Depicting Reality

1. Depicting Reality Barry Smith http://ontology.buffalo.edu/smith

2. David ArmstrongUniversals and Scientific Realism

4. Armstrong’s Fantology • The spreadsheet ontology

9. and so on …

10. First-order logic • F(a) • R(a,b) • F(a) v R(a,b) • Either a F’s or a stands in R to b

11. Fantology • The syntax of first-order predicate logic is a mirror of reality • ‘Fa’ (or ‘Rab’) is the key to ontological structure • (Fantology a special case of linguistic Kantianism: the structure of language is they key to the structure of [knowable] reality)

12. For the fantologist • “(F(a)”, “R(a,b)” … is the language for ontology • This language reflects the structure of reality • The fantologist sees reality as being made up of atoms plus abstract (1- and n-place) ‘properties’ or ‘attributes’

13. Fantology infects computer science, too • (Modern forms of this in the world of OWL, where we might talk of “Fology”)

14. Formal Ontology vs. Formal Logic (Husserl) • Formal ontology deals with the interconnections of things • with objects and properties, parts and wholes, relations and collectives • Formal logic deals with the interconnections of truths • with consistency and validity, or and not

15. Formal Ontology vs. Formal Logic • Formal ontology deals with formal ontological structures • Formal logic deals with formal logical structures • ‘formal’ = obtain in all material spheres of reality

16. Formal Ontology and Symbolic Logic • Great advances of Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, Peano • (in logic, and in philosophy of mathematics) • Leibnizian idea of a universal characteristic • …symbols are a good thing

17. First principle of fantology • all form is logical form

18. pace Russell, Wittgenstein, Armstrong … • where entails is a logical relation, • part-whole is an ontological relation

19. Standard FOL semantics • ‘F’ stands for a property • ‘a’ stands for an individual • properties belong to Platonic realm of forms • or • properties are sets of individuals for which ‘F(a)’ is true

20. Armstrong • Departs from fantology in some ways (for example with his Aristotelian doctrine of universals as immanent to particulars)

21. ... but • He is still a prisoner of fantological syntax • … the forms F(a) and R(a,b) are still the basic key to ontology

22. Fantology • Works very well in mathematics • Platonist theories of properties are here very attractive

23. Second Principle of Fantology • “All generality belongs to the predicateˮ • The ‘a’ in ‘Fa’ is a mere name • Contrast this with the way scientists use names: • The electron has a negative charge • DNA-Binding Requirements of the Yeast Protein Rap1p as selected In Silico from Ribosomal Protein Gene Promoter Sequences

24. Third Principle of Fantology • “Individuals are mereologically simpleˮ

25. ‘a’ leaves no room for ontological complexity • Hence: reality is made of atoms • Hence: all probability is combinatoric • All true ontology is the ontology of ultimate universal furniture – the ontology of a future, perfected physics • Fantology cannot do justice to the existence of different levels of granularity of reality • Thus fantology is conducive to reductionismin philosophy

26. Fantology • Armstrongʼs spreadsheet idea rests on a belief in some future state of ‘total (perfected) scienceʼ (see also Peirce) • when the values of ‘Fʼ and ‘aʼ will be revealed to the elect • (A science as a totality of propositions closed under logical consequence)

27. Fantology • Fa yields the form of the basic ingredients of reality • Thick particulars: a + F + G + H + … • Thin particulars: a (‘irreducible particularity’)

28. Fantology: Some optional elements • Fa • The particular corresponds to a bare name • noumenal view of particulars (distinction between thin and thick particulars) • aversion to idea of substances as spatially extended and spatially located • (Fantology useless e.g. for biomedical ontology)

29. Fantology • Fa • noumenal view of particulars • Cf. Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (doctrine of simples)

30. Fantalogy • Fa • Quine’s distinction between ontology and ideology physical objects do not instantiate universals; they are just occupied regions of spacetime predicates are just ideology (no singular terms for universals)

31. Fantology • All form is logical form • All necessity is logical necessity • Cf. Wittgenstein‘s doctrine of the independence of states of affairs

32. Fantology • Fa • To understand properties is to understand predication • (effectively in terms of functional application à la Frege)

33. Contrast Aristotle • Predication in the category of substance: • John is a man, Henry is an ox • Predication in the category of accident: • John is hungry, Henry is asleep

34. Fourth Principle of Fantology • “There is no predication in the category of substance” • (Alternatively: the two types of predication are confused)

35. Armstrong • There are only property universals • negatively charged (of electrons) • phosphorylated (of proteins) • etc. • Thus no need for kind universals • electron • protein • etc.

36. Armstrong’s own view • State of affairs = Substance + universals • Substances are the locus of particularity • Universals explain invariance/similarity • (Both particulars and universals are abstractions from states of affairs)

37. No tropes • For Armstrong, tropes are congealed states of affairs • (Propositions of the form ‘Fa’ are the key to basic reality) • ‘a’ refers always to substances (objects, things) • ‘F’ refers always to Platonically conceived universals

38. Fantology • Fa, Gb • x(Fx  Gx) • This should be the form of laws of nature (not, for instance, differential equations) • Therefore, again, a noumenal view of science • Armstrong not able to name even one example of a really existing univeral or of a really existing particular • Compare Wittgenstein

39. Fantology • leads not only to Armstrong’s atoms + properties view of the basic ingredients of reality • but also to trope bundle views • (where the a is deleted, and the F, G, H… are seen as having particularity) • Compare: Leibniz’s monadology (each monad is a bundle of concepts)

40. Fantology • (given its roots in mathematics) • has no satisfactory way of dealing with time • hence leads to banishment of time from the ontology • (as in Armstrong’s four-dimensionalism)

41. Fifth Principle of Fantology: Booleanism • if F stands for a property and G stands for a property • then • F&G stands for a property • FvG stands for a property • not-F stands for a property • FG stands for a property • and so on

42. Strong Booleanism • There is a complete lattice of properties: • self-identity • FvG • F G • F&G • non-self-identity

43. Strong Booleanism • There is a complete lattice of properties: • self-identity • FvG • not-F F G not-G • F&G • non-self-identity

44. Booleanism • responsible, among other things, for Russell’s paradox • Armstrong free from Booleanism • With his sparse theory of properties

45. Gene Ontology • Cellular Component Ontology: subcellular structures, locations, and macromolecular complexes; • examples: nucleus, telomere Substances • Molecular Function Ontology: tasks performed by individual gene products; • transcription factor,DNA helicase • Dependent Continuants • Biological Process Ontology: broad biological goals accomplished by ordered assemblies of molecular functions; • mitosis,purine metabolism Processes

46. Fantology implies a poor treatment of relations • R(a,b) • in terms of adicity • What is the adicity of your headache (A relation between your consciousness and various processes taking place in an around your brain) ?

47. Fantology implies a neglect of environments • John kisses Mary • always in some environment • (= roughly, in some spatial region: a room, a car …) • Spatial regions are, like substances, three-dimensional endurants

48. Fantology leads you to talk nonsense about family resemblances

49. Fantology • emphasizes the linguistic over the perceptual/physiognomic • (the digitalized over the analogue)

50. The limitations of fantology • lead one into the temptations of possible world metaphysics, • and other similar fantasies