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Cherie Holland Director , Head of Safety and Risk Engineering

Cherie Holland Director , Head of Safety and Risk Engineering. PARARI 2017 Management of Risks from Co-located and Transported Hazardous Chemicals - Insights and Case Study. 22 November 2017. Explosives in Hazardous Chemicals Risk Management. Hazardous Chemicals, MHFs and WHS.

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Cherie Holland Director , Head of Safety and Risk Engineering

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  1. Cherie Holland Director, Head of Safety and Risk Engineering PARARI 2017 Management of Risks from Co-located and Transported Hazardous Chemicals - Insights and Case Study 22 November 2017

  2. Explosives in Hazardous Chemicals Risk Management Hazardous Chemicals, MHFs and WHS State and territory governments starting to align focus on management of risk for facilities that deal with large quantities of hazardous chemicals(including munitions processing and EO storage) • Implementation of legislation for MHFs in the harmonisedWHS legislation Intent of the legislation and codes of practice, and related standards, is to protect workers and the public safety of the surrounding community With the increased focus on WHS legislation and duty of care, existing landowners and operators with multiple tenants that deal with hazardous chemicals in close proximity are starting to look at risk of the aggregated activities Some of this is relevant to Defence operations on bases and in ports • Multiple and co-located operations or transport involving hazardous chemicals Many of these reflect best practice approaches (e.g. performance based) which can be used by Defence

  3. WHS Legislation Risk Management Insights Formal process of hazard identification, risk assessment, risk management (through implementation of controls), and maintenance of control measures Expectation that minimum safety requirements in Australian Standards are satisfied, however, sole reliance on Standards for safe design, operation and maintenance of inventories of HAZCHEM will not ensure that WHS obligations for risk management are addressed Operations generating offsite risk require careful consideration for understanding and managing risks to health and safety of workers (e.g. port, Defence base, etc.) and members of the public To address these complexities can require formal risk assessment techniques that are beyond the capability of qualitative risk assessment. Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) provides a systematic and defensible means of evaluating the complex interaction of HAZCHEM, either co-located on a site or located in close proximity on adjacent sites

  4. Quantitative Risk Assessment Overview Purpose of QRA Identify hazards and associated Major Incidents due to operations with hazardous chemicals Assess the • significant onsite risks for a site that stores, handles or processes hazardous chemicals or dangerous goods, • the corresponding significant risk on adjacent sites, and • the corresponding significant risk on neighbouringcommunity areas This provides an objective understanding of the significant risks posed by the operations (can include onsite and offsite transport of hazardous substances, ship loading/unloading, shipping operations, and temporary storage). The QRA informs further assessments, such as Occupied Building Assessments, Fire Safety Studies and Emergency Planning

  5. QRA Overview Progressive Process to Assessing Offsite Impact Hazard Identification Process Hazard Analysis Key focal areas QRA Risk Mitigation Identify hazards Credible consequences Individual Risk (LSIR) Major Incidents Worst credible consequences Societal Risk WHS Scope for assessment Consequence Thresholds Risk Thresholds Risk Reduced SFARP

  6. Risk Thresholds Annual Individual Fatality Risk Criteria • Industry recognised risk thresholds typically represent minimum acceptable requirements • Meeting a threshold does not mean that the risk is reduced SFARP

  7. Occupied Building Assessment (OBA) Manage Hazards to Permanent and Temporary Buildings Globally used in onshore Hazardous Chemical industry: American Petroleum Institute, API RP 752 and API RP 753 Intent: • To locate personnel away from hazardous areas, minimise and manage use of buildings exposed to hazards • To design all new buildings intended for occupancy to meet safe building siting criteria • To implement a mitigation plan for all existing occupied buildings that fail to meet safe building siting criteria, to become compliant with safe operations Assess new and existing building siting for occupant vulnerability to: • Explosion • Fire, and products of combustion • Toxic material release Evaluation process can employ “spacing tables”, “consequence-based” approach, or “risk-based” approach. • Consequence and risk-based approaches employs the outputs from QRA

  8. Fire Safety Study Ensuring Fire Controls Measures are Appropriate NSW Gov. HIPAP 2 – Fire Safety Study Guideline Intent: • Ensure that the existing or proposed fire prevention, detection, protection and fighting measures are appropriate for the specific fire hazard; and • Adequate to meet the extent of potential fires for the subject development. Consideration of land use safety, available infrastructure, resources for fighting fires, external factors and regulations: • Identify and assess fire incidents (employs output from QRA) • Fire prevention strategies and measures (e.g. control of ignition sources) • First aid fire protection arrangement and equipment • Fire detection and protection systems • Fire fighting water demand and supply • Containment of contaminated fire fighting water Emergency Planning should be performed in conjunction with a fire safety study

  9. Case Study – Explosives Transport Transport from Port Alma to Mount Stuart Port Alma Import Cargoes (FY17): Bulk AN 83,500t • Avg. 4,910t per vessel Explosives: • 20ft containers 7,662t, avg. 295t per vessel • 40ft containers 166t Case Study: 20ft containers with 3t NEQ Offloaded from the vessel to the wharf Transported by road from Port Alma to Mount Stuart Inland Route Coastal Route

  10. Port Alma - Storage of Hazardous Chemicals Minimal Offsite Risks Associated with Storage at the Port Industrial - Public - Commercial - Vulnerable - Diesel Tanks Diesel Tanks Wharf Sensitive -

  11. Port Alma – Vessel Import Hazardous Events Associated with Shipments of Explosives • Should Trigger: • Risk Assessment - QRA • Occupied Building Assessment • Fire Safety Study • Emergency Planning Impact to existing occupied buildings Detonation of 295t explosives (1 vessel) Escalation – LOC of diesel tanks Escalation – LOC of diesel tanks

  12. Port Import Operations Risks from Fuel Storage, Explosives Import and Road Transport Industrial - Public - Commercial - Vulnerable - Port Buildings Sensitive -

  13. Road Transport Routes Populations Along the Main Routes Port Alma to Mount Stuart 2016 Census data indicates potentially affected populations along the two routes The coastal route may be preferred based on distance and travel time, but potentially affects more people 780km (9hrs) Mackay Rockhampton Emerald 930km (10hrs)

  14. Road Transport Through Rockhampton Risk For 10 Trucks Per Year • Risk between the Vulnerable and Sensitive land use thresholds • Vulnerable land use includes: • Child care • Community care • Education facility • Hospitals • Retirement facility

  15. Road Transport Through Rockhampton Risk For 100 Trucks Per Year • Risk between the Sensitive and Commercial land use thresholds • Sensitive land use includes residential areas • The risk exceeds target thresholds for several schools along the route Sensitive Vulnerable

  16. Road Transport Through Rockhampton Risk For 100 Trucks Per Year School Sensitive Vulnerable

  17. Road Transport Through Rockhampton Societal Risk Exposure Risk Lower Risk Threshold Upper Risk Threshold 10 Trucks per year 100 trucks per year

  18. Case Study – Explosives Transport Summary - Transport from Port Alma to Mount Stuart Risk exposure within a Port is significantly increased when the vessel transport, cargo transfer and road transport of explosives are considered Buildings within the Port (if occupied) can be exposed to a significant increase in risk when performing unloading operations of explosives, and would likely require a risk mitigation plan Fire Safety Studies and Emergency Planning assessments should be updated to account for introduced hazards, as current protection and procedures may be inadequate The risk exposure to land use and populations (from societal risk) along an entire route should be considered for route selection for road and rail transport

  19. Insights for Risk Management of EO Summary – Quantitative Assessment Techniques Should only be used when required Provide fidelity to enable understanding of high consequence, low likelihood events Explore the credible outcomes of loss of control/containment events Enable testing of assumptions, e.g. • Transporting EO through populated areas • Increasing diesel/avgas holdings or frequency of operations on a base • qualitatively this could fall in the same place on a risk matrix • quantitatively this would yield a different risk contour due to either the increase in consequence or increase in the frequency of operations Enable comparison of resultant risk against industry recognised thresholds • Industry recognised thresholds typically represent minimum acceptable requirements) Provide evidence to support your safety argument

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