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An Early Example of EITM

An Early Example of EITM. John Aldrich and Arthur Lupia. Testable Spatial Models. Davis, Hinich, Ordeshook formalize and extend Downs McKelvey develops aggregate level conditions that are testable Aldrich specifies McKelvey conditions, given first suitable data.

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An Early Example of EITM

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  1. An Early Example of EITM John Aldrich and Arthur Lupia

  2. Testable Spatial Models • Davis, Hinich, Ordeshook formalize and extend Downs • McKelvey develops aggregate level conditions that are testable • Aldrich specifies McKelvey conditions, given first suitable data.

  3. Davis, Hinich, and Ordeshook • M: Why formalize? • NH: Same as Duncan Black in Downsian setting? • P: Key decisions in formalization: • Voter Utility and Choice • Abstention • Candidate Goals • Equilibrium Concept • C: Results: Convergent equilibrium at multivariate median • Value of the Exercise?

  4. McKelvey’s Generalization • The What – Probabilistic Formulations • The Why – What was Gained Theoretically? • The Success – How General? How Empirically Useful?

  5. Aldrich Tests • What are M and NH? • P: Measurement Issues • Candidate Positions • Voter Ideal Points and f(x) • C: Results • f(x) and Symmetry • Candidate Support Functions • Better Test? • Given f(x), why bother?

  6. Shesple - Rikerand the New Institutionalism

  7. Rohde-Shepsle’s“Fundametal Equation” They (1978) proposed that: Political Outcomes = f(Goals, Institutions, Context) Early rational choice examined variation in goals, holding institutions and context fixed. The “new institutionalism” examines variation in goals and institutions, holding context (mostly) fixed. This approach assumes that the search is for institutional equilibrium, but not equilibrium institutions.

  8. The Shepsle Model as Iconic • Did it attract attention because it defined the problem better theoretically? How? • Did it attract attention because it defined the formal institution in a way that appeared to be “like” the U.S. House? • Can it be general? Is it as useful today? • How does it advance Romer-Rosenthal?

  9. Riker and Majority Rule • What is “inheritability”? • Is it a special problem of majority rule? • Is it a special problem of preferences? • Is it a special problem of politics? • How might it be avoided? • Binder’s claim about Senate

  10. Inter-Branch Politics

  11. Moe and the New Economics of Organizations • Principle-Agency – Theory or Metaphor? • Information • Adverse Selection • Moral Hazard • Multiple Agents • Multiple Principles

  12. Weingast and Moran • M: “Congressional Dominance” – Absence of Behavior does not Demonstrate Absence of Effect • NH: Agency Discretion Dominant • P: Congressional Committee Dominance Equates with Congressional Dominance; “Interrupted Time Series” • C: Change in FTC Behavior due to Change in Senate Committee Membership

  13. Electoral Institutions and Strategic Coordination

  14. Cox • M: Extend Duverger’s Law, in this case to SNTV systems, like Japan’s. • NH: Voters vote sincerely, any number of candidates compete. • P: Game theoretic understanding of strategic voting by the electorate, with rational expectations. • C: In districts electing M candidates, voters desert weak candidates, beyond M+1, and voters in excess of that needed for election desert leading candidates. The ratio of votes for the second to first candidates (SF ratio) spike at 0 (Duvergerian equilibrium) or at 1 (non-Duvergerian equilibrium, with essentially tied standings.

  15. Reed • M: Empirically infer extension of Duverger’s Law to the (n + 1), case, in which one more candidate runs than seats to be one by plurality, due to learning and elite coalition formation. • NH: An unpredictable number of candidates run. • P: Process due to learning, rather than rationality, and driven by elite coalition building rather than by voters. • C: Duverger’s Law and extension is driven by the “mechanical” rather than “psychological” factor and therefore there is a very slow convergence to (n + 1).

  16. Bawn • M: Does the fact of endogenous institutions yield inheritability? Strategic political choice better explains choice of electoral systems in post-War Germany. • NH: Participants in choice of institutions do not seek alternatives that favor their desired policies; choice of electoral rules non-political. • P: Parties value policies, have full information, and reason strategically, knowing the consequences of rules to be adopted. • C: In the essentially PR system of 1949, the CDU/CSU was hurt and the FDP helped, as predicted and as they acted. The 1953 law helped incumbents, the governing coalition, and had voters avoid wasted vote. All of these as predicted.

  17. Gerber • M: Direct Democracy Influences Republican Institutions • NH: Legislatures do not Respond to the Initiative • P: Single Dimension; Sequential Moving; Three Options – Status quo, (single) legislative proposal, (single) initiative; full information and strategic choice • C: If legislature deviates, in Romer-Rosenthal fashion, from electorate, a second agenda-setter reduces that deviation, making outcomes closer to the median voter than purely legislative choice.

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