Water in Israel

1. Water in Israel The Dry Facts Dr. Martin Sherman

2. First of all, my son, see to it that you are always camped upstream … and your adversaries downstream North American Indian Adage

3. What distinguishes political interactions from all other kinds of social interactions is that they are • predominantly oriented towards the authoritative allocation of values of society. • David Easton,A Framework for Political Analysis, p. 50

4. That branch of politics dealing with the authoritative allocation of societal values that pertain to hydrological resources. Hydro-politics:

5. The conflict over the Jordan’s water … has determined the behaviour of the co-riparians for almost forty years. The worsening situation of water supply among all the co-riparians … is only going to increase the magnitude of the[ir] conflicting interests… The scarcity of water in the Jordan-Yamuk system has made water supply a strategic issue related to the national security of the partners to this basin ‘…under severe shortage the Jordan basin becomes a highly symbolic, contagious, aggravated, intense, salient, complicated, zero-sum power and prestige-packed crisis issue, highly prone to conflict and extremely difficult to resolve’ Nurit Kliot, Water Resources and Conflict in the Middle East, London:Routledge, 1994, p. 173.

6. Hydrological Parameters State of the Ground and Surface Water Sources – Decreasing Quantities and Deteriorating Quality Possible Alternative and Unavoidable Imperatives The Middle East as Israel’s Political Environment Political Parameters Defining the scale of the Problem- Natural Sources of Supply vs Demand Trends Hydropolitical Implications The Implications of the Peace Process: Dramatic Changes in Control over Hydrological Resources

7. “Non-Domestic” Component Domestic Component Israel’s Hydrostrategic Predicament

8. Price Quantity Price Elastic Supply Inelastic Supply Inelastic Demand Elastic Demand Quantity Normal Supply and Demand Situation: Price Can Be an Effective Demand Regulating Device Inelastic Supply and Demand Situation: Price Cannot Be an Effective Demand Regulating Device Price Declining Natural Supply Due to Salting and Pollution of Wells Expanding Inelastic (Urban and Industrial) Demand due to Increased Population and Living Standards Growing Gap between Increasing Inelastic Demand and Declining Inelastic Supply: Entire Quantity of Additional Artificially Produced/Imported Water Available in Foreseeable Future Water Will be Required to Fill This Gap Quantity Artificially Produced Water Required to Augment and not to Replace Existing Natural Supplies

10. Source Permissible Annual Extraction (According to Natural Recharge) Coastal Aquifer 300-350  W. Mountain Aquifer (Yarkon Taninim) 300-350  450 - 80 National Water Carrier Permissible Annual Extraction from the National Water System (According to Natural Recharge)

11. Year Amount (mcm) 1995 360 1996 336 1997 455 1998 105 1999 177 Mcm 2000 69 2001 257 2002 944 2003 647 2004 332 Total 3682 368.2 Average Kinneret: Annual Amounts of Available Water

12. Mr. Rafael Eitan Minister of Agriculture I received Martin Sherman’s letter of 4.4.91 addressed to you Here are my remarks as you requested: It is not a bad idea to have a prophet of doom. However there are several errors in the way things are presented, in the style and the immediate short term conclusions. I do not dispute the conclusions as to the future It is not possible to ensure a permanent supply of water from the major sources above the rather low level of 800 Mcm per annum

13. Year Municipal Consumption Industrial Consumption Combined Municipal & Industrial Consumption 1990 482 106 588 1999 682 127 809 Increase 200 (42%) 21 (20%) 221 (38%) 2001 658 120 778 2005 713 120 833 Source: Statistical Year Book, Central Bureau of Statistics, 2001, *********** Municipal and Industrial Consumption 1990-2005 (Mcm)

14. Price Quantity Price Elastic Supply Inelastic Supply Inelastic Demand Elastic Demand Quantity Normal Supply and Demand Situation: Price Can Be an Effective Demand Regulating Device Inelastic Supply and Demand Situation: Price Cannot Be an Effective Demand Regulating Device Price Declining Natural Supply Due to Salting and Pollution of Wells Expanding Inelastic (Urban and Industrial) Demand due to Increased Population and Living Standards Growing Gap between Increasing Inelastic Demand and Declining Inelastic Supply: Entire Quantity of Additional Artificially Produced/Imported Water Available in Foreseeable Future Water Will be Required to Fill This Gap Quantity Artificially Produced Water Required to Augment and not to Replace Existing Natural Supplies

15. ...even at very high water prices, household consumption of water would hardly decline... Any attempt to lower the domestic water consumption below this level would be rather unsuccessful and its costs in terms of welfare might be quite high. G. Fishelson, Israeli Household Sector Demand for Water,Tel Aviv: The Armand Hammer Fund for Economic Cooperation in the Middle East, Tel Aviv University. 1993, p. 23. Inelastic consumption of fresh water will amount to approx. 1200-1650 million c.m. per year (in 2020). S. Arlosoroff, ‘Managing Scarce Water: Recent Israeli Experience’, Israel Affairs, Vol. 2(1), 1995, p. 240

16. Price Price P2 P2 P1 P1 Quantity Quantity Q2 Q1 Q2 Q1 Price Price P1 P1 Quantity Quantity Q2 Q1 Q2 Q1 Effect of a Change of a Variable (Price) on Demand Inelastic Demand Elastic Demand Reduction of Demand due to Change in Price (Variable) No Reduction of Demand due to Change in Price (Variable) Effect of a Change of a Parameter (Income/Tastes) on Demand I1 I1 I= Income I2 <I1 I2 <I1 Inelastic Demand Inelastic Demand Elastic Demand Reduction of Demand due to Change in Income/Tastes (Parameter) Reduction of Demand due to Change in Income/Tastes (Parameter)

18. High Upper Middle Lower Middle Low Urban Water Consumption as a Function of Income

19. ...even at very high water prices, household consumption of water would hardly decline... Any attempt to lower the domestic water consumption below this level would be rather unsuccessful and its costs in terms of welfare might be quite high. G. Fishelson, Israeli Household Sector Demand for Water,Tel Aviv: The Armand Hammer Fund for Economic Cooperation in the Middle East, Tel Aviv University. 1993, p. 23. Inelastic consumption of fresh water will amount to approx. 1200-1650 million c.m. per year (in 2020). S. Arlosoroff, ‘Managing Scarce Water: Recent Israeli Experience’, Israel Affairs, Vol. 2(1), 1995, p. 240

20. Overall Water Consumption Incl. Supply to Jordan and the Palestinian Authority Mcum Palest. Author Jordan Domestic Industry Agricul. (marginal) Agricul. (sweet)

21. Area Extraction Insertion Outflows Total Usage Recharge ** Overall Saline * Overall Saline Coast 505 18 110 505 304 Yarkon-Taninim 573 3 0 34 33 607 350 W. Galilee 97 0 24 7 121 194 Carmel 40 10 3 3 43 44 Kinneret Basin 69 346 21 415 550 Eastern Highland 176 18 187 124 363 330 Negev & Arava 90 58 90 55 Total 1550 115 110 594 188 2144 1827 Source :Hydrologival Service , 2000 (*) Above 400 mg Chlorides (**) Recharge of Coastal Aquifer based on long term average rain fall + runoff from irrigation and leakages estimated at 59 Mcm

22. Total Recharge and Net Inflows Total Extraction and Outflows Deficit 1865 Mcm 2132Mcm 267 Mcm

23. About 10 per cent of the coastal aquifer already exceeds the national limit for chloride salts and by 2010, if pumping continues, 20 per cent of the water will exceed the limit. N. Kliot,Water Resources and Conflict in the Middle East, p. 237 Overpumping of water from the coast aquifer has caused a steep reduction in its water level and, as a result, sea water has penetrated into it causing it to become salinated over a 4 km wide belt leading to the closing of many wells. Pollutants are accumulating within the aquifer and wells are being shut down because they contain too much salt, nitrates from fertilizers and heavy metals from sludge.

25. Coastal Aquifer Pollution-Chlorides: Anything not blue or yellow does not conform to standard Coastal Aquifer Pollution -Nitrates Anything not blue does not conform to standard

26. Coastal Aquifer Pollution Chlorides + Nitrates All red areas do not conform to standard

29. Water Line Rishon Le’Zion Jordan Valley Ben Gurion Airport 1976 Green Line

30. The Mountain Aquifer Recharge, Storage, and Pumping Areas Pumping Area Recharge Area Jordan Valley Storage Area Mediterranean Subterranean Flow Aquiclude Aquifer

31. It is the rain falling on the West Bank that recharges the aquifer; any new wells drilled between the recharge area and the Israeli taps could cut off supply and, by lowering the water tables in the part of the aquifer that extends to the west of the Green Line, allow saline water from greater depths to seep in, permanently ruining what is left” US News & World Report, 16.12.91. Wells within Israel proper were tapping this water long before the Six-Day War. But as the population and water demand on both sides of the Green Line have grown, the control of the western slopes has attained a new and vital importance for Israel.

32. Location of wells and springs in districts of the West Bank http://www.arij.org/pub/water/fig6.jpg

35. Recharge Areas of the Mountain Aquifer

36. The Mountain Aquifer –Water Movement and Sources of Salination Judea & Samaria Highlands Pumping Sites Coastal Plain Direction of Salt Propagation

37. Rain Falling on the outcropping aquifer across the Green Line Recharge Area Green Line Direction of Flow of Pollutants Mountain Aquifer Surface Discharge of Aquifer Direction of Subterranean Flow of Ground Water in the Aquifer Mediterranean Sea Jordan R. Direction of Progression of Salting

38. 14 May, 1989 To: Itzhak Shamir, The P.M. Office Jerusalem Water Security for Israel Now and In the Future Enclosed is a memorandum concerning the water supply connected to Judea, Samaria and Gaza. I hereby request to raise this crucially important subject at a meeting of the government or of the cabinet for discussion and decisions Attached is proposed resolution A. Katz-Oz, Minister of Agriculture Cc: Mr. Shimon Peres, Deputy P.M. & Finance Minister Mr. Itzhak Rabin, Minister of Defense Mr. Moshe Arens, Foreign Minister

39. To Prevent the Increase of Pumping from Present and Future Sources in Judea, Samaria and Gaza To Prepare the Legal and Political Basis to Ensure Israeli Control and Management of the Water Sources in Judea and Samaria in Any Conceivable Political Situation in the Future

40. הסכנה העיקרית [למימי אקוויפר ההר המערבי] נובעת מהיכולת הדלה של הפלשתינאים לאכוף את ההסכם [לניהול משותף של המאגר], וכתוצאה ממנה לריבוי קידוחים פראיים ושאיבת יתר שתדלל את כמות ואיכות המים באקוויפר. הארץ – 7.11.1999 Recommendation to Barak to Retain Israeli Control of Water in West Bank The main danger arises from the poor ability of the Palestinians to enforce the agreement [for joint management of the aquifer], and the resulting uncontrolled drilling and over-exploitation that would degrade the quality and quantity of the ground water in the aquifer,

41. Without border changes, a very grave danger to Israel’s principal sources of drinking water will arise. 105.Tahal Report p Israeli control over most of the water resources must be retained to prevent an increase in the extraction of ground water in Judea & Samaria at the expense of Israeli use of Yarkon Taninim Aquifer.

42. The Israeli interest is to prevent the unregulated increase of the extraction of the ground water in the future, at the expense of the Israel’s water supply, and to prevent the pollution of the aquifer as a result of uncontrolled activities such as untreated flows of sewage and other forms of waste. The Israeli demands will be based on the principle of prior and present use, on the definition of the source according to the location of the springs and not the outcrops of the aquifer, and on the derivation of higher economic benefits (lower production costs) The Palestinian authority will present demands for enhanced water rights on the basis of geographic and hydrological principles (contribution of water to the source) and socio-economic needs (industrial and agricultural development). The Arabs claim that the ground water in Judea and Samaria is Arab water according the Helsinki Convention and they are therefore entitled to make use of the entire in the aquifer Tahal Report pp. 103-106

43. [This] blatant one-sidedness, which might be rationalized as a reflection of the abnormality of the interim phase, [is] an arrangement which would visibly violate Palestinian sovereignty in the future. S. Elmusa, Negotiating Water: Israel and the Palestinians,, (Washington: Institute for Palestinian Studies, 1996), p. 43 [Article 40 of the Oslo II Agreements] empowers Israeli personnel on the Joint Water Committee to inspect (jointly with Palestinians) hundreds of Palestinian wells scattered across the West Bank

44. All the Jewish settlements in the Jordan Valley are supplied by deep wells which were specifically drilled for this purpose. By contrast, most of the Arab agriculture is supplied by shallow wells especially in the areas of Jericho, Ouja, Jiflik and Marj Naja. As a general rule, there has been no effect from the deep wells on the shallow ones, except in the case of the Barda’le where the flow of the springs decreased, and the Arab farmers were compensated by supplies from new wells. דו"ח תה"ל, ע' 102 Tahal Report , p.102

46. Head of Military Intelligence: The Arabs Demand 60 Percent of Israel’s Water