Proposals for An Effective 21st Century Army (Part 3 of 3)

1. Proposals for An Effective 21st Century Army(Part 3 of 3) Donald E. Vandergriff (MAJ, USA) Version 5, 5 June 1999 “Machines Don’t Fight Wars, People Do, and They Use Their Minds!” COL John Boyd

2. To Resolve the Fundamental Conflict Between “efficiency” and “effectiveness” Create and Sustain Individual Experience & Unit Excellence … While … Allowing Individuals to Influence Their Own Careers

3. The End State! • Change DOPMA: • Replace “Up-or-Out” with “Up-or-Stay” • Allow Officers to decide whether they want to get promoted or stay at current grade (CPT- Above) • Reduce the Size of the Officer Corps at the Middle and Upper Grades • From 14.3 percent to 5 percent of force over 10 years • Tailor DOPMA to Fit the Specific Cultural Needs of Each Service • Replace the “All or Nothing” Retirement System with a “Vest at 10+, Collect at 55” System. • Design the Force Structure around a “Regimental” System (for cohesion): • Flatten the organization, eliminating many headquarters above the brigade • Integrate reserve and active components into each regiment • Empower a Bottom-Up Approach to Leadership and Doctrine Development • Change the Personnel Management System: • Accessions and Entry • Education • Decentralize Management and Promotion Policies The Remainder of this Briefing Explains The Details of the End State

4. The Problems? • We do not have a good understanding of: • Culture (Command Climates/Environments, etc…) • Cohesion-What causes it e.g., tough tours bond! • Measures—How to Measure things like Military Environment in a non-threatening way • We preach decentralization and trust, but in reality—in our drive for efficiency -- we practice centralization, undercutting trust

5. Overview • We have an understanding of the: • Fundamentals • Examine the History of the Army Personnel System • Compare with Other Personnel Systems • Now We Organize for Military Excellence • The Evolution of Warfare: The U.S. Army is Stuck in the Second Generation • Implications on the Personnel System: A Changing World • Overview of Current System: “Tangible and Intangible Mismatch” • The Changes: “Revolutionary Thoughts: Parallel Evolution” Theme: Promote Individual Growth … WITHIN … The Context of Unit Excellence

6. The Evolution of Warfare • Can the U.S. Win 3rd & 4th Generation Wars with • a 2nd Generation Military Personnel System? • 1st Generation: Driven by Ideas & Aristocratic Culture, Culminating in the “Nation-of-Arms” • Linear Tactics of Column and Line -- Regularity Driven by Culture & Technology • Operational Art - Intuitive -- Napoleon’s use of Time & Space to Set Up Decisive Battle • 2nd Generation: Attrition Warfare, Driven by Technology • Materialschlacht or Industrial War of Attrition - Civil War to WWI and Most of Allies in • 2nd WWII (exceptions like Patton, JS Wood) • Linear Tactics - Regularity Driven by Technology (Indirect Arty, Machine Guns, • Barbed Wire Gave Advantage to Defense) • Operational Art - Procure Success from Top Down: Move Around Defense to Destroy Adversary • in a Battle of Encirclement • Space-Time Decisions SYNCHRONIZED, 1st Moltke, then by Petain, Based on • Mobilization and RR (e.g., Schlieffen Plan and Methodical Battle) • 3rd Generation: Maneuver Warfare, Driven by Ideas(Army has at least a foot into this) • Infiltration tactics - Blitzkrieg -USMC & OODA Loop • Nonlinear Tactics - Evolve Penetrations based on Ideas of Surfaces & gaps, Recon Pull, Multiple Thrusts, • Mission Tactics & Decentralized, all harmonized, by Ideas of Commander’s Intent & Schwerpunkt, etc • Operational Art - Dismember & Collapse Adversary by penetrating Mind-Time-Space Frame of Reference • (ie., Penetrate his observation-Orientation-Decision-Action Loops, (Boyd)) • 4th Generation: Irregular Warfare -- Ideas (?) (Special Forces understand it) • Revolutionary (Lawrence - Mao - Giap) - Non Sate Actors (Ethnic/Tribal/Religious - Gang - Terrorist -etc.) • Tactical Penetration Techniques still developing, but are clearly spreading w/unknown implications • Operational Art - Collapse Adversary by Bypassing Army & Attacking Population and Culture

7. End of the Cold War Implications for the Personnel System (I) • U.S. Forces in WWI, WWII, & Cold War Were Shaped Primarily to Counter Power Imbalances in Europe and to Lesser Extent in East Asia. • Collapse of Soviet Empire Restored Balance of Power Among European Countries & Obviated Strategic Need for Massive Fwd Deployment of Heavy Air/Land Forces. • End of Cold War Neutralized Organizing Dynamics of Bi-Polar Rivalry & Unleashed a Welter of Nationalist, Ethnic, Religious, Tribal, and Criminal Conflicts, All Taking Place in a Multi-Polar, Multi-Cultural, Political Context. • Techniques of 4th Generation Warfare Spreading as “State” & “Non-State” Actors Learn to Exploit Weaknesses of Hi-Tech, Fire-Power Intensive, Conventional Forces -- (Serbian Response to Nato’s Methodical Campaign). • Lesson of Gulf War -- If You Fight the West, Don’t Mass Conventional Forces in Open or in Static Defensive Positions, Where It is Easy to Separate Friend From Foe. • Increased Reliance on Irregular/Urban Combat (Hue, Beirut, Mogadishu, Grozny, Kosovo), with Intermingling of Friendly, Hostile, and Neutral Parties. • Rise of Different Forms of Warfare -- Arabs Achieved More with Intifada and Rocks, Backed Up by Hamas, Hizbollah & CNN, than in 4 Wars with Israel. • U.S. Driven out of Somalia, in Part Because Aideed Won the Infowar. • Heavy Russian Forces Defeated by Tribal Irregulars in Chechnya & Afghanistan. • Loose Nucs & Chem/Bio Wpns Magnify the Leverage of Irregular Forces.

8. End of the Cold War Implications for the Personnel System (II) • Restored Balance of Power => US Military Operations Evolving Toward a Modern Variation of 19th Century Intervention Operations, at least in Near Term. • Increased Focus on Littorals (within 100 miles of sea), Where Most of World’s People, Wealth, Commerce, Instabilities, and U.S. Interests are Concentrated. • Increased Need for Professional Army=more experience at lower levels, ie., captains and field grades, middle grade NCOs, leading more cohesive units at plt, co, bn levels. • Decreased Need for Large Standing Air Forces (=> A Big Shift to Reserves). • Decreased Need for Heavy Naval Forces Configured for Global War at Sea and Heavy Bombing (=> Shift to Sea & Air Control in Littorals to Support Interventions). • Still Need Intervention & Extraction Capabilities to Protect Lives, Property, Commerce, & Other Interests (=> Evolution Toward Higher Speed, Lighter Forces, Configured for Autonomous Operations in Hostile Regions). • Rise of 4th Generation Warfare => Increased Need for Irregular Warfighting Skills/Capabilities in Close Quarters Combat & Small Unit Operations Among State/Non-State Actors. • Decreased Reliance on Firepower/Attrition in Ground Warfare • Decreased Reliance on Deep Strike/Strategic Bombardment in Air Warfare. • Increased Reliance on Fast-Transient Littoral Penetration Opns, Infowar Opns, Special Forces Opns, Pol-Mil Opns, Counter-Drug/Anti-Terrorist/Anti-Nuc Opns, and Increased Occurrences of Urban/Suburban Combat. • Increased Resource Constraints - Growing Internal Competition for Resources. • E.g., Need To Fix Decaying National Infrastructure & Pay For An Aging Population. • Decreased Manpower Pool

9. An Overview of Preceding Discussion (I): A Personnel System Tuned to 2nd Generation Warfare • The preceding discussion showed that theories developed in the Progressive and Post WWII eras managed officers according to the following Theoretical Ideas: • Officers should be “Generalists” and thus need a wide spectrum of experience at many jobs in order to prepare for high command in the event of massive mobilization to fight a global war. • The personnel management system should be based on concept of Equity to ensure everyone gets a fair chance at critical jobs to create a large pool of Replacements -- with the following Policy Consequences:. • Individual replacement rather than group rotation (e.g, leaders routinely after CTC rotations) • Social Darwinism: Equal opportunity & Progressive Assumption of Survival of the Fittest used to manage careers via Personal Advancement and rapid promotions. • Careerism: Central Assumption: An individual’s psychological “Investment” in his/her career, coupled to a Promotion-for-Pay economic reward system, provides a sufficient incentive structure to ensure superior group performance. • Need for Massive Mobilization shaped personnel management policies:: • Numbers of officers should be kept top-heavy in the middle and senior grades to provide Pool to lead new formations in time of mobilization • Evaluation, Promotions and Selections for Premier Assignments are based on Subjective Statistical PerformanceStandards (OERs) that permit large numbers of officers to be selected, trained and replaced in war, if necessary. Consequence of managing individuals instead of units: “Centralized, merit promotion policies and increased pressures to support ‘official’ positions have spawned a generation of careerists, more concerned with personal advancement than the state of the Army or the capabilities and welfare of its soldiers.” The Struggle for A 20th Century Army, Barrie Zais (Col USA Ret)

10. An Overview of Preceding Discussion (II): A Personnel System Tuned to 2nd Generation Warfare • Legacy of General Marshall’s world view is Army focused on 2nd Generation Warfare: • Today’s Army remains organized as in World War II to fight an attritional war. • Today’s Army remains organized around individual (vice unit) replacement • Individual replacement means all ranks are continuously “trickling-in” and “trickling-out” in all types of units • Trickling accession of individuals in to Combat UnitsImpedes development of combined-arms (group) skills at all levels squad to battalion task force. • Each “trickle” increases administrative burdens and personnel instabilities in Combat Units. • Individual rotation in Combat Units reduces and the bonding necessary to sustain cohesive units under pressure of casualties & combat stress - particularly in close quarters combat, like Mogadishu. • These effects are greatly compounded in wartime when replacement policies replace casualties one by one in front line units, as was seen in WW II, Korea, and Vietnam (as opposed to replacing and rebuilding entire units). • On the other hand, individual replacement are less of an impediment to the functioning of support units.

11. An Overview of Preceding Discussion (III): A Personnel System Tuned to 2nd Generation Warfare • Current unit training doctrinemagnifies negative effects of Individual Replacement: • Training Doctrine maintains following distribution • One third of units in a division size formation are near so-called Army Training and Evaluation Performance (ARTEP) standards (Green Cycle). • Two-thirds are below ARTEP stds (Red/Amber Cycles). • Consequences & Problems: • Most battalion units are not really operationally ready; meaning their major parent unit is not ready either (train-up periods during Desert Shield). • ARTEP training standards are suitable forattritional warfare (loss-ratios). • Degraded readiness in first-to-fight, forward deployed units. • Army can not provide enough ready battalions to execute the national strategy calling for the ability to wage two Major Regional Conflicts on short warning. • Throwing more money at higher Training Tempo (as in the Reagan years) does not address the drivers of these problems. Individual Replacement vs. Unit Replacement The COHORT Experiment: “Least efficient [COHORT] units [were] 3x more efficient than best individual replacement units. Most efficient units were superb; impossible to compare with IR units.” Summary of Results of Evaluation of COHORT WRAIR, Dr. Faris Kirkland (Lt Col USA Ret)

12. Result: The Mismatch Between a 2nd Generation Army and Future Warfare … But … • Future conflict (3rd & 4th Generation) requires highly cohesive units led at all levels by competent leaders empowered to make quick decisions with little or no oversight: • Units that are unprepared for fighting in high-stress close-quarters combat in cities as well as mountainous and forested terrain … and ... • Current personnel system creates Leadership Culture that embodies - • A competitive ethic that undercuts trust and bonding (which are essential in combat). • “Promotion anxiety” that leads to risk averse behavior (“zero defects”). • Incentives to subvert moral courage. • Management systems that reward ticket punching in lieu of experience. • … or put another way ... • A Culture Lacking Mutual Confidence (among subordinates, peers and superiors). • Evidence From COHORT Experiments: • Demand overload - Experimental doctrinal changes applied to units requiring immediate high readiness in Rapid Deployment Force (too much, too soon). • Inability of most officers and NCOs to understand the need for trust, mutual respect, and empowerment. • “Can-do’ ethic” overrode common sense; everyone is afraid to say no. • Dr Faris Kirkland (WRAIR)

13. Mismatch Between Current System (II) and Future Warfare Maneuver Non-linear Doctrine -relies on agility and tempo, not mass focuses on quality and best units - allows units along the thrust line to be of high quality - Thrust lines/Preemptive Doctrine -as less quality units are prepared and arrive allows them to align along flanks Attritional Doctrine -claims -requires numbers all units and technology are high in its linear approach quality -assumes across the board frontal assault -achieves homogeneity -requires time to buildup and train-up -a surge of replacements occurs on verge of conflict, ensuring “statistical” readiness “Tangible and Intangible Mismatch” Causes: “The most significant problems in adapting unit replacement to war conditions involve the overall force structure of the Army rather than the mechanics of providing replacements.” Robert Goldich, The U.S. Army’s New Manning System

14. The Answer to the Mismatch Between Current System and Future Warfare Three Corps Groups controlling twenty-four brigade maneuver groups with battalions rotating from regimental depots to brigades; National Guard composes next echelon of forces 50 percent of all battalions are in a “ready-now” status, while the remaining 50 percent of battalions are preparing for, or drawing down from service with a brigade; readiness is measured by collective training results What is done, is the overhead is transferred from numerous head- quarters and enables the current force structure of battalions to increase in order to rotate units The current light/heavy force of nine separate Army commands, regional armies, four corps, ten divisions, thirty-three maneuver brigades, controlling over 90 maneuver and 60 artillery/rocket battalions All units, and headquarters are in a state of turbulence by a constant in and out flow of personnel. Readiness is measured by numerical -- 90 percent -- while the unit turnover rate varies from 33- 50 percent (100 percent for Korea) a year From a Mobilization Structure From an Attritional To Maneuver Warfare Convert to a Maneuver Warfare Attritional approach: “divisions that are maintained on the front indefinitely requires a constant flow of individual replacements.” Robert Goldich New Manning System

15. Surfaces & Gaps Multiple Thrusts Combined Arms Cmdrs Fwd Recon-Pull Fluidity & Harmony of Efforts Commander’s Intent Main Effort Mission Tactics Large Reserve Quick Decisions First: A New Doctrine for Future Warfare Focuses The Personnel System It is a Way of Thinking That Focuses on the Enemy. A Common Outlook for Speeding Up & Harmonizing the Differing Tempos & Rhythms of the Observation - Orientation - Decision - Action Cycles (OODA Loops) at Each Level of Organization, W/O Establishing Rigid Uniformity. The Culture Must be Redesigned to execute Maneuver Doctrine: Conflicts: short tours, statistical measures for readiness, IR units, large overhead, centralization zero-defects Operations/doctrine must drive the personnel system-- not vice versa! Critical to TRUST

16. Revolutionary Reforms, but Parallel Evolution The Timeline -Thoughts are Revolutionary -Changes Evolve Parallel to One Another- “Parallel Evolution”-(COHORT/7ID) -Occurs Over a Period of Ten Years -You Do Not Want the Reforms to Harm the People Reduce Officer Corps Army Campaign Plan First Regimental System Regiments In place Flatten Army Education Reform DOPMA First Corps Group Remaining CGs in place 1999____2000_____2002_____2004______2006______2008______2010

17. Revolutionary Reforms, but Parallel Evolution (I) Reform DOPMA • Force the Army (the services) to maintain officer percentages that are aligned with historical numbers: 3-5 percent. Promote Demonstrated LEADERSHIP. • Replace “up-or-out” with an “up-or-stay” promotion system • Specifically tailor the law to the needs of each service: • the Air Force and Navy are more technically oriented • while the Army and Marines should have its officer policies revolve around a unit system • Go back and eliminate or revise laws that call for so-many officers in assignments away from “troops” such as title XI, Goldwater-Nichols requirement for “joint-duty.” • Do away with the “all-or-nothing” twenty retirement and replace with a vest in ten, collect at 55 retirement. Why DOPMA is Not Aligned with the Future: “Any new officer management legislation should be based not on how serving officers are used to being managed or as a reaction to past practices and outdated situations, but on how future officers will need to be managed to maintain requisite quantity and quality and to confront the dynamics of the future environment.” Bernard Rostker, et al… The Defense Officer Management Act of 1980: A Retrospective Assessment

18. Revolutionary Reforms, but Parallel Evolution (II) Reform DOPMA: “Up-or-Stay” • Is characterized by entry into the professional force upon making captain after strenuous testing and selection methods, and remaining competent through evaluations, annual mental and physical examinations. • This structure allows the Army to retain officers where selected skills are perishable such as the commander of combined arms or special operations at the company/team level and higher. • This structure remains consistent with the profession of arms. • Promotion decisions are independent of separation decisions. Officers will make their own decisions whether or not to get promoted. • Less turnover will occur, especially in combat units--special operations benefits greatly. • The usual criticism of this system is that too much “deadwood” accumulates. These are based on previous experiences with systems that existed in the 19th and early 20th Century. To prevent this: • unlike the past, the Army must employ specific physical fitness tests for each career track -- eliminate officers when they do not pass • Proficiency examinations must be used/Leadership must be demonstrated • This system rewards experience in a given field. • Promotion ability is based on performance in force-on-force exercises, in front of boards, and on examinations. “Up-or-Out” is out of synch with the 21st Century: “We paid--and continue to pay--a heavy price for such frequent rotations. Even an extraordinary talented and well-prepared officer takes time to learn his or her job; often it seems that we rotate our officers just as they really hit their stride.” Mr. Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense.

19. Revolutionary Reforms, but Parallel Evolution (III) A New Organizational Structure • Defense Reform Initiative of 1997 is largely a transfer and reorganization that makes marginal changes at best. • A National Staff of “purple suitors” must be formed, with representatives from all services and civilians from government branches. Unlike the Joint Staff, the National Staff will have internal career patterns with members strenuously selected for entrance--Healthy combination of military and civilians. • Reducing the officer corps and flattening the bureaucracy must go hand-in-hand. • Administratively decentralization occurs when administrative responsibility, authority, and discretion are delegated to administrative units having jurisdiction over at least one program: • Institutions obtain more flexibility so they can respond quickly to changing circumstances and mission needs • Effectiveness in dynamic environments. Soldiers are closest to the problems, and, more importantly, the opportunities • Take a bottom-up approach vs. a top-downapproach • Generate higher morale, more commitment, and productivity The Current Organizational Structure is to Large for the 21st Century: “middle level base operations … duplicate higher and lower headquarters functions. They usually provide only advice and recommendations, adding little of value or substance.” Derek Vander Schaaf, Deputy Inspector General, DoD A Study of DoD Military Commands, 1988

20. Revolutionary Reforms, but Parallel Evolution (IV) Flatten the Officer Corps • The theory behind a large officer corps was readiness for mobilization, what in fact occurs is the opposite: • -Officers must frequently be assigned to “make work” jobs that are not relevant to warfighting and in which military skill atrophy. • -Personnel turnover and competition increases as officers fight for moves from“make work” to critical “branch qualifying” jobs. • - An officer surplus leads to centralization, as officers at more senior levels create work for themselves by pulling decisions up to their level, and work for their staffs by producing an incredible number of power point slides--and building unnecessary staffs (empires). • Flattening the Officer Corps will: • - Most importantly, a stronger bond of trust will build among the officer corps. • - Officers will gain more experience in positions requiring complex decision making, ie. combined arms. • - Junior officers will gain more responsibility. • - Officers will focus on what is important -- combat readiness and effectiveness. • - Less consensus, and more importantly, less centralization occurs. A Large Officer Corps Undercuts Readiness: “If officers are rotated too fast, little experience is gained in field formations [and] military expertise suffers…. If command is held to the Army’s recently discontinued goal of 30 months for the purpose of building cohesive units, most officers are excluded from command their raison d’ etre: experience for wartime command and staff responsibilities.” Dr. Steven Canby

21. Revolutionary Reforms, but Parallel Evolution (V) Where to Flatten the Officer Corps The Future Officer Corps This means not only in proportion to the total force but in rank structure as well: First: The Culture has to change the definition of success in the officer corps from one based on rank to one based on experience/competence at each grade within their given field. Far less senior officers -Generals return to 1:10,000 -One Four Star Chief of Staff (Not incl. CinCs) -Three stars Commanding Corps Groups -Two stars as deputies, One-Star bde commanders -50 percent of the field grade force is cut -Officers enter the professional force upon making captain Then End Result 3-5% of force are Officers “Many commands exist, so a two or three star has a place to hang his hat!” 1988 Inspector General Report Junior officers are strenuously selected prior to commissioning

22. Revolutionary Reforms, but Parallel Evolution (VI) The Force Structure • A force structure must be adapted that promotes unit cohesion at the battalion and company level. The priority of personnel fill must be toward maintaining unit building blocks, not large headquarters. • Commands such as FORSCOM, TRADOC, Regional Armies, Corps, Divisions and Most TDA commands will be eliminated, and replaced by Six Corps Groups stationed in CONUS--Responsibilities such as personnel management are decentralized. Original division designations are not eliminated, 82nd Division becomes 82nd Airborne Bde. 45th Oklahoma NG becomes 45th Separate Infantry Brigade (SIB). • Make Entities compete against each other. Force competition between organizations. The National Staff National Guard Corps Group National Guard Corps Group Corps Group The Army Staff Corps Group Corps Group Corps Group

23. Revolutionary Reforms, but Parallel Evolution (VII) The New Army Staff • A smaller officer corps will force the Army to do away with meaningless positions and employ technology to assist the remaining officers performing their duties. • The Army Staff will oversee many areas that were once handled by TRADOC, FORSCOM, AMC, and commands in evaluation and testing. • Any function to do with personnel (ROTC, Rec Cmd) is rolled into PERSCOM. They tell regiments when and how many to promote, and how many to recruit. • Operations-oversees the daily activities of the Army: • Plans-makes and wargames realistic war plans based on strategy and maneuver warfare • Logistics-sets priorities in regards to allocating resources to maintain appropriate readiness levels-echelons • Force Development-Tailor doctrine, weapons and organization into effective counters for future threats • Research & Development-Find better ways to make weapons less dependent on technology, and logistics--decrease the ratio of tooth to tail • Put teeth into the IG. Make the IG the von Steuben of the Army! • The first mission of the Army Staff is to address the diverse complexities of the officer surplus and the resulting bureaucratization of the various branches and commands. A Flatter Army will Speed-up Its Decision Cycle: “… the U.S. Military today is like the U.S. auto industry of the 1980s: too much overhead, too hierarchical, too much middle management, and too slow.” General John J. Sheehan, CinC Atlantic Command

24. Revolutionary Reforms, but Parallel Evolution (VIII) The Corps Group • Corps Groups compose the 2nd Echelon and 3rd Echelon forces (Special Ops join the Marines in 1st Echelon forces) • CG s possess the force assortment to provide tailor made force modules to meet a wide assortment of global missions: • Can range as small as task forces to support a 1st Echelon contingency mission • A deputy in command, forms a larger division-size task force to support preemptive offensive operations • On a larger scale, the CG commander deploys the entire CG as a ground component commander for a Joint Task Force (JTF) • CG headquarters will assume many responsibilities currently conducted by a wealth of headquarters • Without moving the large staffs from Washington DC, FORSCOM, or TRADOC, commanders and officers must ensure NCOs run the daily activities of units as the officers concentrate on the larger issues • The CG will have a regional area for recruiting based on the manpower to sustain an effective regimental system supporting 84,000 soldiers • Pushing down many responsibilities for warfighting, training,experimenting, andadministration to the CG and Regimental headquarters The Cost of a Cold War Force Structure: “The large-division/individual-replacement model appears to make possible more efficient deployment of manpower, but at the expense …. of combat effectiveness.” Robert Goldich, Army’s New Manning System

25. Revolutionary Reforms, but Parallel Evolution (IX) The Corps Group (Maneuver-Heavy) Total-84,000 36,000 serve in Bdes- BNs were calculated using 700 men; Bdes 36,000 in Regiments 4,000-5,000 Remaining 12,000 man Hqs/Support (IR) Abbreviations M-Mechanized Infantry AR-Armor AV-Aviation LT-Light Infantry FS-Fire Support. RDs-Regimental Depots CT-Corps Troops IR-Requires Individual Repl. BN-Battalion BDE-Brigade The CG controls seven maneuver brigade HQs, one Rocket artillery Bde, and regimental HQ depots CGs can consist of different BDE mixes. The CG displayed is mechanized heavy HQ (M) CT AR CAV Regiments are the administrative centers rotating battalion and company parts FS AV How does the Regimental System work? BDEs are the fighting head- quarters RDs LT

26. Revolutionary Reforms, but Parallel Evolution (X) The Regimental System Officers fall in from the beginning to the end Brigade Control A 3 cycle, 3 or 4-year system Phase II, 1st year Collective Trng-goes to NTC Phase II, Collective Trng continues 2d trip to CTC Phase II 2nd or 3rd year 25% of all Bns are in this year Phase II 1 year 25% of all Bns are in this year Phase III, Battalion cadre drawsdown &, turns-in equip., personnel perform recruiting, and post-support duties. Phase I Unit is in Basic Trng Individual & Small unit training Phase III Final 6mos- year 25% of all BNs are in this year Phase I 6 mos or 1 yr 25% of all Bns are in this year Cadre All Leaders and Soldiers Regimental Control

27. Revolutionary Reforms, but Parallel Evolution (XI) Aligning the Officer System • Officers and NCOs await the assembled soldiers from the various Regimental depot’s Advanced Individual Training. • While the full complement of officers begins with the battalion, as officers are placed in XO positions, and specialty platoon positions, they are not replaced; NCOs are moved up to assume platoon leader psns. • Battalion and company commanders command the entire time, the operations and executive officer occupy their positions for the entire cycle as well. • Rank becomes more flexible. Do not prevent promotions, but give the rank structure in the units the flexibility to handle it, ie., captain plt ldr, or LTC as battalion XO. • In the 3rd phase, most officers, while still with the battalion for administrative purposes, go on to perform other duties for the regiment, Bde, and OG such as recruiting, or in training • The accession and education system better prepares officers for their active service with less time spent “learning on the job” and wasting the unit’s time • Attendance at Army schools becomes whenever possible “TDY and return” • Officer management at the LTC and below is decentralized with the Regiment of the OG Stop linking pay Solely to PromotionsPay is equated with experience, and responsibility not just rank.

28. Revolutionary Reforms, but Parallel Evolution (XII) Build Officer Policies Around a Unit System Phase I-Reg.. Individual/Crew Training Assimilates new equip/technology that will use in Phase II Phase II-Joins Bde Platoon, Co/TM, TF trng-Multiple Combat Training Centers (CTCs) at two years these are the go to war first units. BDEs are composed of half 2 and half 3 year units Phase III-Rejoins Regt. Draws down-prepares to turnover equip. or turn-in old equipment/Perform Other Duties A cadre of personnel continues to drawdown as officers and NCOs go out and perform other duties for the Army, OG, or BDE Officers NCOs Solders Outgoing personnel are retained for call-up by the regiment Volunteers go on to assist the beginning of new BN Lieutenants get accessed in the regular force The Problem with Previous Unit Systems: “The bonding between led and leaders [vertical] was never achieved because of the concern to protect the career interests of officers. This eventually led to the ultimate failure of COHORT.” Dr. Faris Kirkland

29. Revolutionary Reforms, but Parallel Evolution (XIII) Change Accessions • Every officer candidate must enlist a minimum of two-years in a National Guard unit, or come from the ranks of the active enlisted force. • Commissioning sources will not change, but with less officers, the number of programs will decrease, and be delegated to the OG--standards will also increase. • Officers will continue to attend the pre-commissioning sources, but the change will occur prior to and at commissioning: • All officers will have to take the same comprehensive two-three day exam including solving tactical and technical problems, general skills, and appear in front of a board of officers • Newly commissioned officers will then attend a six-month school for officers where their specialties will be determined for the first four years with a battalion. The Officer Preparation Course will prepare them to be ready upon their arrival at a battalion: • The first three-months will be general stress relating problem solving education • The final three-months will be specialized -- ie., Combined Arms officers will attend a small unit leader’s course similar to Ranger School; Logistics & Specialists even longer schooling • Officers proceed to tracks in the Combined Arms, Logistics, or as Specialists Other Thoughts on Accessions: • Encourage mavericks to join system • Enlist first selects out those who just want to be officers • Bringing in civilians--lateral entry (fresh perspective) • Rank structure should be reexamined, certain ranks disappear

30. Revolutionary Reforms, but Parallel Evolution (XIII) Officer Professional Tracks: Highlighting Strengths Rotates back and forth National & Army Staff BN Cmds Divided Between Both Operational & Tactical BDE/OG/Instructor Rotates between staff/Command of BN, BDE, CG-Above Officers may compete at any time to enter operational track Operational C&GSC 2 Years Rotates between BN/BDE/ Regt/ Instructor; Commands companies battalions regiments top 15-20% on exam Upon Completion of Commissioning Source, officer takes 1st Exam, appears in front of Regimental Board of his choice and that has space Induction into Regulars Tactical 1 year Combined Arms Logistics Specialists Makes Captain attends school • Consists: • 2nd Exam • Board of Regimental Officers • Evaluation Reports Combined Leader’s Course One of many technical fields EnlistedTime/ Commissioning Sources Technicians Civilian related Graduate School

31. Revolutionary Reforms, but Parallel Evolution (XIV) Officer Tracks: Tactical • Becomes the expert at the tactical level of war • With more operations focused at the small unit level centered around operations other than war, and combat with non-state players, provides a pool of experienced officers dealing with these sensitive areas. • Skills requiring Commanding Combined Arms and Special Operations would benefit greatly: • Officers would command 3-4 years and then move to instructor position, then return for second command -- multiple commands not out of question • If officers opted for higher rank, they would occupy battalion, regimental and BDE operations and executive officer positions • Officer could rise as high as BDE or Regimental commander, possibly with commands in both of them • In between commands, officers could also rotate to serve with reserve battalions/brigades within the regiment/OG, or as instructors. • Increased pay would stay competitive with middle-class lifestyle and would increase with experience or rank -- bonuses given while in positions of responsibility The Competence Required: “COHORT soldiers pushed leaders to be more competent by soldiers lust for knowledge. This caused high stress; soldiers insatiable for attention, information, respect. As a result, many leaders failed physically,intellectually, or psychologically.” Summary, Report No. 5 WRAIR

32. Revolutionary Reforms, but Parallel Evolution (XV) Officer Tracks: Operational • The Operational Track would have internal career paths/independent of the Regiment: • Officers would have to score in top 15-20% of the second professional exam • Would also have to pass through demanding interviews • Examinations consist of demonstrating proficiency at tactics, doctrine, technical details. Core of exam consists of solving tactical problems within a time limit. • Would then attend a two year course equaled to a graduate education in the art of war using staff-rides, examinations, essays and wargames to determine progress. • Would serve on the staffs of Brigades, Operational Groups and Army/National Staff rotating between commanding battalions, brigades, Operational Groups, and serving as deputies of the higher organizations. • This would free them from branch parochialism, and they would acquire wider interests. • Could consist of officers from combined arms, logistics or specialists. • At any time in an officer’s career, they could compete to enter the national staff A Unified Staff Requires Members free of Parochial Interests: “The Department of Defense must clarify command relationships … to ensure that all commanders have the requisite authority to accomplish their assigned responsibilities.” General Wayne Downing USA (ret.) “Schwarzkopf had to individually negotiate with the service chiefs for his forces. What he told Powell afterwards was, ‘This [system] does not work. It is broken.’” Robert Worth, “Unwieldy and Irrelevant”

33. Revolutionary Reforms, but Parallel Evolution (XV) Officer Tracks: Technical • Involves more than just doctors and lawyers • Involves any position to support the force which requires a civilian related graduate education • Positions include: • Acquisition corps • Academic instructors • Operations research analysis • Comptrollers • Computer experts • Communications specialists • Facilities managers • Intelligence • Could remain captains with pro-rated pay as they remain in positions, or opt to get promoted as positions open up at higher levels • Does not have to command or move back to “troops”, but will have to do temporary duty as observers with units to retain purpose Many of these positions can be contracted to civilians with military oversight. Also allows lateral transfers from civilian market into certain non-combat fields The Necessity of Having Specialists: “Officers in the the technician category would ensure that the influences of entrenched civilian bureaucrats were broken up. Officers would not have to command to remain successful.” Colonel William Hauser USA (ret.)

34. Revolutionary Reforms, but Parallel Evolution (XVI) Education • Must change from Cartesian methods emphasizing memorization of processes, formulas and matrixes. • Must teach officers to think holistically. • Must focus on high tempo, non-linear environment • Must be grounded in the art of war in the classical sense, with students aggressively challenging students and instructors. • Focused on the case study, demanding critical analysis of historical examples. • Use interactive tactical decision tools: • Use a living opponent, possessing his own will with an incentive to win • Free exercises are taken to their natural conclusion, allowing for a clear winner and loser • Pprovide invaluable learning for the development cognitive and intuitive skills • Opponents must possess asymmetrical experience as well as armament and weaponry • Challenges students to approach problems realistically, rewarding decisions and judgments demonstrating their innovation, tactical logic, situational awareness, and boldness -- in total sum , a student’s strength of character -- “out-OODA looping.” Comments About the Current System: “Out of the ‘box’ thinking is not allowed. Doctrine is the rule. When we do not know what the threat will be, we adhere to the Desert Storm model or worst, the Fulda Gap model.” Major P.J. DermerC&GSC Learning Inhibitor

35. Revolutionary Reforms, but Parallel Evolution (XVII) Training • Force-on-Force free play training becomes the keystone at all levels -- get away from scripted, fixed scenarios. • Training funding priority goes to battalions and separate companies under brigade control that are in the 2nd Phase. • 2nd phase battalions should get two trips to the Combat Training Centers (CTCs). • A fixed Opposing Force (OPFOR), using Soviet based doctrine should be scrapped, and replaced by Army units going “head-to-head,” overseen by professional observer-controllers. • Short of actual combat performance, the results of force-on-force training must be included in promotion decisions: • Those officers belonging to the “winning” unit get a high percentage of promotion opportunities, the “losers” get less • Selections for commands of Battalions, Brigades, and the promotion for higher ranks must be based on performance in the field • Rank-free After Action Reviews should continue, but they should be based on results not the process Current Training Has Not Gone Far Enough: “legitimizing repetitive losses by emphasizing the process at the expense of the results is riskier.” Colonel Doug MacGregor Breaking the Phalanx

36. Revolutionary Reforms, but Parallel Evolution (XVIII) Change the All or Nothing Retirement • Retirement benefits “vest” after ten years and will be payable to the officer when he reaches retirement age of 55. Compensation will increase with each year of experience. • Officers who reach their retirement limit will receive 75 percent of the pay of the rank they retired at when they reach 55. • Longer career system with tenure by grade: • Captains in Combined Arms must retire at 20 years • Majors in Combined Arms must retire at 25 years • Lieutenant Colonels must retire at 27 years • All Colonels and Generals must retire at 35 years • All officers in other fields mandatory retirement for captains and majors is 30 years, for all others 35 years • This system values experience and maturity, which is needed when conducting no-notice preemptive force-entry operations or peace operations with officers involved in complex situations under media oversight. The Costs of An Out of Date Retirement System: “… rethinking the service’s preparations for mobilization would save much more. The bottom line is that, once retirement costs are added, taxpayers spend $8 billion a year to stockpile lieutenant colonels and colonels alone.” James Bennett, “So Many Officers, So Little to Do”

37. Final Thoughts • How does the Army ensure that someone is staying is competent? • Natural dynamic--people know each other, saying their friend can no longer stay in a certain position is hard. • Annual force-on-force competitions evaluated made by outside personnel. • Must identify people who lose and screw up, and those who win (culturally difficult for U.S.). • Once the new culture is established, must allow CGs the latitude to deviate from the original practices (including the use of money). • Must enforce shared standards of unit performance, which then forms a unit-based value set (instead of artificial quotas set by race and gender)=trust. Proposed System Builds Leaders and Units Ready for Future Combat: “Psychological readiness for combat is comprised of five dimensions: horizontal cohesion, vertical cohesion, individual morale, confidence in group combat capability, and confidence in leaders.” … As A Result … “… also reported that highly cohesive units, with strong horizontal and vertical bonding and strong unit self confidence, experienced minimal numbers of combat stress casualties as well as maximum possibilities for reconstitution of units after battle.” WAIR Lessons Learned to Date 1987

38. Resistance to Change • Uniformed leadership not willing to admit flaws • in system which promoted them. • Congress hesitant/unwilling to aggressively deal • with these issues for fear of offending contractor • community, lobbyists, and special interest groups. • Real perceived (or more likely, contrived) cultural • resistance to a truly professional officer corps • (class? caste?).

39. Conclusion Revolutionary Thoughts: Parallel Evolution The reforms align personnel, doctrine, and force structure to develop an Army capable of: • Fighting 3rd and 4th Generation Warfare with a faster decision cycle by getting away from the mobilization paradigm. • A decentralized personnel system: • That develops units less reliant on firepower/attrition in ground warfare and are more agile. • Allows officers to become experts at fast-transient littoral penetration, information war, special forces, political-military, counter-drug/anti-terrorist/anti-nuclear operations, and urban combat. • Allows people to have more choices while promoting unit excellence--gets away from rigid and damaging career patterns. What The U.S. Army Must Get Away From: “The Army’s individual replacement system, instituted during World War I to place large numbers of soldiers in the combat theater rapidly for geopolitical reasons, was based on the fundamental concept of industrial mass production. Soldiers were defined as interchangeable parts in systems that required stereotyped behaviors (“by the numbers”). Under those assumptions, unit performance was presumed to be a simple summation of individual soldier skills.” WRAIR Lessons Learned to Date 1987