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BYSTANDER TO GENOCIDE -INTERNATIONAL FAILURE IN RWANDA- Leo Pascault and Trine Futtrup. TUTSIS AND HUTUS. Peaceful cohabitation Socio-economic titles def. In relation to the Tutsi Monarch 1916: Belgian colonisation 'Hamiatic' superioty of Tutsis → Favoured over Hutus.
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BYSTANDER TO GENOCIDE -INTERNATIONAL FAILURE IN RWANDA- Leo Pascault and Trine Futtrup
TUTSIS AND HUTUS • Peaceful cohabitation • Socio-economic titles def. In relation to the Tutsi Monarch • 1916: Belgian colonisation • 'Hamiatic' superioty of Tutsis → Favoured over Hutus. “If your inclusion or exclusion from regime or rights or entitlements , as defined by law, then this become a central defining fact for you the individual and your group.”
CIVIL WAR BREAKS OUT • 1959: Hutu riots result in killing of 20.000 Tutsis • Wave of refugees (Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda) • 1962: Independence under Hutu government. • 1973: Military Coup by Hutu leader Juvenal Habyarimana • 1987: Rwandan Political Front (RPF) forms. • Oct '90: Tutsi invasion of North.
THE ARUSHA ACCORDS • The Arusha accords (August 4, 1993): - Ends civil war between RPF (Tutsi) and Rwandan Defense Forces (Hutu) - Establishes ceasefire and a Broad-Based Transitional Government • UN supervision (UNAMIR)
UNAMIR (OCT.5th 1993) • Resolution 872: United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda • Main objectives: monitor • Implementation of the ceasefire • Movement twd. transitional gov. • Method: 1,458 troops (I)~2548 troops (II)* • US condition: peace implementation progress keeping costs under control.
RESOLUTION 909(5thapril 1994) • Topic: 6 month extension of UNAMIR mandate? • US: withdrawal unless immediate action • Council: time and resource argument. • Decision: 6 weeks or withdrawal.
100 DAYS OF GENOCIDE • April 6: The presidential airplane Habyarimana is shot down (by Hutu extremists?) • Killings of Tutsis start the very same day • April 7: PM and 10 belgian soldiers killed • April 10: Westerners rescued from Rwanda • Genocide extends to whole country by end of April ”We had two French military officers who helped train the Interahamwe[3]. […] The French military taught us how to catch people and tie them. […] I saw the French show Interahamwe how to throw knives and how to assemble and disassemble guns.”
EXECUTIONERS OF THE GENOCIDE • All layers of society • State institutions • Interahamwe +Impuzamugambi: paramilitary groups with no uniforms • Execution of PM Uwilingiyimana & 10 Belgian Soldiers • RTLM: genocidal radio station. Tracked path of fleeing Hutus. • Were the Arusha accords indirectly responsible for the genocide?
WAS RWANDA A GENOCIDE? • The Convention of the Prevention and the Punishement of the Crime of Genocide (1948) • Article 2 defines a genocide as any of the “following acts committed with intent to destroy in whole or in part, a national, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intented to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”
International community • Misinterpretation of the situation >< bad faith? • UN secretary general's report • Resolution 912 (April 22, 1994) • UNAMIR forces are reduced to 270 soldiers • The shadow of Somalia • Sacrifying western soldiers'life to save Tutsis? • Presidential Decision Directive 25
NEW STANCE: UNAMIR(II) • Secretary General's criticism + offer of troops from African states → Resolution 925 unanimously passed on June 8th. • Objective: protect civilians support for humanitarian relief • Method: 5,500 troops • Issues: action required massive media reports on killings securing equipment to enable troops to deploy
OPERATION TURQUOISE • 22 June 1994: Resolution 929: allowed France to set up humanitarian mission to protect Tutsis • French motives: humanitarian mission or Francafrique? • The Humanitarian Safe Zone • Provided security to Tutsi refugees, government officials and Hutu perpetrators
Action that should have been taken • Involve Hutu extremists in the Arusha peace proces • Change of mandate and extra resources for UNAMIR. • Employ UNAMIR faster • Inaction of the UN: 9 months to intervene preventively before the killings started • Favoring of Western lives over Rwandan ones • Troops could have saved Rwandan lives as well. • Extended interpretation of article 39: threat to peace • Reference to chapter VII and genocide convention • Responsibility of the Clinton administration • Media coverage • Use of the term genocide
A FAILURE OF RESPONSIBILITY • The Responsibility to Protect • Ghost of Rwanda • A failure to...Prevent, react, rebuild? • “The task is not to find alternatives to the Security Council as a source of authority,but to make the Security Council work better than it has.” • “The SC should deal promptly with any request for authority to intervene... It should in this context seek adequate verification of facts or conditions on the ground that might support a military intervention.”
POST-GENOCIDE RWANDA • Population: 11.6m (430.64/sq. km) • Birth rate: 4.60 children/woman • 42.6% of the population is aged 0-14y. • Life expectancy: 47.3years • Head of State: Paul Kagame (RPF) • Disproportionate power representation • GDP: US$6bn • 8.8% growth/year
THE MARK OF GENOCIDE • Presence of genocide • Prisoner population: 115,000 in jails and cachots(2002). • Memorials • No history lessons since 1994 • Poverty and population pressure • Public discourse: genocide terminology • refugees, returnees, victims, survivors and perpetrators
NATIONAL RECONCILIATION • Public discourse: “We are all Banyarwandan” • Collective memory • NURC: National Unity and Reconciliation Comission (1999) • Gacaca courts (closed as of 12/06) • Conviction of 2,000,000 genocidaire
INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES • ICTR (1995): International tribunal based in Arusha. • Dec 2003: 10 detainees convicted. • 56 high-ranking officials and leaders incarcerated • Criticism • Ineffectivity of the International Court • Investigations of the RPF? • The unpopularity of the UN and the West in post-genocide Rwanda.
OPERATION TURQUOISE • Supreme Humanitarian Emergency: O • Necessity/ Last resort: O/ Δ • Proportionality: X • Positive Humanitarian Outcome: O/ Δ • Humanitarian motive: X • Humanitarian justifications: Δ • Legality: O • Selectivity: X
RESPONSE OFTHE IC? • Supreme Humanitarian Emergency: O • Necessity/ Last resort: O/X • Proportionality: X • Positive Humanitarian Outcome: X • Humanitarian motive: Δ/X • Humanitarian justifications: Δ/X • Legality: O • Selectivity: X
Wheeler, N. “Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society” (2003) Frontline. “Ghosts of Rwanda” (2005) Mamdani, M. “When Victims become Killers” (2002) Maritz, D. “Rwandan Genocide: Failure of the International Community?”(2012) http://www.e-ir.info/2012/04/07/rwandan-genocide-failure-of-the-international-community/ WORKS CITED