Protocols Chapter 2

1. Protocols Chapter 2 Protocol: A series of steps, involving two or more parties, designed to accomplish a task. • All parties involved must know the protocol • All parties must agree to follow it • Must be unambiguous • Must be complete

2. The Playersdramatis personae Alice First participant Bob Second Carol Third Eve Eavesdropper Mallory Malicious attacker Trent Trusted arbitrator Peggy Prover Victor Verifier

3. Types of Protocols Arbitrated Protocols Intermediary trusted by all parties Lawyer is involved Adjudicated Protocols In case of a dispute a third party becomes involved Judge is involved Self-Enforcing Protocols The protocol itself guarantees fairness No third party is involved

4. Attacks against Protocols Passive attack Passive eavesdropper e.g. network sniffing Difficult to detect Active attack Alter protocol Pretend to be someone else Cheaters Not following the protocol Liars

5. Protocol Building Blocks Symmetric key cryptography One-Way Hash functions Public-key cryptography Digital signatures Random sequence generators

6. Symmetric Key Cryptography Secure communications Secure storage Computationally efficient Depends on a shared secret

7. Symmetric Key Cryptography Alice and Bob want to communicate securely. • Alice & Bob agree on a crypto algorithm • Alice & Bob agree on a key • Alice encrypts message with the key • Alice sends ciphertext to Bob • Bob decrypts with the key and reads the message

8. Symmetric Key Cryptography C Alice Bob Key: K Message: M Ciphertext: C = EK(M) Key: K Ciphertext: C Message: M = DK(C) = DK(EK(M))

9. Symmetric Key CryptographyAttacks Passive attack: Eve can only try a ciphertext only attack Eve can attempt to determine the key during the key exchange Active attack: Intercept Alice's message and substitute his own Break communication channel Cheaters: Alice can give the key to Eve, so Eve can read Bob's message

10. One-Way Hash functions One-way functions No inverse (known to exist) Hash function No known collisions Variable length inputs Fixed length outputs

11. Message Authentication Code Uses a secret key One-way hash of both the pre-image and the secret key K = symmetric key M = Message MAC = H(EncK(M)) Only those who have the key K can calculate H(EncK(M).

12. Public-Key Cryptography Public key and private key Each player has their own key pair Computationally intensive Vulnerable to chosen-plaintext attacks Very difficult to deduce the private key from the public key

13. Public-Key Cryptography Let: Pr = Alice's private key Pu = Alice's public key (Pr, Pu) is the key pair, and must go together. M = Plaintext from Bob Ciphertext C = EPu (M) is calculated by Bob with Alice's public key. Only Alice has access to her private key. Thus only she can calculate the plaintext M = DPr (EPu (M)).

14. Public-Key Cryptography BPu Alice Bob C Message: M Ciphertext: C = EBPu(M) Key pair: BPu, BPr Ciphertext: C Message: M = DBPr(C) = DBPr(EBPu(M))

15. Digital Signatures Authentic Not forgeable Not reusable Unalterable Cannot be repudiated

16. Digital Signatures with Symmetric Crypto Alice wants to sign a digital message and send it to Bob with Trent's help. • Alice/Trent key, KA. Bob/Trent key, KB. • Alice encrypts her message to Bob with KA and sends it to Trent. • Trent decrypts the message with KA. • Trent encrypts Alice's message to Bob along with a message that it is from Alice. • Trent sends the encrypted bundle to Bob. • Bob decrypts the bundle with KB. Bob can read Alice's message along with Trent's certification.

17. Digital SignaturesPublic-Key Crypto Alice wants to sign a digital message and send it to Bob without Trent's help • Alice's public key, KA-pu, private key, KA-pr.. • Alice encrypts her document with her private key, KA-pr. • Alice sends the signed document to Bob. • Bob decrypts the document with KA-pu, thereby verifying the signature.

18. Digital Signatures Public-Key Crypto & Hash Functions Alice wants to sign a large digital message and send it to Bob without the public-key's compute hit. • Alice's public key, KA-pu, private key, KA-pr.. • Alice produces a one-way hash of her document. • Alice encrypts the hash with her private key, KA-pr. • Alice sends the document and the encrypted hash to Bob. • Bob decrypts the hash with KA-pu, calculates the hash of the document himself and compares them, thereby verifying the signature.

19. Digital SignaturesVulnerabilities Alice can cheat. She can sign a document. She can claim that her private key was compromised. Time stamps help. Escrow agents are expensive. Tamper resistant modules.

20. Random Sequence Generators Pseudo-random generator Looks random: Passes all of the statistical tests. Cryptographically Secure

21. Cryptographically SecureRandom Sequence Generators It is unpredictable. Computationally infeasible to predict what the next random bit will be given complete knowledge of the algorithm and all previous bits. It cannot be reliably reproduced.

22. Basic Protocols Chapter 3 Protocols • Key Exchange • Authentication and key exchange • Secret splitting • Secret sharing

23. Key Exchange with Symmetric Crypto • Alice/Trent key, KA. Bob/Trent key, KB. • Alice calls Trent and requests a session key to communicate with Bob. • Trent generates a random session key. • Trent encrypts the session key with KA and encrypts another copy with KB. • Trent sends both copies to Alice. • Alice decrypts her copy with KA and sends Bob his copy. • Bob decrypts his copy with KB. • Alice and Bob can communicate securely with the shared session key.

24. Key Exchangewith Public-Key Crypto • Bob sends Alice his public key, Pu. • Alice generates a random session key, K. • Alice encrypts K using Bob's public key, EPu(K). • Alice sends EPu(K) to Bob. • Bob decrypts Alice's message using his private key, DPr(EPu(K)) = K. • Alice and Bob encrypt their communications using the same session key, K.

25. Authentication • Passwords and pass phrases • Dictionary attacks • Hashed passwords subject to dictionary attacks • Salted passwords • Public key encryption • Requires key pairs • Key management

26. AuthenticationPublic Key Encryption 1. Host sends Alice a random string. 2. Alice encrypts with her private key and sends it back to the host along with her name. 3. Host looks up Alice's public key and decrypts the messsage. 4. If the message matches the string the host sent Alice then the host permits access to Alice.

27. Key Exchange with Authentication • All involve a trust intermediary –Trent • All subject to man in the middle attack • Want to be sure you know who you are talking to.

28. Kerberos Guarding the Gates of Hell. No one leaves.

29. Authentication & Key ExchangeKerberos • Maintained by MIT • Up to version 5-1.10.3 - Release 1.9.4 • Strong authentication • Uses symmetric key encryption • Uses a trusted intermediary

30. Authentication & Key ExchangeKerberos A = Alice's ID B = Bob's ID KAT = Alice/Trent symmetric key KBT = Bob/Trent symmetric key Trent KAT KBT Alice Bob

31. Alice sends message to Trent A = Alice's ID B = Bob's ID Trent A, B Alice Bob

32. Trent responds to Alicewith info for Alice and Bob Trent generates: TS = Time stamp L = Lifetime for the key KAB = Session key M1 = (TS, L, KAB, A) M2 = (TS, L, KAB, B) A = Alice's ID B = Bob's ID Trent EKAT (M2) EKBT (M1) Alice Bob

33. Alice gets message from Trent Trent generates: TS = Time stamp L = Lifetime for the key KAB = Session key M1 = (TS, L, KAB, A) M2 = (TS, L, KAB, B) A = Alice's ID B = Bob's ID Trent EKAT (M2) EKBT (M1) Alice Bob Alice calc's DKAT (EKAT (M2)). She now knows TS, L, KAB , B and EKBT (M1) which she cannot decrypt. Alice also calc's EKAB(A, TS).

34. Alice sends message to Bob Trent generates: TS = Time stamp L = Lifetime for the key KAB = Session key M1 = (TS, L, KAB, A) M2 = (TS, L, KAB, B) A = Alice's ID B = Bob's ID Trent EKAT (M2) EKBT (M1) EKAB(A, TS), EKBT (M1) Alice Bob Alice calc's DKAT (EKAT (M2)). She now knows TS, L, KAB , B and EKBT (M1) which she cannot decrypt. Alice also calc's EKAB(A, TS). Bob calc's DKBT (EKBT (M1)). He now knows TS, L, KAB , A. He can also calc DKAB (EKAB(A, TS)).

35. Bob gets message from Alice and replies to Alice Trent generates: TS = Time stamp L = Lifetime for the key KAB = Session key M1 = (TS, L, KAB, A) M2 = (TS, L, KAB, B) A = Alice's ID B = Bob's ID Trent EKAT (M2) EKBT (M1) EKAB(A, TS), EKBT (M1) Alice Bob EKAB(A, TS + 1) Alice calc's DKAT (EKAT (M2)). She now knows TS, L, KAB , B and EKBT (M1) which she cannot decrypt. Alice also calc's EKAB(A, TS). Bob calc's DKBT (EKBT (M1)). He now knows TS, L, KAB , A. He can also calc DKAB (EKAB(A, TS)).

36. Secret Splitting Protocol Secret splitting • Split a message up into n-pieces • Give each to a person • The message can be read only if all n-people put their pieces together

37. Secret Splitting Protocol • Trent wants send a message to Alice and Bob that they can only read together. • Trent generates a random bit string R, the same length as the message, M. • Trent XOR's M with R to generate S. M Å R = S • Trent gives R to Alice and S toBob. • Alice and BobXORtheir pieces together to reconstruct the message: R Å S = R Å M Å R = M

38. Secret Splitting Protocol n – parties 1. Trent generates random bit strings R1, ... Rn-1the same length as the message, M. 2. Trent XOR's M with R1, ... Rn-1 to generate Rn. M + R1+ ... + Rn-1 = Rn 3. Trent gives Ri to Alicei. 4. The Alicei's XOR their pieces together to reconstruct the message: R1+ ... + Rn = M

39. Secret Sharing Protocol n – parties Goal: To share a message among 5 people so that any 3 can reconstruct the message. Threshold Scheme: (m, n) – threshold scheme. A message is divided into n pieces called shadows or shares so that any m of them can be used to reconstruct the original message.

40. Intermedate Protocols Chapter 4 • Time Stamping • Subliminal Channels • Bit Commitment

41. Time Stamping Goals: • The document itself must be time stamped. • Impossible to change any part of the document without it being apparent. • Impossible to timestamp the document with a date/time different from the present one.

42. Time Stamping Arbitrated Solution: • Alice transmits a copy of the document to Trent • Trent records the date/time he received the document and retains a copy of the document for safekeeping. Storage problems Privacy problems

43. Time Stamping Improved Arbitrated Solution: • Alice produces a one-way hash of the document. • Alice transmits the hash to Trent • Trent appends the date/time he received the hash onto the hash. H(M) | dtg • Trent signs the rersult. ETpri (H(M) | dtg) • Trent sends the result back to Alice.

44. Subliminal Channels • Secret messages sent within other messages • Often within the digital signature of an innocuous message • Useful enough for a lot of work to be done in this area

45. Computing with Encrypted Data • Alice wants to calculate f(x) on Bob's machine. • Alice does not want Bob to know x. • You want to know the value of your portfolio without the news service knowing what your portfolio is.

46. Bit Commitment • Alice picks a winner for tomorrow's race. • Alice doesn't want Bob to know. • Bob doesn't want Alice to be able to change her choice tomorrow.

47. Bit Commitment • Bob generates a random-bit string, R, and sends it to Alice. • Alice creates a message of her commitment, b and R. • Alice generates a random key, K, and encrypts Rb with it and sends the result to Bob. Result is EK(R,b) • Later Alice sends Bob the key, K. • Bob decrypts the message and checks his random string.

48. Zero-Based KnowledgeProblem Zero-Knowledge Protocol • Alice knows a secret • Alice wants to prove to Bob she knows the secret • Alice does not want to reveal the secret to Bob.

49. Zero-Knowledge Protocol Alice claims she knows the secret combination to the door in the back of the cave. She wants to prove so to Bob. • Bob stands at point A. • Alice goes to point C or D. • Bob goes to B and asks Alice come out of the cave either on the left or the right. • Alice complies using her secret combination if she has to. • Repeat n times until Bob is convinced.

50. Zero-Knowledge Protocol A B C D