GEOG 352: Day 25

1. GEOG 352: Day 25 More Presentations

2. Housekeeping Items • Reminder about the fairtax forum on Thursday evening (seefolder) • GEOG 324 students are presentingtheirresearch on various aspects of climate change on Friday from 12:30 to 3:30 in 243. As many extra people as can fit are welcome! • Linda went to a film and workshop on co-ops at the Duncan campus on the weekend. Maybeshecouldbriefly tell us about it. • Todaypresentersinclude Cody, MJ, Jim, Linda, and John. Anyonehaving trouble sending me their PPT? • If we have time, wewillstart in on Chapter 21.

3. Chapter 21 of Daly and Farley • A constant themethroughout the book isthatmarkets have manystrengths, but optimizingaccess to non-marketgoods (equity, environmentalhealth) is not one of them • The authors, using a non-deterministicand non-nihilistperspective, argue that are real alternatives to the status quo, and thatsome conditions are betterthanothers. • Within the context of three macro-goals (scale, justdistri-bution, and allocativeefficiency), theyoffer six design principles for a steady-state economy: -eachpolicy goal needsitsown instruments to optimize (eventhoughtheycan serve more than one goal, theycan’toptimize more than one) [seefootnote p. 414];

4. Design Principles for Policy Instruments • -one shouldachieve macro-levelcontrolwith minimal sacrifice of micro-levelfreedomandvariability(for instance, as with per capita CO2emissions); leave a margin of errorwhendealingwith the biosphysicalenvironment (‘precautionaryprinciple’) and in thiswayalsoavoiddraconian discipline; -startfromwherewe are (a policy of resolutegradualism); -adaptpolicies to changing conditions, both in the external world and in the state of ourknowledge (metaphor of a sailboat); - implementsubsidiarity (develop and implementpolicyat the appropriatelevel – e.g. solidwaste as a municipal responsibility vs. climate change as a global issue).

5. Chapter 21 • How canwemakethesepolicyprinciples a bit more concrete? • While the marketis good atdeliveringefficiciency (one of the three macro-goals), itis not good atdeliveringappropriatescale or just distribution, each of whichisalso a condition, ultimately ,for efficiency. • For instance, having a market for CO2 or SO2maybe the most efficient way of gettingresults in terms of reducingemissions, but without a scaledecision as to an optimal level of emission, and withoutdecidingwho has the right to emit and who the atmospherebelongs to, one cannot have a properemissionsmarket.

6. Design Principles for Policy Instruments • As theymakeclearthroughout the book, the three macro-goals are not of equal importance. They rate them: scalejust distribution allocation • Theyrecommend in most cases startingwithinflows, not outflows, thoughthisis not a hard and fastrule. For instance, itiseasier to prevent pollution beforeitiscreatedthanat the end of the pipe. Also: sources are generallyowned and sinksare not, the latter thusbeing harder to regulate (rememberopen accesssystems?) • Theyrecommendagainst setting quantityandpriceat the same time; theyprefer setting quantities (i.e. quotas). • Limitscanbe set on extraction on privatelyowned…

7. Design Principles for Policy Instruments • …sources and potentiallyalso on outflows to sources. Whatevertheirpropertystatus, these are aspects of natural capital that affect all of us. • The source vs. sink issue illustrates the dilemma of addressingconflictingprinciples – itis more efficient to tacklethings at the source end, but this islessincrementalthantacklingthings at the sink end. • One cantaxeither inputs or outputs, but itisbetter to do soat the depletion (source) end, as thiscanbeused to adjustprices. • As time permits, wewill continue with Ch. 21, and go on to 22-24.