Can you speak Microsoft?

1. Can you speak Microsoft? (Certainly I can, but I may not)

2. Bibliografia • Weckstrom, Katja G., "The Lawfulness of Criticizing Big Business: Comparing Approaches to the Balancing of Societal Interests Behind Trademark Protection" . Lewis & Clark Law Review, Vol. 11, No. 3, 2007 Available at SSRN: {http://ssrn.com/abstract=963220} • Christophe Geiger *Geiger: Trade Marks and Freedom of Expression - The Proportionality of Criticism IIC 2007 Heft 3 320 • Laura E. Little , Regulating Funny: Humor and the Law, Social Science Research Network Electronic paper Collection: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1124627 (to be published 2009)

3. Bibliografia • Matthew Rimmer, The Black Label: Trade Mark Dilution, Culture Jamming and the No Logo Movement, (2008) 5:1 SCRIPT-ed • Weighing the parody factor in a trade mark infringement and dilution case Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, No. 06-2267 (4th Cir. 13 November 2007), Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice, 2008, Vol. 3, No. 4 • EMILY ADELMAN, TRADEMARK PARODIES:WHEN IS IT OK TO LAUGH, Emily Adelman, Comment, Trademark Parodies: When is it OK to Laugh?, 6 J.MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 72 (2006).

4. A relação difícil entre pretensão de registro e liberdade de expressão

5. A relação difícil entre pretensão de registro e liberdade de expressão • Art. 124. Não são registráveis como marca: • III - expressão, figura, desenho ou qualquer outro sinal contrário à moral e aos bons costumes ou que ofenda a honra ou imagem de pessoas ou atente contra liberdade de consciência, crença, culto religioso ou idéia e sentimento dignos de respeito e veneração;

6. A relação difícil entre pretensão de registro e liberdade de expressão • Art. 100. Não é registrável como desenho industrial: • I - o que for contrário à moral e aos bons costumes ou que ofenda a honra ou imagem de pessoas, ou atente contra liberdade de consciência, crença, culto religioso ou idéia e sentimentos dignos de respeito e veneração;

7. A relação difícil entre pretensão de registro e liberdade de expressão • Art. 100. Não é registrável como desenho industrial: • I - o que for contrário à moral e aos bons costumes ou que ofenda a honra ou imagem de pessoas, ou atente contra liberdade de consciência, crença, culto religioso ou idéia e sentimentos dignos de respeito e veneração;

8. A relação difícil entre pretensão de registro e liberdade de expressão • Art. 100. Não é registrável como desenho industrial: • I - o que for contrário à moral e aos bons costumes ou que ofenda a honra ou imagem de pessoas, ou atente contra liberdade de consciência, crença, culto religioso ou idéia e sentimentos dignos de respeito e veneração;

9. A relação difícil entre pretensão de registro e liberdade de expressão

10. A relação difícil entre pretensão de registro e liberdade de expressão

11. A relação difícil entre pretensão de registro e liberdade de expressão

12. A relação difícil entre pretensão de registro e liberdade de expressão • Tradicionalmente, excluem-se do registro os signos contrários à moral e às idéias, religiões e sentimentos veneráveis (art. 124, III; Convenção de Paris, art. 6º, 2º, parte III). • Assim, mesmo se o signo é res nullius no mercado pertinente, a tradição normativa brasileira, do direito comparado e dos tratados em vigor impedem o registro de um signo – quando o signo em si mesmo é contrário àqueles valores.

13. A relação difícil entre pretensão de registro e liberdade de expressão • Assim, tem-se admitido, sob a chancela da jurisprudência, que o direito constitucional de registro pode ser coibido por razões de ordem pública. Veja-se, abaixo, a questão das vedações – possíveis ou não – ao registro de marcas para produtos de tabaco. • Anote-se, porém, que, a luz do Direito Internacional pertinente, a licitude das marcas não tem relação com os produtos sobreosquais a marca e aposta. Vige, impositivo, o princípio da independência da marcas em face dos produtos e dos serviços (Convenção da União de Paris, art. 7º). BODENHAUSEN, Guide to the Paris Convention, BIRPI, 1969, p. 128. • Assim, é posível recusar uma marca cujo signo seja contrário à ordem pública ou moralidade, mas não cujo uso – aposto a um determinado produto ou serviço – o seja.

14. A relação difícil entre pretensão de registro e liberdade de expressão • Fabio Cesar dos Santos Oliveira[1] a entender que, salvo razoabilidade na pretensão da política pública, seria inconstitucional a lei que excluísse um determinada atividade do âmbito do registro marcário. No caso, tratava-se de projeto de lei que vedava o registro de marcas para produtos de tabaco. • [1] Direito Constitucional. Direito Econômico. Propriedade Industrial. Proibição Legislativa do Registro de Novas Marcas de Cigarro, Revista de Direito Mercantil, 133, p. 288. Vide em tema correlato, Clemerson Merlin Clève, Proscrição da propaganda comercial do tabaco nos meios de comunicação de massa, regime constitucional da liberdade de conformação legislativa e limites da atividade normativa de restrição a direitos fundamentais, Revista Forense - vol. 382 Pareceres, p. 209.

15. A relação difícil entre pretensão de registro e liberdade de expressão • Curiosamente, uma das mais importantes decisões do Conselho Constitucional Francês versa exatamente sobre a mesma questão, concluindo pela constitucionalidade de uma vedação similar. Mas os elementos da decisão, significativos para nosso tema, são de que se reconheceu o estatuto constitucional do direito sobre a marca como propriedade, fazendo incidir sobre ela os interesses maiores da saúde pública. • 10. Considérant sans doute, que la prohibition de la publicité et de la propagande en faveur du tabac est susceptible d'affecter dans son exercice le droit de propriété d'une marque concernant le tabac ou des produits du tabac ; 11. Mais considérant que ces dispositions trouvent leur fondement dans le principe constitutionnel de protection de la santé publique ; qu'au demeurant, la loi réserve la possibilité de faire de la publicité à l'intérieur des débits de tabac ;; 12. Considérant qu'il résulte de ce qui précède que la limitation apportée par l'article 3 à certaines modalités d'exercice du droit de propriété n'est pas contraire à la Constitution ."

16. A colisão da marca com as liberdades expressivas

17. Como uma marca pode colidir com a liberdade de expressão • Por ser instrumento de concorrência e compromisso com o consumidor, a marca não deixa jamais de ser também instrumento de expressão e de informação. • Faz parte essencial dos direitos fundamentais o uso da língua, de forma livre e construtora dos valores humanos. • Vem aqui a noção, crucial para nosso tema, de patrimônio cultural: • Art. 216 - Constituem patrimônio cultural brasileiro os bens de natureza material e imaterial, tomados individualmente ou em conjunto, portadores de referência à identidade, à ação, à memória dos diferentes grupos formadores da sociedade brasileira, nos quais se incluem: • I - as formas de expressão; (...)

18. Como uma marca pode colidir com a liberdade de expressão • Quanto do dever do Estado, e do direito público subjetivo, ao acesso à cultura: • Art. 215 - O Estado garantirá a todos o pleno exercício dos direitos culturais e acesso às fontes da cultura nacional, e apoiará e incentivará a valorização e a difusão das manifestações culturais. • Para José Afonso da Silva, os direitos culturais a que se refere o art. 215 são os seguintes: • se trata de direitos informados pelo princípio da universalidade, isto é, direitos garantidos a todos. • Quais são esses direitos culturais reconhecidos na Constituição? São: a) direito de criação cultural, compreendidas as criações cientificas, artísticas e tecnológicas; b) direito de acesso às fontes da cultura nacional; c) direito de difusão da cultura; d) liberdade de formas de expressão cultural; e) liberdade de manifestações culturais; f) direito-dever estatal de formação do patrimônio cultural brasileiro e de proteção dos bens de cultura, que, assim, ficam sujeitos a um regime jurídico especial, como forma de propriedade de interesse público. Tais direitos decorrem das normas dos arts. 215 e 216, que merecerão, ainda, exame mais aprofundado no titulo da ordem social[1]. • [1] SILVA, op. cit., p. 320.

19. Como uma marca pode colidir com a liberdade de expressão • Certo é que o titular da marca, ao utilizar a capacidade expressiva do objeto de seu direito para atuar no mercado, sofre necessariamente de uma apropriação do signo pelo domínio comum, qualificado pela liberdade de expressão. • Assim lembra Alex Kosinski[1]: • The point is that any doctrine that gives people property rights in words, symbols, and images that have worked their way into our popular culture must carefully consider the communicative functions those marks serve. • The originator of a trademark or logo cannot simply assert, “It’s mine, I own it, and you have to pay for it any time you use it.” • Words and images do not worm their way into our discourse by accident; they’re generally thrust there by well-orchestrated campaigns intended to burn them into our collective consciousness.

20. Como uma marca pode colidir com a liberdade de expressão • Having embarked on that endeavor, the originator of the symbol necessarily - and justly - must give up some measure of control. • The originator must understand that the mark or symbol or image is no longer entirely its own, and that in some sense it also belongs to all those other minds who have received and integrated it. • This does not imply a total loss of control, however, only that the public’s right to make use of the word or image must be considered in the balance as we decide what rights the owner is entitled to assert. • [1] Alex Kozinski, Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Trademarks Unplugged, New York University Law Review, October 1993, 68 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 960.

21. Marca e direito à expressão • O estatuto constitucional das marcas tem assim outra vertente além da propriedade – o da liberdade de informação. E isso se dá de forma dupla: existe a tensão entre o direito à informação de terceiros e exclusividade legal do titular da marca. • O princípio constitucional opositor, aqui, é o vazado no art. 5º da Carta: • IX – é livre a expressão da atividade intelectual, artística, científica e de comunicação, independentemente de censura ou licença.

22. Marca e direito à expressão • [1] Sobre o uso social das marcas como manifestação de liberdade de expressão, vide Sonia K. Katyal¸Semiotic Disobedience, encontrado em http://justinhughes.net/ipsc2005/papers/Paper-KATYAL.doc, visitado em 26/10/2006: • ‘As many other scholars have argued, an overbroad extension of trademark rights can deleteriously impact the marketplaces of speech and affect democratic deliberation. Yet at the same time, an overbroad assessment of trademark control can also split the marketplace of speech, thereby sowing the seeds for semiotic disobedience. • Rather than forming parodies that receive enfranchisement under the law, some artists and activists will seek to interrupt and then occupy the sovereignty of the brand itself— raising, and even inviting—civil sanction.

23. Marca e direito à expressão • Consider this case, involving the ubiquitous Starbucks logo, which consists of a green and white graphic depiction of a mermaid, emblazoned on countless Starbucks items, including cups, napkins, apparel, mugs, ice creams, coffees, and other assorted retail items. • Cartoonist Kieron Dwyer reworked the logo extensively, first by anatomically enhancing it, adding a navel ring as well as a cellular phone, opening the mermaid’s eyes, and then by replacing the words “Starbucks Coffee” with the words “Consumer Whore.” • And some versions of the parody include the slogan “Buy More Now” underneath the logo. • Although well aware that there were some risks of a lawsuit involved in his logo, Dwyer insisted on publishing his work on the cover of his comic magazine, and selling a few t-shirts along the way. • Soon after, he was faced with a suit from Starbucks alleging copyright infringement, trademark infringement, and dilution. The suit contended that the logo was “sexually offensive” and would tarnish the trademark by associating it “with conduct that many consumers will find lewd, immoral, and unacceptable.”

24. Marca e direito à expressão • [The court’s approach in resolving this case is both interesting and symbolic of the difficulty courts have with integrating semiotic disobedience into case law regarding the intersection of trademark and First Amendment principles. • While the court rejected Starbucks’ trademark and copyright infringement claims on the grounds that the mark represented protected parody and fair use, the court ultimately granted an injunction against further publication on the grounds that the parody tarnished Starbuck’s image, thus constituting dilution. • In other words, the parody’s negative, humorous association had to be enjoined, simply, because it worked successfully in exposing the subtle motivations behind the Starbucks enterprise”.

25. Marca e direito à expressão • Em palestra na UFJF em 14/9/2006, me foi suscitado pela platéia como exemplo de uso parodial de marca o caso Daspu, onde se criou um brand através da analogia com a marca de alto luxo Daslu.

26. Marca e direito à expressão • A Daspu, grife lançada pela ong de prostitutas Davida, foi notificada anteontem pela Daslu. A megaloja de luxo paulistana, que há 3 meses foi investigada por sonegaçao e contrabando, considerou a criaçao da marca “um deboche que visou denegrir a imagem da Daslu” e ameaçou “tomar as medidas judiciais” caso a Daspu nao mude seu nome em 10 dias. A Daspu contratou advogado para cuidar do caso. • O nome da ONG é genial (Davida).2. A grife vai produzir três estilos diferentes: moda batalha, festa e básica.

27. Marca e direito à expressão • No entanto, vide a observação de Jason Bosland, The Culture of Trade Marks: An Alternative Cultural Theory Perspective, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=771184, vistado em 26/10/2006: • “The underlying difficulty with shaping a dilution right is balancing the competing interests in allowing the public to use a mark as an expressive resource through criticism or commentary, while at the same time, preventing harm which is adverse to a trade mark’s continued cultural use. • To balance these interests, I propose that the expressive use of a mark should be protected from dilution in the context of trade, that is, where a plaintiff’s mark is being used in the advertising context to market a defendant’s goods or services. • This is to be compared with a commercial situation where the defendant’s expressive use of a trade mark forms part of the goods on offer, such as in the title or lyrics of a song, or where the trade mark is used in a poster or on a t-shirt.”

28. Primeira hipótese: Exercício de crítica

29. Freedom of Expression • Trade Marks and Freedom of Expression - The Proportionality of Criticism • Christophe Geiger *Geiger: Trade Marks and Freedom of Expression - The Proportionality of Criticism IIC 2007 Heft 3 320 • It has now become common practice for a number of corporate trade mark holders to try to use their intellectual property rights to prevent criticism of their company´s products or policies by certain organisations. • While these companies have prevailed in a number of cases, the courts are increasingly relying on freedom of expression as a ground for permitting the use of trade marks for purposes of parody or criticism. • Nevertheless, freedom of expression is not a justification for simply every kind of use, and excesses can be punished under civil law. What form does this abuse take?

30. Freedom of Expression • This is clearly the case for the freedom of expression in Art. 10 of the Convention, the European Court of Human Rights having laid down beyond all doubt that „genuine, effective exercise of this freedom does not depend merely on the state´s duty not to interfere, but may require positive measures of protection, even in the sphere of relations between individuals“. • This can be regarded as the logical consequence of a certain transfer of state power to the benefit of the business world, with the result that abuses of power can occasionally also come from major companies who are tempted to use legal means to achieve what they cannot achieve by means of social consensus. • They are encouraged in this approach by a certain development of intellectual property which is increasingly marked by the logic of the protection of investments

31. Freedom of Expression • It is therefore hardly surprising that intellectual property rights, granting their holders a formidable „right to prohibit“, have been invoked in order to prevent criticism. Sometimes with success, since in certain cases the courts seem to have considered that the absence of express limits allows the rightholder to forbid any use of the protected sign. • In particular, they have sometimes held in cases similar to that under discussion that the misappropriation of a trade mark in an anti-smoking campaign amounts to an infringement. • In these cases, trade marks had been used to draw attention to the harm that tobacco causes to health: a pool of tar emanating from the Marlboro packet or the winged helmet of Gitanes cigarettes placed on a skull. • Other decisions have also prohibited the reproduction of a trade mark in newspaper articles, whatever the purpose. • It is difficult not to believe that the trade marks in these cases were used for purposes that strongly resemble a type of private censorship.

32. Freedom of Expression • This is a strange paradox. While intellectual property rights are without doubt an element of a liberal society, it would now seem that, to quote Professor Vivant, „liberalism has discovered the charms of feudalism“. • While under the ancien régime the control of speech and information was the responsibility of the lord (or other governor), today it would seem to be controlled by powerful companies. • The result is, as we have already emphasised, that it has gradually become apparent that individual liberties require protection not only as against the state but equally as against private persons, and it is for this reason that constitutional rights have gradually acquired an increasingly important position in civil law litigation.

33. Freedom of Expression • In the context of intellectual property rights, certain authors have expressed their concern, emphasising the risk to the subject as a whole that might result from the application of the sometimes vague rules that constitute fundamental rights. • Admittedly these fears are in part justified, as is confirmed by the fact that a large number of litigants today misuse the concept of freedom of expression and freedom of information in order to avoid being punished for infringement. However, the courts are by no means deceived, and only very rarely give intellectual property rights second place to freedom of expression. • They only do so in extreme cases, specifically where the undifferentiated application of the law would lead to undesirable results in the light of its purpose. Fundamental rights such as competition law thus sometimes serve as a corrective measure and thereby contribute to guaranteeing a certain coherence of intellectual property.

34. Freedom of Expression • In particular, the courts have in a number of cases allowed the use of a trade mark for critical purposes by relying on the freedom of expression. • However, there are also limits to the freedom of expression, and abuse could lead to the perpetrator being made liable under civil law (in France, on the basis of Art. 1382 of the Civil Code). • It is in this field that the ruling of the Supreme Court dated 19 October 2006 is of particular interest, allowing as it does a slightly better definition of the limits to the freedom of expression when it is in conflict with trade mark rights

35. Freedom of Expression • It is therefore hardly surprising that intellectual property rights, granting their holders a formidable „right to prohibit“, have been invoked in order to prevent criticism. Sometimes with success, since in certain cases the courts seem to have considered that the absence of express limits allows the rightholder to forbid any use of the protected sign. • In particular, they have sometimes held in cases similar to that under discussion that the misappropriation of a trade mark in an anti-smoking campaign amounts to an infringement. • In these cases, trade marks had been used to draw attention to the harm that tobacco causes to health: a pool of tar emanating from the Marlboro packet or the winged helmet of Gitanes cigarettes placed on a skull. • Other decisions have also prohibited the reproduction of a trade mark in newspaper articles, whatever the purpose. • It is difficult not to believe that the trade marks in these cases were used for purposes that strongly resemble a type of private censorship.

36. O Caso Esso • Après une ordonnance de référé de 2002 confirmée en appel en 2003 et un jugement au fond de 2004, la cour d’appel de Paris, dans un arrêt du 16 novembre 2005, réaffirme que la campagne en ligne de Greenpeace contre la politique environnementale d’ESSO s’inscrivait dans les limites de la liberté d’expression, principe à valeur constitutionnelle. • La compagnie pétrolière reprochait à l’association d’avoir reproduit sans autorisation sa marque dans le code source du site greenpeace.fr et d’avoir contrefait deux de ses marques par imitation en remplaçant, par exemple, les deux SS d’Esso par des $$. • La cour rejette le recours aux articles L. 713-2 et L. 713-3 du code de la propriété intellectuelle dans la mesure où les références aux marques en question « ne visent manifestement pas à promouvoir la commercialisation de produits ou de services, concurrents de ceux de la société appelante, au profit de l’association Greenpeace France mais relève d’un usage purement polémique étranger à la vie des affaires et à la compétition entre entreprises commerciales ». • La cour ne retient pas davantage le dénigrement indiquant que la critique de la politique d’Esso n’excédait pas non plus les limites de la liberté d’expression.

37. O caso Areva • Dans un arrêt du 8 avril 2008, la première chambre civile de la Cour de cassation vient de donner gain de cause à Greenpeace France et New Zealand qui • « agissant conformément à leur objet, dans un but d’intérêt général et de santé publique par des moyens proportionnés à cette fin, n’avaient pas abusé de leur droit de libre expression ». • La cour suprême a également considéré que l’utilisation des logos Areva ne visait pas la société mais les marques déposées par elle, et par conséquent ses activités et services. • La campagne portant atteinte à ces derniers et non à l’honneur ou à la considération de la personne morale, il ne pouvait donc pas être reproché à Greenpeace d’actes de dénigrement contre la SPCEA.

38. Considérant qu’à cet égard, les sociétés COMPAGNIE GERVAIS DANONE et GROUPE DANONE ne sauraient invoquer les dispositions de l’article L 713-3 du Code de la propriété intellectuelle, dès lors que, par les modifications apportées à la marque DANONE par l’adjonction du pronom et du verbe ’« jeboycotte » et les textes qui l’accompagnent, l’association RÉSEAU VOLTAIRE et Olivier M. montrent clairement leur intention de dénoncer les pratiques sociales des sociétés mises en cause et les risques pour l’emploi, sans induire en erreur le public quant à l’identité des auteurs de la communication ; • Considérant qu’il s’ensuit que les appelants avaient, en créant les sites litigieux, inscrit leur action dans le cadre d’un stricte exercice de leur liberté d’expression et dans le respect des droits des sociétés intimées dont les produits n’étaient pas dénigrés et que, d’autre part, aucun risque de confusion n’était susceptible de naître dans l’esprit des usagers ; http://www.foruminternet.org/specialistes/veille-juridique/jurisprudence/cour-d-appel-de-paris-4e-chambre-section-a-30-avril-2003.html?decoupe_recherche=danone

39. décembre 16, 2007 • En France, le droit à la liberté d’expression semble désormais clairement reconnu à la triple condition: • qu’il n’y ait pas de confusion possible entre la marque à protèger et le signe qui la parodie, • qu’aucun préjudice n’en résulte, dû à une intention de dénigrement ou d’avilissement de la marque parodiée, et • que la parodie ne poursuive pas une finalité commerciale. • http://protectiondesmarques.info/category/droit-des-marques/

40. Centre d’arbitrage et de médiation de l’OMPIDÉCISION DE LA COMMISSION ADMINISTRATIVESociété Française du Radiotéléphone, SFR contre Zeev ArzoineLitige No. D2007-1505 • Enregistrement et usage de mauvaise foi • L’enregistrement et l’usage du nom de domaine litigieux sont évidemment de mauvaise foi. • En effet le défendeur semblait parfaitement connaitre l’existence de SFR puisque son site a été créé pour dénoncer, selon son appréciation, les “arnaques” du requérant comme cela apparait clairement aujourd’hui. A coup sûr il connaissait le nom commercial, l’enseigne sur les magasins et pouvait bien se douter qu’une société de la taille de SFR avait déposé des marques. Il lui appartenait au demeurant de le vérifier avant le dépôt de son site. • Comme déjà constaté, il apparait que le site n’était pas exploité ce qui, apparemment, n’est plus le cas aujourd’hui. Mais ceci n’a pas d’incidence sur notre opinion. L’usage du site litigieux reste une atteinte aux droits de propriété industrielle du requérant commise en toute connaissance de cause. • Le but du défendeur est de dénigrer systématiquement le requérant en le traitant d’arnaqueur ce qui constitue un abus du droit à la liberté d’expression. • Vide também ”.(The Royal Bank of Scotland Group plc, National Westminster Bank plc A/K/A NatWest Bank v. Personal and Pedro Lopez Case No. D2003-0166 sfrarnaque.com

41. WIPO Arbitration and Mediation CenterADMINISTRATIVE PANEL DECISION Shell International Petroleum Company Limited v. Alfred DonovanCase No. D2005-0538 • There is no evidence to support a claim under subparagraphs (i) or (iii), nor has any direct commercial gain been established, as required by (iv). The Complainant’s case thus rests on subparagraph (ii). Arguably, the Respondent is preventing the Complainant from reflecting its trade name and the name of the “tellshell” facility in a corresponding domain name, but then only in respect of the “.com” TLD. There are several other TLDs available to the Complainant. • More importantly, based on the record in front of this Panel, those trade names are not protected as marks. • In addition, the evidence does not show that the Respondent’s intent and purpose was to prevent the Complainant from using his marks, but rather to draw attention to his criticism of the Complainant’s activities. • The Panel thus finds for the Respondent on the third part of the test. http://royaldutchshellgroup.com/

42. Brasil • Rubens, assim como outros pescadores, não se conforma com a instalação da Estação de Tratamento de Esgoto (ETE), apelidada de “pinicão”, em Vila Sauípe. “A Embasa prometeu que não iria poluir o rio e que ia ser muito bom para nós, porque a água ia ficar a mesma coisa ou até melhor do que já era. No final, poluiu tanto que os mariscos e até o mangue começaram a morrer”, queixou-se ele. Ele compara. “Antes, em uma hora a gente pegava 200 aratus. Hoje, em uma maré, só acha quatro ou cinco. A gente até confiou neles, mas hoje vive dessa maneira, todo mundo prejudicado”, diz emocionado.

43. Brasil • Da confusão e práticas a diluir e denegrir marcas e nomes comerciais de Costa do Sauípe • Em relação à possibilidade de alegarmos confusão de marcas, devemos ressaltar que quaisquer marcas são registradas com limites de aplicabilidade em relação à área merceológica de exploração. No caso, a classe do empreendimento Costa do Sauípe é de hotelaria e já o dos sites pinicão.org e costadosauipe.org seriam relativos à criticas e proteção ao direito ambiental, sendo, portanto, áreas diferentes. • Da mesma forma, visando os sites aparentemente criticar a atuação ambiental e não obter quaisquer imediatos benefícios comerciais, devemos analisar as decisões da WIPO a fim de verificar se, ainda assim, haveria possibilidade de obter-se uma decisão favorável à Sauipe. No direito brasileiro, não nos parece que haveria uma certeza de deferimento do pedido, caso fosse ajuizada ação no território nacional.

44. http://www.alitaliasucks.com • THIS SITE IS IN NO WAY CONNECTED WITH Alitalia S.p.A. - Italy's flagship air carrier. We support the boycott of: Alitalia Airlines • Here's why: It doesn't pay to purchase Alitalia's cheap airline tickets • Here's why: Nobody wants to partner with Alitalia • Here's why we think: Alitalia will be out of business within 24 months • Here's how: Alitalia tried to steamroll a passenger whose luggage they lost • Here's what: Alitalia did to a passenger after he publicly criticized them - they sued the passenger in Federal Court! • Here's how: Alitalia gives up after Public Citizen steps in • Here's why: Alitalia Airlines Sucks and why any American can freely say it. • Boycott Alitalia: Alitalia has attacked our Free Speech rights • Remind Alitalia: That this is America, where every American has free speech rights even after Alitalia loses our luggage. 1-800-223-5730 • Click here to see why Alitalia sucks. • Click here to email your Alitalia Horror Story

45. http://www.starbucked.com/

46. Africa do Sul • Laugh it Off Promotions CC v. South African Breweries Int. (Finance) B. V. t/a Sabmark Int., CCT 42/04. • See also, the concurring opinion of the Justice Sachs, in which he held: „ • What is in issue is not the limitation of a right, but the balancing of competing rights. • The present case does not require us to make any determinations on that matter. • But it would appear once all the relevant facts are established, it should make no difference in principle whether the case is seen as a property rights limitation on free speech, or a free speech limitation on property rights. • At the end of the day this will be an area where nuanced and proportionate balancing in a context-specific and fact-sensitive character will be decisive, and not formal classification based on bright lines“ (emphasis added).

47. Africa do Sul • The Constitution cannot oblige the dour to laugh. It can, however, prevent the cheerless from snuffing out the laughter of the blithe spirits among us. • Indeed, if our society became completely solemn because of the exercise of state power at the behest of the worthy not only would all irrelevant laughter be suppressed, but temperance considerations could end up placing beer-drinking itself in jeopardy. • And I can see no reason in principle why a joke against the government can be tolerated, but one at the expense of what used to be called Big Business, cannot.

48. Alemanha • Copyright: Humorous Milka postcard is the artistic freedom captured The Federal Court decided with the judgement of 03.02.2005 (I ZR 159/02) that the freedom of art the brand right approach. For example, if the artistic object is not the right of ownership to the mark by reducing or defamation violated. • Decision reason was the action of the well-known Schokolenproduzenten "Milka" against the publisher of a purple-postcard. The judges clearly were initially found that the presentation of a kennzeichenmäßiger use. • Color, text and the use of the word "Milka" to make the presumption that the card was attributable to the company. The satirical character jokingly-but just based on this connection and is protected by the fundamental artistic freedom. • In case of dispute, that priority because judges no disparagement of the mark and could also detect an exclusively commercial use is not available.

49. O uso paródico

50. O uso paródico • LDA Art. 47. São livres as paráfrases e par ódias que não forem verdadeiras reproduções da obra originária nem lhe implicarem descrédito.