuted Some CNNC officials want to build Option 1 now, then build second reprocessing plant on Option 2 or 3

8. The case for delayed reprocessing No near-term pressure to produce large quantities of plutonium fuel Future direction of FBR program not clear Scale of Chinese nuclear program not clear Chinese regulatory resources are thin China is accumulating uranium inventory Security and nonproliferation issues Ongoing Chinese participation in international advanced reprocessing and reactor research

9. 2020-2030: China Chinese nuclear development will have stabilized Advanced reactor, reprocessing technologies may be ready for commercial development Chinese oversight will be experienced, robust China will have accumulated both domestic reprocessing experience and R&D experience with foreign partners Progress in integrating China with international nuclear security, nonproliferation, disarmament agenda

10. 2030: China and Southeast Asia Several states may deploy power reactors China fully capable and endowed with intellectual property to export modern PWRs China through foreign holdings emerges as major uranium producer and also enricher Southeast Asian states ship spent fuel to China for storage/reprocessing China may retain/burn plutonium and retain HLW