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Reliability Analysis SNS Linac Reliability Model (MAX Task 4.2)

Reliability Analysis SNS Linac Reliability Model (MAX Task 4.2). MYRRHA Accelerator 1 st International Design Review Brussels , November 12-13 2012 Adrian Pitigoi, Pedro Fernández - EA. From PDS-XADS/EUROTRANS to MAX 2. MAX Task 4.2 - SNS Linac Model 3. SNS Model – Input Data

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Reliability Analysis SNS Linac Reliability Model (MAX Task 4.2)

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  1. Reliability AnalysisSNS Linac Reliability Model (MAX Task 4.2) MYRRHA Accelerator 1stInternational Design Review Brussels, November 12-13 2012 Adrian Pitigoi, Pedro Fernández - EA

  2. From PDS-XADS/EUROTRANS to MAX 2. MAX Task 4.2 - SNS Linac Model 3. SNS Model – Input Data 4. Modeling Methodology 5. SNS Fault Tree Development 6. SNS Systems - Reliability Analysis SNS RS - Model and results evaluation Logbook Data – SNS Accelerator trip failures 7. Conclusions and Recommendations 8. Next Step MAX Task 4.4)

  3. 1. From PDS-XADS/EUROTRANS to MAX XT-ADS Reliability Assessment– PDS-XADS Deliverable 063 (WP3) report: ¨Definition of the XADS class reference accelerator concept & needed R&D” 4.3 Accelerator Reliability Analysis– role of Redundancies and Fault Tolerance on Overall Reliability Simplified (“lumped” elements) reliability model Different Linac configurations – RBD analysis (Relex) Set of reliability characteristics of the baseline components (given) – effect of their connection on the resulting system Mission time of 3 months (2190 hours); goal of 3 system faults during the mission – approx. MTBF = 700 hours (design requirement) • Reliability Analysis Conclusions • System layout is much more important than the role of the reliability characteristics • of the individual components. • For given component reliability numbers, the chosen degree of redundancy and fault • tolerance in the linac configuration can result in a wide range of system reliability characteristics. • Higher reliability gain for system: parallel redundancy with “hand-on” repair possibilities. • For in-tunnel components (requiring system shutdown for corrective maintenance), sufficient degree of fault tolerance has to be applied. Moderately fault tolerant linac with a double injector (split RF system repair design provisions)

  4. 1. From PDS-XADS/EUROTRANS to MAX IT Linac Reliability Analysis and sensitivity studies– PDS-XADS Deliverable 080, ¨Extrapolation from XADS Accelerator to the Accelerator of an Industrial Transmuter” The linac design was extended to the case of the IT for a mission time of 4,380 hours (6 months),same components MTBF as for XADS System MTBF dropped - faults arising from low equivalent MTBF of the support subsystem RF subsystems - proper reliability characteristics (degree of redundancy and fault tolerance) No substantial increase of system MTBF if longer MTBF from the RF components Sensitivity analysis by increasing the MTBF of the components in the injector block and of the support systems • Sensitivity Analysis Conclusions • Reliability goals of the IT accelerator - can be reached mainly by improving the reliability characteristics of: components of the injector and conventional support systems. The RBD for the IT linac configuration with MTBF=2023.

  5. 1. From PDS-XADS/EUROTRANS to MAX • Reliability Analysis Conclusions • No. of Acc. shutdowns (simulation for the ten tests) - between 1 and 5, with an average of 3.1 • Main systems failures leading to the accelerator shutdown - RF systems pertaining of SC part, failing due to: • RF sources malfunctions (HVPS and water cooling with low MTBF). • Magnets malfunction (malfunction of the water cooling: low MTBF- • 4500 hours). • RF systems malfunction (water cooling; and the HVPS, low MTBF - • 4500 hours. XT-ADS Acc. Reliability analysis: Monte Carlo-type simulation of the accelerator (Matlab) – EUROTRANS - ¨Reliability Analysis of the XT-ADS Accelerator¨ Time history of the number of shutdowns of the accelerator for each test. Systems of the superconducting part that cause accelerator shutdowns Distribution of the systems responsible for the shutdowns of the accelerator.

  6. 2. MAX Task 4.2 - SNS Linac Model WP 4 Task 4.2 Objective - Reliability model of SNS Linac accelerator Feedback on actual SNS reliability performance, in order to develop a reliability modeling toolfor MAX project Task 4.2 Activities: Selection of the accelerator to be used for modeling (SNS) SNS Design & Reliability data collection Development of SNS Linac RS reliability model Performing reliability analysis of the SNS Linac systems Task 4.2 Targets: Evaluate the SNS Linac model (model results vs. SNS operational data) Conclusions and recommendations on optimization, increasing reliability. Layout of the SNS Linac

  7. 3. SNS Model - INPUT DATA SNS Design Data SNS Accelerator overall structure (main and auxiliary systems); system interfaces Systems components/interconnection Number of components (by type) Degree of redundancy Data Sources: SNS RAMI Static Model SNS BlockSim model (Reliasoft) SNS Systems and Functions SNS Parameters Systems and components System functions Systems functional interdependencies Data Sources: SNS website (http://neutrons.ornl.gov/facilities/SNS/): ¨How SNS works¨ - http://neutrons.ornl.gov/facilities/SNS/works.shtml; SNS Parameters (doc no. SNS 100000000-PL001R13) (http://neutrons.ornl.gov/media/pubs/pdf/sns_parameters_list_june05.pdf) SNS Design Control Documents (DCD) SNS BlockSim Model

  8. 3. SNS Model - INPUT DATA SNS Reliability Data Number of components (by type) Degree of redundancy Failure data: λ=1/MTTF; MTTR (λ– Failure rate; MTTF-Main Time To Failure; MTTR-Main Time To Repair) Data Sources: RAMI Static Model SNS BlockSim detailed model SNS Operating Status Component failures - cause, type of component, time to repair, etc. Availability data (component failures causing accelerator trips: cause, component and system concerned, duration of trip) Data Sources: SNS Operation Data collection (http://status.sns.ornl.gov/beam.jsp) http://status.sns.ornl.gov/beam.jsp

  9. 4. Modeling Methodology • General Assumptions • SNS systems/components not modeled – Ring - RTBT, stripper foil, etc. (considered as not relevant for Max project purposes) • Risk Spectrum Type 1– Repairable components reliability model (continuously monitored) – Type 1 reliability model - modeling all SNS Linac components • ¨Mean Unavailability¨ type of calculation is used to obtain the unavailability values of the basic events; • (the long-term average unavailability Q is calculated for each basic event) • a) The 1,000-foot SNS linear accelerator is made up of three different types of accelerators. • The SNS ring intensifies the high-speed ion beam and shoots it at the mercury target 60 times a second (60 Hz). • Target

  10. 4. Modeling Methodology General Assumptions Continuously monitored repairable component RSType 1reliability model has been considered for modeling all SNS Linac components failing behavior. Failure/Repair processes – exponential distributions; failure/repair rates ct. It is assumed q=0 (λ=1/MTTF (failure rate); µ=1/MTTR (repair rate)) MTTF;MTTR data – BlockSim Model data ¨Mean Unavailability¨ type of calculationis used for calculating basic events availabilities: Q=λ/(λ+µ)

  11. 5. SNS Reliability Model - Fault Tree Model SNS Module 1- first modeling step: RFQ + MEBT + DTL Gradual development of the SNS Linac model In-depth understanding of the SNS design and functioning for an accurate model.

  12. 5. SNS Reliability Model - Fault Tree Model SNS Fault Tree (complete model)- graphical representation of the SNS systems functional structure describing undesired events (“ system failures") and their causes. • The Fault tree – logical gates and basic events. • A fault tree - subdivided between several fault tree pages (bound together using transfer gates).

  13. 5. Modeling the SNS Linac SNS Linac Fault Tree Structure - Main levels of the fault trees - major parts of the SNS accelerator (Ion Source, LEBT, RFQ, MEBT, DTL-CCL-SCL, HEBT, CONV - auxiliary systems)

  14. 5. Modeling the SNS Linac • DTL RF Fault Tree Structure

  15. 5. Modeling the SNS Linac • CCL Transmitter Fault Tree Structure

  16. 5. Fault Tree Model development • Failure Identification Codes Fault Tree symbols

  17. SNS Linac Model (resuming): • System Fault Trees – BE, logical gates • Basic event (BE) - RS Repairable Model • (RS model Type1) • Quantification of BE (λ and MTTR – • R and TR in RS model) • BE - Mean Unavailability type of • calculation • SNS Linac complete Model has been analyzed (SNS ACC DOWN- top event ) • RS MCS (Minimal Cut Set) • type of analysis. • MCS generates the minimal cut sets • of the Fault Tree and • perform a mean availability point-estimate • quantification of the top event • Analysis Case – Results • Q = 2.60E-01 = 0.26; Q = 26 % • A = 1 - Q = 73 %(the limit Availability • – Mean Availability) 6. SNS Systems - Reliability Analysis

  18. Analysis Case – Results • Q = 2.60E-01 = 0.26; Q = 26 % • A = 1 - Q = 73 % (the limit Availability – • Mean Availability) 6. SNS Systems - Reliability Analysis Results Minimal Cut-sets (MCS) MCS Contribution

  19. Analysis Case – Results • Q = 2.60E-01 = 0.26; Q = 26 % • A = 1 - Q = 73 % (the limit Availability – Mean Availability) 6. SNS Systems - Reliability Analysis Results • MCS Analysishas been performed for the SNS Linac complete model (SNS ACC DOWN), as well as for different parts (SCL, etc.) of the accelerator, with the following conclusions: • Results indicate a wide range of failure modes– components, systems (wide failures dispersion- SNS Electronic op. Logbook) • The Linac, (DTL-CCL-SCL) represents the most concerned part (Q=1.25E-01; A=87.5%) • The higher values of Unavailability have been found for: • SCL (Q=9.85E-02; A=90%) • DGN&C (Q=7.15E-02; A=93%) • Front-End (Q=6.93E-02; A=93%) • The most affected part of the SCL is the SCL RF system: Q=6.33E-02; A=94% (primarily due to power supplies failures and • klystronfailures, but also to cooling and vacuummalfunctions) • The most affected parts of the Front-End are the LEBT (Q=2.83E-02; A=97%) and MEBT (Q= 2.82E-02; A=97%), more • specifically the magnets the vacuum systems

  20. Analysis Case – Results • Q = 2.60E-01 = 0.26; Q = 26 % • A = 1 - Q = 73 % (the limit Availability – • Mean Availability) Minimal Cut-sets (MCS) 6. SNS Systems - Reliability Analysis Results

  21. SNS Reliability considerations (from past operation experience) • The reliability of input data mix used (RAMI static model, BlockSim model) - sources - data from staff Engineers, manufacturers (e.g. Titan, Varian, Maxwel), design reviews, etc. • A reliability program has been implemented at SNS, reaching significant increase of the reliability of SNS installations in the past few years. • SNS RS Model Limitations • The SNS reliability data (MTTF; MTTR) used for RS model quantification, are from • the SNS data mix mentioned above • The reliability improvements gained through the reliability program have not been • quantified/represented in the RS model. • The LEBT and DGN&C modules are relatively developed (lack of detailed information) • The availability results obtained by MCS analysis run separately for the different SNS Linac parts (IS, RFQ, MEBT, DTL, CCL, SCL, HEBT) have matched up very well with the SNS Logbook Availability records, although the global result is A=73%. This is attributable to the fact that the MTTF and MTTR values used for model quantification may be too conservative and other constraints above. 6. SNS Reliability modeling – Model evaluation Accelerator reliability Workshop in Cape Town, South Africa in April 2011 (G.Dodson talk) • Considering the reliability database used for quantifying, and the fact that the last years reliability improvements have not been included in the model, it can be affirmed that the overall availability of the SNS Linac (A=73%) resulting from RS model is confirmed by the availability figures of the SNS from the first 4 years of SNS operation

  22. 6. Logbook Data – SNS Accelerator trip failures

  23. SNS Reliability graphics (Logbook Availability and failure data) 6. Logbook Data – SNS Acc. trip failures Availability (Oct.2011 - June 2012) Accelerator trip failures frequency (by system) SNS Outages (Jan-Feb, June 2012) • RF system and electrical system failures - the most frequent; • Electrical systems failures - the most important contribution to total accelerator downtime • (in consonance with the conclusions from the SNS RS Model runs) Accelerator downtime contribution (by system)

  24. 6. Logbook Data – SNS Acc. trip failures Electrical subsystems contribution to the acc. downtime • The most affected subsystems of the SNS Linac (failures leading to accelerator trips): • SCL-HPRF (Superconducting Linac - High Power Radiofrequency)- • (short failures frequency) • HVCM (High Voltage Converter Modulator(duration of trips) • (in accordance with the SCL RS analysis) RF System failures

  25. Statistics of accelerator trips by duration (hour fractions): failure frequency and contribution to the total downtime graphics 6. Logbook Data – SNS Acc. trip failures • General context - all Linacsystems: total of 705 failures recorded over the studied period of time • beam interruptions of between 0 and six minutes (0 - 0.1 hours) - approx. 47 % of beam trips, i.e., 327 failures • failures whose duration exceed 1 hour represent 13 % of the total. These are the most contributing to the total downtime for the same period, which means 308 hours representing 70 % of the total (445 hours).

  26. The reliability results show that the most affected SNS Linac parts/systems are: • SCL, Front-End systems (IS, LEBT, MEBT), Diagnostics & Controls • RF systems (especially the SCL RF system) • Power Supplies and PS Controllers • These results are in line with the records in the SNS Logbook • The reliability consideration that most needs to be enforced in linac design is redundancy of the most affected • systems, subsystems and components • There is a need for intelligent fail-over redundancy implementation in controllers, for compensation purposes • Enough diagnostics have to be implemented to allow reliable functioning of the redundant solutions and to • ensure the compensation function. 7. Conclusions and Recommendations

  27. Development of the MAX Linac Reliability model, starting from the SNS RS Model results and • conclusions • Need for a well defined basic/concept design (system schemes) at the same level of detail/development • – inputs from the team to the Task 4.4 model. • Integration work is needed to define system interfaces • The process should be iterative: the MAX Model to be developed and continuously updated during the • design work, assimilating continuously the current design information and providing recommendations • for improvements in reliability. 8. Next Step – MAX Task 4.4

  28. Thank you

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