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Information Security has Failed What Next?. Professor Richard Walton CB Royal Holloway 6 September 2014. Infosec has failed. Infosec defined in mid-1980s Generalisation of Comsec Crypto Technology of 1970's solved the major technical Comsec challenge
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Information Security has FailedWhat Next? Professor Richard Walton CB Royal Holloway 6 September 2014
Infosec has failed Infosec defined in mid-1980s Generalisation of Comsec Crypto Technology of 1970's solved the major technical Comsec challenge Infosec should have followed with technical solutions to: Availability Confidentiality Integrity
Infosec has failed Today Technical Cyber attacks abound Software quality is abysmal Criminals download commoditised malware Mobile devices exacerbate the problems Security is permanently reactive We can't PREVENT successful attacks
Information Security Today and Tomorrow Today Business Dependency Criminal Threat Some Control of assets Poor 'professional' software Tomorrow Personal Dependency Increased Threat Ubiquitous uncontrolled assets Amateur software
Response - More of the Same(only better this time) • Awareness - must keep banging on • Law • must improve • must enforce • Better Authentication • Better Risk Management
Software Quality Bespoke still required at the High end - But will be resisted Must accept that most Apps will be written by incompetent progammers Vital to harden the building blocks
Software Quality Software Libraries require a total rewrite Documentation must be improved and simplified to cater for the dummed down programming Education of the elite must be upgunned Education of the masses also needs attention Strengthen acceptance criteria for Apps
Change the Goals Prevention Detection Diagnosis Cure Damage Limitation Recovery
Detection - Transparency Better Documentation from Developers enforced by regulation/strict liability Transparency of actions - what and why More user control Revelation of hidden processes Integrity checks available to users
Call to Arms Government Developers Academia Professional Institutions
Government The Law - strengthen enforcement Spearhead Public Awareness Seed-corn funding Strengthen consumer power
Developers Improve documentation and other aids to transparency Strengthen acceptance critieria for public Apps Provide for more user control Meaningful monitoring and diagnostics to detect problems
Academia and Researchers Education of programmers Hardening Software Assurance mechanisms to support the non-expert user
Professional Institutions Advice on technical risks - lobbying Government Engineering standards Mitigating the amateur threat Provide a counter to vested interests from industry
Conclusions 1 Infosec has failed to prevent or cure the ill-effects of the security challenges of the past 30 years The environment is getting more challenging The priority needs to shift to detection, recovery and damage limitation The challenge from ubiquitous threat must be met by ubiquitous defence aimed at the non-expert consumer
Conclusions 2 Actions are needed to arm the consumer This requires Government to act to counter the vested interests In some areas Software Quality must improve; elsewhere an environment must be created to limit the damage from low-quality Apps. The playing field must be tillted to protect the general non-expert user.