Overview of the ICAO Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme

1. International Civil Aviation Organization Overview of the ICAO Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme North Asia Regional Aviation Safety Team Beijing, 25 September 2003

2. Outline • Background • Audit programme • State Safety Oversight System • Status of implementation • Analysis of the findings – AFDD • Implications of the findings • Future of the Programme

3. What is safety oversight? • Safety oversight is a function by which States ensure the effective implementation of the safety-related Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs), and associated procedures and practices contained in the Annexes to the Convention on International Civil Aviation and associated documents

4. Most importantly, • Safety oversight is aboutCOMMITMENTto the Convention on International Civil Aviation; a commitment by Governments to satisfactorily fulfill their obligations under the Convention, having agreed on certain principles and arrangements in order that international civil aviation may be developed in a safe and orderly manner.(Preamble to the Convention))

5. Universal safety oversight audit programme • The ICAO Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme was established to: • Assist States to effectively implement the critical elements of a safety oversight system; • Assist them to better undertake their responsibilities for safety oversight under the Convention; and • Uphold the principles and the spirit of the Convention on International Civil Aviation.

6. Why an ICAO Programme? • Various reports in the early 1990s on the lack of implementation by States of ICAO SARPs • Increased concern over the level of aviation safety world-wide • Need to reduce accident rates to off-set the rapid increase in traffic

7. The making of a programme • Assembly Resolution A29-13 (1992) • Approval of the ICAO safety oversight voluntary assessment programme by the Council (June 1995) • Voluntary assessments commence (March 1996) • DGCA Conference (November 1997) • Approval of the ICAO Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme by the Council (May 1998) • Assembly Resolution A32-11 (1998) • Mandatory audit programme established on 1 January 1999. • Assembly Resolutions A33-8 and A33-9 (2001)

8. Evolution of the Programme ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME (Mar 96 - Dec 98) AUDIT PROGRAMME (Jan 99 ) VOLUNTARY MANDATORY CONFIDENTIAL TRANSPARENT FUNDED BY STATE CONTRIBUTIONS FUNDED BY ICAO

9. ANNEXES: 1 – PEL 6 – OPS 8 – AIR Scope of the audits • Compliance with: • Chicago Convention • State Regulations • Conformance with: • ICAO Standards • Adherence to: • Recommended practices • Related procedures • Guidance material • Relevant industry practices The overall implementation of the Critical Elements of a Safety Oversight System

10. State safety oversight systems • The establishment of a safety oversight system is essential to fulfill State obligations under the Chicago Convention. • State safety oversight systems are comprised of a number of organizational processes and procedures, which enable civil aviation administrations to implement international SARPs and safe industry practices. • Failure to implement proper safety oversight systems could harbour conditions which may have an impact on the safety of civil aviation.

11. USOAP Audits Organizational Processes and Procedures Organizational Processes and Procedures Safety defences Safety defences Workplace conditions Workplace conditions Latent conditions Latent conditions Active failures Active failures

12. Audits = a tool for aviation safety The audits, as a tool to enhance aviation safety, enable ICAO to: • Evaluatethe effectiveness of organizational procedures and processes in Civil Aviation Administrations • Reinforcesafety defences • Detectlatent conditions which may be embedded in the system • Identifyworkplace conditions which could adversily impact safety • Avertactive failures and, thus, prevent accidents and incidents

13. Auditing philosophy and approach USOAP Audits Organizational Processes and Procedures Safety defences Workplace conditions

14. Primary legislation Resolution of safety concerns Operating regulations Continuing surveillance Critical Elements of a Safety Oversight System Licensing/ certification Structure/ organization Qualified Technical Personnel Technical guidance USOAP Audits Organizational Processes and Procedures Safety defences

15. USOAP Audits Organizational Processes and Procedures Workplace conditions - Job stability - Staff turn-over - Competitive remuneration - Support equipment, facilities and guidance - Qualifications and experience - Employee morale - Credibility and trust

16. USOAP Audits Organizational Processes and Procedures Breaches in safety defences harbour latent conditions • No effective laws, policy, procedures and guidance • No clearly established safety requirements • Non implementation of SARPS • No programmes to certify, inspect and surveille the industry • No training policy and programmes • Self-regulating organizations • No identification of safety concerns • No resolution of safety issues Safety defences Latent conditions

17. USOAP Audits Organizational Processes and Procedures Adverse workplace conditions result in active failures • Inappropriate issuance, validation or renewal of licenses/certificates • Improper approval of procedures and documents • “Cutting corners” • Errors and violations • Inability to identify safety concerns and take remedial actions • Lack of enforcement • Inability to provide guidance to industry counterparts Workplace conditions Active failures

18. AUDIT USOAP Audits Organizational Processes and Procedures USOAP Audits Organizational Processes and Procedures REINFORCE ENHANCE Safety defences Safety defences Workplace conditions Workplace conditions AVERT IDENTIFIFY Latent conditions Active failures Active failures Latent conditions PREVENT

19. 180 181 * 181 173 102 Audits completed Interim reports Action plans Summary reports Audit follow-ups Status of implementation *In addition, five territories have been audited under the auspices of Contracting States Total – 187 Contracting States

20. Analysis of the findings Audit Findings and Differences Database (AFDD) • Based on factual and recent data • Enables identification of deficiencies impacting on safety • Coincides with regional accident/ • incident rates • Safety tool, both for ICAO and its Contracting States • 178 audit interim reports analyzed • Updated as audit follow-up validation missions are completed

21. Benefits of the AFDD • Customization of remedial action: • At a State or group of States level • At a regional or sub-regional level • Can be targeted to resolve specific problems on the basis of established priorities • It will support and allow: • ICAO Regional Offices prioritize their activities, seminars and workshops • ANB Sections identify needs for guidance material, seminars, workshops and SARPs amendment • Identification of regional or subregional needs and development of specific projects to resolve identified and quantified problems

22. EUR/NAT/53 – 20.42% GLOBAL/180 – 28.63% APAC/33 – 25.3% ESAF/21 – 40.03% SAM/13 – 23.47% MID/17 – 30.65% NACC/21 – 23.16% WACAF/21 – 50.17% SAFETY OVERSIGHT SYSTEM CRITICAL ELEMENTS (Doc 9734)Lack of Effective Implementation (%) 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 Primary Aviation Legislation Specific Operating Regulations CAA Structure & Safety Oversight Functions Technical Guidance Material Qualified Technical Personnel Licensing & Certification Obligations Continued Surveillance Obligations Resolution of Safety Issues

23. SAFETY OVERSIGHT SYSTEM CRITICAL ELEMENTS (Doc 9734)Lack of Effective Implementation (%)

24. Audit Findings – Lack of Effective Implementation of SARPs, (178 audit reports) Accident rates per 1 000 000 departures - scheduled (International and Domestic, 1996) Accident rates per 1 000 000 departures - scheduled (International and Domestic, 2000) Parallel between findings and regional accident rates 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Asia and Pacific Region Eastern and Southern African Region European and N. Atlantic Region N. / C. American and Caribbean Region Southern American Region Western and Central African Region Middle East Region

25. What does this all mean? • What is the impact of the results of the audits on safety? • What can and should be done?

26. What can and should be done? • Increasedcommitmenton the part of Governments to fulfill their responsibilities • Greatersupportto Civil Aviation Administrations: • Legislation and regulations • Delegation and empowerment • Proper staffing, resourcing and financing • Working together– joining efforts • ICAO, Contracting States, international organizations and industry • Regional, sub-regional or group of States

27. REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS ICAO CONTRACTING STATES AVIATION INDUSTRY Working together PARTNERS IN THE PROMOTION OF AVIATION SAFETY

28. Taking corrective action CRITICAL ELEMENTS OF A SAFETY OVERSIGHT SYSTEM LACK OF EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION (%) GLOBAL: 181 (29.58%) Initial Audit: 85 (26.30%) GLOBAL Follow-Up: 181 (22.56%) Audit Follow-Up: 85 (9.51%) 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 Primary Aviation Specific Operating CAA Structure and Technical Guidance Qualified Technical Licensing and Continued Resolution of Legislation Regulations Safety Oversight Material Personnel Certification Surveillance Safety Issues Functions Obligations Obligations

29. Taking corrective action

30. Future of the Programme • Continued validation of the implementation of State corrective action plans • Generic air navigation support to States • Expansion of the Programme to other safety-related areas (Annexes 11, 13 and 14 as of 2004) • Promotion of the development of State Safety Quality Management Systems

31. Review • Background • Audit programme • State Safety Oversight System • Status of implementation • Analysis of the findings – AFDD • Implications of the findings • Future of the Programme

32. International Civil Aviation Organization Overview of the ICAO Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme THANK YOU! MBeland@icao.int