Command and Control of Nuclear Forces Major Gen Robert Wheeler (ret)

1. Command and Controlof Nuclear ForcesMajor Gen Robert Wheeler (ret)

2. History: First use of NC2 and Nukes Dec 42: Manhattan Project begun 16 July 45: Trinity test (Alamagordo, NM) 25 July 45: Official bombing order to Army Air Force 30 July 45: Press statement drafted 31 July 45: Stimson to Truman requesting “release” (President Truman on way home from Potsdam, GE) 31 July 45: Truman authorizes release 6 Aug 45: Atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima 9 Aug 45: Atomic bomb dropped on Nagasaki 15 Aug 45: Japan announces unconditional surrender

3. Official bombing order: Gen. Handy to Gen Spaatz 25 July 1945 TO: General Carl Spaatz Commanding General United States Army Strategic Air Forces • The 509 Composite Group, 20th Air Force will deliver its first special bomb as soon as weather will permit visual bombing after about 3 August 1945 on one of the targets: Hiroshima, Kokura, Niigata and Nagasaki. To carry military and civilian scientific personnel from the War Department to observe and record the effects of the explosion of the bomb, additional aircraft will accompany the airplane carrying the bomb. The observing planes will stay several miles distant from the point of impact of the bomb. ……. • The foregoing directive is issued to you by direction and with the approval of the Secretary of War and of the Chief of Staff, USA. ……..

4. Stimson to Truman (31 July 1945) Sec War cable #41011 The time schedule for the Groves project is proceeding so rapidly that it is essential that statement for release by you be available not later than Wednesday, August 1. I have reviewed draft of statement, previously presented to you, in light of: (A) Your recent ultimatum (B) Dramatic results of test and (C) Certain minor suggestions made by the British of which Byrnes is aware. . . . . .

5. Draft press release (drafted 30 July 1945) The White House Washington, DC Immediate Release Statement by the President of the United States Sixteen hours ago an American airplane dropped one bomb on ___________ and destroyed its usefulness to the enemy. That bomb had more power than 20,000 tons of T.N.T. It has more than two thousand times the blast power of the British “Grand Slam” which is the largest bomb ever yet used in the history of warfare. . . . . .

6. Truman handwritten response to Stimson (31 July 1945) Sec War: Reply to your 41011 suggestions approved. Release when ready but not sooner than August 2. HST

7. NC2 and Deterrence • NC2 controls all three legs of the triad • NC3 is the only system (platform) that touches all three legs of the triad • Constitutes POTUS control of nuclear weapons • At the strategic level NC3 consists of two parts • POTUS to first military node • First military node to shooters • Redundancy and resiliency provide assured response and deterrence

8. Role of Nuclear Command and Control • Clearly and unambiguously detect and characterize an attack; • Establish conference with President and senior leaders to assess attack and determine appropriate/timely response; • Rapidly replan strike missions based on situation and POTUS direction • Disseminate emergency action messages to nuclear forces taking into account the survivability of the force elements; • Provide two-way communication with forces so executed; in the case of bombers: • for their recall before a strike or • for damage assessment after a strike. • Provide enduring control of surviving forces.

9. Basic Principles Governing NC2 • Only the President can authorize use of U.S. nuclear weapons • This has enormous implications for the NC3 system • Decide on the move versus decide than move • Provide maximum decision time for the President • Provide capability for prompt execution of forces (10’s of minutes) • Not rely on early execution decision to assure devastating response • Two distinct physical means for detection of attack. Typically: • Infrared detection of launch and boost of Russian ICBMs/SLBMs • Early warning radar detection in mid-course • Two survivable, physically-distinct communications links between Presidential authority and forces • ELF, LF/VLF, SatCom (EHF, UHF), UHF line of sight

10. National Leader Command Capability National Nuclear Nuclear C2/C3 Integrated Tactical Warning & Attack Assessment (ITW/AA) Integrated Msl Defense (IMD) Sensors Space Situational Awareness (SSA) Global Strike (GS) Senior Leader Communications (SLC) National Security/Emergency Preparedness Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) Communications with Other Nations (CWON) Continuity of Govt DoD Continuity of Operations (COOP) Comms Continuity of Government (COG) Comms

11. Where does MDC2 and NC3 cross? MDC2/NC2 MDC2/NC2 MDC2/NC2 MDC2/NC2

12. Deterrence, assurance, escalation control and C2?

13. Elements of the NC2 System • Launch detection satellites • Ground-based early warning radars • Facility to interpret EW information (Colorado Springs, etc.) • Air, ground-mobile, and fixed command centers • Role: Establish conference, advise President, direct forces, etc. • Survivable communications to forces • Satellite, other RF, and land-line communications • All totaled the Air Force owns over 100 separate NC3 systems • Air Force owns ~ 75% of total NC3 systems

14. NC3System

15. NC3 System: Space, Air, Land, Sea Notional Connectivity Warning Decision Making Forces Commercial Satellites Survivable Satellites Warning Satellites Non-Survivable Satellites BOMBERS NAOC ABNCP TACAMO NMCC ICBMs Mobile Systems NMCC SITE R SSBN COCOM CMD CTRS Ground Systems Radars • LANDLINES Ground Entry Points (Air-to-Ground) FSBS

16. Space-Based Launch Detection Satellites Defense Support Program (DSP) Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS)

17. U.S. Early Warning Radars

18. Ground-Based Early Warning Radars • BMEWS • Thule AB Greenland • Clear AFS Alaska • Fylingdales UK • PAVE PAWS • - Cape Cod AFS Mass • Beale AFB California

19. Military Communications Satellites AEHF MILSTAR

20. E-4 NAOC

21. Command Post Inside the NAOC

22. E-6 TACAMO

23. TACAMO “Trailing Wire” LF-VLF Comms to Trident SSBNs

24. Governance • NSS: Modernization and sustainment require investing in our aging command and control system and maintaining and growing the highly skilled workforce needed to develop, manufacture, and deploy nuclear weapons • NDS: Nuclear forces. The Department will modernize the nuclear triad—including nuclear command, control, and communications, and supporting infrastructure. Modernization of the nuclear force includes developing options to counter competitors’ coercive strategies, predicated on the threatened use of nuclear or strategic non-nuclear attacks.

25. Governance Continued • NPR: U.S. nuclear capabilities, and nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3), must be increasingly flexible to tailor deterrence strategies across a range of potential adversaries and threats, and enable adjustments over time. • To do so, the United States will sustain and replace its nuclear capabilities, modernize NC3, and strengthen the integration of nuclear and non-nuclear military planning. Combatant Commands and Service components will be organized and resourced for this mission, and will plan, train, and exercise to integrate U.S. nuclear and non-nuclear forces to operate in the face of adversary nuclear threats and employment.

26. Governance Continued • Today’s NC3 system is a legacy of the Cold War, last comprehensively updated almost three decades ago. It includes interconnected elements composed of warning satellites and radars; communications satellites, aircraft, and ground stations; fixed and mobile command posts; and the control centers for nuclear systems. • In light of the critical need to ensure our NC3 system remains survivable and effective, the United States will pursue a series of initiatives. This includes: strengthening protection against cyber threats, strengthening protection against space-based threats, enhancing integrated tactical warning and attack assessment, improving command post and communication links, advancing decision support technology, integrating planning and operations, and reforming governance of the overall NC3 system.

27. Who “Owns” NC2/NC3 In DoD Today? • 2018 NPR tasked CJCS to provide a plan to SecDef for reforming NC3 governance • 23 May 18 – SecDef approved overarching plan to reform NC3 governance • 3 Oct 18 – SecDef Approved I-Plan & signed Implementation Memo • 13 Dec 18– 1st NC3 Enterprise Review with DSD & VCJCS UNCLASSIFIED

28. Approved NC3 Governance Construct • Operations • Lead: CDRUSSTRATCOM • Role: Operate NC3 Enterprise (CJCS retains NC2 operations) • Responsibilities: • Conduct operation performance & risk assessment • Synchronize planned system changes across NC3 Enterprise • Monitor NC3 health and status • Requirements • Lead: CDRUSSTRATCOM • Role: Develop NC3 Requirements • Responsibilities: • Define and prioritize NC3 requirements • Elevate requirements issues based on operational risk • Develop and maintain authoritative NC3 systems list • Systems Engineering & Integration • Lead: CDRUSSTRATCOM • Role: Conduct SE&I for NC3 Enterprise (DISA/JSEIO aligned to STRAT) • Responsibilities: • Architecture (as-is, to-be) • Data collection & analytics • Inspection & verification • Configuration Management • Modelling & Simulation “Supported” SecDef --------- DSD | CJCS • Resources • Lead: OUSD(A&S) • Role: NC3 Capability Portfolio Manager • Responsibilities: • Lead NC3 resource process • Develop and advocate for NC3 within Program & Budget Review • Provide USSTRATCOM resource information to Inform operational risk assessment • Acquisition • Lead: OUSD(A&S) • Role: NC3 Capability Portfolio Manager • Responsibilities: • Oversee & monitor NC3 programs • Inform milestone decision forums • Provide USSTRATCOM acquisition program information to Inform operational risk assessment • Co-lead NC3 Enterprise portfolio review (w/CDRUSSTRATCOM) “Supporting” CDRUSSTRATCOM NC3 Enterprise Lead USD(A&S) NC3 CPM Fix: Fragmented Management & Imperfect Alignment of Roles, Responsibilities, Authorities & Accountability In order to: Operate & Sustain As-Is & Deliver Next Generation NC3 Director NC3 Enterprise Center Director NC3 CPM

29. NC3 Enterprise CenterOrganization Structure Technical Director (Vacant) Director Ms. Durham-Ruiz Executive Officer (Vacant) Deputy Director Mr. Doebel (Acting) Administrative Assistant (Vacant) Chief of Staff (Vacant) Resource Advisor Manpower Advisor NC3 Enterprise Special Programs Division NC3 Enterprise Compliance & Inspection Intelligence Liaison Office NC3 Enterprise Operations Management NC3 Enterprise Systems Engineering & Integration NC3 Enterprise Assessments & Analytics NC3 Enterprise Requirements & CPM Liaison UNCLASSIFIED

30. Air Force NC3 LeadershipAir Force Organizational Chart and Associated NC3 roles HQ USAF AF/A10 AF/A5 • NC3 Division (A10N) AFMC AFGSC AFSPC AFNWC AFLCMC USAFE ACC PACAF AETC AMC AFRC SMC • NC3 Requirements (A5R) SAF/AQ SAF/CN AF/A2/6 & AF/A3 USEUCOM Component and DCA NC3 PEO NC3 Integration Directorate Platform PEOs (Bombers, Tankers, E-4B, MCCC, etc.) Platform PEOs (SIBRS, AEHF) Recce support to nuclear ops Development & Sustainment Tankers & C2 Nodes NC3 Education & Training Tankers, VIP Aircraft USPACOM Component Lead MAJCOM for NC3 Lead MAJCOM for Space-Based Capabilities & ITW/AA - Cybersecurity • Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisitions) • Nuclear / NC3 (AQP) • Space (AQS) • Information Dominance (AQI) • Global Reach (Mobility) (ACQ) • Cyberspace Ops and Warfighting Integration • Senior Leader Communications AF/A8 • Plans and Programs, Budget (A8X, A8P) Acquisition authority Direct support AFNC3C OT&E for AF NC3 Weapon System: Architecture, Governance, Reporting

31. Compelling Need for NC3 Transformation Evolving Threats, Broken Effects/Kill Chains, Delayed Capability, Obsolete Technology Effective nuclear deterrence demands a robust, flexible, and modern NC3 system that performs five critical functions: Detection, warning, and attack characterization ● Adaptive nuclear planning ● Decision-making & conferencing ● Presidential force directions/orders ● Dynamic force management Procure the right capability at the right time for the right reason UNCLASSIFIED

32. Questions?

33. Backup Slides

34. Nuclear Weapons Physical Security Nuclear Weapons Security Standard • Deny unauthorized access tonuclear weapons; • Prevent loss of custody; • Prevent, to maximum extent possible, radiological contamination caused by unauthorized acts. DoD Systems Approach • Provide defense in depth via 5 D’s • Deter, Detect, Delay, Deny, Defeat • Security measures designed to counter demonstrated/assessed adversary capabilities • Compliance-based requirements provide foundation for site-specific employment Twelve Operating Environments • Fixed Site Storage • Transportation • Operational Platform

35. Nuclear Weapons Storage Igloo

36. U.S. Ballistic Missile Delivered Nuclear Weapons W78 W87 W76 W88 Description ICBM Warhead ICBM Warhead SLBM Warhead SLBM Warhead Delivery system Minuteman III Minuteman III Trident II (D5) Trident II (D5) Labs LANL & Sandia LLNL & Sandia LANL & Sandia LANL & Sandia Primary use Surface to Surface Surface to Surface Underwater to Underwater to Surface Surface Service Air Force Air Force Navy Navy Date entered 9/79 7/86 11/78 6/89 stockpile

37. U.S. Air-Delivered Nuclear Weapons B61-3/4/10 B61-7/11 B83 W80-1 Description Non-strategic Strategic Strategic ALCM Bomb Bomb Bomb Delivery system F-15, F-16, B-52, B-2 B-52, B-2 B-52, B-2 NATO Tornado Labs LANL & Sandia LANL & Sandia LLNL & Sandia LLNL & Sandia Primary use Air to Surface Air to Surface Air to Surface Air to Surface Service Air Force Air Force Air Force Air Force Date entered 10/79, 8/79, 9/85, 11/97 9/83 3/84, 2/82 stockpile

38. Evolution of Stockpile Size (1945-2009) Not a linear relationship between weapons and budget. As the stockpile gets smaller, if anything goes wrong it impacts a greater fraction of the stockpile. 38