Matthew J. Slaughter Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth and NBER World Trade Organization

1. Developing Countries ina Changing Trading System:Issues and ChallengesRegarding Industrial Tariffs Matthew J. Slaughter Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth and NBER World Trade Organization Public Symposium May, 2004

2. Introduction • As the Doha Development Agenda of the current WTO round of negotiations continues, many parties have proposed the elimination of all industrial tariffs among WTO Members. • In response, some developing countries have raised three major concerns about free trade in industrial products. (1) Eliminating an important source of needed revenue (2) Eroding existing trade preferences (3) Generating an inability to compete without tariff protection • These concerns are understandable, but are largely contradicted by the empirical evidence. Instead, gradual elimination of tariffs, accompanied by sound macroeconomic and fiscal policies to ensure continued a revenue stream, would eliminate a significant tax on economic development.

3. Concerns About Loss of Fiscal Revenue • Developing countries do rely on trade taxes (mainly tariffs) more heavily than developed countries, although this reliance has diminished in recent years. • In 2000-2001, 15% of total d.c. revenue vs. 18% in 1991-1992 • For many reasons the gradual elimination of tariffs will likely stimulate, rather than reduce, tariff and other revenue sources. • Stimulates imports via price reductions, such that total tariff revenue actually increases: e.g., Ghana, Malawi, Senegal, the Philippines, Mexico, and many Caribbean nations. • Increases trade-law compliance by removing incentives to avoid taxes through smuggling, bribery, underreporting import values, and misclassifying products for duty purposes. • Creates dynamic economic gains through greater trade and thus a more efficient and productive economy, which in turn can enhance a country’s overall tax revenue basis.

4. Concerns About Loss of Preferences • Trade preferences might benefit certain firms and industries in certain countries. But the benefit in terms of greater exports is far smaller than typically assumed. • Three recent, comprehensive studies have all calculated that comprehensive tariff reduction in preference-granting countries would reduce developing-country exports only very slightly—calculated declines in the value of developing-country exports are 0.2%, 0.3%, and 1.7%.

5. Concerns About Loss of Preferences • Several considerations explain the very small drop in developing-country exports from loss of preferences—and thus should mitigate concerns. • GSP programs entail high costs of information, compliance, and conditionality that must be set against any benefits. • GSP programs often do not cover many key products in which developing countries likely have the greatest comparative advantages, such as textiles and apparel. • GSP programs often deter countries from their own trade liberalization thanks to entrenched interests of the advantaged. • GSP programs often supplant more efficient trade links with other developing countries that would exist with freer trade. Thus, what is good for one developing country in terms of GSP-facilitated market access may be bad for another in terms of GSP-prevented market access.

6. Concerns About “Infant Industries” • The argument that protection facilitates industrial development enjoys virtually no empirical support. Instead, today there is a large amount of evidence that precisely the opposite is true. Liberalization of trade and FDI spur the performance of firms in developing countries through three important channels. • Access to new technology. 80% of all worldwide R&D is conducted in just five OECD countries, a similar fraction is conducted within multinationals. • Access to foreign capital. In recent years, FDI has accounted for the majority of total international funding for developing countries (and has also been a more-stable source as well). • The discipline of product-market competition. There is a strong positive correlation between the exposure of developing-country firms to global best practice and the productivity of these firms. • Build capacity with global engagement, not without it.

7. Who Has Global Integration Benefited:What U.S. Industry Is This?

8. Who Has Global Integration Benefited:What U.S. Industry Is This?

9. Who Has Global Integration Benefited:What U.S. Industry Is This?

10. Who Has Global Integration Benefited? • Greater global engagement through trade and FDI stimulates firm performance and overall growth—in developed and developing countries alike. In recent years, IT industries provide a clear example of this. • Malaysia has been liberalizing its trade for decades, including in 1997 by signing the ITA. Today, Malaysia is widely regarded as one of the few developing countries that has been highly successful in raising their shares in world manufacturing exports and value added through participation in global production networks, such as those in electronics and computers. • Costa Rica liberalized its trade and investment policies much later, in the 1990s. But since then, the country has become integrated into global production networks in multiple industries such as IT and medical devices, with economy-wide benefits that have been widely noted.

11. Conclusions • There is ample theoretical and, more importantly, empirical evidence that developing countries will gain, not lose, from the gradual elimination of industrial tariffs. • Concerns regarding fiscal revenue, existing trade preferences, and potential for industrial development are largely not borne out by the evidence.

12. Contact Information Matthew J. Slaughter Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth 100 Tuck Hall Hanover, NH 03755 Tel: (603) 646-2939 Fax: (603) 646-0995 email: matthew.j.slaughter@dartmouth.edu internet: www.dartmouth.edu/~mjs